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 Abstract 
The present study deals with the Sino-Romanian political, diplomatic, economic, 
technological and cultural ties from the very beginning in 1880, to this day. It precisely 
attempts to illustrate how, following Romania's bitter transition to democracy in 1989 and 
during its process of Westernisation and presence in a global context for 
internationalisation, the Sino-Romanian bilateral relationship has undoubtedly deteriorated, 
in comparison to the period prior to the revolution when the two countries’ constantly 
expanding bilateral political and economic partnership, as well as their public support, 
enabled Bucharest to attenuate the Soviet economic pressure, to improve its autonomous 
policy towards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and to undergo processes that 
resulted in the Romanian Communist Party sharing brotherly relations with the Communist 
Party of China in the 1970s. The study investigated the Romanian anti-communist 
revolution of December 1989 as the watershed for the Sino-Romanian relationship as, in the 
wake of those events, China embarked on the road of becoming a global superpower while 
the government in Bucharest, struggling economically, politically and socially to cope with 
the reverberations of the regime change, utterly disregarded the Asian capital’s economic 
and military potential as well as diplomatic influence in the international arena, and 
eventually turned its eyes to the West. The work emphasised that, when compared to other 
CEECs trade with China, Romania only ranked 5th, preceded by Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Slovakia, suggesting that previous academic research - that placed 
emphasis on the traditional friendly relations which the two countries have shared since the 
1960s and that has yielded, beginning with the 2000s, to a steady development of the Sino-
Romanian pragmatic cooperation - and statements of (former) diplomats or experts working 
in the field - that tend to overemphasise the outcomes of the bilateral ties between Romania 
and China in the 2000s - are either too optimistic, or unfounded. The research found that the 
lessening of the Sino-Romanian collaboration after 1989 resides in Bucharest leadership’s 
inefficiency in developing a strategic partnership with Beijing subsequent to Romania’s 
accession to NATO (2004) and the EU (2007) and in their hesitation in capitalising on the 
rising Chinese economic presence in CEE since the beginning of the new millennium. 
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 I. Introduction 
The present study aims to display, with the greatest possible degree of accuracy and 
impartiality, a chronological investigation of the Sino-Romanian diplomatic, political, 
economic, technological and cultural ties before and after December 1989. It precisely 
attempts to illustrate how, following Romania's bitter transition to democracy in 1989 and 
during its process of Westernisation and presence in a global context for 
internationalisation, the Sino-Romanian bilateral relationship has undoubtedly deteriorated, 
in comparison to the period prior to the revolution when - after the initialisation during the 
1950s owing to the common membership to the Soviet bloc at the onset of the Cold War - 
the two countries’ constantly expanding bilateral political and economic partnership as well 
as their public support, enabled Bucharest to attenuate the Soviet economic pressure, to 
improve its autonomous policy towards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 
and to undergo processes that resulted in the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) and later 
Romanian Communist Party (PCR) sharing brotherly relations with the Communist Party of 
China (CPC) in the 1970s. In order to identify the causes and rationality which influenced 
the two countries’ ineffectual cooperation in the aftermath of the Romanian anti-communist 
revolution, this study focuses, on the one hand, on the historical events dictated by the Cold 
War, that determined the Sino-Romanian relationship to become unique in the 1970s, as 
well as on Bucharest leadership’s inefficiency in developing a strategic partnership with 
Beijing subsequent to Romania’s accession to NATO (2004) and the EU (2007), on the 
other. 
The research embraces an analytical approach drawing from a historical perspective, an 
outlook of trade and investment flows with the PRC, Romanian authorities’ attitude towards 
Chinese economic initiatives within the larger framework of Romanian nationals’ 
understanding of China, as well as a comparative analysis of two major periods, 1949-1989 
and 1989-2016, by scrutinising 1989 as the watershed, the breaking point with the past and 
the swift overtaking of the traditional period of brotherly relations, carried out by Bucharest 
and Beijing for almost two decades, between the 1960’s and the 1980’s. 
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 From the historical perspective, the study begins with the very first events in the history of 
the Romanian-Chinese relations by taking into account the works, relevant to the 17th 
century, of emissary at the court of the Russian Tsar, Nicolae Milescu Spătarul, as well as 
several writings of Moldavian chronicles that introduced knowledge about Chinese culture 
in the territories that would later be known as Romania. Subsequently, the study focuses on 
the relations between Romania and China behind the Iron Curtain. It precisely emphasises 
that Bucharest and Beijing’s friendly and intense cooperation in the political, diplomatic, 
economic, technological and cultural fields, as well as the two countries’ mutual support in 
the international arena, reached its climax during the Cold War by virtue of the PRC’s 
dispute with the Soviet Union during the 1960s, which coincided with Bucharest’s efforts to 
break free from Moscow’s influence. The Romanian Workers Party’s (RWP) defiance of 
and detachment from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) during Gheorghe 
Gheorghiu-Dej, was subsequently intensified by Nicolae Ceaușescu, who continued to steer 
a neutral position in the Sino-Soviet dispute and, by means of numerous exchanges of visits 
with the Chinese leadership - Ceaușescu visited the PRC in 1964, 1971, 1978, 1982 and the 
Chinese political elite returned those visits in 1966, 1978 and 1983 - that intensified 
economic, cultural, political and military interactions, succeeded in making Romania’s 
relations with Beijing distinguish themselves from those of other Warsaw pact socialist 
countries’ relations with the Asian capital. Bucharest authorities’ attempts to act as mediator 
between PRC and the USSR in the 1960s, and between the USA and the PRC in the 
beginning of the 1970s, were in some way reciprocated.  
Hence, if in 1968 Beijing publicly supported Romania against a possible USSR-WTO 
invasion, Ceaușescu’s trip to China and North Korea three years later opened his eyes to the 
use of political and ideological mobilisation, as well as to an extensive use of  personality 
cult. In the same year, 1971, relations with China gained new momentum as Beijing granted 
Romania a loan of $ US 250 million to be repaid starting from 1980. At the same time, 
Romania acted as an attorney of admitting China to the United Nations, supported Chinese 
assessment of the Indochina situation and expressed views, close to Chinese opinions, on 
the Palestinian national movement. During the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
Romania actively contributed to the industrial modernisation of China and many Chinese 
 
 students were educated in Romania in various fields, including oil and gas engineering, 
while some of the best Chinese universities were initiated with the help of Romanian 
teachers. Romania exported to China equipment and machinery, turn-key plants and 
transferred know-how for modern industry and agriculture development. By the end of the 
1970s, Sino-Romanian bilateral trade reached an unprecedented amount of approximatively 
US $ 2 billions.  
With the Romanian revolution of 1989 however, the two countries assumed different paths. 
If in China, the post-1989 model of economic reform was exercised more efficaciously, 
allowing Beijing to become a global player in the international arena within a decade, 
Romania registered a period of economic stagnation and social confusion, while 
Bucharest’s foreign policy strategies were bounded to the Euro-Atlantic partnership. 
Nevertheless, in view of Romania’s political and economic transformations as well as the 
country’s strong economic and close diplomatic ties with China prior to 1989, the 
conditions were almost perfect to support the preservation and evolution of these ties. 
Reforms and adjustments for NATO and EU accession gradually boosted the Romanian 
economy, however, the latter’s relations with traditional partners such as China, were 
clearly lessened.  
The trade and investment flows approach looks into Romania and other Central and East 
European Countries’ cooperation with China beginning with the 2000s. With Sino-European 
bilateral exchanges being almost quadrupled - from 101 billion in 2000, to 395 billion in 
2010  - during the first decade of the 21st century, the authorities in Beijing began to look 1
for new partners, and the exploitation of the Balkan Peninsula’s untapped business potential 
seemed the right initiative for the Chinese long-term investment plans. However until 
recently, unlike other CEE countries, Bucharest’s policies towards Beijing have been 
characterised by constant wriggles, while Romanian decision makers’ unpredictability and 
hesitation in foreign policy matters have led to an unsuccessful and inefficient Sino-
Romanian relationship.  
Moreover, despite a discernible political drive to expand bilateral cooperation with China 
 Loïc Poulain, “China’s New Balkan Strategy”, Center for Strategic and International Studies, vol.1, no.2, 1
August 2011 
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 during the Social-Democratic government led by Romanian former Prime Minister Victor 
Ponta, Sino-Romanian ties are stagnant and Romania falls behind counties like Hungary, 
Poland, the Czech Republic and even Bulgaria in their cooperation with the PRC. Not only 
Bucharest lost the 1st place in the hierarchy of Beijing’s best diplomatic partners  in 2
Southeastern Europe but, in 2008, Romania reached a trade deficit of US $ 3.2 billions , in 3
comparison with the surplus of almost US $ 700 million accumulated between 1992-1995 
and a bilateral trade of almost US $ 2 billion at the end of the 1970s.  
Moreover, the work also encompasses an examination of the image of China in Romania, 
and exposes how an offhand perception of, and attitude towards the PRC, affects the 
relationship between the two countries. This study therefore, aims both at identifying the 
main hallmarks of Sino-Romanian ties since their very beginning, as well as at detecting the 
grounds for Romania’s incapacity to fully benefit from the potential of Chinese investments 
in the 21st century and accordingly, boost Sino-Romanian ties. 
I.1 Methodology 
The methodology appointed for this study is constituted by historical research, aiming to 
compare and examine the emergence of Sino-Romanian bilateral ties, their development, 
transformation and adaptation - determined by historical events - in two different periods of 
time. In order to provide an illustration and examination of past events and people, to 
identify and interpret the data already existing, the analytical approach  “a form of research 
in which events, ideas, concepts, or artefacts are examined through analysis of documents, 
records, recordings or other media”  is considered the most appropriate for this work. Its 4
implementation “lies in a range of research methods such as historical research which 
could use both quantitative and qualitative data, legal analysis (…), concept analysis which 
 Budura, R. I., “The Romanian independent politics and the Romanian-Chinese relations 1954-1975”, 2
Documents, 2008, Bucharest, Romanian National Archives
 Corneliu Russu, Marius Bulearcă, “Chinese economic reform and the Romanian - Chinese economic 3
relations”, Buletinul Universității Petrol-Gaze din Ploiești, Vol. LXI, No. 4/2009,Seria Ṣtiințe Economice, p.49
 “Analytical Method”, September 2014, available at http://sscemathematics.blogspot.it/2014/09/research-4
designs-analytic-studies.html , accessed on 04.07.2016
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 is carried out to understand the meaning and usage of educational concepts (…) and 
content analysis which is carried out to understand the meaning and identify properties of 
large amounts of textual information in a systematic manner” . 5
The investigation entails a combination of quantitative and qualitative analysis in view of 
the fact that, by merging the strengths of each method, the data collected produces deeper 
understandings of economic and social change or policy impacts. Nevertheless, because of 
the meagre economic data generated, the sources for this analysis are primarily constituted 
by archival references (historical accounts, records, written messages, agreements, 
understandings and memorandums), current official government documents, reports of 
governmental and non-governmental institutions, international organisations and cultural 
associations, recent articles on the web, public statements, speeches and transcribed 
interviews of former and current Romanian and Chinese officials and diplomats, as well as 
by Romanian and Chinese journalists, professors, experts in diplomacy, economy and 
international politics.  
The secondary sources required for this study are constituted, besides Romanian and 
international literature on Sino-Soviet/Romanian-Soviet and Sino-Romanian relations as 
well as articles, various assessments and press releases dealing with the current situation of 
bilateral relations between Bucharest and Beijing, by structured and semi-structured face-to-
face interviews to both political and non-political actors that support the primary sources. In 
fact, interviewing is a primary way of collecting data in qualitative research that directs the 
participant in responding to a specific research question. By employing official sources, 
produced by experts who activated within the context of the Romanian-Chinese bilateral 
relation, the prospects to accomplish a clear-cut outcome increase drastically. Moreover, in 
order to uncover exclusive results that provide a trailblazing conclusion, the major events 
were individually analysed and compared, the sources were carefully examined and 
presented with the aim to portray, when required, both differences and similarities.  
 Ibidem5
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 I.2 Limitations of the topic 
Based on new evidence, on the analysis of an in-depth research coordinated by former 
Romanian ambassador to China, Romulus Ioan Budura (2005, 2008, 2009, 2015), Ion 
Buzatu (2005, 2009), Liu Yong (2006), Liu Zuokui (2012, 2013), Iolanda Ţighiliu (2005, 
2006), Dan Tomozei (2014) as well as Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai (2012, 2015, 2016), this 
study depicts the Sino-Romanian ties in major areas (political, diplomatic, economic, 
cultural and people to people exchanges) since their very beginning, in the penultimate 
decade of the 19th century, until present day. With regard to the post-revolution bilateral 
ties, the investigation takes into account the symbolic year 1989 and analyses the relations 
between China and Romania in terms of durability and extent also by juxtaposing data 
relating to China’s cooperation with other CEECs.  
Assessed from a historical perspective, this undertaking represents a demanding task for 
different reasons, such as the extended historical period, the lack of solid research on Sino-
Romanian relations after 1989, as well as the inability of using Chinese-language sources. 
Moreover, some major difficulties in my research are given by the historiographical aspects, 
meaning the total amount of writings, studies and historical conceptions of certain moments 
and facts in history. If numerous studies on China have emerged in Western Europe, their 
number in Romania is still particularly low, thus resulting in the necessity to employ 
English language sources for this part of the investigation. Another obstacle in the research 
on this topic is Bucharest’s preservation of a secretive stance towards the archives of the 
former regime, especially the 1980s Securitate archives, which are still difficult to consult. 
Moreover, with the bilateral relation between two countries being a quite complex issue, 
that encompasses aspects of national security, abundant official data is not available for 
research. However, memoirs, documents and interviews released in the Romanian media, 
clear up the history of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR), and make it possible to 
engage in an academic approach based on both open sources (something people can modify 
and share because its design is publicly accessible) and archival material. 
Therefore, with limited official data (seldom from specialists in the fields of politics, 
diplomacy or economy) and sparse interviews (many potential interviewees avoided to 
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 answer certain questions, motivating either that they were not qualified to answer, or simply 
refused to have their opinion on several issues made public), it is compulsory to bear in 
mind both the subjectivity of the information provided by former diplomats and officials, 
and the dissimilarities between sources provided by the embassies, consulates, and other 
(non)governmental institutions and organisations.   
Last, but not least, in order to achieve an accurate outcome it is essential for the author to 
remain impartial throughout the whole data analysis process and realisation of interviews.  
I.3 A historical perspective of Sino-Romanian bilateral relations 
In accordance with historical evidence, Nicolae Milescu Spătarul (1636-1708), a writer, 
diplomat and traveler, was the first Romanian who visited China. As envoy of the Russian 
Empire to Beijing, then capital of the Qing Dynasty, he remained in China for three years, 
between 1675-1678. In this lapse of time the diplomat wrote several accounts, of which a 
travel diary, later published as his book “Travels through Siberia to the Chinese borders” 
and three volumes of “Travel notes and Description of China”. Hence, alongside his 
commission to represent the Russian Tsar’s interests at the court of the Qing Dynasty, 
Milescu Spătarul is worthy of having introduced China to Europe. In fact, numerous 
translations of his works reached the territories that would later be called Romania. 
Nevertheless, the first Romanian-Chinese official contacts occurred much later, in 1880, 
between Mihail Kogălniceanu, the first Romanian ambassador to Paris and China’s 
representative in the French capital. The exchange of messages between King Carol I of 
Romania and Emperor Guangxu of China, a milestone in the history of Sino-Romanian ties, 
represented the mutual recognition between the two countries, regardless of obstacles such 
as the distance, size and influence in the world, that separated them.  
Forty years after the mutual acknowledgment of the two countries, in 1920, the head of the 
mission to Siberia, Victor Cădere wrote to the Romanian council of ministers in order to 
recommend the establishment of diplomatic legations in Tokyo and Beijing, with one 
military and naval attaché for both legions, as well as the institution of Romanian consulates 
in Shanghai and Harbin. Cădere motivated these directions with the economic prospects, the 
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 need to protect the Romanian inhabitants of those areas and the fact that other small states 
had already opened consular representations in China. Nevertheless, Tokyo and Moscow 
would oppose Romania’s drive to establish diplomatic relations with the Chinese 
government. 
Subsequently, during the second Sino-Japanese war of 1937-1945 , Nicolae Titulescu, 6
Romanian diplomat and president of the General Assembly of the League of Nations, 
succeeded with skill and tact in supporting China by adopting a position that yield no 
indignation or spitefulness from the Japanese side. Still, throughout these years the 
Romanian authorities’ stance towards China were influenced by the great European powers 
and the United States’ attitude towards it. Therefore, in May 1939, Romanian foreign 
minister Grigore Gafencu reaffirmed the endorsement for establishing diplomatic relations 
with China, however without concluding a preliminary agreement in the form of a 
friendship treaty. As one would expect, it did not take long before Sino-Romanian bilateral 
diplomatic ties were interrupted. Indeed, it happened on July 10th, 1941, following the 
recognition of the pro-Japanese government of Nanjing by the Romanian government, an 
event that brought to a stand-still the further development of Sino-Romanian relations. 
When Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
on October 1st, 1949, Romania was the third country in the world, after the Soviet Union 
and Bulgaria, to recognise the new Chinese government. It was the initial phase of four 
flourishing decades of Sino-Romanian friendship, mutual support and commendation. In 
fact, after the Soviet Union, Romania was China’s second partner for industrial 
modernisation, and the intense economic and cultural cooperation, particularly in the 1960s 
and the 1970s, was sustained by a strong mutual political backing.  
If in the beginning of the 1960s Bucharest’s friendliness towards Beijing was not as intense 
as the conviviality coming from the government in Tirana, by the end of the 1960s Romania 
found itself in the position of secret mediator between China and the United States in the 
initial phase of their rapprochement. Although eventually not decisive, the Bucharest 
channel’s noteworthiness has been tackled with many times and several studies agreed on 
its influence, however bounded, in Henry Kissinger’s secret trip to Beijing in 1971 and the 
 The first armed conflict between China and Japan occurred between 1894-18956
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 Sino-American thaw. Moreover, against the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the 
leadership in Bucharest supported their Chinese counterpart against the Soviet attacks, and 
Romania adopted a firm stance to back China on reinstating its membership in the United 
States as well as in the Security Council (1971). The frequent Romanian and Chinese high-
level visits promoted Sino-Romanian bilateral relations to reach their peak in all spheres. 
Sino-Romanian ties were considered a successful example for all socialist states on how to 
deal with the relationships between different political parties and different countries. For 
example, in 1979 Sino-Romanian bilateral trade volume reached almost US $ 2 billion, an 
amount that would only be reached again in 2006, however under completely different 
circumstances. In the same manner, Zhou Enlai’s public support to Romania’s independence 
in the wake of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Treaty’s (WTO) invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968, Ceaușescu’s triumphal reception in China in 1971, as well as Bucharest’s role in 
the Sino-US rapprochement and its slight contribution, from an unbiased position, in the 
Sino-Soviet thaw, all give evidence about the intensity of the two countries’ flourishing 
relationship. For instance, Ceaușescu’s visit to China in 1978 resulted in the ratification of a 
ten-year economic and technological cooperation treaty, a consular convention as well as a 
bilateral agreement for cooperation on culture. Moreover, research has also revealed that in 
the aftermath of Ceaușescu’s trip to Beijing, the authorities in Bucharest began cooperation 
in arms production with their counterpart in the Chinese capital. In a nutshell, the period 
between 1970-1980 stood for the finest and matchless stage in the history of Sino-
Romanian relations.  
Beginning with the 1980s, Romania and the PRC embarked on different paths. While 
Ceaușescu’s strategy to pay back Romania’s huge external debt forced the country in 
isolation and a wearing economic position, and coerced the society to wide-ranging scarcity, 
in China Deng Xiaoping pushed the PRC on the course of reforms and opening up to 
foreign markets. Deng’s prominent idea that economic efficiency, and not political 
orientation was essential, constituted a successful background for the acceleration of both 
China’s domestic economic development and its cooperation with the outside world. That 
being so, Romania and China’s political and diplomatic bilateral relationship was 
maintained amiable throughout the 1980s, nevertheless Bucharest ceased to be a significant 
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 economic partner for Beijing.  
The end of the Cold War reshaped in all respects, and without exception, the status of the 
countries within the socialist bloc and with it, the system of international relations moulded 
by the Marxist-Leninist ideology that had been a pillar of the Soviet and European 
communist regimes. Nevertheless, albeit new economic, political and social opportunities 
allowed these countries to interact in new ways, the new Romanian government, unprepared 
to immediately and advantageously cope with such radical transformations, witnessed a 
decade of economic failings, political and social confusion. Only beginning with the 2000s, 
as reaction to a sustained reform process provided by the integration into NATO and the 
EU, the leadership in Bucharest managed to strengthen the Romanian economy and 
subsequently, as a EU member state, Romania constantly articulated its position towards the 
expansion of deep-seated relations with the United States and Western EU member states, 
as well as the maintenance of good relations with Asian countries, China included.  
Following the events of 1989, Beijing tried to maintain good diplomatic relations with each 
state. However, China’s new economic leap, that gradually broadened Beijing’s access to 
the international market and the latter’s positive policy towards the CEECs was not enough 
to maintain bilateral relations with the Romanian government at an ordinary level. On the 
contrary, Sino-Romanian bilateral relations decreased rapidly during the first decade of 
transition. If Beijing invested US $ 43,2 millions, positioning itself on the 18th level in the 
hierarchy of Romanian’s foreign direct investments (FDI), Bucharest, by virtue of not more 
than two Romanian companies, only invested US $ 1,3 millions in China. Moreover, for its 
becoming unprofitable, the Bucharest-Beijing direct flight route established in 1974 was 
interrupted in 2003, and then completely canceled in 2004. At the trade level, beginning 
with 1996, the Romanian import-export deficit increased rapidly, in connection with the 
intensification of Chinese exports to Romania and fluctuating Romanian exports to China. 
Indeed, although there was a clear improvement of Romanian exports between 2004-2008, 
those continued to be insufficient to counterbalance the enormous deficit for the Romanian 
economy, ineffective and inert, and largely generated by the shattering events of  December 
1989 and consequently, the post-Decembrist uncertainty.  
However, as reaction to Beijing’s development of a new strategy to spread its influence 
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 through increased trade, clean energy investments, and political alliances, China’s relations 
with Southeastern Europe improved greatly beginning with 2011. By taking into 
consideration that China’s trade ties with the region initially focused on developing 
exchanges with the region’s largest markets - corresponding to the countries on the path of 
joining the EU, thus Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia - in 2010 Bucharest’s bilateral trade 
with Beijing amounted to “EURO 2.6 billion, while business with Zagreb and Sofia was 
valued at EUR 1.1 billion and EUR 630.5 million, respectively” . 7
However, when compared to the CEE10 or CEE5 trade with China, Romania ranks 5th, 
after Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia/Bulgaria. Moreover, considering both 
that in 2012 almost 75% of Romania’s foreign trade was with the EU, and the same year 
Romania’s trade deficit with China reached approximatively US $ 2.2 billions, it is no 
surprise that the Romanian revolution is ought to be considered a watershed in the history of 
Bucharest’s relations with Beijing, a critical juncture for Bucharest’s authorities, who, at 
sixes and sevens about how to efficiently position the country within the new world order, 
predominantly adopted a pro-EU and pro-American approach. Western countries thus 
became Romania’s main trading partners since the 1990s. 
While in the 2000s other CEE countries managed to capitalise on the China-CEE 16+1 
cooperation platform, Romania was left behind and even the recent social democratic 
government in Bucharest seems skeptical or incapable to tap the full potential of the 
Chinese investments in Romania and the Sino-Romanian economic partnership.  
I.4 Structure of the study 
By means of a chronological investigation of the Sino-Romanian diplomatic, political, 
economic, technological and cultural ties both prior and subsequent to the Romanian 
revolution of December 1989, this study primarily seeks to answer the question why, 
following Romania's bitter transition to democracy and in the wake of its process of 
Europeanisation and presence in a global context for internationalisation, Sino-Romanian 
 Loïc Poulain, “China’s New Balkan Strategy”, Center for strategic and international studies, vol.1, No. 2, 7
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 relations have suffered compared to the period prior to the Romanian revolution? Therefore, 
considered the two states’ solid diplomatic ties - brotherly economic aid and understanding, 
traits of the socialist ideal behind the Iron Curtain, and thus the vivid, perfect backdrop for 
an all-inclusive pragmatic cooperation - which were the main events from a political-
diplomatic as well as economic, cultural and technological perspective, that negatively 
affected the two countries’ bilateral relationship? 
In order to identify and uncover the grounds and course of thought that determined the 
stagnation of the two countries’ bilateral ties in the aftermath of the Romanian anti-
communist revolution, this study first emphasises the historical occurrences dictated by the 
Cold War, that swayed the traditional friendly relationship between Bucharest and Beijing 
to reach its peak in the 1970s, and then focuses on Bucharest’s leadership inefficiency in 
developing a strategic partnership with Beijing subsequent to Romania’s accession to 
NATO and the EU, and thus on Romanian foreign policy decision-makers skepticism 
towards capitalising on the innovative potential of the Chinese investments in the CEECs. 
Moreover, considering that when it comes to the relationship between Romania and China, 
both Bucharest and Beijing frequently refer to each other as “old friends” and call upon a 
traditional friendship that connects the two distant nations even nowadays, by dint of recent 
findings, the following chapters open new research approaches to the Romanian-Chinese 
post-Decembrist relations, and put under question the role of the leaders' beliefs in 
Romania's foreign policy choices and the purpose of the media or policy makers in 
considering Romania as China's best friend in Southeastern Europe or China's gateway to 
Europe.  
Therefore, while previous examination has portrayed Sino-Romanian relations before and 
after 1989 through a persistent optimistic chronological trajectory in terms of economic, 
social and cultural partnership, this study, using an interdisciplinary approach and an 
empirical focus, will demonstrate that 1989 represented a breaking point with the past for 
both Romania and China, and that the “special relation” that the two countries enjoyed for 
more than two decades during the Cold War, became just a relationship which must be read 
and analysed within the network of a globalised world. 
For clarity and straightforwardness, this work will be structured in five chapters portraying 
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 the Sino-Romanian relationship in chronological order. Thus, in the first section I provide 
an overview of the foundation of modern Romania and China, which is compulsory for the 
better understanding of the Sino-Romanian relations themselves, as well as a preliminary 
analysis of the Sino-Romanian earliest ties. Thence, the main objectives of this section is to 
follow the main events in the Chinese and Romanian history that led, in the Chinese case, to 
the creation of the Republic of China in 1912, when the last imperial dynasty of the Qing 
was overthrown in the Xinhai Revolution, to the emergence of nationalist movements 
(1911-1930s) and the transition to a modern statehood, by taking into consideration the 
image and ventures of both Sun Yat-sen and his successor Chiang Kai-shek, the 
implications of the second Sino-Japanese War and last, but not least, the establishment of 
the People’s Republic of China in 1949 through the deposition of the Nationalist 
government in Taiwan. Furthermore, as mentioned, the study covers the main events of the 
17th, 18th and 19th century in the Romanian Principalities - insurrections, nationalist 
movements and revolutions following the European pattern for the achievement of civil 
liberties, social and economic reforms, emancipation, and in the case of Romania, 
independence from foreign rule - that resulted in the 1859 Union of the two Principalities of 
Wallachia and Moldavia (Romania since 1862) by the hands of Alexandru Ioan Cuza and 
the rise of Carol I, initially prince (1866-1881) and then king of united Romania 
(1881-1914), who induced the country’s independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1877 
and its acknowledgment in the international arena in 1880.  
The work then follows the events that enabled the realisation of Romania's Great Union in 
1918 and its development as a unitary, independent modern state until the end of WWII, 
when the accession to power of the Romanian Workers Party and the coerced abdication in 
1947 of King Michael I, the last monarch of Romania, resulted in the foundation of the 
Romanian People's Republic. Subsequently, the chapter identifies the main features of the 
Sino-Romanian earliest ties, by taking into account the image and memorialistic works of 
traveler and diplomat of the Russian Empire to Beijing Nicolae Milescu Spătarul, the 
Romanian chroniclers mentions or descriptions of China between the 17th-18th century, the 
first official contacts between King Carol I of Romania and Emperor Guangxu of China in 
1880 - a milestone in the history of Sino-Romanian ties, the president of the League of 
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 Nations Nicolae Titulescu’s position of support towards China fifty years later, during the 
second Sino-Japanese war, as well as the establishment of the honorific consulate of 
Romania in Shanghai in October 1941. 
In the second chapter I attempt to get an insight on Sino-Romanian political, diplomatic, 
economic, cultural and technological ties between 1949-1969, by taking into account the 
events that marked Bucharest’s relations with Beijing since Romania’s recognition of the 
People’s Republic of China in the aftermath of Chairman Mao Zedong’s proclamation in 
October 1949, until the escalation into border conflicts of the Sino-Soviet ideological and 
political dispute in the end of the 1960s. The chapter thus unveils that ever since the two 
countries established diplomatic relations, Romania has provided assistance to the People’s 
Republic of China in its development of its oil extraction and refinement industry and 
displays how, against the backdrop of a common membership to the socialist ideology and 
on the basis of the ratification of several bilateral agreements, the two countries established 
long-lasting cultural ties and significant people-to-people exchanges.  
Subsequently, it emphasises how especially after the 1960s, when the national communist 
elite headed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej decided to challenge Nikita Khrushchev’s 
integrationist plans, the Romanian government took some distance from Moscow and 
slowly got closer to the People’s Republic of China. This “deviation” of the Romanian 
Workers’ Party, that resulted in the restructuring of the official ideology and in the 
assimilation of populist and nationalist values, gradually allowed the Romanian communist 
elite to issue the “Declaration of April 1964”. The document, that epitomised Dej’s policy 
of independence from Moscow was one of the RWP’s most significant official document 
and in the long-run, represented the framework for the intensification of Sino-Romanian 
bilateral ties. Following Nicolae Ceaușescu’s denunciation of the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact and Soviet troops in August 1968, Bucharest also had 
to face a potential Soviet military invasion of Romania. In this context, Nicolae Ceaușescu, 
regarded as the “maverick” within the socialist bloc by the international media, enjoyed a 
full public support from the Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. From that moment on, in 
the end of the 1960s, Bucharest undertook autonomous foreign relations and pursued a 
policy of friendship towards Beijing.  
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 In the third chapter I will deal with the Sino-Romanian relations since 1969 until 1989, by 
taking into account the Romanian political elite’s drive, for two decades, to deepen and 
broaden political and economic relations with China, thus since Zhou Enlai’s open support 
to Romania’s independence in the wake of Prague’s events in 1968 until the tragic events of 
1989 in both Romania and China, the Romanian revolution and the Tiananmen Square 
massacre. Therefore, in this part I will examine important questions such as Bucharest’s 
position in the Sino-Soviet thaw, the Romanian authorities’ role in the Sino-US 
rapprochement as well as the effects of Ceaușescu’s triumphal visit to Beijing in 1971 on 
Sino-Romanian ties. I will thus emphasise that once Romania started to benefit from a 
strong ally to counterbalance the influence of the Soviet Union, Bucharest became Beijing’s 
first European diplomatic partner, followed by Vietnam and North Korea, and Romania’s 
relations with China were consequently enhanced in all areas of activity. The period 
between the 1970s and the 1980s represented an unparalleled period in the history of 
bilateral relations. Hence, the chapter will highlight that episodes such as the Chinese aid 
and support to their Romanian counterparts during the devastating floods in Romania in the 
beginning of the 1970s, Ceaușescu’s visit to Beijing in 1971 and the Romanian Communist 
Party’s public backing of the CPC, eventually resulted in the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade 
reaching its peak in the end of the 1970s.  
Moreover, from a political perspective, Ceaușescu’s policy to oppose the interference in 
other countries internal affairs linked perfectly with China’s will of achieving independency, 
mainly in the context of the Sino-Soviet conflict. The chapter will then follow the events 
that led, with the beginning of the 1980s to Romania and China’s undertaking of different 
paths; while Ceaușescu decided to pay back Romania’s huge external debt, forcing the 
country in a difficult economic position, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping pushed the 
People’s Republic to a path of reforms and opening to external markets. Hence, albeit the 
bilateral relationship remained amiable on a political and diplomatic level during the 1980s, 
Romania ceased to be an important economic partner for China..  
In chapter four I will try to provide an understanding of the effects, at political and social 
level, of both the Romanian Revolution of December 1989 and of the democracy movement 
in Tiananmen Square the same year, as well as an overview of the Sino-Romanian bilateral 
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 ties between 1989-2004. Hence, by providing an analysis of the implications of these 
crusades for political, economic and social improvement in both Romania and China, I 
endeavour to demonstrate that the downfall of Ceaușescu’s regime in December 1989 
undoubtedly altered the bilateral relationship between Romania and China in the long-run, 
and albeit the political and diplomatic background was favourable for the maintenance of 
amicable ties, especially considering the Chinese government’s prompt recognition of the 
new government in Bucharest in the aftermath of the revolution, in the beginning of the 
1990s Sino-Romanian relations became stagnant and remained sluggish for more than a 
decade. For this reason, I will look into the origins of the Romanian revolution that 
eventually led to the adoption of a multi-party system, free elections and a market economy 
(1990) and I will attempt to provide an analysis of the dramatic events in Tiananmen Square 
that resulted in Beijing’s isolation in the international arena.  
Moreover, I will examine the year 1989 as a turning point for the Romanian-Chinese 
bilateral ties by taking into account the new Romanian leadership’s uncertain foreign policy 
and hesitation when dealing with the future of the country. In fact, being both 
geographically and strategically positioned between West and East, for a while, the 
Romanian political elite vacillated between the two sides, and if before 1989 they supported 
the Bucharest-Beijing axe as an alternative to Moscow, with the revolution the 
circumstances changed. While the Soviet Union vanished and China opened to the world, 
Romania lost its role as China’s gate towards (Central and Eastern) Europe.  
Clearly, if Bucharest’s diplomacy tried to find new ways of cooperating with the West, they 
concomitantly neglected the bilateral relations with Beijing. Both China and Romania 
entered complex and agonising transition processes, but the paths they opted for were 
substantially different. While Romania chose to set up a democratic society and a capitalist 
economy having as main goal the adaptation to and the integration into NATO (2004) and 
the European Union (2007), China decided on keeping its political system as well as many 
of the institutions almost unchanged, while concentrating on gradual economic reforms and 
building up a market economy with Chinese characteristics.  
Last, but not least, throughout this section I will explore crucial issues such as the Sino-
Romanian unfavourable bilateral economic ties, their relations at socio-cultural level by 
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 considering the first wave of Chinese migration towards the CEECs - Romania included, as 
well as the Sino-Romanian political and diplomatic ties by taking into account the 
Romanian government’s position towards the issue of Taiwan, their standpoint regarding the 
human rights in China as well as Bucharest’s relations with Hong Kong and Macao. 
The fifth and last chapter will deal with the Sino-Romanian bilateral ties in the political-
diplomatic, economic, cultural and technological fields since 2004 until 2016, thus since 
Romania’s accession to NATO until the 5th Summit of China and CEECs, held in Riga in 
2016. The main objective of this chapter is to unveil how, with the accession to NATO and 
the EU, Bucharest aligned itself with Washington and Brussels and therefore Romania’s 
foreign policy objectives mainly focused on the development of relations with Western 
countries. Although there has been a slight inclination towards the improvement of relations 
with the Asian countries during the Social Democratic government of Victor Ponta 
(2012-2015), in 2012, two thirds of Romania’s foreign trade was with the EU, and China 
only ranked 3rd after Turkey and Russia as Romania’s non-EU trading partner .  8
Moreover, in view of Romania’s huge trade deficit with China in 2008, 2010, 2012 - with 
imports from China five or even six times larger than exports - it can be deduced that in the 
aftermath of Romania’s revolution, the authorities in Bucharest lacked a long-term strategy, 
that might have contributed to effectively position Romania within the new global order. 
Subsequently, the investigation covers the Chinese foreign policy strategies, and concludes 
that albeit Beijing has infallibly been consistent in maintaining good relations with most of 
the countries worldwide, for international relations experts it is evident that, because of the 
Romanian leaders’ fear that close ties with China might have led, in the media and public 
opinion’s perception, to the reinstatement of the communism rule, beginning with 2011 the 
PRC’s strategy to spread its influence in Southeastern Europe was beneficial only for some 
of the CEECs, that managed to capitalise on the China-CEE 16+1 cooperation platform.  
In fact, when compared to the CEE10 or CEE5 trade with China, Romania only ranks 5th, 
after Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia/Bulgaria, leading to believe that 
even the recent Social Democratic government in Bucharest is either skeptical or incapable 
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 to tap the full potential of the Chinese investments in Romania, and thus to improve the 
Sino-Romanian economic partnership.  
I.5 Previous Research on Sino-Romanian Relations 
a) Present condition of research on Sino-Romanian relations 
This thesis draws upon the limited existing work on the topic of Sino-Romanian ties as well 
as on policy reviews, reports from (non)governmental institutions, Romanian and 
international organisations, journal, newspaper articles, mass media and personal 
interviews. Nevertheless, the past investigations’ achievement to the Sino-Romanian 
relations can be summarised with three sentences: the two countries established bilateral 
diplomatic relations in 1949, there is no academic study covering Sino-Romanian ties 
within such an extended time frame and last, but not least, for both Romania and China, the 
year 1989 represented the breaking up with the past and therefore, with the promotion of 
brotherly traditional ties that had had such an echo during the Cold War.  
Romania established diplomatic relations with China on October 5th, 1949, when Bucharest 
was the 3rd country in the world to recognise the newly born People’s  Republic of China. 
In the 1950s, following Romania and China’s mutual establishment of embassies in 
Bucharest and Beijing respectively, the two countries began to write documents entitled 
“Sino-Romanian relations” or “Romania-Chinese relations”, however for internal 
reference only. These official papers, that encompassed historical, political, economic, 
trade, culture as well as scientific and technological issues, were of considerable length, and 
offered fairly material and references for future research on the topic.  
Some Romanian chroniclers have depicted China already in the Middle Ages. For example, 
if in “Letopisețul Țării Moldovei”, written between 1642-1647 by Grigore Ureche, the 
Moldavian chronicler analysed and depicted China in terms of its wealth, immense territory, 
as well as for her industrious and skilful inhabitants, in “Letopisețul Moldovei de la Aaron 
Vodă încoace”, the Moldavian chronicler Miron Costin, noticed that the Moldavian prince 
Vasile Lupu had adorned his palaces with articles of Chinese fine art, brought via 
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 Constantinople. 
Nevertheless, the first investigation on China comes from Nicolae Iorga, Romanian 
historian, statesman, literary critic, poet and memoirist who, in 1904, wrote “Far Eastern 
war. China, Japan, Asian Russia”, an exposition based on Western sources that sought to 
depict both Japan and China. Prime Minister, professor and academician, Nicolae Iorga 
structured his account on China in six chapters, and portrayed the Chinese people as tall, a 
very hard working society that had established the oldest civilisation in the world. 
Throughout the fifty-one pages exposition, Iorga also offered an insight of the Chinese 
policy regarding neighbouring countries. 
Regarding the Sino-Romanian ties (Chinese language sources excluded), the first research 
can be traced back in 1968, when the bulletin number 3 of “Studii și referate", issued by the 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published “Relațiile româno-chineze până în anul 
1949”, by Eugenia Chitic, that represented the earliest investigation of Sino-Romanian ties 
in Romania. Chitic’s roughly 40 pages long research referred, for the first time, to the 
Russian Tsar’s special envoy Nicolae Milescu Spătarul, who had been in China in 1675 and 
at his return, had written “The Description of China”. Here, the vast “kingdom of China”, 
with its cities and provinces and the great river Amur, have been depicted on the basis of 
Milescu’s impressions and have had, along with his other works “Trip to China” and 
“Travel Journal to China”, great impact in the European knowledge of the Asian country. 
The examination of Sino-Romanian relations entered a new era in the 1970s, when both the 
countries became aware of the importance of research and publication in the field. In fact, in 
the aftermath of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s visit to the PRC in 1971, the Central Institute of 
History and Social Politics of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) was instructed to 
begin research on Sino-Romanian ties, and “Tradiții ale poporului român de solidaritate și 
prietenie cu poporul chinez”, published in 1973 by Editura Politică București, was the 
outcome. The publication, that included articles from Romanian newspapers and periodicals 
disclosing the political situation and revolutionary struggle in China, was printed and 
distributed within the PCR and Romanian Communist Youth League to sustain the Chinese 
revolution during the years 1900-1949. The information provided by this study, counting 
159 historical documents, is more elaborated than Chitic’s and is considered the first 
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 published historical investigation of the Sino-Romanian relations.  
In 1973 Editura Politică also published “Reprezentanțele diplomatice ale României”, a 
volume that presented the Socialist Republic of Romania’s foreign relations with the outside 
world. The part dedicated to Romania’s relations with the PRC was compiled by professor 
Lucian D. Petrescu, who highlighted, in more than 20 pages long, that the earliest contact 
between Romania and China was accomplished by dint of Nicolae Milescu’s visit to China 
in 1675. In comparison with the previous volume, that focused on the period 1900-1949, 
this work covered the relations between the two countries since the 17th century to 1972. 
Although it mainly described the high-level visit exchanges and public speeches as well as 
statements since 1949, the article was the first one to sum up the history of Sino-Romanian 
relations over an extended period of time, and, complementary to the previous version, is 
regarded by Romanian historians as the utmost achievement of thorough research.  
“România, o fereastră în cortina de fier” by Alexandru Oșca and Vasile Poppa published in 
1997 by Vrantop publishing house Focșani, displayed, on the basis of telegrams and various 
messages between the communist parties of Romania, China and the Soviet Union, the 
relations between the triangle Romania-China-Soviet Union during the Sino-Soviet split. 
Moreover, Ion Cristoiu publishing house in Bucharest issued, in 1999, a commemorative 
collected works “Evantaiul celor 10000 de gânduri: România și China, trei veacuri de 
istorie”, edited by Asociația Română de prietenie cu R.P. Chineză (Romanian Friendship 
Association with the PRC). The volume - coordinated, among others, by Florea Dumitrescu, 
President of the Friendship Association with the People’s Republic of China and scholar 
Iolanda Țighiliu - encompassed several articles and papers reminiscing about Sino-
Romanian relations as written by Chinese and Romanian diplomats and scholars. In 2005 
and 2010 the second and third volume were issued by the same publishing house.  
“Nicolae Milescu Spătarul: Viața, călătoriile, opera” and “Connections Between the 
Western And Eastern Civilisations Through The Agency of a Romanian Diplomat: Nicolae 
Milescu Spatharius”, both written by Radu Ṣtefan Vergatti, expert of Milescu’s travels and 
research, as well as “La orizontul imaginarului” by historian Iolanda Țighiliu show, beyond 
doubt, that, by dint of his works, Nicolae Milescu Spătarul encouraged the mutual 
understanding and exchange between the two regions and civilisations in the 17th century, 
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 and resultantly, made him and his works widely known throughout Europe. In fact, the first 
Romanian translation of Milescu's travel across Siberia was materialised in 1888 by 
Gheorghe Sion - a Romanian writer and member of the Romanian Academy - from a 
seriously damaged Greek copy, while in Russian language, the version was translated and 
printed in 1889 and 1896. After a while, his writings spread rapidly by means of the English 
version of the British scholar, traveller and journalist J. F. Baddeley, “Russia, Mongolia, 
China”, published in London in 1919, and providing Europe and the world with all-
encompassing and strategic information on China. 
“Relațiile româno-chineze (1880-1949)” written by Eugenia Chitic disclosed that Sino-
Romanian relations dated back to the end of 1880, when King Carol I notified Romania’s 
independence to the Chinese Emperor Guangxu, who replied through Prince Kong, and 
congratulated Romania and the Romanian people for the achievement. Besides the mutual 
recognition between the two countries, Chitic’s study also covers the period of 
establishment of diplomatic relations between Romania and China and the aeon 
1930s-1940s, with the two countries break-off of relations. For its detailed and fact-based 
investigation, Eugenia Chitic’s study is more reliable than “Reprezentanțele Diplomatice 
ale României”. 
“Istoria relațiilor României cu China din cele mai vechi timpuri până în zilele noastre”, 
written by Ion Buzatu - former cultural counsellor at the Romanian Embassy in China - and 
published by Meteor Press in 2004, on the 55th anniversary of Sino-Romanian diplomatic 
ties, is by far, the first work ever published worldwide on Chinese-Romanian relations. 
However, the roughly 200 pages long study, containing annexes, maps and representations 
of Chinese culture and civilisation, lacks a clear structure, its content is quite insubstantial, 
and the author’s investigation of Sino-Romanian ties since the 17th century until 2004, 
remains vague. Its publication only drew a small-scale attention and many Romanian 
scholars believe it should generally not be regarded as an academic monograph.  
Moreover, in his article “Amintiri despre China”, Paul Niculescu Mizil - former secretary 
of the PCR and vice-Chairman of the Romanian Council of Ministers - who also took 
charge of the Romanian-Chinese mixed committee of economy, science and technology for 
20 years, reminisced about his visits to China since 1959, his contacts with the first and 
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 second generation Chinese authorities, as well as about the state of affairs of the Sino-
Romanian ties when he was in charge of the department. The study proves to be of great 
importance and significant reference owing to its historical specifics. Albeit several articles’ 
content coincided with another work of the author “O istorie trăită”, published in 1997, the 
were large sections that the author never included in the past, and the study is thus, more 
than qualified for the investigation of Sino-Romanian relations. Considered that the year 
2004 stood for the celebration of the 55th anniversary of diplomatic Sino-Romanian ties, 
several articles on this topic were published in different periodicals, such as Magazin 
istoric. In this context, the famous publishing house Editura Enciclopedică collected Paul 
Niculescu Mizil’s interviews in a book entitled “O istorie trăită. Memorii”, and published 
them firstly in 1997 and in 2003, as revised version. Both versions included knowledge 
about Romania’s internal and foreign policies between 1950-1964. The second volume 
however, contained Mizil’s memoirs and was published by Editura Democrația publishing 
house. The latter depicted Romania’s activity in the international communist movement, 
Romanian-Soviet and Romanian-Chinese relations.  
Other Romanian high-level authorities, such as Gheorghe Apostol and former prime 
minister Ilie Verdeț also published their memoirs.  
Nevertheless, the former Romanian Ambassador to China Romulus Ioan Budura’s research 
on Sino-Romanian relations, based on unique archival material and unveiling the strains and 
achievements of the political, diplomatic, economic and cultural cooperation between 
Romania and China during the Cold War, continues to be the most valuable, indispensable, 
noteworthy and accurate investigation of the two countries’ relationship prior to 1989. One 
of the first Romanian students to reach China in the 1950s, Budura worked in the Romanian 
embassy in Beijing for more than 20 years, he assumed the position of Romanian 
Ambassador to China for almost 6 years during this period, and was considered one of the 
best Chinese language speakers among Romanian nationals. “Relațiile româno-chineze 
1880-1974. Documente”, coordinated by Romulus I. Budura and published in 2005 in 
Bucharest, represents the answer to a strong journalistic and academic, historical, political 
as well as diplomatic necessity to unveil achievements, events, domestic and foreign affairs 
matters belonging to Romania’s past and to the realm of Sino-Romanian relations, that 
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 allows both experts and non-specialists to understand the pragmatic role played by the 
Romanian diplomacy especially in the 1960s and the 1970s. The volume, jointly compiled 
by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and National Archives, includes 467 valuable 
archival documents in more than 1300 pages. Moreover, with “Politica independentă a 
României și relațiile româno-chineze 1954-1975”, also coordinated by R.I Budura and 
published in 2008 in Bucharest, the former ambassador to China and his research group - 
including scholar and Director of Confucius class Constanța, Iolanda Țighiliu - focused on 
specific documents and numerous transcriptions of conversations between delegations of 
the C.C. of the PCR and C.C of the CPC that reveal Cold War entanglements such as 
Bucharest’s position of neutrality during the Sino-Soviet split, the former’s renowned 
independent policy towards Moscow, as well as the gradual escalation of Sino-Romanian 
ties in the second half of the 1960s, when the two countries’ mutual support in the 
international arena and their large-scale economic cooperation finally resulted in the 
relationship reaching its peak in the end of the 1970s. In the article “Romanian-Chinese 
relations”, published in 2014, in “New Sources, New Findings: the relationships between 
China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
Forum, former Ambassador Budura realised an overview of Bucharest’s relations with 
Beijing since 1949 until 1989, that unveils the willingness of the Romanian Workers Party 
to collaborate with the leaders of the CPC, and that elucidates the RWP leadership’s 
political thinking, a party with no “Comintern origins, but (…) derived from the claims and 
aspirations of the worker’s movement in Romania” .  9
Liu Yong’s work “Sino-Romanian relations 1950s-1960s”, published in Bucharest in 2006, 
by Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului publishing house represents, next to 
R.I. Budura’s volumes, one of the most accurate and complete investigation of the relations 
between Romania and China in the Cold War period. The volume, a chronological 
examination of the two countries’ political and diplomatic ties on the basis of existing 
literature and archival material from Bucharest and Beijing, tracks back the Sino-Romanian 
relations since their beginning in 1880 until the 1970s, when the bilateral cooperation 
 R.I. Budura, “Romanian-Chinese relations”, in Péter Vámos (ed.), “New Sources, New Findings: the 9
relationships between China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe”, CASS Forum, 2014, p. 411
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 reached its peak, rendering special the Sino-Romanian relationship. Former visiting student 
in Bucharest, Liu Yong’s knowledge of the Romanian language resulted in his research 
encompassing Chinese, Romanian and international literature. For this reason, for the 
accuracy and particulars of the information provided, his research is noteworthy and 
fundamental for the study of Sino-Romanian ties and Cold War affairs.  
Iolanda Țighiliu’s “Nicolae Iorga the Greatest Romanian Historian (1871 – 1940). Nicolae 
Iorga and the Far East China”, published in the journal “Geopolitică. Revistă de Geografie 
Politică, Geopolitică şi Geostrategie”, in Bucharest, 2007, “Românii din China în prima 
jumătate a secolului XX” (“Romanians in China In the First Half of the 20th Century”) 
published in 2005 in the journal “Revista Română de Studii Eurasiatice” and “Dezvoltarea 
relațiilor economice între România și Republica Populară Chineză 1950-1975” (“The 
development of economic relations between Romania and the PRC 1950-1975”) provide 
meaningful knowledge regarding Sino-Romanian earliest ties, especially with regard to the 
first Romanian communities in China in the first decades of the 20th century. The last 
article, on Sino-Romanian economic ties, constitutes a succinct but accurate evaluation of 
the two countries’ commercial and economic relations during the second half of the 20th 
century. 
Constantin Buchet’s “România și Relațiile cu Extremul Orient” (“Romania and its relations 
with the Far East”) as well as Anna Eva Budura's “Primii diplomați chinezi în 
occident” (“The first Chinese diplomats in the West”), the latter published in the journal 
“Provocarea dragonilor. Miracolul Chinezesc. Revistă de Geografie Politică, Geopolitică 
şi Geostrategie” in Bucharest, 2007, albeit not strictly related to Sino-Romanian ties or to 
Cold War interrelations, expand the knowledge about the first Chinese diplomats who 
opened up China’s path of modern diplomacy on the one hand, and reveal Romania’s 
earliest contacts and entanglements with the Far East on the other. 
Subsequent to the opening up of most of the Romanian archives and the publication of R.I. 
Budura and Liu Yong’s volumes on Sino-Romanian bilateral ties prior to 1989, scholars 
worldwide began to focus their attention on the relationship between the two countries after 
the Romanian revolution. In this sense, the main authors dealing with this topic are, from an 
economic perspective Liu Zuokui, Sarmiza Pencea and Iulia Monica Oehler-Ṣincai, from a 
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 political and economic standpoint Gao Ge and Tudor Nemeș, and for handling the question 
of Chinese immigrants in Central and East European Countries, Romania included, Pál 
Nyíri, Adrian Tudor Ondreicsik and Rixta Wundrak’s studies are certainly the most accurate 
and thorough.   
Expert of China and Romania, Liu Zuokui’s papers “The Chinese Perception of the EU 
2007: A Preliminary Analysis of the Survey on the Chinese Perception of the EU and the 
Sino-EU Relations” (2008), “The Pragmatic Cooperation between China and CEE: 
Characteristics, Problems and Policy Suggestions” (2013) and “The Role of Central and 
Eastern Europe in the Building of the Silk Road Economic Belt” (2014) analyse significant 
concepts, themes and scenes that, beginning with the 2000s, have determined China’s 
relations with the EU and the CEECs, such as the Europeans’ perception of China (the 
impression of China, China’s responsibility, China’s threat and the future development of 
China), the Chinese people’s perception of the EU, as well as the 16+1 Cooperation 
framework between the PRC and the CEECs. The latter promotes the Chinese new type of 
international relations since 2011 on the basis of principles of open and inclusive, mutually-
beneficial and win-win international cooperation, and proposes to wisely handle differences 
and divergences.  
Liu Zuokui and Andrea Chiriu's paper “Sino-Romanian Relations. From the First Ponta’s 
government to Klaus Werner Iohannis’s victory in the presidential elections”, published in 
2015 by the Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, 
provides a concise outlook on Sino-Romanian ties since their very beginning in the 19th 
century until 2013, with a special focus on the economic relations between Bucharest and 
Beijing both during Victor Ponta’s premiership and following the election of Klaus Werner 
Iohannis as President of Romania in November 2014. 
The papers of Sarmiza Pencea and Iulia Monica Oehler-Ṣincai’“Chinese Outward Direct 
Investment in CEECs: a Comparative Analysis” (2014), “New Insights into the Trade 
Relationship between China and Romania” (2013), “Main Trends of Trade Flows between 
Romania and China in the last decade” (2012), “Romania, Strategic Partner in China-CEE 
relations” (2014), Sarmiza Pencea and Daniel Bulin's “Insights into the Chinese Outbound 
Tourism - An Empirical Analysis. Opportunities for Romania”, and Sarmiza Pencea’s “O 
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 evaluare a relației bilaterale UE-China în contextul economic și geostrategic actual. 
Poziția României” are considered recent and valuable research for the study of Sino-
Romanian economic and political ties. Overall, these works look into Sino-Romanian 
bilateral relationship against the backdrop of both the new 16+1 platform and the larger EU-
China relations, and seek to “identify the comparative advantages, complementarities and 
commonalities which could create the premises for a new, reinforced China-Romania trade 
and investment relationship. The focus lays on analysing the bilateral trade, both in terms 
of volumes and structure, as well as on dissecting the Chinese investment presence in 
Romania as compared to that in other CEE countries, leading to the conclusion that there is 
a lot of untapped potential, but also a favourable context to change this state of facts” . 10
Gao Ge’s paper, “The Development of Sino-Romanian Relations After 1989” and Tudor 
Nemeș’s study “Romanian-Chinese bilateral relation. How did the Romanian revolution in 
1989 affect the bilateral relation between the two countries?”, both published in 2015, 
represent a valid evaluation of the Sino-Romanian political and economic ties between 1989 
and 2015. The works, however, illustrate the evolution of the cooperation between 
Bucharest and Beijing from two different stances. On the one hand, Gao Ge’s article 
emphasises that, albeit several issues need to be solved by the government in Bucharest in 
order to promote and implement far-reaching, pragmatic and effective measures to deepen 
economic and trade cooperation with China at higher level, even after 1989, Sino-Romanian 
ties “have developed steadily and have played an exemplary and leading role in the 
development of relations between China and CEECs” . On the other hand - by means of 11
the investigation of the main events, from political-diplomatic and economic perspective, 
correlated to the changes in the world order - the study of Tudor Nemeș emphasises that the 
anti-communist Romanian revolution of 1989 has affected the bilateral relations between 
Romania and China. 
Moreover, scholar Pál Nyíri's “Chinese in Eastern Europe and Russia. A middleman 
 Sarmiza Pencea and Iulia Monica Oehler-Sincai, “Romania, Strategic Partner in China-CEE relations”,10
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 minority in a transnational era”, published by Routledge publishing house in 2007, Adrian 
Tudor Ondreicsik’s “The New Minority: A Case Study of Chinese Immigrants to Romania” 
thesis of 2012, and Chen Xiao’s “Souls in Exile: A Study of Chinese Migration Workers in 
Romania” published in 2010, in International Labour Organisation, provide remarkable 
information regarding Chinese migration in Central and Eastern Europe countries, Romania 
included. The first two studies provide a historical background about Chinese nationals’ 
migration towards CEECs, the reasons that lie behind this phenomenon, about issues of 
integration of Chinese immigrants in the host country by taking into consideration aspects 
like employment, political and social changes in the host country, transnational practices 
and politics, asylum seekers, stereotypes and representation of Chinese immigrants, as well 
as issues of legality and human trafficking. Chen Xiao’s investigation unveils the path of 
migration of Chinese workers to Romania and provides details on the labour business 
(among other issues, the research tackles with the reasons of migration, salaries, terms of 
employment) and official data regarding the number of Chinese workers in Romania. 
Moreover, like the first two studies, the research covers the risks associated with human 
trafficking and forced labours and concludes with a list of policy recommendations.   
b) Research on the Cold War, Sino-Soviet and Romanian-Soviet relations 
In the beginning of the 1960s, Romania’s position of neutrality in the Sino-Soviet split 
encouraged researchers and scholars all over the world to investigate the Sino-Romanian 
ties by means of the examination of documentation concerning Romanian-Soviet and Sino-
Soviet relations. Therefore, new evidence was revealed by means of the efforts of the 
famous British scholar David Floyd, who, in 1965, published “Romania: Russia’s dissident 
ally” in Pall Mall Press in London and “The New Rumania: From People's Democracy to 
the Socialist Republic” published in 1967 by MIT Press, who’s author, Stephen Fischer-
Galati, was an expert researcher on Romania in the United States. This volume, that deals 
with Sino-Romanian and Romanian-Soviet relations from different angles, is still 
considered a fundamental reference book by worldwide researchers of Romania. 
In 1972 , the famous researcher Robert R. King published “Romania and the Sino-Soviet 
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 Conflict” in the fourth edition of “Studies in Comparative Communism”. King’s study 
focused on the relationship between the three components of the triangle China-the Soviet 
Union-Romania and consequently, its implications on the relations between Bucharest and 
Moscow since the early 1960s until the 1970s. 
In 1978, Aurel Braun, senior researcher on Romanian issues in the United States, published 
“Romanian Foreign Policy since 1965: the Political and Military Limits of Autonomy”, in 
Praeger publishers in New York. The volume explained the development of relations 
between China and Romania from 1965 to the mid’ 1970s and the research achievements 
led to the creation, in the 1960s, of the International Center for Romanian Studies in the 
United States. However, in the aftermath of the Cold War, the interest for research on 
Romania decreased significantly in the United States. Still, in Western Europe, a large 
number of studies on Romania continued to be published. 
Moreover, “Romania under Communist Rule”, jointly published in 1999 by the Center for 
Romanian Studies and Civic Academy Foundation , as well as “New Evidence on Romania 
and the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1989”, published in 2004 by the Cold War International History 
Project (CWIHP) virtual archive, both put in writing by expert on Romania’s history and 
culture, professor Dennis Deletant, are remarkable works based on historical material, that 
unveil on the one hand, the evolution of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) since its 
establishment in 1921 until Nicolae Ceaușescu’s collapse in 1989, as well as the effects of 
communism on the Romanian society and, on the other hand, Bucharest's behaviour within 
the Warsaw Pact, with its increasing autonomous foreign policy that caused Romania to be 
described as a “maverick” or an “ambiguous” Soviet satellite state.  
There are several Western studies on Sino-Soviet relations, and the most representative are 
“Mao against Khrushchev: a Short Story of the Sino-Soviet Conflict”, written by David 
Floyd and published in 1963 by Fredrick A. Praeger Inc. Publishers, “Soviet-Chinese 
relations (1945-1970)”, conceived by O.B. Borisov and B.T. Koloskov, published by 
Progress Publishers in Moscow in 1975. This volume had a huge echo worldwide, albeit the 
author did not aways hide his pro-Soviet bias. Moreover, “The border negotiations and the 
future of Sino-Soviet-American relations” written by Thomas W. Robinson and published in 
1971 by the Rand Corporation, “One Finger’s Worth of Historical Events. New Russian and 
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 Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959” written by David 
Wolff and published by the CWIHP’s virtual archive in 2000, “The Quarrelling Brothers: 
New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1962”, written by 
Dong Wang and published by the virtual archive of the CWIHP, “A Chinese exploration of 
Sino-Soviet Relations since the Death of Stalin, 1953-1989”, written by Jiaming Zhu and 
published in 1991, “The Interkit Story: A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet 
Relationship” by James Hershberg, Sergey Radchenko, Péter Vámos and David Wolff, 
published in February 2011 by the CWIHP Working Paper Series are extremely valuable 
works that cover the main events in the history of Sino-Soviet relations, from the stage of 
friendship, cooperation and mutual economic aid in the early 1950s, to Beijing and 
Moscow’s differences on a number of foreign policy, ideology and economic issues - the 
Sino-Soviet “Cold War” - and finally, to the military confrontation of 1969.  
Based on new archival material, most of these studies regard the Sino-Soviet border 
confrontation and the Sino-American rapprochement as two of the most important events in 
the international history of the Cold War. With Sino-Soviet relations in deep crisis, Beijing’s 
policy toward the United States began to change and the first signs of the Chinese’ changing 
attitude towards Washington came in autumn 1968. Three years later, Nixon visited the 
PRC and met face to face with Mao Zedong in Beijing. Hence, if the end of the Cold War 
did not actually take place until the late 1980s-early 1990s, when both the Soviet Union and 
the Communist bloc collapsed, however one of the crucial seeds of that collapse can 
certainly be traced back to 1968-1969. The Interkit story instead, tackling with the dialogue 
between the Kremlin and its allies on the gamut of China-related subjects, offers an 
intelligible insight into the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations , thence “both Moscow’s views 
of and policies toward China and the impact, or lack thereof, of Beijing’s efforts to 
“differentiate” in its relations among the USSR’s allies, the better to promote discord within 
the Soviet bloc” . 12
Regarding China’s relations with Central and Eastern European countries during the Cold 
War period, studies such as “China and Eastern Europe 1960s-1980s. Proceedings of the 
  James Hershberg, Sergey Radchenko, Péter Vámos, and David Wolff, “The Interkit Story: A Window into 12
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 International Symposium: Reviewing the history of Chinese-East European relations from 
the 1960s to the 1980s”, Xiaoyuan Liu and Vojtech Mastny (eds.), published in 2004 by 
Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforshung - Center for Security Studies, 
“China and Eastern Europe in the 1980s: A Hungarian Perspective” by Péter Vámos, 
published in January 2016 by the CWIHP virtual archive, and “Sino-European Relations 
during the Cold War and the Rise of a Multipolar World”, edited by Enrico Fardella, 
Christian F. Ostermann, and Charles Kraus, and published by CWIHP digital archive in 
2015, are fundamental. The first title represents the proceedings of the international 
conference on the “Relations between China and East European Countries from the 1960s 
to the 1980s”, where chronologically-arranged discussions of former Chinese and East 
European diplomats and Western and Chinese scholars, aimed at identifying, analysing and 
interpreting the main issues of the relations between China and the Soviet Union’s Warsaw 
Pact allies during their most turbulent period, as remembered by veteran diplomats from 
both sides. Péter Vámos’s volume “China and Eastern Europe in the 1980s: A Hungarian 
Perspective” is an accurate analysis of bilateral relations between China and the closest 
European allies of the Soviet Union (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, 
and Poland), liable to reflect the state of Sino-Soviet relations.  
Overall, the study takes into consideration issues like Beijing’s “differentiated” approach 
towards the socialist community - that is the PRC’s distinguishing socialist states on the 
basis of their degree of autonomy from the USSR - in the aftermath of the Sino-Soviet split, 
the Sino-Soviet thaw in 1979, as well as Beijing’s efforts to reestablish the system of 
relations it had with socialist countries in the 1950s - based strictly on mutual benefit and 
the principles of peaceful coexistence - and last, but not least, Beijing’s delay in the 
development of relations with the Soviet Union. The third publication, “Sino-European 
Relations during the Cold War and the Rise of a Multipolar World” represents the result of 
a prominent critical oral history international conference, where “a group of veteran 
diplomatic officials, all active in Sino-European relations during the Cold War, assembled 
together with a group of international scholars in an effort to provide context to, and fill 
gaps in available documentary record, on China’s relationships with countries in Eastern 
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 and Western Europe from the 1960s through the 1980s” . The volume features the 13
transcript of the conference proceedings as well as key primary source documents from 
international archives and a comprehensive bibliography on Sino-European relations, and 
thus becomes a crucial resource for researchers interested in the dynamics of past and 
present Sino-European relations, and recent and ongoing global repositioning and power 
shifts. 
There are several studies concerning Romanian-Soviet relations, however one of the most 
important and accurate investigations is “In the Shadow of Prague Spring” written by 
Mihai Retegan and published in 2000 by the Center for Romanian Studies in Iași. The title 
of the Romanian first edition was “1968: Din Primăvară până în toamnă”, published in 
1998 by Rao Publishing House in Bucharest. This study, based on Romanian, Eastern 
European and American archival material, provides an explicit investigation of the relations 
between Romania and the Soviet Union as well as on the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the 
Soviet and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation’s (WTO) troops in 1968.  
Vasile Buga’s, “O vară fierbinte în relațiile româno-sovietice. Convorbirile de la Moscova 
din iulie 1964”, published in 2012 by Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului - 
Documents Collection, is a thorough and accurate examination of the Romanian-Soviet ties 
in 1964. Based on archival sources, the study follows the crucial moments and events 
leading to the Romanian Worker Party’s (RWP) disagreements with the Communist Party of 
the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1962, and to the former’s dissent from the CPSU, manifested 
through the commonly known as “1964 Declaration of Independence”. 
Mircea Munteanu's, “When the Levee Breaks. The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split and the 
Invasion of Czechoslovakia on Romanian-Soviet Relations, 1967–1970”, published by the 
Journal of Cold War Studies in 2010, and “Communication Breakdown? Romania and the 
Sino-American Rapprochement” published in the journal Diplomatic History in 2009, are 
noteworthy studies, based on new Romanian archival sources, that explore Bucharest’s 
position with regard to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, by placing it in the 
context of the international system and especially the Sino-Soviet split and, by means of the 
 E. Fardella, C.F. Ostermann and C. Kraus (ed.), “Sino-European Relations during the Cold War and the 13
Rise of a Multipolar World. A critical oral history”, History and Public Policy Program, Critical Oral History 
Conference Series, p.2 
 40
 second paper, investigate the role of the short-lived Romanian backchannel in the Sino-
American opening (1969-1972).  
“Între Beijing și Moscova. România și conflictul sovieto-chinez”, edited by Dan Cătănuș 
and published in 2004 by Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, provides an 
examination of the Sino-Soviet conflict as well as Romania’s standpoint and mediation of 
the dispute between 1960-1964. Based on transcripts of the Politburo meetings, plenary 
sessions of the C.C. of the RWP, the volume was met with considerable success both by 
Chinese and Romanian historians, diplomats and experts in the field. 
Florin Banu and Liviu Țăranu’s “Aprilie 1964 - Primăvara de la București. Cum s-a 
adoptat Declarația de independență a României”, published by Editura Enciclopedică 
publishing house in 2004 - an essential study tackling with the critical events that led to 
Bucharest’s policy change towards Moscow and  eventually the RWP’s decision to issue the 
April 1964 Declaration of Independence, as well as scholar Ioan Scurtu’s “Revoluția 
Română din decembrie 1989 în context internațional”, published in Bucharest, in 2009, by 
Editura Redacției Publicațiilor pentru Străinătate - a valuable volume, based on archival 
material that deals with the circumstances that gave rise to a remarkable popular uprising in 
December 1989, are definitely also worth mentioning.  
Moreover, with regard to the historical documentation, it is compulsory to mention the 
Romanian National Historical Central Archive (ANIC) - fond C.C. al P.C.R., Cancelarie, 
fond C.C. al P.C.R. and the Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej Collection, the latter comprising reports and 
letters on Romania’s activity inside the CMEA and Bucharest’s relations with the USSR and 
China - as well as the Archive of the Romanian Foreign Ministry (AMAE). According to 
the Romanian law however, in most of the Romanian national historical archives, 
documents regarding foreign policy matters can be available for research 50 years after their 
realisation, personal files of communist authorities 75 years after their creation and 
documents regarding national security and integrity issues, 100 years after their creation. 
Additionally, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) virtual archive and the 
Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security website (PHP, the former Parallel History 
Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact), including numerous English version of national 
security archives in China, the former USSR and Eastern European countries during the 
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 Cold War, are an optimum source to put to use, continuously supplemented and renewed. 
“Selected works of Mao Zedong”, 13 volumes focusing on the thoughts of Mao in social 
structure, communism, revolution, economics, war tactics, and welfare of the masses, and 
published by Central Literature Publishing House between 1987-1998, as well as “Selected 
works of N. Ceaușescu”, 6 volumes collecting almost all of Ceaușescu’s important articles 
and speeches, and published by People’s Publishing House, are as well suitable for research 
by offering significant historical grounds. Last, but not least, on numerous occasions 
Chinese periodicals such as “People’s Daily” and Romanian newspapers like “Scânteia”, 
official voice of the Romanian Communist Party or “Magazin istoric”, issued articles 
relating to Sino-Romanian relations and Chinese and Romanian foreign policy affairs.  
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 II. Historical Background  
and Sino-Romanian Earliest Ties 
Even though many academics still consider the 5th of October 1949 as the official date that 
marked the beginning of Sino-Romanian relations, other historians and scholars, in regard 
to the relationship between the two countries, bare in mind one specific date in tracing back 
the official contacts between Romania and China, and that is the years 1880-1881. A high 
number of letters, conveying the message of Romania's independence to the world, was sent 
between 8/20 April 1880 by Prince Carol I to different heads of state, including the Chinese 
emperor. The document, notifying the state's independence - achieved in the aftermath of 
the 1877-1878 Russo-Turkish war, and recognised by the great European powers through 
the Treaty of Berlin in July 1978 - represented a “guaranty of security for the general 
interests on the Low Danube (…) I think (Carol I) that I convince you that the interests of 
all powers is to peacefully develop and regulate European affairs, to successfully crown the 
efforts and the generous sacrifice of a people already acknowledged in the large family of 
the sovereign states” .  14
Hence, on the 22nd of July 1880, on Romanian's Minister of Foreign Affairs demand, Vasile 
Boerescu,  Romania's Minister Plenipotentiary to Paris Mihail Kogălniceanu (1817-1891) 
handed in to the Chinese representative in Paris the official letter signed by Prince Carol I 
and addressed to the Chinese Emperor Guang Xu (1875-1908), informing him not only 
about Romania being a new independent state, but also about his wish to establish friendly 
relations between the two countries . Endowed with high diplomatic skills and very 15
appreciated by the Qing government, the Chinese Minister to Paris, Zheng Jize - who had 
been dealing with the territorial issues between the Qing Empire and Russia and had 
successfully signed a Sino - Russian Treaty in February 1881, that allowed China to regain 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity by reconquering some if its territories in spite of 
Russia - was the one to receive Kogălniceanu's letter and to send another one in  response, 
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 on the 13th of January 1881. It appeared that the response letter was sent while he was in a 
mission in Saint Petersburg, then the Russian capital, and the Romanian Legation in Paris, 
led by Kogălniceanu, delivered it to Prince Carol I. The content of the letter, signed by 
Prince Kong and not by the Chinese Emperor, communicated that:  “(...) because of the 
Sovereign being a minor and through the marquise Zheng in mission to Petersburg,  it's 
Highness Prince Kong, the uncle of the Chinese Emperor, and other high officials of the 
Empire, asked me to have the good will to present to Your Highness, Prince Carol I, the 
Emperor's congratulations and warmly greetings for the country's and people's of Romania 
prosperity and well being” . Henceforward, while authors like Anna Eva Budura have seen 16
in the exchange of messages between the representatives of the two countries an official, 
mutual recognition of the two states, representing a positive will of the governments - no 
matter distances and largeness - to interact with each other, and, why not, a first diplomatic 
achievement in the history of the two countries' relationship, academics like Ion Buzatu 
considered  Prince Kong's signature in the response letter, instead of that of Emperor Guang 
Xu, as carrying two different diplomatic relevances.  
On the one hand, in his opinion, considering the Chinese “masters in protocol and 
ceremonial issues (…) highly tying them to the country's dignity and to the reflection of at 
least an equal position towards their foreigner interlocutors  - they believed that, at the 
letter sent from the Romanian counterpart, and signed by a prince (not by a king or an 
emperor), must be replied with a letter signed by a high dignitary, with the same rank, that 
being Prince Kong, the Emperor's Guang Xu uncle (...)” .  17
On the other hand, he argues that it is in Chinese tradition that the head of the state 
(emperor or president regardless), as Son of Heaven and supreme symbol, deals with the 
most important decisions and state manifestations, and managing the daily affairs of the 
Empire cannot be regarded as one of his tasks. Moreover, according to Buzatu,  in different 
historical periods, the emperor has had a prime minister to deal with these issues, and at that 
 Budura Anna Eva, “Primii diplomați chinezi în Occident”, în Revista Română de Studii Eurasiatice, Anul 16
II, nr. 1-2/2006, Ovidiu University Press, Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Dambovita, pg. 162; Ion Buzatu, “Istoria 
relațiilor României cu China din cele mai vechi timpuri până în zilele noastre”, Meteor Press, București, 2004, 
p. 62
 Ion Buzatu, “Istoria Relațiilor României cu China din cele mai vechi Timpuri pânǎ în Zilele Noastre”, 17
Meteor Press, București 2004, pp. 62-63
 44
 time it was Prince Kong who tackled with the daily internal and external matters of the 
Imperial Chancellery. Furthermore, he states, one should take into account that in 
1880-1881, the Emperor Guang Xu was a minor (he was only 10 years old) and completely 
understanding his mother's influenced, the dowager empress Ci Xi, who was in fact the 
Chinese sovereign, ruling for almost half a century, 1852-1908. Whether both perspectives 
are right or wrong, or one is right while the other one is wrong, is not an issue to be 
examined here. However, in order to have a deeper, ideal understanding of the content of 
the letter nuances and the meaning of this having been signed by the prince and not the 
emperor, one should first have an insight of the historical context within which both the 
countries, Romania and China found themselves when relations were triggered.  
Therefore, only by taking into consideration and always bearing in mind the decisive 
processes that marked, transformed and revolutionised the historical, political, social and 
cultural background in the two countries in that specific time-frame, that finally led to the 
realisation of the Chinese and Romanian modern nation-states, that one can tackle with the 
various aspects of Sino - Romanian relations before 1949. Furthermore, it will be 
demonstrated, again through the analysis of the historical context in both countries, how 
important and relevant this has been especially when dealing with the “gap” in Sino - 
Romanian diplomatic ties between 1881-1928, 1930-1939. Generally, the one hundred years 
between the beginning of the 19th and 20th century, stood for a world in crisis and 
revolutions, for a global condition of decline and collision of empires and the consequent 
foundation of nation-states, but it also stood for the rise of nationalism as “the driving force 
behind imperialism”  practiced by the European powers (Great Britain, France, Portugal) 18
and the United States, and materialised through the creation of colonial empires in Asia, 
Africa and Latin America.  
On the one hand, in 1820's, China entered an important period of its history, which only 
ended in 1912. It was indeed, during these ninety years of European expansionism, that 
China saw in foreign affairs, a growing influence of Western powers aiming at turning it 
 Prasenjit Duara, “The new imperialism and the post-colonial developmental state: Manchukuo in 18
comparative perspective” , The Asia Pacific Journal, Vol. 4, Issue 1, 04 Jan, 2006
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 into a colony . Therefore, the year 1912 not only meant the collapse of the Imperial Qing 19
Dynasty, the last one to govern China, but the destruction of the unity of the empire under 
the direct military challenge of Western powers, British and French in primis. However, it is 
compulsory at this point to add that, together with the European imperialism in Asia, there 
were some other, extremely important factors that led to the fall of the Qing Empire and the 
transition to a modern statehood. In the first years of the 19th century in home affairs, China 
started to experience social turmoil and economic fracturing, and the harsh struggles 
between “modernisers” and traditionalists, that in the end led the country to the republican 
era, couldn't have been avoided.   
On the other hand, after centuries of conflicts and wars fought against the Ottoman Empire, 
while seeking to protect themselves from Austria-Hungary and the Tsarist Empire dominion 
aspirations, in the middle of the 19th century the Romanian Principalities witnessed 
different insurrections, nationalist movements and social revolutions following the 
European pattern for the achievement of civil liberties, social and economic reforms, 
emancipation, and in the case of Romania, independence from foreign rule. Hence, if in 
1859 Alexandru Ioan Cuza accomplished the Union of the two Principalities of Wallachia 
and Moldavia, in 1866, Prince Carol I of the House of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen was 
announced ruler of the United Principalities, a valuable and essential political figure chosen 
to guarantee and safeguard the Prussian support for the achievement of the Romanian 
independence. In fact, in 1877, he would lead the Romanian army in the Russo-Turkish war, 
that would induce the Romanian independence and its acknowledgment in the international 
arena. Henceforward, the acquisition of state independence represented the legitimate 
equality of all sovereign states, with a profound moral significance, firstly because it 
upraised the consciousness of a free Romanian nation in a time defined by the affirmation 
of national will, and secondly as it finally enabled the realisation of Romania's Great Union 
in 1918 and its development as a unitary, absolute modern state.  
   Wolfram Eberhard, “A History of China”, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, 1969, 19
p. 147
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 II.1 The foundation of modern Romania 
I should remark from the very beginning, that the bygone days of Romania - not for all 
peaceful and perfect but, on the contrary, restless and troubled - bespeak, from the dawn, a 
long lasting struggle, namely a series of conflicts, wars and confrontations between the 
Dacians (part of the Getae) affiliated to the Thracians - residing in Dacia - and the multitude 
of barbaric populations that invaded and occupied the territory. For reasons of simplicity, I 
will only mention them chronologically: the Romans until 275, the Goths until the 4th 
century, the Huns, the Gepids, the Avars - with slavic items, until  the 8th century, the 
Pechenegs, the Cumans and the Uzes until the 14th century , when the Romanian 20
principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia were founded (1310 and 1353 respectively).  
Of these migrating populations, the ones that actually managed to reside close to the local 
inhabitants, were the Gothic, Hunnish and Avar Empires, and last but not least, the Slavs. 
The territory of nowadays Transylvania instead, turned into a considerably autonomous 
component of the Kingdom of Hungary by the 11th century and it stayed that  way until the 
16th century, when it evolved, for a short while, into an independent Principality of 
Transylvania. Both the independent principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia had to face the 
dominant military force of the Ottoman Empire seeking for expansionism, in order to 
preserve their independence, ethnicity and religion, but ultimately, they both fell under its 
sovereignty (in the 15th century Wallachia and the 16th century Moldavia). Nevertheless, 
since 1542 - when practically the entire today’s Hungary (thus Transylvania too), as well as 
the Balkan peninsula had fallen under Ottoman rule - the three principalities carried out an 
administration that, by and large, enjoyed  internal autonomy .    21
Tout de suite, I need to draw the attention to one special event in the early modern period of 
Romania's history. The year 1600 envisioned, for the first time and for a short while, the 
three principalities of Wallachia, Transylvania and Moldavia, united under the rule of 
 “Romanian history”, Unirea, Australian Romanian Community Inc., at http://unirea.org.au/index.php/blog/20
item/42-romanian-history, accessed on 5.01.2013
 Ibidem21
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 Michael the Brave, Prince of Wallachia. Owing to his notably personal skills, he pursued his 
interests by signing first an effective treaty with the Ottoman Empire that, on the one hand 
bound him to recognise the Ottoman sovereignty and to pay them the tribute but, on the 
other, urged the Ottoman Empire to approve the lifetime dominion of the voivode. 
Simultaneously, he signed a second alliance, this time with the Habsburg Emperor Rudolf 
II. By acknowledging the latter's sovereignty, he was actually guaranteed the legacy of his 
reign as a prince and a necessary financial aid for the maintenance of his army. In Romanian 
literature, this episode would time and again be interpreted as an attempt to unite the 
Romanian territories on the basis of an already enlightened political consciousness of 
Michael the Brave, “prince of Wallachia, Transylvania and the entire Moldavia” , as he 22
used to call himself.  
This kind of discourse, that sees him as the harbinger of a modern Romania, depicts the 
prince as perfectly aware of the importance of his actions and certain that only the union, in 
harmony with the Orthodox religion morale, as a binder of political union of all Romanians 
under one sceptre, would bring his people to freedom from Ottoman domination or 
Habsburg and Polish interference. Thence, it is evident that this approach takes for granted 
the existence of concepts such the unity of the ethnic groups, language and religion in the 
three Romanian principalities. As this work does not try to elucidate if the union of the three 
Romanian principalities under Michael the Brave, has been the first aspiration to constitute 
a modern Romanian nation state, I will not argue the position above, but I will just point out 
some relevant information that will place some questions on the accuracy of the existing 
narrative and maybe, will bring up some points for future research on this topic. 
First of all, when dealing with this argument, or generally when depicting natural episodes 
in Romanian history, Romanian historiography discourses (as part of a larger Southeast 
European-Balkan trend when tackling with principles like national consciousness, 
nationalist ideology or the foundation of nation-states) often tend to avoid, and sometimes 
even eliminate Romania's history dejected fragments. Therefore, while Western collective 
memory is concerned about the revelation and communication of a pure, sincere knowledge 
 “Prima unire în timpul lui Mihai Viteazul, începutul regimului fanariot, Unirea Din Timpul Lui A. I. Cuza, 22
referat” at http://www.referatele.com/referate/istorie/online19/Prima-unire-in-timpul-lui-Mihai-viteazul--
inceputul-regimului-fanariot--UNIREA-DIN-TIMPUL-LUI-ALEXAN.php  , accessed on 25.05.2013
 48
 of the past throughout a de-codification of the key elements that put a light on the 
particularities of the historical progression, Eastern theories have focused for centuries to 
depict the past throughout the lenses of a state bureaucracy and its undeniable features, that 
is a rigid and authoritarian education and knowledge .  23
Secondly, the universal presence of the intricate antithesis between authentic historical 
discourses and ideology (or the desired political purpose) in the analysis of historical 
events:  the Union of the three Principalities,  that “generated” the sentiment of Romania's 
national unity has been long debated and frequently used as a pretence to legitimate power. 
Even if we considered aspects such as the argued, but surely stunning, political rise of the 
Romanian prince born to a Greek mother, and his industrious strategies to fight the 
Ottomans and gain support for his recognition as prince of Wallachia, Transylvania and 
Moldavia, to be sufficient in delineating the national hero figure, it would still be a 
pretentious or unrealistic articulation of his actions being drawn by an active awareness of 
uniting under one nation, the mostly non-educated Romanian speakers living there. 
Moreover, the national hero figure is unintentionally put to question by the great Romanian 
historian and politician Nicolae Iorga, who, in the thick of his work “Istoria lui Mihai 
Viteazul” (“History of Michael the Brave”), acquaints us with the fact that, at his death, he 
was mourned by no one, his tomb was not surrounded by people feeling gratitude, and 
during life he was not popular .  24
Hence, the personality of Michael the Brave could be best contextualised by considering 
arguments such as the origin, the formation and the unity of the Romanian people, subdued 
to mythification by the Romanian historiography . By applying the binary interpretation, 25
history - ideology/political purpose, the mythification process specific to (Romanian) 
historiography, reconstructs the prince and transforms him into a symbol; thus, the hero, 
 Victor Neumann, “Neam și popor: noțiunile etnocentrismului românesc”, în Victor Neumann, Armin 23
Heinen, “Istoria României prin concepte - perspective alternative asupra limbajelor social-politice”, Polirom, 
București, 2010, pp. 379-400
 Nicolae Iorga, “Istoria lui Mihai Viteazul”, 2 vol., Bucureşti, 1935, p. 17824
  Lucian Boia, “Istorie și mit în conștiința românească”, București, Humanitas, 2011, p. 11125
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 after having experienced a process of naturalisation, almost embraces sacredness . 26
For my third and last consideration, I must look into Claudio Minca’s “Spazio e 
Politica” (“Space and Politics”), for he gives an outstanding definition of the territorial 
states, in contrast with the later to be achieved modern nation-states. Throughout this 
perspective, it becomes clear what the event of 1600 actually represented, and that is the 
unification, by the hand of Michael the Brave, of a territory (state) in which it would have 
been possible and easier to exercise political power, and definitely not an attempt to create 
the modern nation-state, which only arose centuries later.  As Minca pointed out, albeit the 
1648 Westfalia treaty has been regarded as the event that officially symbolised the 
foundation of modern states in Europe, “it is important to underline that, already half a 
century ago, a series of treaties and alliances (…) had already given birth to the first forms 
of territorial unification, destined to transform, in their complete form, in compact states, 
close to each other. The unification and the unity of the territory become the fundamental 
prerequisite to advance pretence of elusive exercise of power in a determined territory. 
Simultaneously, the sovereignty in a determined territory, becomes the fundamental 
principle for the organisation, legitimacy and exercise of the political power” .  27
Moreover, considered the wars conducted by the Ottoman Empire and consequently, the 
expansion of their dominion in that area, the purpose of the efficient treaties signed by 
Michael the Brave with both the Ottomans and the House of Habsburg just half a century 
prior to the Treaty of Westfalia, are also valuably explained with Minca's approach, who 
considers that “the combination between sovereignty and territory, implicated in the idea of 
State, creates (…) a new form of power, associated to a new spatial representation and a 
new legitimacy. Hence, the Treaty of Westfalia consecrates these principles and produces 
the first basis for the definition and acknowledgement of an “interstatal” law. In that 
occasion, in fact, it is permanently ratified the right for every State to exercise its 
sovereignty on its own territory, and the principle according to which the interference in the 
 Idem, p. 7726
 Claudio Minca, “Spazio e politica”, CEDAM, Padova, 2006, p. 86, Personal translation27
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 “internal affairs” of another state wouldn't have been allowed further.”   28
For different reasons, the unity of the three Romanian principalities didn't last long. Firstly, 
history reveals that the process of unification was not beforehand planned, nor organised, 
therefore it encountered powerful resistance from the inside (local leaders from the 
principalities) as well as from the outside (the Habsburg Empire - strongly interested in 
Transylvania, Poland's desire for control in Moldavia  and the Ottoman Empire's constant 
will for domination in Wallachia; he would actually die on Habsburg Emperor Rudolf II's 
command, previously an ally).  
Secondly, European powers, that were plenty benefitting from having the Ottomans’ war 
fought in these territories (especially in Wallachia) and far enough from their borderlines, 
could not have been very satisfied to acknowledge the emergence of a new, vast and quite 
powerful state in Eastern Europe. However, bringing together for the first time and for a 
short while in history, the three Romanian regions under one ruler, have surely contributed 
to provide after centuries, the necessary tools for the 1848 revolution, and hereafter, the 
apparatus of propaganda and mass communication, fundamental for the realisation of the 
Romanian modern nation-state (first, the 1859 Union of Wallachia and Moldavia under 
Alexandru Ioan Cuza, and ultimately, the 1918 accomplishment of Greater Romania). 
During the “oriental question” , a vulnerable Ottoman Empire immediately led Moldavian 29
and Wallachian rulers to promote a skilful policy, aiming the emancipation from the Turkish 
rule. They initiated negotiations with Austria and Russia, resulting in treaties which, on the 
one hand, kept the territorial integrity of the principalities, while, on the other, crystallised a 
concrete liberation program  from Turkish domination. Nonetheless, the Ottoman Empire's 
crisis for authority did not regard the only territory of the Roman principalities, on the 
contrary, it spread to the larger South-Eastern socio-economic and political context . 30
All along, I have tried to detect the major episodes that, with the decline of the Turkish 
  Ibidem28
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 dominion, started towards the beginning of the 18th century, had transformed the Romanian 
principalities into the battlefield between the Austrian and Tsarist Empires. However, aware  
of the Habsburg and Russian threatening ambitions for imperialism, and for a better security 
of its stance, the Ottoman Empire took immediately a stand and thus changed the sway 
apparatus in both Wallachia and Moldavia (the principalities that were still enjoying an 
independent administration and the practice of Orthodox religion).  
At once, the procedures for the replacement of the native princes were initiated, and the 
domestic ruling class substituted. From 1711 in Moldavia and 1715 in Wallachia, without 
consideration for autochthon boyars' perspective or public opinion, rulers from the Greek 
district of Constantinopole (Fanur) were brought, designated and progressively given the 
sceptre of the two principalities. In historiography, this period, that started in the Danubian 
principalities in 1711 and lasted until Tudor Vladimirescu's Wallachian Uprising of 1821, 
would be remembered as the Fanariot regime . 31
Anyhow, with regard to the emergence of national sentiments, the Revolution of 1821 led 
by Tudor Vladimirescu, needs to be given considerable consideration, as it perfectly fuses 
with the broader social and national movements that shook the world between the 18th and 
the 19th century. As a matter of fact, not only did all movements have common goals, such 
as independence, freedom and national unity, proclaimed by the American revolution of 
1783 and the French revolution of 1789, but they were so intertwined and interconnected 
throughout the proliferation of Western European culture, that already in 1784, during the 
Revolt of Horea, Cloșca and Crișan, the leader Horea (or Nicola Ursu) expressed the same 
principles. These principles would also be exposed later on, in “Supplex Libellus 
Valachorum”, the most important political document of the Romanians in Transylvania that 
delineated their demands in the struggle for political and national independence.  
The memorandum generally expressed the Romanians’ requests that offensive appellatives 
like tolerated had to be cancelled, that Romanian nation should see its legal and religious 
rights accomplished, as well as its recognition as equal to the Hungarian nation, whose 
 “Regimul fanariot în Țara Românească și Moldova” at https://www.scribd.com/doc/47804433/Regimul-31
fanariot-in-Tara-Romaneasca-si-Moldova accessed on 05.01.2013
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 lawfulness was esteemed .  32
Moreover, both the Greek-Catholic as well as Orthodox cleric, the nobles, the rural and the 
urban plebe, should enjoy the same privileges as other nations while, in the Transylvanian 
Diet, the Romanian nation ought to be represented by a number of people proportional with 
the number of the population itself .  33
In 1791, a first petition of the “Supplex Libellus Valachorum”, was sent to the Austrian 
Emperor Leopold II, however with no efficiency.  The main point of the petition movement 
had previously been dealt with by Ion Micu's extensive struggle for the Romanian national 
movement in Transylvania, throughout an organised activity extended over time and his 
privileged position in the Diet of Transylvania (where more than 90% were the 
representatives of the three privileged nations and less than 10% was conceded to Romanian 
representatives) .  34
Still, the Greek Catholic Bishop of Blaj never managed to have his petitions accepted by the 
Austrian Emperor and was consequently forced to exile in Rome; hence, the concessions 
made to Romanian population remained insignificant for a long time. Despite his failure in 
the battle to obtain equal rights for Romanians in Transylvania, importantly enough, the 
principle of nation has always been the core of Micu's thesis, in which he intensely 
sustained that Romanian national claims were natural and legitimate, based on arguments 
such as the Romanian nation being the oldest and largest amongst the four; for the first time 
in history, Transylvanian Romanians' demands were promoted throughout this approach. 
Moreover, when introducing the idea of nation, the issue he considered fundamental was 
knowledge - that enriched people, rendered humans' nature superior, and awakened the 
conscience - therefore he fought constantly for the cause of culture and education .  35
 Ana Ene, “Supplex Libellus Valachorum Transilvaniae. Aspecte ale modernităţii discursului retoric”, 32
Universitatea Transilvania Brașov, 2016
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 Returning to the Ist Supplex of 1791 sent to the Habsburg Emperor, that attacked all the 
fundamental issues in the foundation of a Romanian political nation, by meaning to provide 
the principality of Transylvania with a legitimate structure, it becomes clear why the Diet 
refused to accept it. Asserting that Romanians “already enjoyed full rights, with a sufficient 
representation in the Diet, and a new nation would have only overthrown the whole system, 
the issue was closed with the maintenance of an unchanged constitutional system” . 36
However, the Romanian elite that had contributed to the realisation of these petitions, would 
find the way to express the national movements ideologies, that could not have been 
accomplished politically, if they had not been achieved culturally (as the basis for the 
Romanian ideology processes).  
All in all, the concept of unity of the Romanian people developed for the first time in an 
international context coated by an unyielding struggle for renewal and change of  the staled 
18th century dogmas. Generally, thinkers and scholars' ideologies led to battles for the 
national cause and the crystallisation of self-consciousness of the Romanian nation in 
Transylvania .  37
As stated, these revolutionary movements were dominated by social or national objectives, 
and sometimes, by both: the 19th century Romanian liberation movements must be read in 
terms of slow mutations that prepare the world (and thus, the Romanian principalities) for 
the processes of establishment of new, modern liberal patterns, and the abolishment of 
feudal structures obstructing the societal development that would, in the end, replace the 
religion-based absolute authority of the monarch with the authority of a representative 
parliamentary-supported-law. Under the influence of Western political factors, the 
Romanian society too, witnessed the crystallisation of a self-consciousness that materialised 
in the revolutions of 1821 and 1848 .  38
During this aeon, the Ottoman crisis deepened forward and the Empire's structures resulted 
 “Supplex Libellus Valachorum”, Enciclopedia României, available at http://enciclopediaromaniei.ro/wiki/36
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 more and more obsolete, especially in comparison with the Christian sway, enlightened and 
reinvigorated by the endorsement of reforms following both the American (1783) and 
French (1789) revolutions. For example, the field that witnessed notable transformations as 
a result of an enhanced freedom, and reached the whole European continent (the Romanian 
principalities, under Ottoman monopoly included), was trade. The West, like England and 
France, were increasing their interest in the commercial prospects of the Black Sea and 
Danube area: on the one hand, they were looking for new markets for their products, on the 
other, they pursued the purchase of raw materials and grains, increasingly needed in the 
West. Therefore, Russia and Austria, that were looking for hegemony in the region and were 
preparing the annexation of the Romanian principalities, found an unexpected adversary in 
the two European states, which were interested in exploiting the principalities’ resources. In 
conjunction with the peace talks between the Ottoman and Christian Empires,  throughout 
various petitions remitted to the latter, Romanian nobleman demanded the reestablishment 
of the internal autonomy, and most importantly, the restoration of domestic reigns.  
Moreover, the introduction of consulates by the West, in the last two decades of the 18th 
century in Bucharest and Iași constituted an important step in the struggle to diminish 
Ottoman exploitation and in creating an awareness, among European intelligentsia, of an 
earnest Romanian principalities' question. Hence, from now on, neither Russia nor Austria 
could decide alone the future of the principalities, without the great European powers' 
interference . Therefore, “in the aftermath of the Congress of Vienna (1815) that had 39
divided the areas of dominance in Europe within the Great Powers, the Romanian 
Principalities' position evolved between a more theoretical than practical Ottoman 
suzerainty and an increasingly oppressive Tsarist protectorate” .  40
In the international arena, the Romanian revolutionary movement of 1821 was not 
uncommon, on the contrary, it perfectly fitted the broader, clashing, Balkan context: 
favoured by an undermined Ottoman Empire, different nations - such as the Serbs, Greeks, 
Bulgarians and Albanians - began to fight for their freedom. In the Romanian principalities, 
 Ibidem39
 Ibidem, personal translation40
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 on the eve of Tudor Vladimirescu's revolution, the internal context was authoritative in 
generating the insurgency of the masses: under the Fanariot regime, all Romanians - 
peasants, bourgeois, small proprietors and an important part of the boyars - were 
impoverished and burdened by obligations to the Greek princes, hence to the Ottoman 
Empire. Supported by the Church, the movement leaded by a prosperous man, who had 
experienced a proper education and had benefitted from his travels to Europe - aimed from 
the beginning the abolishment of the Fanariot system and the restoration of a new social, 
administrative and economic order, under a Romanian prince, that would have provided the 
principalities with the felicitous independence.  
The general dissatisfaction of the population was so huge that it didn't take long before 
Tudor Vladimirescu , with a positive reaction from “nationalistic” boyars, formed an army 
of more than 16,000 soldiers . However, the boyars’ agreement should not be regarded as a 41
nationalistic milestone in Romanian’ history, as it represented nothing more than their 
attempt to regain power after having almost completely lost it during the Fanariot regime. 
More than that, Tudor Vladimirescu's historical representation has suffered transformations 
in light of some sources that have depicted him as soldier for the Tsarist Empire during the 
1806-1812 Russo-Turkish war, gaining significant warfare experience for the forthcoming 
revolution. Sometimes these accounts go even further, and state that the 1821 Romanian 
rebellion was actually instrumented by the Tsarist Empire with Vladimirescu's support, in 
its attempt to undercut the provinces under Ottoman control .   42
In a nutshell, surrounded by his large army, Vladimirescu reached Bucharest, where he was 
acclaimed like a leader by the crowds. Nevertheless, after having there enabled a new 
political regime for a short period of time by means of a military-based organisation, he was 
forced to retreat by the Turks, and was finally captured and executed by the Filiki Eteria 
(Society of Friends), a secret organisation coordinating the Greek revolution against the 
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 Ottoman rule of Greece . Although Tudor Vladimirescu's uprising saw its end shortly after 43
its emergence, it still succeeded in making the Ottoman Empire replace in 1822, the 
Phanariot rulers with two native boyars, Ioniță Sandu Sturdza and Grigore IV Ghica as 
princes of Moldavia and Wallachia respectively, ceasing the Phanariot regime in the two 
principalities.  
If the 1821 revolution didn't yet represent the first stage towards the Romanian 
principalities' socio-political transformation, the 1826 Akkerman (Cetatea Albă) Convention 
definitely did; in fact, among other things, it established that domestic self-government was 
to be reestablished in the principalities, while the leaders had to be chosen for seven years 
among the local boyars, and could not be displaced without Russian consent, granting 
therefore an intensification of the Tsarist leverage in the Romanian principalities and the 
Balkans. However, the failure to comply with the provisions of the Convention, led to the 
1829 Treaty of Adrianopole between the Tsarist and Ottoman Empires, which solidified the 
advantage of the first in Wallachia and Moldavia over the weakened dominion of the latter; 
hence, if on the one hand, the Treaty provided the Romanian principalities with complete 
administrative autonomy in respect to the Ottoman Empire, on the other, it officially 
entrusted Russia with an intact protectorate over the two regions that aimed at their 
transformation into Russian provinces (guberniya) .  44
In spite of that, internationally, the most interesting result of this particular legal situation 
was determined by the introduction in 1831-1832, by the Russian imperial authorities, of 
the organic Regulation  in the two principalities, which established the separation of 45
powers in state and instituted a General Assembly, having as president the Russian general 
Pavel Kisselef, a council of ministers, a bureaucracy, a tax and educational system and an 
army extended over the whole territory of the two principalities. Considered a symbol of 
transition from feudalism towards the modern age by authors like Florin Negoiță , this law 46
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 inevitably opened up a process of political transformation which, on the one hand, led to a 
concentration of power in the class of the boyars, and on the other, allowed the development 
of the manufacturing industry and greater movement of goods and people.  
However, more often than not, the boyars' excellent conditions, granted by the 18th-19th 
century free trade regime and their ambition to sell huge amounts of agricultural products 
on foreign markets, deteriorated the conditions of peasants by increasing their labor service, 
and limited their existence to the exclusive workforce needed to comply with the landlords' 
requests. In this context, the boyars Mihăița Vodă Sturdza in Moldavia, as well as 
Alexandru Ghica and Gheorghe Bibescu in Wallachia were sometimes found fault by 
domestic liberals for not standing the Russian constrains. Resultantly, part of the leaders of 
the anti-Russian opposition took the matter in their own hands, by spreading news in the 
West (London and Paris generally) about the Danubian Principalities' situation and raising 
the Great Powers' interest in reshaping the two territories' economic and cultural 
framework. Moreover, in this context, not only representatives or leaders of the opposition 
took a stance, but numerous young people as well, who went abroad to study especially in 
France, absorbed, beyond question, the liberal ideas that resulted in the patriotic movement 
of 1848 .   47
Thus, if in the international arena, the revolutions of 1848-1849 have been a natural hold up 
of the 1789 French revolution, demanding for significant transformations in the societal 
structure and launching a new stage for modernisation in areas such as industry, agriculture, 
education, administration, demography and security, in the Romanian principalities, the 
1848 upheaval could be regarded as the legitimate perpetuation of  the 1821 revolution's 
ideologies. The “Springtime of the Peoples” - term also used to refer to the liberal 
movements of  1948 - that emerged in France against the monarchy and immediately spread 
to Germany, Italy and the Austrian Empire, was awakened both by socio-political dialectic, 
insisting on individual liberties (France) and national premises (Germany, Italy, Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Croatia, Romanian principalities), calling specifically for the phasing out 
of the foreign domination, emancipation and ultimately, for the national unification; 
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 moreover, the European rebellions did not only chase common goals, but were organised 
and methodised by liberal groups (electorate) constituted in secret societies, and relied on 
the middle class as leading participants.  
In the Romanian principalities, the revolution that saw the participation of bourgeoisie, 
nobility, townsmen and peasantry, had, first of all, nationalistic principles, delineated by the 
existence of oppressive political regimes (Ottoman sovereignty and Tsarist protectorate in 
Wallachia and Moldavia, as well as the Habsburg domination in Transylvania, Banat and 
Bukovina), and secondly, it contemplated political and social motivations (lack of peoples 
rights and freedoms, of agrarian reform, the existence of social privileges and constraints 
for the peasants). Conclusively, the Romanian society, that had witnessed a chronological 
transformation of the collective consciousness, inaugurated by the Roman origin tradition 
and later observed throughout the lenses of Orthodoxism, as primary feature of the 
Bizantin's civilisation influence, perceived the rise of a Romanian national consciousness 
and political emancipation towards the middle of the 19th century (Boia 2011: 112). 
If in the international arena, the formation of modern nations was acknowledged between 
the end of the eighteen and the beginning of the 19th century, the shaping of a Romanian 
nation, encompassed in the larger European context of socio-political and economic 
reformation, was closely related to the modernisation process of the Romanian social 
system that, as mentioned, had begun under internal pressure during the Phanariot regime. 
Hence, primary agents of the new national community, like culture, school, or church have 
constituted the foundation of the Romanian nation, in a time when political stability was 
unimaginable due to the foreign occupation of the Romanian principalities. Different 
Romanian personalities of the time, as well as youngsters educated in France, Vienna or 
Rome (that created the Romanian Students’ Society in Paris and actively participated in the 
1848 French revolution), longing for social and national emancipation, have struggled for 
two crucial political goals, that is unity and independence, and grounded their political 
programs for modernisation in the specific Roman-Latin legacy and unity of the Romanian 
people . 48
In this context, the articulation of the Romanian Enlightenment especially in Transylvania, 
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 has been Ṣcoala Ardeleană (the “Transylvanian School”), a cultural and national movement 
that emerged in the beginning of the 18th century, in line with the universal progress of the 
human and exact sciences. During this period, Romanian scholars, philologists and 
historians (as Samuel Micu, Petru Maior, Gheorghe Ṣincai and Ion Budai-Deleanu)  have 49
tried to prove the historical rights of the Romanian people by demonstrating their pure 
origin through the authentication of Romanian as a Latin language firstly, and by displaying 
the continuity of Romanian features in Transylvania and Romanians agreement with the 
Magyars (that provided the first with the same rights as the latter), secondly.  
Moreover, historiography intervenes just to clarify what was already acknowledged. Hence, 
as Lucian Boia perfectly explained in “Istorie și mit in constiința românească”, until the 
middle of the 19th century, the historical discourse, based on Roman episode and Latin 
arguments, has been extensively nationalistic, and the political purpose was that to 
smoothly integrate it into a larger Western network. Only later, he informs us, would the 
nationalists witness their break into two wings, that is the Westernizers and traditionalists 
that aimed for the preservation of Romanian traditions and the removal of foreign 
influences, consequently giving rise to the dualistic concept of “others” (Boia 2011: 112).  
To sum up, the national program of the 1848 revolution in the three Romanian principalities 
has actually resumed the long term nationalistic program of the 1791 Supplex Libellus 
Valachorum (as one of many similar documents formulated by Romanian scholars within 
the Transylvanian School), fighting for the social and national cause throughout a well 
organised movement and coherent cooperation between the leaders in Wallachia, 
Transylvania and Moldavia. It is interesting at this point, to call the attention to a particular 
moment in the 1848 revolution in Transylvania, and that is the huge mass of peasants 
reunited at Blaj Liberty  Field, calling for unification with their brothers on the other side of 
the Carpathian Mountains, and shouting “We want to unite with the country” .  50
In fact, it was the principality of Transylvania under Habsburg authority, that witnessed a 
longer and challenging 1848 upheaval, as soon as the Magyars in Transylvania - having 
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 learned about Hungary's wish to declare her independence - decided to fuse Transylvania 
and Hungary together, without considering the  aspirations and dissent of other nations 
living in the territory, such as Romanians and Saxons. Consequently, this situation led to the 
formation of two opposition camps and a civil war: on the one hand there were the Magyars 
in Hungary and Transylvania, longing for a greater Hungary, and on the other there were the 
Austrian Empire, Transylvanian Saxons and Romanians standing up for national causes.  
In the long run however, it represented the groundwork for the unification under Alexandru 
Ioan Cuza elven years later, that generated a new type of consolidation, based on the 
modern approach to the state (people's sovereignty, the principle of separation of powers in 
state, the theory of social contract) and on a new standard of relations between the state and 
the individual (on the one hand, citizens provided with rights by the state and on the other, 
producing and contributing for the welfare of the state).  
Just five years after the 1848 revolutions, another confrontation shook the world. 
Considered one of the first modern armed conflicts, the Crimean war (1853-1856) that 
surged between the Russian Empire on the one hand and Ottoman, British, French Empires 
and Sardinia on the other, has conventionally represented the struggle for control over the 
Holy Lands (part of the Ottoman Empire), but what was actually put into practice in the 
Crimean peninsula battlefield were diplomatic and military strategies, geopolitics . While 51
France promoted the rights of Roman Catholics, Russia - in its search to heckle or at least 
reduce the Ottoman influence over the Balkans and thus over the Romanian principalities - 
used the delicate matter of it being the guardian of the Eastern Orthodox Church in 
opposition to the Muslim Ottoman's control of Jerusalem and other places sacred to both 
Christians and Muslims. After three years of dreadful combats, that brought to the Great 
Powers' attention the Oriental Question again, the war ended with the Allied victory, and the 
Peace Treaty elaborated by the Congress of Paris (1856) yearned to set up the basis for a 
new European order, having as a primary goal the pegging down of Russian strength and 
influence in South-Eastern Europe .  52
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 For the Romanian principalities, the Congress of Paris represented a significant moment, 
granting internationally the possibility for the principalities' future Unification throughout 
the abolition of the Tsarist protectorate and its replacement with the Great Powers’ joint 
pledge. In addition to this, the Congress determined the concession of Southern areas of 
Bessarabia (strategically important, for it controlled the mouth of the Danube river and 
access to the Black Sea) to the Moldavian Principality, thus estranging Russia from the 
Danube on the one hand, and providing the Great Central European Powers with 
considerable authority over the course of the river (throughout the rigorous supervision of 
the European Commission of the Danube river), on the other .  53
In this situation, while Russia could do nothing more but observe the maintenance of the 
Ottoman sovereignty in the Romanian principalities, the Great Powers shared different 
opinions and interests in regard to the principalities' unification prospect, plainly depending 
on their foreign policy strategies. In France, for example, Napoleon's III infallible principle 
of nations have had an incontestable favourable effect over France's representation, by 
repositioning it as European key pawn since the Congress of Vienna, 1815. Therefore, it 
was not unusual that in a broader context, the issue regarding each nation's right to decide 
its own destiny and in particular, the question concerning the Romanian principalities' 
unification under a foreign prince and the formation of an ample state in Eastern Europe, 
were brought up by France itself.  
On the contrary, Great Britain, the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires had different reasons 
to position themselves against the principalities' unification. Initially approving the union, 
Great Britain later lost strategic interest in the Danube region, once the Ottoman Empire 
guaranteed the neutrality of the straits, the Ottoman Empire feared that an event of this 
proportion could constitute a precedent, while the Habsburg’s disapproval reflected their 
assault on France . In the end, however, it was decided that the population of the two 54
Romanian principalities could determine their own destiny throughout the activity of their 
representative Ad hoc Divans, that were coordinated by church delegates, boyars, 
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 bourgeoisie and serfs and having the assignment to consult each other for the common fate 
of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.  
After a failed first attempt to unite the regions in 1857, the two Divans opted for unification 
under the protection of the Great Powers, that confirmed the preservation of the Ottoman 
rule and established the maintenance of two leaders, two governments and two parliaments 
and the principle of separation of powers in the state. At first glance, the decisions reflecting 
the Romanian principalities’ desire for unification and their embracement of a democratic 
political regime during the 1858 Convention in Paris, was pointed up by the resolution to 
inaugurate a foreign, European monarchy, with the intention to enhance extrinsic support. 
However, the Romanian principalities were constrained to accept the decisions of the 
European powers, materialised within the Paris Convention of 1858.  
Through an international act which only took partially into account the will of the people, 
fundamental standards relating to both the political and legal situation of the Principalities 
and their reorganisation, were settled. The Paris Convention that made valid the Romanian 
principalities’ unification under the name The United Principalities of Moldavia and 
Wallachia, not Romania as the Divans had requested - has thus become not only a 
Constitution (the second after the 1837 Organic Regulation) for the Romanian people, but a 
truly constitutional reference point.   
On that account, on the 5th of January 1859, Paris-educated Alexandru Ioan Cuza was 
elected Ruling Prince of Moldavia, and after the unionists made sure that the conservatives 
wouldn't mess with the elections in Wallachia and ascertained that the Paris Treaty's claims 
wouldn't reject the election of the same ruler in the two principalities, on the 24th of 
January, Alexandru Ioan Cuza was voted Prince of Wallachia as well. With the double 
election of the Ruling Prince, France, Great Britain, Russia and Prussia recognised the 
unification in haste, while the Sublime Porte and the Habsburg Empire would only 
acknowledge it later. During A. I. Cuza's three years’ rule, the governments of the two 
principalities would act homogeneously for the socio-economic and political modernisation 
throughout the consolidation of the unification, the implementation of a thorough reform 
program and the realisation of state institutions, suburb tribunals and the foundation of 
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 universities . Moreover, the unification of the military, providing a full defence of the 55
whole territory, was regarded by Alexandru Ioan Cuza, as a must for the United 
Principalities' preservation of independence. Externally, the principalities enjoyed a rather 
unrestricted foreign policy, outlined by the signing of various international agreements, for 
instance the foundation of the first diplomatic Romanian agency in Paris.  
So far I have tried to illustrate how the numerous events, such as revolutions, military 
confrontations, enabled mostly by the population's discontent  have led to a gradual 56
struggle for Romanians' unification in a nation state, reaching its second best outcome  in 57
1859, with the establishment of the United Principalities. Nevertheless, modernising 
legislative measures adopted by Alexandru Ioan Cuza were accompanied by some 
authoritarian tendencies, which earned him the enmity of all orientations' politicians.  
The beginning of 1863 was characterised by the delineation of a heterogeneous group, 
formed by radical liberals and conservatives, and called the “monstrous coalition”, 
demanding for Cuza's overthrow and the reinstatement of a foreign prince on the throne of 
the United Principalities. For both of the groups, Cuza's policy was inappropriate, hence, 
the induction of a coup d’état immediately resulted in Cuza's abdication and his 
replacement with ad-interim rulers .  58
The removal would produce different reactions within the European powers. While the 
Habsburg Empire called for the dissolution of the union, Russia and the Ottoman Porte used 
this occasion to ask for the United Principalities' separation and military occupation. 
Internally however, both Liberals and Conservatives were in favour of bringing a foreign 
prince on the throne of the Romanian Principalities, as a safe and effective solution to 
political and social stability. Hence, through France's interference and with Prussia's 
consent, Carol of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen - second son of Prince Karl Anton of 
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 Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen - was taken to the Romanian United Principalities, where he 
was proclaimed ruler after the referendum in April 1866 .  59
Presented with a fait accompli, Romanian political circles welcomed prince Carol in 
Bucharest on the morning of May 10th. He was proclaimed ruler by the Assembly, to which 
he swore the safeguard of Romania's law, rights and integrity. This time the Great Powers, 
divided by conflicting interests, officially accepted Carol I. The idea of a foreign prince 
ruling in the United Principalities had already been proposed by the boyars and through the 
resolutions of the 1857 ad-hoc Assembly, but ten years later this solution had multiple 
meanings.  
In the first place, it was a solution for the strengthening of the nation-state. considering that 
European powers had recognised the union of the principalities only during Cuza's rule. 
Secondly, it ensured internal stability by eliminating the conflicts of power. Thirdly, having 
a representative of a great European royal family on the United Principalities' throne, could 
have strengthen the country's prestige internationally by guaranteeing a sustained autonomy 
and preparing the ground for the acquisition of Romania's state independence.   
Following heated debates between Conservatives and Liberals, the new fundamental law 
was promulgated by Carol I on July 1st, 1866, representing the first Romanian internal 
Constitution, actually elaborated by the legitimate representatives of the nation. Inspired by 
the Belgian Constitution - yet ideas and ideals were basically French  - it was one of the 60
most democratic document in 19th century Europe, and its adoption represented a 
significant step forward on the path of modernisation of institutions, and their undeniable 
collocation in the network of the European 19th century transformations. More specifically, 
the fundamental act took into account the Romanian specific conditions, and covered a 
variety of issues, aiming at the society's development and modernisation: Romania's 
territory, substantial civil rights, national representatives (Parliament), the separation of 
powers in state, the Prince and his ministers' prerogatives, etc. By expressing the desire for 
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 independence, the Constitution officially proclaimed the name of Romania, did not allude to 
relations with the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers, and acknowledged that the 
Romanian state was a constitutional monarchy with a multiparty political system.  
The fundamental principles of the Constitution included: national sovereignty; 
representative and responsible government; democratic principle of separation of powers; 
ministerial accountability; hereditary monarchy; rights and freedoms for the nation. The 
fundamental act, perceived as a strong manifestation of independence and an input to the 
consolidation and modernisation of the Romanian nation-state remained valid until 1923.  
The year 1875 that saw the “Eastern Question” re-opened by means of the anti-Ottoman 
uprisings in Bosnia and Herzegovina, offered the opportunity for political and military 
struggles for independence. The crisis worsened in 1876, when Serbia and Montenegro 
declared war to the Porte, and Bulgarians started their liberation movement. In July, through 
a memorandum that had no effect, the Romanian government asked the Ottomans and the 
Great Powers to recognise the Romanian state's name and individuality. After different 
attempts to establish alliances, the idea of obtaining independence by dint of a war, was 
becoming more and more realistic within the Romanian political class, especially for Prime-
minister I. C. Brătianu and minister of foreign affairs M. Kogălniceanu.  
Hence, after the signing of a Romanian-Russian Convention on 4 April 1877, twenty days 
later, on 24 April 1877, Russia declared war to the Sublime Porte  and engaged its troops 61
into crossing the Romanian territory. The Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 became 
therefore Romania’s War of Independence, as the Parliament voted for the termination of all 
kind of relations with the Porte, the annulment of the Great Powers' joint pledge, and the 
proclamation of Romania’s absolute independence. With the Treaty of San Stefano failing to 
bring peace, Germany had taken the initiative of organising new peace negotiations, that 
concluded with the Peace Congress in Berlin (1/13 July 1878), an act rethinking the 
previous one of San Stefano and reflecting, anew, the struggle for influence between the 
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 Great European Powers . Romania, for the second time, was not allowed the participation.  62
However, the Congress recognised Romania's independence under the condition that 
Romanian Constitution suffered some modifications; moreover, the Romanian state got hold 
of Dobruja, the Danube Delta, the Snake Island and the Port of Constanta in exchange for 
Russian possession of Southern Bessarabia. Beyond certain inconvenient stipulations 
however, the primary goal or the epochal act had been achieved, namely the international 
recognition of Romania's state independence .  63
With the closing treaty signed on the 1st of July, Russia, the Porte, Serbia, Austria-Hungary 
acknowledged the independence immediately, while France, Great Britain and Germany 
would do the same only in 1880. Surely, the acquisition of independence had valuable 
consequences for the Romanian state: it created the excellent conditions for the 
strengthening of the political regime, and the acceleration of economic and social progress; 
moreover, Dobruja's restoration, due to its strategic geographical location by yielding access 
to the Black Sea, provided Romania with new perspectives regarding the economic and 
commercial relations with the world. Politically, having achieved independence, served as 
launcher for Romania's turning into a full-fledged state in international relations. Moreover, 
national sovereignty allowed Romania to uphold its own foreign policy, permitted the 
establishment of a protectionist system necessary for economic development, and created 
the favourable conditions for the strengthening of the political and institutional system . 64
Internationally, having achieved the recognition of Romania's independence, subsequently 
led to Prince Carol crowning as Carol I King of Romania, on March 14 1881, and to 
Romania's promotion of its position and status in the international arena (by becoming a 
kingdom under the House of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, the latter enjoying an excellent 
image in Europe). Accordingly, it is legitimate to assert that in the modern epoch, the 
progress witnessed by the Romanian society was reflected in the organisation and 
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 functioning of fundamental institutions like: rule (monarchy), the Ruling Council 
(Parliament), government, justice, church and army.  
The political system of modern Romania was based on the 1866 Constitution, which created 
the democratic foundation of the political exercise. Romania had thus joined the group of 
constitutional monarchies diffused in Europe, in which the sovereign represented the 
mediator, as well as the stabilising agent. The political parties that came to power in 1895, 
enjoyed the leading role throughout the governance rotation system, while the Parliament, 
elected throughout a census suffrage, became the scene of disputes because of the laws 
designed by the two governing political parties, the Conservatives and the Liberals .  65
All in all, by the end of his 48 years reign (the longest in Romania's history), Carol would 
have managed to strengthen the monarchy's image, ensuring Romania's internal stability 
throughout the acquisition of independence and therefore, development. Another objective 
pursued with great consistency by King Carol I, was the enhancement of the Romanian 
economy. From this point of view, since the very beginning, he understood the urgent need 
to build a strong infrastructure, railways especially (if in 1866 Romania had no kilometre of 
railway, at the King's death in 1914, Romanian railways reached a length of about 3,800 
kilometres). It should also be noted that Carol’s era expressed a clear detachment of the 
Romanian circles from the Oriental sphere of influence, and their commitment in an 
undeniable historical process of Westernisation .  66
With Carol I, political and institutional life, economy, culture and attitudes gradually began 
to gain both the form and the substance of Western European model. In fact, a huge part of 
Carol I legacy has been preserved until present day Romania as, besides securing the 
country’s independence, obtaining territories such as the Romanian Dobruja and leaving 
behind a modern system of transportation and communication - the railways, at institutional 
level some of Romania's landmarks were founded as a result of his personal involvement, 
for example the Romanian Academy and the National Bank of Romania, and he regulated 
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 the production of present-day Romanian currency, called leu .  67
In the summer of 1916, Carol’s successor, King Ferdinand adjudicated the country’s entry 
to the war next to the Entente, in the hope that this alliance would provide Romania's union 
with Transylvania. Indeed, on December 1st, 1918, Romania would become Great Romania, 
through the unification (the Great Union) of Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bukovina with 
Romania. Undeniably, it was a quite unexpected result, that only few could have hoped for 
when the war set in, in 1914.  
In 1922, eight years after his accession to the throne, King Ferdinand I and his wife Mary 
were officially crowned kings of Great Romania. The rest of Ferdinand’s reign, that lasted 
until 1927, would be marked by the challenges emerging in a unified state. In short, the 
most significant moment during his reign was the adoption of a new Constitution in 1923, 
designed in such a way as to provide an effective framework for the development of modern 
Romania. Nonetheless, the next two decades in Romania's history as a liberal constitutional 
monarchy, would witness a father and son's rule alternate, namely the reign of Michael I 
(first reign, until 1930), Carol II (1930-1940), and Michael I again (second reign, 
1940-1947), and a very difficult and conflicting social and political context, marked by the 
rise of nationalist and anti-semitic parties and the liberal monarchy's reformation as a 
dictatorship between 1938-1944, during the reign of Carol II.   
Moreover, through the Paris Peace Treaty in the aftermath of WWII, the country's territory 
registered significant transformations: Northern Transylvania was returned to Romania 
(after having lost it by means of the IInd Vienna Award in 1940, that allocated it to Hungary) 
however Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Southern Dobruja were not regained (the first 
two were occupied by the Soviet Union, while the last was lost to Bulgaria in 1940, shortly 
after Carol's abdication). Furthermore, in 1947, premeditating that King Michael I was 
forced by the communists  to abdicate and leave the country under Soviet occupation , we 68 69
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 distinguish the transformation and adaptation of the Kingdom of Romania into the Socialist 
Republic of Romania, that was due to prevail until the last days of 1989. Hereinafter, after 
having identified the main episodes in Romanian history that produced, generated and 
motivated an awakening of national consciousness and thereupon the creation of the nation 
and thus, the modern, integrated nation-state, it is rightful to dwell upon the Romanian 
nation-building process and the discourse of nationalism.  
First of all, in Europe, national discourses have been universally accompanied by a rhetoric 
whose aim was to legitimise the new aspirations by grounding them into previously 
documented practices and values. Hence, tradition was used to support a susceptible, 
unstable present, and everything that could facilitate the success of the national project, was 
employed. So, historicism designated an exaltation of the own virtues, often in contrast with 
other nations. For Romania, the path towards modernity was reached on the basis of several 
factors, in which the national idea and ideal had played a dominant role. However, in the 
Romanian sphere we are faced with an inconsistency: first of all, the already mentioned 
notion of belonging to a Latin space, but this time in the context of an opposing Slavic 
population, represented as the other, while the reconstruction or restoration strategies were 
based essentially on the privileged relation with Western Latin arena.  
Secondly, there is the hypothesis of simultaneity, namely the synchronisation with the West, 
by “burning the stages” . The period between 1830-1860, is characterised by a culture and 70
literature orientation presenting features of the revolutionary era, of social and national 
liberation, emancipation, and the call for unification; it is the period when there are attempts 
to “burn” some phases that had not been accomplished in Romanian literature, and which 
instead, had already been dealt with in Western literature, for over more than a century and 
a half . In the interwar period, different theories of nationalism have been formulated 71
within the academies, still, the definition that Hans Kohn formulated for nationalism, 
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 nowadays still enjoys authority among specialists in the field (historians, sociologists, 
anthropologists), and best suits this study: “nationalism is a state of mind, residing in a 
large part of the population and claiming to pertain to each and every member; he 
recognises the national state as the ideal form of political organisation and nationality as 
the source of all creative cultural energies and economic welfare” . 72
Kohn sees nationalism as a result of a long historical process, influenced by historical 
traditions and political climate, specific to every population. He systematically applied a 
binary interpretation between the voluntarily Western nationalism, and the organic 
nationalism, specific to Central and Eastern Europe . Hence, in Central and Eastern 73
Europe, social and economic backwardness and weakness of the middle class have favoured 
the success of an emotional and potentially authoritarian nationalism, promoted by a small 
group of aristocrats and intellectuals. The national ideology promoted by this elite has 
emerged as a protest against dominant multiethnic state structures, and initially functioned 
on the cultural arena. In order to conquer political power, the promoters of this nationalism 
turned to popular instincts of the peasantry, that were promised support, disengagement 
from their traditional tasks and land appropriations .  74
Here, the intellectuals of noble origin, who developed the national ideology and the political 
program for emancipation, emphasised the collective dimension of national rights in the 
detriment of individual freedoms, and encouraged the "natural" adversity of the peasantry 
towards the foreigner, identified with the enemy of the nation state . Romanian historian 75
and intellectual Pompiliu Teodor argued that "Romanian studies devoted to the nation, most 
of them originated in sociology, have focused on the historical premises of the emergence of 
the nation. (…) They insisted less on the perception of the constituted phenomenon, have 
   Kohn Hans, “The Idea of Nationalism. A Study in Its Origins and Background”, Pp. xiii, 735. New York: 72
The Macmillan Company, First published 1944, the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, vol. 235, 1, p.135
  Kohn Hans, “Nationalism: Its Meaning and History”, New York, Toronto and London: D. Van Nostrand 73
Company Inc., 1965, p. 10
   Snyder, Louis Leo, “The New Nationalism”, Transaction Publishers, 2003, pp. 53-5474
  Idem, pp. 55-57.75
 71
 neglected the expansion of national consciousness in the society” . In his view, the 18th 76
century represented for Romanians an era of assimilation of the modern world ideas, and 
integration in European Enlightenment. Even the term “nation” was introduced in the 
political vocabulary in the Enlightenment epoch. Moreover, he argues that the concept of 
nation has suffered significant transformations during this period, meaning the change of 
direction, from an elitist vision to the reevaluation of national traditions, to the study of the 
people and to the defence of the rights of all social groups .  77
Furthermore, in the age of the “Forty-Eighters” , under the influence of romanticism, the 78
idea of nation community, language, traditions, aspirations, tended to occupy a dominant 
position, even if democratic opinions and resultantly, the social dimension, were still 
expressed throughout the activity of N. Bălcescu, C.A Rosetti, C. Bolliac . George Marica 79
argued that the assimilation of the nation with the people was a constant of the period. One 
explanation could be that Romanians still did not have a nation state, as the political 
struggle for its construction sought the support in the idea of ancestral community, in the 
concern for the disclosure of what is specific for the nation and in promoting an 
“aggressive xenophobia” due to “total segregation of interests between Romanians and 
Greeks, produced in the aftermath of the events of 1821” . After 1821, instead, the concept 80
of nation tends to rely on history more and more, becoming the driving idea and a shock 
image in the same time, that personifies contemporary ideals and polarising all available 
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 energies . Hence, the frustrations caused by the presence of foreigners (Greeks firstly), 81
favoured anti-Phanariote feelings and attitudes, that came around as a continuation of some 
similar, previous ones; there is indeed a continuity between the ways of representation of 
foreigners in the Old Regime and the project for a national state in the fourth and fifth 
decades of the 19th century. Besides, on the basis of the Enlightenment ideas, the impact of 
the French Revolution was capable of strengthening the revolutionary ideology and 
influence the nationalist movement, even if it sometimes suffered delays and offsets .  82
The revolution contributed to the revival of European political life and resulted in the 
strengthening of the struggle for national rights. Thus, this new nationalism, militant and 
missionary, has exerted its influence across the continent, far greater than that of the 
Enlightenment . The Romanian nationalism was born in a certain political context, 83
dominated by the desire of creating a unified, independent and modern Romanian state. 
Moreover, especially after 1859, the will for modernisation and the prestige of the West, 
made possible the assimilation of Western model in the Romanian Principalities.  
But the Romanticism of the 1848 Revolution had already been correlated to nationalism, for 
between 1830-1860, Romanians discovered more and more the Western values and Western 
cultural models, which, on the basis of common Latin origins of Romanian and Latin 
languages, began to fascinate the Romanian people. Hence, sons of boyars no longer went 
to Constantinople to pursue their studies, but chose Italian (like Kogălniceanu and N. 
Bălcescu) and French universities (V. Alecsandri, A. Russo, I.H.Rădulescu, etc.). Through 
the imitation process, the affinity of most Romanian intellectuals to the French sphere in the 
first half of the 19th century, provided this era with a Francophone and Francophile 
dimension.  
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 II.2 Late Imperial China 
  
The Chinese civilisation, estimated one of the longest and continuous in the world (approx. 
five thousand years), has witnessed a fascinating cycle of rise and fall, war and peace, has 
seen Western barbarians and invaders from the North (Mongols, Manchus) barging in and 
leaving scars, yet, it's leaders have always had the idea of ruling from the center . Even the 84
common Chinese name for the country Zhōngguó (from zhōng, “central” or “middle” and 
guó, “state/states”) means Middle Kingdom or Middle Country. The Qing dynasty (also 
Empire of the Great Qing or Manchu dynasty) was the last imperial dynasty of China, 
ruling from 1644 to 1912. My study begins from this stage in Chinese history for a simple 
reason: it is not because they represented a multi-cultural Empire that survived for almost 
three centuries, or because the Qing/Manchu maintained a separate identity from the 
Chinese Han, but only because they formed the geographical foundation for the modern 
Chinese state. 
The Manchu's economic and social structure was not that different from the previous ones, 
still, there is an important aspect that has made it unique: the huge demographic increase; 
the earlier economic and commercial revolution had allowed an important growth of 
agricultural production and, together with a well-organised network for the distribution of 
goods, contributed to an overall wellness of the general economic environment. Moreover, 
the economic development allowed not only the extension of the rural commercial network, 
but also its enlargement outside China's borders; in fact, the Chinese controlled the traffics 
with Mongolia, Central and  South-East Asia.  
From a socio-cultural perspective, for almost the whole Qing Dynasty, there were very few 
Chinese traveling to Europe, and their actual influence in China was minimal. So there is no 
doubt that the knowledge that Chinese elite had about Europe, was obtained in China. With 
the exception of Russia, with which China had a land trade, the European trade was 
confined to Canton. Therefore, it was mainly the merchants of Guangzhou who came in 
contact with the Europeans. “The Chinese emperor and his officials, however, were in 
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 contact with the Jesuit missionaries, and particularly the emperor Kang Xi, had a close 
relationship with them” .  85
However, this improvement would only last until the middle of the 18th century, followed 
by a continuous decline; foreign wars along the Russian frontier, against Turkestan and 
Tibet, and the penetration of the Chinese trade by Europeans, are some of the reasons for 
the gradually decline of the Qing Dynasty. Even if these wars couldn't have actually 
economically ruined China, they were nevertheless, an expensive strategy for the 
government. But for China, these wars also meant conflicts with the European colonial 
powers; hence, side by side with the Russian pressure in the North, the Chinese had to cope 
with Western colonial powers in the South. 
During the long reign of the forth son of sovereign Yong Zheng, Qian Long (1735-1796), 
the Chinese empire experienced the greatest expansion and prosperity of the Manchu 
regime on the one hand, and a great deal of internal manifestations that led to different 
popular risings, on the other. Nevertheless, 1774 was the year when the first great popular 
rising in the province of Shandong broke out, and just an year after, there was another one 
in Hunan, that of “The Society of the White Lotus”. These risings can be explained, as 
history has taught us, that social movements don't emerge groundless; in this case 
particularly, it was the excessive oppression of the people by the government, that led the 
Chinese to independent manifestations towards the “Manchus of the cities, living on state 
pensions and behaving as a ruling class” .  86
However, even if Qian Long had to deal with an extreme internal crisis, it didn't affect and - 
considered his response to Lord McCartney, England's first envoy to China in 1792 - 
couldn't have affected the expansion of the Manchus' Empire, that not only reached the 
largest territory in history, but witnessed a significant growth of the population, a third of 
the total global population. With the institution of the East Indian Campaign, in the 18th 
century (1715), the British started a long series of commerce and trade, and after occupying 
Calcutta in 1757, they would succeed in starting the opium trade with China through the 
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 province of Bengal - taken by the British an year after Calcutta.  
Therefore, it would be exactly in the last decade of the 18th century, while Chinese 
conquered Nepal, that the first political interests of the Qing Dynasty  and British came into 
contact. As mentioned above, in 1792, Great Britain sent envoys to China with a clear 
purpose, to negotiate a treaty of commerce and determine the Chinese to accept an English 
minister at the court of Emperor Qian Long. Furthermore, the Chinese were asked for the 
opening of alternative ports, besides Guangzhou, and the concession of a base, next to the 
regions producing tea and silk, for the British merchants. Notwithstanding, the British 
envoys thought about bringing some goods to the Chinese court, hoping this would make 
the emperor reconsider and consequently would insure new markets for the British products 
in China. However, on the one hand, China was experiencing a period of economic 
prosperity that allowed it to fully satisfy the internal consumption and was obviously not 
interested in and not depending on imports from other parts of the world; moreover, it’s 
huge territory, rich in natural resources, together with a climate adequate for agricultural 
production, made it unparalleled in the East Asia region.  
On the other hand, the British envoy Lord McCartney's refusal to go through the protocol 
that regulated the tributary missions (he withheld from doing the Kowtow in front of the 
emperor), is believed to have contributed to the failure of the mission and its objectives.  In 
fact, by means of two edicts addressed to George the III King of England , the Chinese 87
emperor explained the reasons for his refusal to grant the several requests presented by 
McCartney. Therefore, if on the one hand, the emperor's words unravel what were the 
Chinese Empire's intentions regarding European powers and how the Qing government 
would deal with them, on the other hand, many Western historians have tried to give an 
explanation or a reason to why, in the end, the mission had failed. McCartney himself saw 
the failure of the mission as a result of the Chinese people being semi barbarians. 
According to John K. Fairbank, it was the refusal to execute the Kowtow, legitimising the 
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 Chinese domination, that impeded from the beginning the well-going of the mission .  88
From the Chinese perspective, East Asia was the whole world, so the Qing court couldn’t 
have perceived other countries as equal political entities . So, even if we considered the 89
McCartney Embassy to have returned to London without obtaining any concession from 
China, the mission could still be regarded as a success, because it allowed the accumulation 
of detailed observations of a great empire. However it might seem, some authors sustain 
that China's isolationism was only a myth, diffused by the West since the 18th century; they 
argue that, after all, China engaged in a considerable commerce with the European powers, 
and the declaration for self-sufficiency of Emperor Qian Long was unfounded, as its only 
purpose was to prevent critics from the inside, and the affirmation of China's superiority on 
the foreigners. The Qing court had to resign to the recovery of the sea commerce, but 
remained vigilant in dealing with the outside.  
Later, in 1802, during the reign of Qian Long's successor Qia Qing (1796-1821), the 
popular rise of the “White Lotus” was beat down, but only to witness a new one brake out 
in 1813 Northern China, called “the Society of Heaven's Law”. Another movement, like the 
previous one, that expanded quickly in the provinces and was quickly suppressed by the 
government. Therefore, the numerous risings in China in that period, leads into thinking 
that the empire failed to see the real dialectic behind these movements, that is the general 
impoverishment of the population, and only feared it was driven by feelings such as 
national consciousness arousing within the middle and lower classes of the population. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to tackle with the risings in China in that precise time-frame 
by only taking into consideration the impoverishment of the population and the hatred 
towards the Manchus, as Wolfram Eberhard, on the other hand, argues.  
Furthermore, similar position is taken by Buzatu, who stated that with the beginning of the 
19th century, the autocratic policy of China, of self-sufficient development and closed 
doors, by ignoring the industrial revolution and the great progress (especially in the new 
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 technology of weapons and transportation) would lead to the economic fall, the weakening 
of military power and a drastic drop of Chinese leverage and position worldwide, with its 
negative consequences on its internal evolution and especially on its relations with other 
countries and the maintenance of its sovereignty and territorial integrity .  90
In my regard, these Euro-centred explanations, see the peoples’ need for political and social 
transformation during the late Qing dynasty as a process that can only be undertaken as a 
one-way path, by giving for granted the strong desire of Chinese people for a radical 
internal socio-political change. But one should bare in mind that “ideas do not change 
organically; this is a process of stimulation and impetus wrought by shifting exogenous 
conditions” , therefore the interaction within the contact zones with the European powers, 91
have obviously had a huge impact both on the Chinese population's ideas and the Qing 
government's outlook. On the other hand, seeing the Western aggression as solely reason for 
ideological change, would be too bounded.   
As Wang Xi puts it: “the impact of Western challenges can only be understood in the 
context of internal Chinese historical development” . With the end of the Napoleonic wars, 92
that had confirmed Great Britain as the first naval force worldwide, different events would 
put even higher pressure between the British and the Chinese; hence, in 1816, Lord Amherst 
led a second embassy to the Manchus court, but his requests for better commercial 
agreements, were again decisively refused. Nevertheless, the opium trade, carried from 
India to China started rising, and in the 1830's  the value of the drug imported was so high, 
that the commercial balance got turned upside down, unfavourable for China, while the 
deficit had to be paid in silver. Consequently, this situation determined an inevitable lack of 
balance in the Chinese monetary system: the devaluation of copper compared to silver, 
meant worse living conditions of the low and middle class peasants, that payed taxes on the 
base of silver currency and received copper coins by selling their products. Hereinafter, 
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 edicts and sanctions against the opium commerce were useless, as the opium import raised 
from 120 tons in 1800, to 2400 tons in 1838.  
So, even though Great Britain's missions of 1793 and 1816 had failed, during the reign of 
Emperor Dao Guang (1821-1850), opium had become the chief article of trade, and allowed 
that a great deal of Chinese money flew abroad. In 1836, the “circle of purification”, a 
group of intellectual officials, managed to convince emperor Dao Guang to refuse the 
proposal that legalised the opium trade, and to support a moral crusade against the drug 
consume. Hence, two years later, the imperial commissioner Lin Zexu, was given the task to 
go to Guangzhou and stop the opium trade. Considering that opium was prohibited in 
China, he first sent a letter to Queen Victoria, gently asking her to use her leverage in order 
to prevent its production in territories under his jurisdiction. Later on, his actions, regarded 
as hostiles and able to put in danger the British trade in Far East, would end with the First 
Opium War (1839-1842), that led to the Treaty of Nanjing, signed on the 29th August 1842. 
China was forced to cede Hong Kong to Great Britain, pay a war indemnity and open other 
five ports to European trade . Furthermore, in 1843 another treaty was signed, the one of 93
the Bogue, with the damaging statement that would be acknowledged as the Most Favoured 
Nation clause (under the Most Favoured Nation clause, in essence, every privilege granted 
by China to one of the foreign powers – Great Britain, France, United States or Russia, had 
to be granted to all powers).   
Nevertheless, the crisis generated by the presence of foreign powers, greedy for 
accumulation and profit, was not the only issue that Chinese emperors were confronting 
with, in the middle of the 19th century. In fact, during the reign of emperor Xian Feng 
(1851-1861), the Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), the bloodiest conflict in the world before 
the 20th century, broke off in Guangdong, in the context of a continuous social struggle 
against authorities, poverty and against famine, all consequences of the destruction brought 
in the Celestial Empire by war. The Taiping movement would expand quickly, inspired by 
some religious books brought in the South by the Christian missionaries, and after having 
adopted Christianity as doctrine for themselves, they settled in Nanjing, where they created 
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 their own government and bureaucracy and founded the Great Celestial Empire. In the 
beginning, their intention to overthrown the Qing administration was supported by the 
European powers and the United States, that almost seemed determined to recognise the 
new government. However, the disillusionment with the Taiping beliefs, together with the 
manifestation of an arrogant and brutal behaviour and the realisation that an unstable and 
disorganised China was not the best context to fulfil their interests, finally led the foreign 
powers to send troops in help of the Qing dynasty.   
Hence, the modern war technologies, brought by the foreign powers in support of the 
Emperor to suppress the Taipings , changed within a few years the course of the war; 
consequently, not only the new tools of combat and new types of weapons put an end to a 
war that had been lasting for fourteen years, but “the effects of the modernisation of the 
military in China were permanent” .  Hence, if on the one hand, the Taiping movement 94
created chaos and a huge number of casualties, without having really achieved its goal, on 
the other hand, it allowed the increase of provincial and regional armies that would “become 
an element in the destruction of the Qing Empire, and in the shaping of the post-imperial 
political system” .     95
The Second Opium War (1856-1860), in which “France joined for the sake of the booty 
expected” , was concluded with the signing of the Treaty of Tianjin (1858), that confirmed 96
some of the previous treaties' clauses and added ten more ports to expand the British trade, 
the permit for foreigners and missioners to travel inside China's territory, and the acceptance 
of a British minister to reside in Beijing. Moreover, taking advantage of a powerless China 
during the negotiations in Tianjin, once finished the Crimean War, Russia turned its 
attention to the East. There had been hostilities between the two countries over Siberia since 
the end of the 18th century, and, through the Treaty of Aigun signed in 1858, China was 
forced to cede territories in Northern Manchuria, thus making possible the founding of 
Vladivostok two years later, in 1860.  
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 All in all, the opium wars led to three significant treaties, that have been crucial in opening 
China to Western powers on the one hand, and have been regarded as unfair and unequal to 
China, on the other. They also marked the beginning of the “fall” of the Celestial Empire, 
and a new process of transformation of the Sino self - centredness  into a suppressed power, 
facing the British invasion and the risk of becoming a colony. The two opium wars made 
clear to many government officials and intellectuals that China faced both internal disorder 
and foreign threats, and that the Chinese state had become impoverished and weak. The 
Western powers, on the other hand, were economically and militarily strong and 
technologically and culturally advanced .  97
Nevertheless, with the end of the Second Opium War and the harsh clauses imposed to 
China by the numerous treaties, scattering Chinese government representatives, intellectuals 
and officials felt the necessity to take a more rational approach when dealing with the 
Manchus' administration difficulties. Therefore, compelled to do so, the Qing gradually 
started to adopt a cooperation policy towards the European powers and the United States, 
and resultantly, a good personal relationship China-West was established. However,  with 
the increased China-West relations, the Manchu realised that a long-term ministry of foreign 
relations was needed in order to manage fruitful interactions and “modern” diplomatic 
affairs .  98
The dowager empress Ci Xi (1835-1908), one of the strongest personalities of the end of 
19th century, with a very active part in Chinese political life, promoted a conservative 
policy, emphasising Chinese traditions and refusing to accept the need for change or 
adaptation to the new context. Naturally, the denial of a new surrounding reality, the 
abnegation of the processes of modernisation as consequence of the Industrial Revolution 
taking place in Western Europe and the United States (but embraced by Japan), together 
with the dowager empress' iron will in diffusing traditional ideas “even in light of the recent 
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 humiliations” , finally led to the rise of different reformation groups and movements by the 99
end of the 19th century. Generally, the reformers of the “Self-Strengthening 
Movement” (1861-1872), believed that China needed to adopt Western science and skills, 
military and naval technologies and engage foreign advisers in order to regain it's status in 
international relations, and position of supremacy worldwide.  
Yet, the self-strengthening goal of the reforms could have only been provided by a more 
opened and more participative China, in terms of trade and industry and naturally, the 
reformers didn't receive any kind of encouragement from the Chinese conservatives. 
Despite the arguments brought up by Confucian reformers (that China could still maintain 
intact it's cultural heritage even by adopting some features of the West in matters of science, 
technology, and forms of knowledge), the opposition of the Conservatives, supported by the 
obsolete mentality of the Qing imperial court, stagnancy, incompetence and corruption, 
succeeded almost completely in destroying the efforts of the reformers.  
The last two decades in Chinese history were also marked by two other major events, more 
precisely the wars that China faced against France, firstly and Japan, secondly. Thus, 
between 1883-1885, the Chinese war against and France for the control of North Vietnam 
concluded with the Chinese recognition of the French protectorate over Vietnam that 
offered great economic possibilities in South-East China for the French government. A 
similar situation was the Sino - Japanese war over Korea (1894) when, after the 1868 Meiji 
Revolution , China had to face the armed forces of a country pulled out from isolation and 100
definitely more pragmatic regarding the acquisition of military technologies brought by the 
industrial revolution. Hence, with the end of the war in 1895,  the Qing government had to 
accept the conditions imposed by the Treaty of Shimonoseki: the recognition of Korea's 
independence and the loss of the islands of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu, in spite of Japan; 
Taiwan would again become part of Chinese territory, only in august 1945.   
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 The loss of important Chinese territories as consequence of these wars, had further 
demonstrated that the attempts of restoration of the reform movements were useless. 
Moreover, the humiliating defeat of the Manchus during the Sino - Japanese war, not only 
exposed China's lack of modern armament, while other countries, like Japan, were 
assimilating Western industrialisation, but underlined China's weakness and much worse, 
it's credibility as a sovereign country. The dowager empress, incapable of understanding the 
realities of world politics, felt that Westernisers would destroy the societal organisation - the 
founding pillar of the Qing dynasty power - by swapping the power from the gentry, to the 
middle class and the merchants.  
However, in the 1880s and 1890s, there were several intellectuals and Western-educated 
students, overseas Chinese that brought new ideas, motivation and dynamism to the numb 
political and societal background. In this sense, the most remarkable influence of the 
Europeans on Chinese history “was in the political realm  - both in the sense of theory and 
of practice by bringing about the modernisation of the Chinese state (…) Chinese students 
who went to Europe in the 1870s and 1880s to study naval technology and other scientific 
and applied technologies took an interest in British, French and German societies around 
them and realised that the advances of the Europeans had deeper social and philosophical 
mainsprings” .  101
The necessity of reform was nevertheless, seen differently by the divided reformist groups. 
One group considered that the acquisition of technology from abroad - by introduction of 
slow reforms - was necessary, but it shouldn't have changed the social structure of the state, 
while another group advocated radical changes within the whole territory of the Empire. 
Adopting two different perspectives, the figures of Kang Youwei (1858-1927) and Sun Yat-
sen (1866-1925) would offer solutions for dealing with the dynasty's problems, internally 
and externally (reform, modernisation, Westernisation, nationalism). Believing that the 
European model, adopted by Japan and successfully confirmed by the Meiji Revolution, 
was the perfect gateway for a new, reform waken China, Sun Yat-sen actively militated 
within different associations, and immediately became the leader of the anti-Qing, turning 
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 the reform party into a middle class revolutionary party. China, however, was no Land of 
Nod.  
In fact, two years after the Reform Movement of 1898, a new popular movement broke out 
in China, the Boxer Uprising, which lasted for three years. After successful negotiations 
with the Qing government, the rebellion was not only directed into the service of the 
dowager empress Ci Xi,  but against the foreigners, throughout different acts of vandalism 
against Western zones and commercial activities selling foreign products in Beijing. But the 
violent anti-foreigner uprising was soon to be suppressed by an international military 
expedition; the Western powers made the Emperor Guang Xu, the dowager empress and 
other officials of the government flee, while the first could return only in 1902. With the 
peace treaty that followed the Boxer Uprising, China was forced to different concessions to, 
and enormous war indemnities for eight foreign powers; it marked, once again, a difficult 
moment in the Qing dynasty's maintenance of sovereignty and a huge fragmentation of the 
central governance .  102
On the one hand, the Boxer Uprising could be regarded as a popular response to the foreign 
aggression and presence in China,  as Westernisers were regarded as the evil, and the only 
reason for which China and Chinese found themselves in that tragic situation; the 
construction of a Catholic church in Shandong and an increased number of converted 
Chinese (almost a million) by the Christian missionaries in China (more than 3000) were 
actually the driving forces for the rebellion.  
On the other hand, the catalysing role of the movement lies in the fact that it would enable a 
new sentiment in Chinese social and cultural scale, that is nationalism. The unequal treaties 
imposed to the Chinese Empire by the European powers, the presence of  foreign troops, 
merchants and missionaries on the Celestial Empire's territory and the modernisation 
process as result of the interaction with the West, developed anti-foreign sentiments that 
eventually, would (naturally?) be transformed in nationalistic ideology.  
As Duara ideally asserted, the mortification that China suffered from the West, pointed the 
way for a “rapid transformation [of culturalism] to nationalism, or to a culture protected 
 Jan Kočvar, “Germany and the Boxer Uprising in China”, West Bohemian Historical Review V, 2015, 2102
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 by the state—politicisation of the culture” . When, in 1908, the emperor Guang Xu died, 103
the dowager empress, managed to nominate the three year old prince Pu Yi, as emperor. 
Nevertheless, in the context of a confusing internal socio-political background, a weakened 
Empire in foreign affairs, and another child-emperor supposed to reign the Celestial Empire 
in the aftermath of empress Ci Xi's death, allowed the emergence of different local, social 
formations, leaded by troop commanders or political revolutionary leaders.  
Accordingly, the uncontested leader of the revolutionary forces was Sun Yat-sen, and his 
centre of operations was in Canton. Capital of Guangdong province, Guangzhou had been 
the heart of interaction with foreigners, a zone of assimilation and flow of goods and ideas, 
as well as a place often portraying political movements and insurrections.  
With European powers, Russia, America and Japan lurking around every corner and waiting 
for the right moment to split China and take possession of its territories, a Chinese 
government craving for wherewithal and a revolutionary movement in the South, uprisings 
against the Qing government began to emerge in the province of Hunan. Between 
1910-1911 several movements broke out simultaneously, but the turning point proved to be 
the Wuchang Uprising on October 10th, 1911, as the outcome of a negligently managed 
Railway Protection Movement. Through the establishment of the secret society and 
underground resistance movement Tong Meng Hui (the United League or the Chinese 
Revolutionary Alliance) in 1905 in Tokyo, Sun Yat-sen had urged the founding of a 
republic, with the implementation of massive political and agrarian reforms and, by means 
of the Min Bao journal (the People’s Journal) had propagandised his political philosophy, 
the “Three principles of the people, based on Abraham Lincoln's concept of government of, 
by, and for the people” : nationalism, peoples sovereignty guaranteed by democratic and 104
republican administration and welfare of the people. Other revolutionary societies from 
twelve Chinese provinces had joined them, allowing Sun Yat-sen to spread his ideas 
instantly within young officers and revolutionary elites. In December, they decided to 
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 establish a temporary government in Nanjing, that would become just days later, in the very 
beginning of 1912, the Republic of China. Sun Yat-sen was elected as the first temporary 
president of the new republic.  
Hence, the events and transformations that started with the Double Ten Day (10.10.1911) 
and ended with the establishment of the republic in January 1912 (the Xinhai revolution), 
represented a successful overthrown of the Qing dynasty and in Chinese history has been 
referred to as the bourgeois - democratic revolution. Meanwhile, in the North of China, the 
desperate Manchu administration asked for general Yuan Shikai's help, and invested him 
prime-minister in an attempt to establish a new government. He was due to fight the 
revolutionaries on behalf of the Qing. Nevertheless, after realising that a direct military 
conflict would have been impossible to sustain, the Nanjing revolutionary government 
changed strategy and, in the pursuit to turn the imperial army on their side, they decided to 
come down to negotiations. On 12 February 1912, on the basis that he could no longer 
count on his unreliable troops, general Yuan Shikai forced the Imperial Court to issue an 
edict that bound the six years old emperor Pu Yi to abdicate, and the Republic of China was 
proclaimed a constitutional form of state.  
II.3 The Republican years 
The beginning of 1912 would see the last dynasty in Chinese history, the Manchu, come to 
its end. As soon as the imperial house was overthrown, Sun Yat-sen abandoned Nanjing and 
recommended the reformist Qing general Yuan Shikai as president. This twisted conclusion 
of the events could only become pertinent if one considered the long clashes between the 
intellectuals and military, the North and the South, during the revolutionary years. While, on 
the one hand, Sun Yat-sen was an intellectual endowed with exceptional communication 
skills but had no military to rely on, Yuan Shikai, on the other, held a considerable military 
power and therefore had the means to suppress or dispose of anyone at any moment.  
At the head of a new state, recognised by foreign countries, Yuan Shikai's period of 
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 governance was not exempt from a series of coups d’état, mostly due to his strategies of 
dealing with the Western powers, from which he obtained loans and aids in return of which 
he gave more concessions to foreign banks and companies, allowing countries like Great 
Britain and Russia to boost their influence in Tibet and Mongolia. Akin, Japan's 
imperialistic strategy in Manchuria (which it perceived as its sphere of influence) and 
Shandong province, went hand in hand with Western polity.  
While Shikai was desperately trying to consolidate his power and reduce the impact of the 
February, 1913, victory of the newly founded party, the Kuomintang (KMT or the 
Revolutionary Party), leaded by Sun Yat-sen, the most organised putsch against his 
government, known as the Second Revolution, emerged.  
Furthermore, after the promulgation of a new Constitution that endowed the president with 
absolute governance power in 1914, conservative Yuan Shikai revealed that the Republic, 
no longer adequate as political configuration for China, was due to be exchanged for the 
Imperial institution. This decision would obviously be the cause of a lot of irritation in the 
revolutionaries’ camp. Despite all the reform attempts that attracted foreign aid, Shikai’s 
system proved wrong. In addition to this, by secretly accepting the conditions imposed by 
Japan by dint of the 21 Demands  (regarding the control over South Manchuria, Shandong 105
and Fujian provinces, as well as inner Mongolia) the already difficult situation became 
critical. Therefore, if WWI was shattering the European international arena, the South of 
China - where Sun Yat-sen, supported by his followers, instigated for a democratic republic 
- was marked by turmoil.  
Meanwhile, retaining that a segregated China was easier to conquer than a united one, 
Western powers contrasted Yuan Shikai. With the latter’s death in June 1916 - leaving a 
huge blankness of power and an open struggle amidst provincial leaders for central 
government control - and the subsequent rise to power of Li Yuanhung (1864-1928), the 
already harsh political and social background degenerated altogether, and European powers 
did not leave anything to chance. Five provinces had proclaimed their independence when, 
   In 1915 Japan presented China with a secret ultimatum aimed at providing Japan with regional control 105
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 in 1917, China was imposed to declare war to German and Austro-Hungarian Empire. Even 
though China saw this situation as a possibility to get back its territories in Shandong 
province and Qingdao, the purpose of this action taken by the Western powers would only 
open them further strategic doors in China. In fact, during the Peace Conference in Paris in 
the aftermath of World War I (1919) the Chinese delegation claiming China’s territories 
under German, British, Russian, French and Japanese occupation on the basis of the 14 
Points Declaration of the American president Woodrow Wilson, would receive no reaction 
from the Western powers. 
Under these circumstances, over fifty Chinese cities would witness huge manifestations and 
upheavals organised mostly by students and young intellectuals. On the 4th of May 1919, in 
Beijing, one of the strongest movements ever organised became synonym of Japanese 
harassment, shops selling Japanese products were destroyed and pro-Japanese Chinese were 
attacked. The repression of the movement by the authorities was brutal, as it ended up with 
numerous deaths, wounded and more than a thousand arrests. These actions could have not 
provoked but a mass reaction, so what began as a demonstration by students, became a 
national movement involving students, labour and political groups in every part of the 
country and embracing all social classes. The leadership took action against the culprits and 
instructed the Chinese delegation in Paris not to sign the Treaty of Versailles, that conceded 
Japan the administration of the territories in Shandong province, previously under German 
control. Nevertheless, “the May Fourth Movement failed to halt the Japanese takeover of 
Shandong” .  106
In the aftermath of the movement that would be remembered as the Wu-Si Yundong, the 
May Fourth day would prove to have had a significant impact globally. Not only was the 
Chinese situation discussed in details during the great powers' meeting in Washington, but 
Japan found itself under pressure to return to China its territories in Shandong province, 
firstly occupied by Germany and, after the Treaty of Versailles, by Japan. 
Western discourses have been debating on the Chinese nation-building processes for 
decades, from Chinese (inner) or Western (outer) perspective, and sometimes even from 
 “The May Fourth Movement”, Alpha History 2015, available at http://alphahistory.com/chineserevolution/106
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 both. In my regard, it is still necessary to read these kind of interpretations from a binary 
stance, as only if we considered both perspectives to be right, we could enjoy a better 
insight of all the developments and relations domestically as well as internationally, that put 
an end to thousands of years of dynastic rule in China, and led to the creation of the 
People's Republic in 1949. Different theories of nationalism have been formulated by 
authors such as Benedict Anderson, Prasenjit Duara, Anthony Giddens or Ernest Gellner, of 
which some, with a special eye to Chinese nationalism.  
In my opinion, an appropriate approach to the case of nationalism in China, has been 
Gellner’s “Nations and Nationalism”, where he formulated the idea that nationalism - as the 
perfect response to the great transition from agrarian societies to industrial, mobile, 
mechanic societies (hence modernisation) - has been a needed, and therefore constructed 
imperative. So, while the agrarian societies were characterised by different, fixed social 
classes, industrial societies/industrialisation - which stood for individuals' homogeneous 
mass literacy and mobility - ought to yield nationalisation.  
Hence, through the lenses of a functionalist nationalism, we might find the solution in 
explaining the Chinese nation-building process, the previous different long-lasting socio-
political crisis during the Chinese dynasty, the frustration among the population and the 
collapse of the faith in “old folk” (Gellner 1983:124) culture and traditional practices. The 
author's archetype of “Habsburgic nationalism”  - where the authority is endowed and has 107
access to high culture, while the rest of the society is identified thanks to their folk culture - 
stands for and fits perfectly the Chinese case: throughout an articulated structure, a political 
unity is created, capable of assimilating the folk culture community, which meanwhile had 
displaced the folk for the high culture throughout education (controlled by the centralised 
power) and have already embraced the high culture of the people in command.  
However, through Gellner's framework, we can only unravel a one way solution, the inner-
Chinese centred perspective, and even if it proves to be right, it lacks a salient aspect, and 
that is the impact and consequences - reaction to West/refusal of West - of a hundred years 
of European colonialism in China and Chinese humiliation (outer-Western perspective). At 
this point, this account stops being sufficient, as post-colonial China must not and can not 
  Ernest Gellner, “Nations and Nationalism”,  Basil Blackwell, England, 1983, p.124107
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 only be regarded as the perfect, natural moment and lieux for the realisation of a nationalist 
discourse and hereafter, a nation-formation process, but as a/another gateway to explain the 
various intellectual movements, people's discontent and the dissolution of the old in spite of 
the new. 
Hence, only through a binary interpretation, that considers the sum of the two approaches 
equally feasible - that is the Chinese society's development from traditional to modern and 
the Western impact-initiative within China's societal, cultural and political environment - it 
becomes possible to understand the framework within which a native Chinese nationalism 
could arise. Furthermore, according to Gellner: “nationalism is primarily a political 
principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent. 
Nationalism as a sentiment , or as a movement, can best be defined in terms of this 
principle. Nationalist sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by  the violation of the 
principle, or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment” .  108
In my understanding, what  stems from his words is, on the one hand, that a nation should 
correspond to a state and a political unit should be indispensable in giving rise to a nation, 
and on the other, that European powers could not have regarded China as a state on an equal 
footing, honourable enough to have its sovereignty regarded.  
From a different perspective, Duara's account on nationalism in China goes beyond issues 
of transition to modernisation and the challenges that emerged from this process. By 
disagreeing with Anderson and Gellner, he argues that already during Imperial China, a 
peculiar form of nationalism existed. In fact, unlike Anderson, for him “it was not only (…) 
the print media that enabled Han Chinese to develop a sharp sense of the Other, and hence 
of themselves as a community, when they confronted other communities. The exclusive 
emphasis on print capitalism as enabling the imagining of a common destiny and the 
concept of simultaneity ignores the complex relationship between the written and spoken 
word” . Duara emphasised that “there were large numbers of people in agrarian societies 109
who were conscious of their culture and identity at multiple levels, and in that sense were 
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 perhaps not nearly so different from their modem counterparts” . However, “in 110
privileging modern society as the only social form capable of generating political self-
awareness, Gellner and Anderson regard national identity as a distinctly modern mode of 
consciousness: the nation as a whole imagining itself to be the cohesive subject of history 
(…) in India or China, people historically identified with different representations of 
communities, and when these identifications became politicised they came to resemble what 
is called modern national identities” . 111
At this point I shall note, that several approaches to and theories of nationalism look up at 
the nation-building process in China to have surfaced during the Qing dynasty, when the 
Han ethnic group were not the only ones constituting the Empire, but, on the contrary, a 
multiethnic consolidated community - whose devotion aiming the emperor outlined the 
regime; hence, by contrasting Gellner, what follows through is that the political authority 
was able to contain the nation as a whole, without the ethnic boundaries interfering with the 
political ones.  
Nevertheless, Duara's insight advanced below proves to fit this study, as it becomes highly 
relevant for the better understanding of the mechanisms that generated the outer-Western 
perspective (nationalism as effect of Western impact), and that, together with the inner-
Chinese viewpoint (a functional nationalism, emerged as reaction to Chinese' need for 
transition - modernisation), were the undisputed sources, qualified to enable a unique, 
abiding sentiment of nationalism and henceforward, a nation-building process.  
In conformity with Duara, prior to the emergence of the modern nation-state there were 
various models of political community in China, and one of these, named culturalism, has 
been counterposed to modern nationalism. According to the author, “Joseph Levenson (…) 
observed a radical discontinuity between a nationalistic identity which he believed came to 
Chinese intellectuals around the turn of the 20th century, and earlier forms of Chinese. The 
high culture, ideology and identification of the literati, he believed, were principally forms 
cultural consciousness, an identification with the moral goals and values of a universalising 
   Ibidem110
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 civilisation” . Hence, Duara goes on, we witness the “transition (…)  from a "culturalism" 112
to a nationalism to the awareness of the nation-state as the ultimate goal of the community. 
Culturalism referred to a natural conviction of cultural superiority that sought no 
legitimation or defence outside of the culture itself. Only when (…) cultural values sought 
legitimation in the face of the challenge posed by the Other in the late 19th century, do we 
begin to see "decaying culturalism" and its rapid transformation to nationalism - or to a 
culture protected by the state (politicisation of culture)” . 113
To conclude, the author emphasises that it is no surprise that “from at least the time of 
resistance to the increased foreign presence in south China after the Opium Wars through to 
the Boxer rebellion of 1898-1900, there existed a general expectation, not only among the 
elite, but also among the populace, that the state would protect the culture and the people of 
the empire(…)Although not all segments of the population were affected by it, this 
representation of political community was sufficiently rooted to make it a powerful 
mobilising force in the 19th and 20th centuries” . Resultantly, it can be alleged that the 114
series of events that culminated in the 1919 May 4th Movement, and that instigated and 
paved the way to nationalistic sentiments in China like the Opium Wars, the first Sino-
Japanese War, in other words the dishonour and humiliation that China had to endure for the 
sake of the West, undeniably generated the switch-over from culturalism to nationalism “or 
to a culture protected by the state - politicisation of culture” (Duara 1996: 56). 
Sun Yat-sen was, no doubt, a central figure of Chinese political and social transformation. 
His political and intellectual background were deeply influenced by the education received 
in Western - administrated zones. His early interest towards politics and secret organisations 
would soon make of him a revolutionist in need for military power, to organise the anti-
dynastic campaign. With financial aid received from overseas Chinese, and significant 
intellectual support from foreign-educated students, the driving force of the 1911 
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 Revolution, he succeeded in continuing the struggle for a re-organised Revolutionary Party, 
in line with his non-democratic views and in the context of a politically divided, multi-
government China.  
Still, only a few years later, because of his non-interference to Japan's aggressive attitude 
towards China, surrounded by people closely connected to traditional forces like the gentry 
and secret societies, and with no actual ideological aspiration,  Sun Yat-sen experienced a 
fall down of his political credibility that made him look more like a betrayer than as the 
leader of the nation when he returned to China in 1916 . Moreover, hoping to obtain 115
German military power in order to fulfil his dream and accomplish the ideal Republic, he 
would never take a clear position regarding China's entry to WWI. Hence, he never stood 
for neutrality but he never wished for China to go to war next to the Allied forces as well.  
If in the beginning, when Sun Yat-sen began to formulate his principles of Nationalism, of 
Democracy, of Livelihood, he considered nationalism only in terms of the driving force that 
mobilised masses against the Manchu dynasty, but with no real importance to the 
revolution, later, in 1919, nationalism would become a highly important, relevant sentiment, 
in a country where, as said before, next to the military-based central government, there were 
local governments scattered all over.  
As already mentioned, the New Culture Movement of the May Fourth intellectuals was 
different than any other manifestation or any other form of activism prior to it because of its 
capacity to combine the old folk, popular sentiments with the new desire for modernisation, 
and it this way, not only it succeeded in rendering the political matters popular, but it almost 
managed to transform the revolution into a mass movement . However, deeply involved in 116
his military revolution issues, focusing on solving political and economic matters, and 
without accepting the primary role of the concepts like culture and individual liberties, in 
that moment Sun Yat-sen lost the chance to contribute to a movement that, at that point, 
might have been decisive in fulfilling the Chinese nation-building process.  
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 With these perceptions, the idea of nationalism could not have represented more than an 
instrument serving to produce consent, in pursuance of gaining legitimacy for the new state. 
In addition to this, internationally, extremely important events were beginning to shape the 
global arena and the world's map: firstly, the dissolution of the German, Austro-Hungarian 
and Tsarist (partially) Empires; secondly, the rise of the “red revolutions” in Germany and 
Hungary; and last but not least, the October Revolution, that brought the Bolsheviks' rule in 
Tsarist Russia. The latter would immediately have a large echo in China, where Lenin's 
socialist, democratic-left ideas would rapidly begin to penetrate Chinese territory and 
Chinese cultural environment.  
In 1919, in order to achieve its purpose, Lenin's new despotic government made various 
promises to China (most of which, utterly remained promises) of which I remind: the return 
under Chinese control of all the territories conquered by Tsarist Russia, the unequal treaties 
between China and Tsarist Russia being declared null, Russian controlled railways in N-E 
China returned to their homeland administration, and the debts that China still owed Russia, 
being cancelled. As stated before, it didn't take long before the Soviet policy proved to have 
been effective in reaching its goal: not only did the Russian advisors influence Sun Yat-sen's 
stance regarding Chinese political attitude towards the West, but their left political views 
reached the large circle of Chinese intellectuals that, on July 1st, 1921, in Shanghai, decided 
to found the Communist Party of China (CPC). Mao Zedong was one of the eleven 
members, founders of the party. Further on, prominent leaders of China such as Zhou Enlai 
and Deng Xiaoping would also join the CPC.  
Considered the difficult situation in the international arena in the years following WWI, and 
the fact that Western powers lacked real interest in helping the nationalist leader against the 
Japanese aggression, as well as against the military government in Beijing, it is clear why 
political-diplomatic agreements with Russia were preferred. By signing a joint statement of 
military collaboration against imperialistic threats, and without “making any commitment to 
Communism” , China would receive Soviet aid and Sun Yat-sen would be recognised as 117
the President of China. Moreover, a United Front between nationalists (the Kuomintang, 
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 now called “People's Party”) and communists was created in order to fight the Japanese 
aggression first and Western powers later, and a Military Academy in Guangzhou (Canton) - 
having Moscow educated Taiwan's nationalist president Chiang Kai-shek as director, and 
the young communist Zhou Enlai as officer in charge of political education - was 
established with the help of Russian advisors and finances.  
Sun Yat-sen's pro-Russian tendencies could also be traced in another significant moment. 
Together with the significant land reforms, in 1924, as honorary leader of the 
Reorganisation Congress, he changed the third principle (principle of People's Livelihood) 
concerning the economic development policies, into a principle of socialist economy . Just 118
a few months before his death in March 1925, he went to Beijing and unsuccessfully tried to 
discuss the possibility of a reunion between North and South. Unfortunately, however, he 
died before any important result could be achieved.  
Son of poor breeders, “father of modern China” , as he would be remembered by 119
academics or within political debates, Sun Yat-sen set down his vision of a new China on 
the basis of his Three Principles of the People, first sketched in 1905: nationalism, 
democracy and peoples's livelihood (the latter interpreted as welfare and socialism) and, in 
spite of some inconsistency in his policies (the cooperation with the Chinese Communism 
in constructing an anti-Japanese resistance or the alliance with Soviet Russia as anti-
Western imperialism strategy), right after his death, during the Kuomintang and the 
Communists split, each group claimed to be his true heirs. Only a year later, in 1926, 
Chiang Kai-shek - head of the GMD and one of the major leaders of the South after Sun 
Yat-sen's death - never really believing in a legitimately and honestly United Front with the 
communists, eradicated the Soviet influence and set out the communists' massacre.  
With the dissolution of the First United Front, immediately after the purge, in 1928, under 
his authority, China appeared a unified Republic. Chiang declared himself head of the new 
national government. Brilliant and experienced, he set up an elite government in Nanjing 
(1928-1937), that until 1931 grew in stability and strength, benefitting from imperialist 
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 powers’ credence. Hence, the “Nanjing Decade” has been a period of solidification and 
achievement under the guidance of the Nationalist Party , characterised by improvements 120
in the economy, social progress, development of democracy and cultural creativity. 
Moreover, some of the bitter aspects of foreign concessions and privileges in China, were 
moderated through diplomacy.  
Nevertheless, the Chinese central government in Nanjing witnessed many others massive 
rebellions, insurrections during the 1930’s, and a disastrous second Sino-Japanese War 
(1936-1945), the biggest Asian armed conflict in the 20th century that broke out when the 
leader of Nationalist government Chiang Kai-shek, was kidnapped by the commander of the 
Communist forces, and forced to set a second common Nationalist-Communist anti-
Japanese front, as requirement for his release. After three months of battle against the 
Japanese forces, Shanghai was the first city to give in, while the capital Nanjing witnessed 
terrifying moments of violence when it capitulated in December 1937, in an episode that 
would be remembered as the Nanjing Massacre. In addition to this, strategic cities in China 
were occupied by the Japanese army in the attempt to put an end to Chiang Kai-shek’s 
nationalist government, now secluded in Chongqing.  
In March 1940, while nationalist China was trying to cope with the Japanese perseverant 
offensive, a new Chinese state was created, the “Reorganised National Government of the 
Republic of China” or the “Wang Jingwei regime”, with the capital in Nanjing. The puppet 
state of the Empire of Japan consisted of a collaborationist government ruled by a one-party 
totalitarian dictatorship under Wang Jingwei, former official of the Kuomintang and rival of 
Chiang Kai-shek. However, the entrance of the United States into the Pacific War after 
1941, changed the balance of the conflict between the two armed forces. In fact, not only 
was Chiang Kai-shek’s government in Chongqing acknowledged by the United Nations as 
the only Chinese legitimate government, but the American financial and military aid, 
allowed the Chinese to solidly resist the Japanese aggressions .  121
Meanwhile, the Communists under the leadership of Mao Zedong, expanded their influence 
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 wherever opportunities presented themselves, throughout mass organisations, administrative 
reforms and land and tax reform measures, favouring the peasants and the spread of their 
regulatory network. Poles apart, the Kuomintang, under the leadership of Generalissimo 
Chiang Kai-shek, struggled to counterbalance the spread of communist influence. In the 
aftermath of World War II, China managed to regain almost all of its territories occupied by 
the defeated Nippon army, with few exceptions. One of these exceptions was Manchukuo, 
the puppet state set up by Japan in Manchuria.  
Politically indoctrinated by Japanese politicians for almost fifteen years, between 1931 and 
1945, Manchuria was occupied by the Soviet troops as a result of the Allied agreement at 
Yalta Conference in February 1945. In fact, Soviet troops were brought into Manchuria in 
order to accelerate the termination of war against Japan, and to dismantle and remove more 
than half of the industrial equipment and weaponry left there by the Japanese troops, thus 
enabling the communists to arm themselves with the combat equipment surrendered by the 
withdrawing Japanese army .  122
By late 1948, the Kuomintang position was difficult, as their troops proved to be no match 
for the highly motivated and disciplined Communist People's Liberation Army, earlier 
known as the Red Army. Although larger in numbers (of both men and weaponry) and 
enjoying considerable international support, the Kuomintang lost the major cities instantly, 
for instance in January 1949, Beijing passed from Nationalist to Communist control 
without a fight. On October 1st 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the present-
day People’s Republic of China and in December the same year the Kuomintang relocated 
the government of the Republic of China (ROC) to Taipei, in Taiwan.  
II.4 Sino-Romanian Earliest ties 
Even though the Roman Empire was the first one to establish relations with China in 100 
 “The Coming Of The Cold War, 1945–57. The Chinese civil war”, 20th century international relations, 122
Encyclopaedia Britannica, available at https://www.britannica.com/topic/20th-century-international-
relations-2085155/The-coming-of-the-Cold-War-1945-57#ref304585 ,  accessed on 03.06.2013
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 AD – 160 AD, throughout the Silk Road, that allowed the Romans to acquire the Chinese 
precious products, like the expensive silk, and trade it around Europe, the first intense 
contacts between China and the West could be traced back in the second half of the Ming 
Dynasty, with the emergence of the Christian missionaries on Chinese soil on the one hand, 
and the penetration of the Chinese sea by the Dutch (that in 1624 took Taiwan/Formosa), 
Portuguese (that in 1557 took Macao) and Spanish (that in 1626 occupied North Taiwan) 
naval forces, on the other. Later on, during the Qing government, the most industrious 
colonisers would prove to be the British, the first “Westernisers” to open commercial offices 
in Canton (Guangzhou) in 1699, followed by the French in 1728 and the Unites States 
almost a century later, in 1784.  
There were, however, many Italian and French writers and travellers during the Middle 
Ages, that reached the Middle Kingdom and wrote about it or described it carefully. For 
example, the travels of Niccoló and Matteo Polo to China in the mid 13th century, leaving 
behind a rich record of their experiences; the Italian Franciscan missionary John of 
Montecorvino, traveller and statesman, archbishop of Peking;  and last but not least, Marco 
Polo's prison companion Rusta from Pisa (Rustichello), that brought together in “The 
Million” (1298-1300), different events and sometimes colourful details about China. Hence, 
he provided evidence and descriptions about the Great Wall of China, about the practices of 
planting and drinking tea and more generally, he contributed to the achievement of 
geographical, historical, political and scientific picture of medieval Asia .  123
Moreover, Giovanni de' Marignolli, Niccoló da Conti or the Muslim Ibn Battuta, traveled 
between 1300-1436 in the distant lands of India, China, Southeast and Central Asia; 
according to Buzatu, in order to influence the extension, intensification of Christianity in 
China during the Age of Discovery, Matteo Ricci, Adam Schall von Bell,  John Schreck – 
Terentius, and Giuseppe Castiglione produced important studies that were meant to provide 
a clear knowledge of the Middle Kingdom. Later, together with the penetration and control 
of the Chinese market by the Great colonial powers, the relations between the Empire and 
the foreign countries, as well as the studies about Chinese civilisation and history, started to 
 Ion Buzatu, “Istoria relațiilor României cu China din cele mai vechi timpuri până în zilele noastre”, Meteor 123
Press, București 2004, p. 10
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 flourish, coupled with some highly important historical events that at times completely 
changed the national and international structure (meaning the geographical areas lost by 
China in spite of the Great European Powers).  
Under these circumstances, despite the fact that official Romanian-Chinese relations were 
triggered late, they were however enacted on mindful grounds. Hence, it becomes possible 
to identify in the Romanian historiography the first relevant information about China, and I 
should start by naming the diplomat, philosopher, philologist, geographer, ethnographer and 
theologist Nicolae Milescu Spătarul (1636-1708) for, through his scholarly activity, he has 
been regarded as a significant figure in the 17th century Romanian and Russian culture and 
a notable geographer and life scientist, contributing to the development of social and 
political thought.  
I would like, however, before returning to Milescu Spătarul, to mention some other indirect 
accounts on China during the Middle Ages. First of all, in “Letopisețul Țării Moldovei”, 
written between 1642-1647 the first Moldavian chronicler Grigore Ureche analysed and 
depicted in terms of its wealth, immense territory, as well as for her industrious and skilful 
inhabitants, “the tatar country Hina or Catai (…) country that produces wheat, rice (…) 
silk, ginger, sweet crust, pepper, sugar”  Secondly, in “Letopisețul Moldovei de la Aaron 124
Vodă încoace”, the Moldavian chronicler Miron Costin, noticed that the Moldavian prince 
Vasile Lupu adorned his palaces with objects of Chinese fine art, brought via 
Constantinople. Thirdly and lastly, the Czech-German diplomat Georg Franz Kubich 
mentioned that in 1698, when he attended the wedding of lady Ilinca, daughter of 
Constantin Brâncoveanu, prince of Wallachia (1688-1714), Chinese silk robes were worn 
and Chinese dances were performed (Buzatu 2004: 63-64). 
Returning to Milescu, I need to specify that he was born in Vaslui in a boyars' family and, 
after having studied foreign languages in the Patriarchal School in Constantinople and in 
Italy, he turned back to Moldavia first and Wallachia afterwards, where he was appointed as 
Wallachian's ruler Grigore Ghica representative at the Sublime Porte . After 1664, he 125
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 would travel to Europe, first in Berlin, then in Poland, Stockholm and Paris and in 1671, 
with a recommendation letter in his hands, he would leave for Moscow as Latin, Greek and 
Romanian interpreter inside the Deputation Department, where he would be appointed for 
life, superior of all interpreters within the Russian diplomatic Chancery; here, besides the 
normal duties and translations of official acts and Greek and Latin translations of a number 
of works of ancient and medieval European culture, he conceived over thirty works of 
theological, philosophical and historical content for his students' and the Tsar's Alexei I 
Mikhailovich (Peter the Great's father) furtherance. On the latter's assignment, Nicolae 
Milescu Spătarul went in a diplomatic mission in Peking (1675-1678) and, in view of this 
travel, he investigated the different aspects of Chinese flora, fauna and customs and 
recorded this information and his observations in many works that rendered him popular 
within the scientific and diplomatic fields (Buzatu 2004: 66).  
The journey to the Celestial Empire, as well as the way Milescu carried out his mission, 
produced stir and curiosity all over Europe, thus increasing his prestige and establishing his 
position. It follows that he would write accounts of his journey across Siberia to the borders 
of China in a diary format in Russian language, that proved to be the first travel memorial 
written by a Romanian and recalled under the title “The Journey from Tobolsk, Siberia's 
capital, to China” . Moreover, the different phases and results of his diplomatic efforts 126
would be disseminated throughout an official report labeled like the previous one, under 
different names, and deposited to the Foreign Office Posolski Prikaz. Hence, the “State 
document of Nicolae Spătaru deputation in China, 1675-1678”, “A report for the state 
authorities” or “Travel notes from China” outlined China's landscape, throughout a very 
much different perspective than Siberia's representation. Thus, elements like the villages, 
the abandoned fortresses, the great reinforced animated cities or the Beijing walls, were 
brought forward and examined in contrast with Moscow's urban shaping. Moreover, 
descriptions of the Great Wall and how it had been built, of temples and monasteries were 
executed throughout lenses of analogy with places and configurations already spotted.  
Most interesting however, is the fact that Milescu composed these accounts without letting 
 The text can be found under different titles, like “Journey across Siberia” or “Diary of my journey in 126
China”
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 himself astonished, overwhelmed by the exotic traditions; on the contrary, endowed with 
pragmatic attitude, he maintained evenness while illustrating the Chinese stone bridges and 
only after a cautious analysis he estimated, with no particular excitement, that Moscow's 
manufacture was more fascinating than the Chinese one. In addition to this, owing to his 
competence in weapons expertise, both of his travel diaries contained military observations 
regarding Chinese engineering techniques  as well as political, religious and cultural 127
remarks (by making a parallel between the Ottoman and Chinese music).  
His most important achievement however, has been the accurate “Description of China”, 
where the vast kingdom of China, with its cities and provinces, as well as the great river 
Amur, have been depicted on the basis of his impressions and have had, along with his other 
works, great impact in the European knowledge of China (Buzatu 2004: 64-65). It would 
have certainly been impossible for Nicolae Spătarul to illustrate the whole Chinese 
sceneries during his stay in the Celestial Empire, as it was instead natural for the Tsar to 
solicit him. Hence, after only laying eyes on and examining part of the Chinese territories 
and landscapes, it is verifiable that he assembled what he had seen with his own eyes with 
what he had managed to uncover from other works, thusly bringing forth a coherent and 
meticulous portraiture of the entire China.  
Moreover, at his return in Moscow, he even provided the Tsar with an accurate map of 
Siberia, China and Mongolia, a truly desired and valuable representation based on field 
observations, that the West would give chase to. By all means the works he created, linked 
to his journeys and judged state secrets, were not destined to have a public readership. The 
Great Powers however, precisely because the documents were kept confidential, initiated 
unyielding operations (i.e. diplomatic and intelligence activities) that finally led to the 
discovery and investigation of the manuscripts, while the distribution and circulation of the 
copies uncovered the state secret to the benefit of the whole world.  
In fact, most of the numerous accounts and knowledge that he passed on, have started 
circulating in copies, in early Greek translations already during his lifetime and, at the end 
of the nineteenth and the beginning of the 20th century, the journal of his diplomatic mission 
 For example, he displayed the suitable areas where strongholds could be build up and know-how 127
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 in China was thoroughly expounded and edited in Russia. Hereof, the first Romanian 
translation of Milescu's travel across Siberia was materialised in 1888 by Gheorghe Sion - a 
Romanian writer and member of the Romanian Academy - from a seriously damaged Greek 
copy, while in Russian language, the version was translated and printed in 1889 and 1896. 
Nonetheless after a while, his writings spread in a flash by means of the English version of 
the British scholar, traveller and journalist J. F. Baddeley, Russia, Mongolia, China, 
published in London in 1919, and providing Europe and the world with all-encompassing 
information about China from geographical, historical, political, strategic and cultural 
perspectives . 128
According to Mihaela Irimia, the “mediator between Europe and Asia”- as tsarist officials 
portrayed him - Milescu acknowledged that China was in the Chinese eyes and mind, 
permanently settled as the centre of the world, while the Emperor was looked upon as God 
on Earth, sitting on the throne of his secret city; when he went out for a walk, the imperial 
passages were completely cleared. Moreover, she asserts that from Milescu’s description, 
we discover that the entire mission was close to failure because of Chinese doggedness 
regarding the ceremonial process being completed with accuracy. Hence, “the Tsar’s letters 
are not to contain any single trace of possible offence or disrespect and should state in so 
many words that the Chinese Emperor is ‘the Son of the Sky’ (...) A series of negotiations 
shall then result in agreeing on what language to be used for possible contacts between the 
two empires in the future, a prospect encouraged by the Russian envoy, but hardly 
envisaged by the Chinese side” . Moreover, the author revealed that “after exhausting 129
procrastinations, the much-awaited meeting does take place, but not before the Russian 
envoy accepts to do the kowtow ritual(…) European fascination with things Chinese has a 
history encroaching upon the territory of magic” .  130
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 Thereupon, it is actually Irimia's last sentence, the key to understanding European relations 
with Asia and more particularly to interpreting and disclosing, throughout an efficient 
approach, the Romanian-Chinese relationship all along the 17th-18th century. Moreover, in 
Orientalism, Said offers an excellent access towards the comprehension of East and West, 
by challenging the idea of orientalism, by providing signification to contrasting terms such 
as Occident – civilised, Orient – uncivilised, and by allowing studies, contingent to 
Romanian-Chinese relations, to be contextualised and dealt with by virtue of this theory.  
Hence, not only Milescu Spătaru's conduct, attitude and performance can be elucidated, but 
the academic heritage he provided could be unraveled and interpreted all over within the 
framework produced by Said's orientalism, despite the differences of actors or peculiarities 
of locations. According to the latter, “if it is true that no production of knowledge in the 
human sciences can ever ignore or disclaim its author's involvement as a human subject in 
his own circumstances, then it must also be true that for a European or American studying 
the Orient there can be no disclaiming the main circumstances of his actuality: that he 
comes up against the Orient as a European or American first, as an individual second. And 
to be a European or an American in such a situation is by no means an inert fact. It meant 
and means being aware, however dimly, that one belongs to a power with definite interests 
in the Orient, and more important, that one belongs to a part of the earth with a definite 
history of involvement in the Orient almost since the time of Homer” .  131
What follows is Said’s definition of orientalism or, rather the framework for a 
comprehensible exploration of “things Chinese” as seen and meticulously described by the 
Tsar’s envoy. Thus, in the author’s opinion both European and American interest in the 
Orient was political, however “it was the culture that created that interest, that acted 
dynamically along with brute political, economic, and military rationales to make the 
Orient the varied and complicated place that it obviously was in the field I call 
Orientalism” . For that reason, Said stated, “Orientalism is not a mere political subject 132
matter or field that is reflected passively by culture, scholarship, or institutions; nor is it a 
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 large and diffuse collection of texts about the Orient; nor is it representative and expressive 
of some nefarious “Western" imperialist plot to hold down the "Oriental" world. It is rather 
a distribution of geopolitical awareness into aesthetic, scholarly, economic, sociological, 
historical, and philological texts; it is an elaboration not only of a basic geographical 
distinction (….)of two unequal halves, Orient and Occident, but also of a whole series of 
interests which (…) not only creates but also maintains” .  133
By the same token, future investigation of relations between Europe - Romania and Asia - 
China  must be done  throughout the same channel of analysis, namely by considering the 
large passage opened by Milescu Spătarul as major success to promoting the forthcoming 
development of bilateral ties between the two countries. Therefore, exclusively throughout 
this procedure, one can gain a plain insight of the significance of other Romanian great 
scholars and historians' works, accounts and narratives on China such as the teacher's 
Costea from Scheii Brașovului 1703 translation of the story of how many countries and 
Kings are in the land of Asia. Here, the names Cataaghion (Chatai, China) and the Tartar 
Kingdom (Manchurian) were “so important and notorious in Asia, that they would not 
know an equally strong enemy in the world” (Buzatu 2004: 76).  
In the same manner, endowed with geographical and cultural determinism, the monk Antim 
from Cozia (1766) copied the book “Le relazioni universali” of the Italian Jesuit Giovanni 
Botero Benese, and entitled it “Cosmography, namely the creation of the world”; the 
volume provided information about “Hina”'s emplacement and physical geography 
minutiae. Other accounts and notes on China were introduced in Romania by means of the 
cultural impact of monasticism. Hence, like the Jesuit Giovanni Botero's book, the Jesuit 
French philosopher, historian and teacher Claude Buffier's manual Geografie universelle 
was copied, translated and printed (under the name De obște gheografie) at Iași Cathedral in 
1795, as a result of the scholar and bishop of Hotin, Amfilohie’s efforts (“Geography and 
history of China”); the latter proved to be the most important textbook offering, by using an 
archaic and regional language, knowledge about China's history, geography and culture, and 
would be constantly used within academies for different decades. Moreover, another text 
comprising legendary and mythological geographical descriptions, including China, is 
 Ibidem133
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 believed by scholars to have been transcribed by the teacher Costea from Scheii Brașovului 
School, between 1693 and 1703. If it was true, it would be the oldest cosmography text 
book identified in Romania.  
The translation in Romanian language and the printing of these volumes represented the 
starting point, the gateway to the modern sources picturing the Orient. Initially, the original 
concern of the scholars for the knowledge of the universal history, started in the middle of 
the 17th century, was either limited to ecclesiastical matters or was dealing with studies of 
Romanian past within the broader European history (especially the scholars within the 
Transylvanian School focusing on the Latin blood of the Romanian people). Likewise, the 
interest for the East-Orient was intended and planned on a binary stance: religious and 
national. The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries instead, would witness a gradual widening 
of the time and space, meaning that state of the art information become richer and frequent. 
Geographical and historical texts, key players of this open-mindedness, represented cracked 
echoes of Western discourse about the world.  
However, the cultural picture that Romanian readers draw in their understanding about 
China, throughout these books, depended on the corresponding Western ideas, from which 
they have been copied and/or translated; in this sense, the outcome they acquired, meaning 
the knowledge of the East-Orient, was immediately tainted with Western countries' beliefs, 
solutions, understandings. England, France, Portugal, the Netherlands and partly Germany 
and Italy in fact, produced knowledge linked to the practice of colonial power. Evidently, 
for the Romanian population in early 19th century, China was only an intellectual 
experience and the Far East was more an idea than a geographical location; it was depicted 
as an ancient place, object of annexation and military campaigns. The modernised 
representation of these places, which materialised rapidly in the West, knew a much slower 
revision in the Romanian printed books and in fact only later, when Romanian culture 
discovered the West at beginning of the 19th century,  the modern restoration began. Since 
then, the synchronisation with the Occident has always been a constant.  
The Orient, and especially the Far East, as well as other exotic areas, interested the 
Romanian society and academy only in so far as they were revealed by the Western culture. 
There is no way to render the argument more understandable than Said when applied to the 
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 specific Romanian case. As maintained by the author, “men have always divided the world 
up into regions having either real or imagined distinction from each other. The absolute 
demarcation between East and West (...) had been years, even centuries, in the making. 
There were of course innumerable voyages of discovery; there were contacts through trade 
and war” . More importantly however, Said explained, is the fact that since the 18th 134
century the East-West relations operated on two dominant constituents, of which “one was 
a growing systematic knowledge in Europe about the Orient (…) reinforced by the colonial 
encounter as well as by the widespread interest in the alien and unusual (…) to this 
systematic knowledge was added a sizeable body of literature produced by novelists, poets, 
translators, and gifted travellers. The other feature of Oriental-European relations was that 
Europe was always in a position of strength, not to say domination” . Consequently, the 135
political, cultural and religious relationship was regarded in the West as one between a 
“strong and a weak partner” .  136
It was 1882, the first International Geophysical Year, when, throughout a joint effort, twelve 
nations of the world began to investigate the polar regions of the planet. Among the 
participants there was Sweden, whose engineer Salomon August Andrée, in 1896, was 
experiencing ways of exploring the polar regions by balloon. His unique and bold initiative 
however, had aroused very much interest within the scientific circles throughout the world, 
Romanian engineer's Bazil G. Assan included. Andrée and Assan had studied both 
engineering in France and had become friends; now, the latter, as delegate of the Romanian 
Geographical Society  was among the scientists and worldwide professors witnessing, 137
attending the launch of the balloon - constructed by Andrée - in flight over the North Pole. 
Unfortunately, the crew of the balloon under Andrée's leading, died in October 1897, in 
Spitzbergen Archipelago region, leaving all mankind baffled.  
However, as my research does not investigate the 19th century’s geographic discoveries, I 
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 would set my sights on the figure of Bazil Assan, the Romanian engineer and explorer of 
the Arctic, but not because he was the first Romanian traveler to Japan, publishing his 
impressions, nor because he was a motoring promoter, holding the first automobile in 
Romania, but because at the end of the 19th century (1897-1898) he accomplished a five 
months long economic and consequently commercial expedition around the world, on the 
route Constance - Istanbul - Cairo - Ceylon Island - China (Hong Kong, Guangzhou, 
Shanghai) - Japan - USA - London - Bucharest, and thus introduced to the king, the prince 
and the Romanian society, information and knowledge about China.  
In 1899, during his presentation before the king, entitled the “Journey around the Earth”, 
Assan displayed among varied impressions, essential input on Chinese culture and 
civilisation, as well as data concerning Romania's interest to export numerous products in 
Asia, like salt, wood, beans, petrol, flour and alcohol. He was impressed by the importance 
of the Suez Canal, the shortest link between East and West due to its unique strategic 
position, the varied fauna of South East Asia, while, in the Far East (Japan and China) he 
was committed to purchase materials for his polish factory in Bucharest. Moreover, he even 
drew the attention of the Romanian authorities on the need to establish a legation in Tokyo, 
to conclude trade treaties with Japan, and to form a strong commercial fleet.  
The beginning of the 20th century would behold several presentations disposing data about 
the Far East. In 1904, in accordance with diplomat Ion Buzatu and scholar Constantin 
Buchet, while many academicians, historians had already unravelled various, indisputable 
materials about Japan, the great Romanian historian, statesman, literary critic, poet and 
memoirist Nicolae Iorga, wrote an exposition based on Western sources, that sought to 
depict from a neutral stance (resultantly unfolding both positive and negative peculiarities), 
Japan and China's outlook, while the title of the book encompassed the great European 
question mark of the time, “Far Eastern war. China, Japan, Asian Russia”.  
Prime Minister, professor and academician, Nicolae Iorga structured his account on China 
in six chapters and portrayed, by means of a respectful and appreciative language, the 
Chinese people as tall, “with scowling eyes, always black in a china-like white, crooked 
nose, black, thick, shiny hair. Big and soft, robust and slow, indefatigable and patient, these 
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 are the Chinese” ; a very hard working society, that had managed to establish the oldest 138
civilisation, believed however that their extensive territories, characterised by numerous 
deep valleys, were the perfect settlement for barbarians; in fact, in order to protect 
themselves from threats, they needed to create “stone walls, running in the mountains from 
a peak to another” .   139
Moreover, throughout a fifty-one pages exposition, Iorga also offered an insight of Chinese 
policy regarding neighbouring countries; for example, in terms of territorial expansion, he 
disclosed some details concerning the Chinese Empire receiving deliberately 
submissiveness, solely throughout money, gifts and desire for trade. It was indeed this type 
of foreign policy, that allowed the empire's extension to Mongolia, Manchuria, Indochina 
and Eastern Turchestan. In addition to this, Iorga revealed that when Chinese civilisation 
came into contact with less advanced populations, the latter winded up by being absorbed 
by the Chinese culture, resultantly giving rise to unique processes of assimilation in specific 
geographical areas.  
Furthermore, along the same lines as previous Romanian scholars writing about China, 
Iorga unveiled some aspects of religion in China  by confronting it with European - Greek 140
and Roman - cult of the ancestors and heroes. Besides, the Romanian historian and 
statesman sympathised with Chinese appreciation and devotion for nature, so evident in the 
painting and the art of gardening, and noticed the importance of the Feng Shui art (wind and 
water) in the adornment of a residence. Other attractive and curious exotic practices, have 
interested Nicolae Iorga, for example the Chinese cuisine, and thus he described it 
attentively: “[the Chinese] put lots of cakes on the guest’s plate, who has to eat with the 
ivory chopsticks the Chinese’s turtles, his eggs preserved for years in lime, shark flippers 
boiled with radishes, sea snails, shrimp pies, bamboo roots, garlic” (Iorga 1904: 26). 
Likewise, the Chinese society's particularities such as kindness and politeness were singled 
out by the Romanian historian, as well as their great patience when conclusions needed to 
 Nicolae Iorga, “Far Eastern War, China, Japan, Asian Russia”, Bucharest, Socec publishing house, 1904, 138
pp. 2-4.
 Ibidem139
 Religions and beliefs such as Taoism, Confucianism, Buddhism, Christianity140
 108
 be drawn (Iorga 1904: 33).  
In the end, after having delineated the major attributes for a balanced Chinese society and a 
unique age-old culture and civilisation, Iorga carried on his task by concisely presenting the 
transformation of the political conditions within the Celestial Empire in the nineteenth and 
the beginning of the 20th century, by depicting the major events of the time: the Opium War, 
the Taiping revolution, the numerous insurrections, as well as the unfair treaties imposed to 
China by the Great Powers, and without taking any position, he does not flinch from 
expressing his thought that, driven by imperialist strategies in China, the actions of the 
Europeans have not rendered Europe a better, eulogised site.   
According to Buzatu and the Romanian press, in the summer of 1908, the Touring Club de 
France, an agency in Paris organised a unique competition which aimed at the 
“development of tourism in all its forms” (Buzatu 2004: 78). The unprecedented challenge 
was to cover afoot, one hundred thousand kilometres, namely bypassing the Earth by own 
means, for the sum of one hundred thousand francs .  141
The nineteenth years old Romanians Dumitru Dan, Paul Pârvu, Gheorghe Negreanu and 
Alexandru Pașcu, studying in France, were the only ones willing to meet the great 
challenges of the journey and were finally accepted by the French club due to the itinerary 
chosen. After preparing themselves for the great expedition of the century, they left 
Bucharest on the 1st of April 1910. By the end however, three of them would die in 
dramatic conditions: intoxicated with opium in India, deceased in the China Mountains 
chasms, or perished because of gangrene generated by the extremely long walk in the 
Siberian cold. After having perambulated five continents and seventy-four countries, having 
crossed oceans seven times, and having overused almost five hundred slippers, Dan 
however, managed to return in Romania in 1916, and completed the remaining part of the 
journey-competition, in the immediate aftermath of WWI.  
I dwell upon this boundless exploration as in the end, excepted the tragic loss of human life, 
it proved to have had a substantial value in the memorialistic literature, while the accurate 
descriptions of the places observed and put together in the form of a report, constituted an 
original sketch that allowed further input to the subtle and indirect knowledge about China. 
 The equivalent of approx. 100.000 euros today141
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 It was disclosed, throughout the travel journal and Dan's accounts, the general impression of 
the two days that the Romanian students spent in Tokyo. Subsequently, the youngsters left 
Japan to go to China and traveled through Hong Kong, Canton (Guangzhou), eventually 
setting Peking as final destination in that stage of their journey. Even if the Chinese 
experience ended up tragically for the Romanians, with the loss of another one of them 
during the dangerous itinerary involving the crossing of the Chinese mountains, it was well-
established that the contact with the Far East had created an everlasting bond, overcoming 
time and space, or life and death.  
As reported by Liu Yong, expert of Sino-Romanian relations, during the Chinese revolution 
that overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1911, the Romanian people in Transylvania articulated 
their sympathy and sustenance through journals and periodicals that produced “extensive 
reports and comments on this event” . Likewise, in 1918 “the press circles in China paid 142
close attention and sympathy to the national independence and liberation movement in 
Central and Southeast Europe (including Transylvania). Shen Bao, one of the earliest 
newspapers with profound influence in China, made a series of reports to the course which 
Transylvania and Bukovina were unified into Romania” .  143
Moreover, Liu Yong revealed that researcher Lu Xianggan, editor in chief of Social 
Sciences Documentation Publishing House in Beijing has subsequently realised a 
distinctive investigation on this issue in the 1970's. It is also worth mentioning two volumes 
on China, the first one written by professor Mihai Negru, published in 1917 and entitled 
“Aspects of Chinese civilisation and thought from the very beginning until present day” , 144
re-edited and published again in 1937 and another work, a bibliography, published in 
1926  by the hands of the adventurous traveler Vasilescu Nottara, who entitled it 145
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 “Traveling across China from Shanghai to Beijing”  (Buzatu 2004: 11). 146
After having delineated from Romanian perspective, the historical, geographical and 
cultural acquaintance between the two countries, most of which throughout indirect contact, 
travel memoirs and descriptive accounts, it wouldn't be unusual to assert that, after a 
satisfactory starting-up of the diplomatic and political ties - determined by the exchange of 
letters between Prince Carol I and the Chinese Emperor Guang Xu in 1880 - a four decades 
long cycle of non-relations characterised the two countries' political and diplomatic rapport. 
This matter wouldn't be atypical however, if we considered that both internally and 
externally, Romania and China were witnessing political, social and territorial 
transformations, and most of all, were facing or experiencing several difficulties generated 
by the emergence of national consciousness and ideologies, ordinarily enabled by the 
occupancy of foreign powers.  
Hence, in this interval, while China observed political and social instability, territorial 
extirpations, political regime adjustment, as well as the absence of a solid centralised 
government, Romania saw this period through the lenses of social turmoil and nationalist 
discomposure. The two countries found themselves lacking any kind of eagerness to 
establish bilateral ties: on the one hand, threatened to jeopardise its national integrity and 
plunging to become a semi-colonial territory, China has ignored from the start any type of 
strategy aiming at the establishment of bilateral ties with small or medium foreign 
countries, and has only attempted to maintain her national existence and basic sovereignty; 
on the other hand, already before joining WWI with its vicissitudes, the monarchy in 
Romania had ceased looking at China conscientiously, specifically on account of the 
Chinese mutation from the imperial regime to the republican era, in 1911-1912.  
To round off, I might say that this interval in the Romanian-Chinese historical diplomatic 
relations, could be regarded as a fluctuating channel, a circuit never going backwards, but 
moving from side to side instead of going forward. Henceforward, once a central 
government was established in the two countries, the first drives to enable durable and 
strong official relations between Romania and China proceeded.  
On the 26th of May 1920, Victor Cădere, head of the Romanian legation to Siberia, 
 Original title “Străbătând China de la Shanghai la Beijing”.146
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 proposed the Romanian government to enable diplomatic service and legation to Tokyo and 
Beijing, having a common military and naval attache’ for both the locations. Moreover, he 
invoked the urgent establishment of Romanian consulates to Shanghai and Harbin for the 
achievement of economic interests and the concern to protect the Romanian subdued, as 
well as for the reason that many other much smaller states had already actualised consular 
representation in those places . 147
Subsequently, in conformity with Liu Yong, “the year 1928 was thought to be a moment to 
put forward the suggestion of establishing diplomatic relations with China by the Romanian 
government” (Liu Yong 2006: 41). In fact, during the first mandate of Prime Minister Iuliu 
Maniu and Gheorghe G. Mironescu as Minister of Foreign Affairs, in July 1928, “Aurel 
Vasiliu of the Romanian Legation to Tokyo received the task of exploring the opportunity of 
setting up a Romanian Legation in China” . The idea of founding a Romanian diplomatic 148
representation by the Nanjing government, under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, 
seemed thriving in the beginning, but the Chinese authorities first wanted to sign a 
friendship treaty to “boost their international position and promote their legitimate 
interests” .  149
Moreover, Aurel Vasiliu informed the Romanian government that the Japanese authorities 
seemed contrary to Romania establishing diplomatic relations with the Nanjing government, 
causing a delay of the political program. Subsequently however, in March 1930, through the 
Chinese minister to Berlin's legation Jiang Zuobin, the Chinese authorities gave a positive 
response to the Romanian diplomacy, adding however a preliminary condition to conclude 
an Arbitration, Friendship and Conciliation Treaty between the two countries. According to 
Liu Yong, “the Chinese minister to Germany asked his Romanian counterpart to deliver the 
treaty draft to his Ministry of Foreign Affairs as soon as possible, pointing out that the 
Chinese government will also sign it as soon as possible” (Liu Yong 2006: 42). Romania's 
government refusal followed in haste, with Romanian minister Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen 
 Romulus Ioan Budura, eds., “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. Documente” [Sino-Romanian 147
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 stating that a such a document was not seasonable as it “would seem a baseless threat to 
Moscow” (Budura 2005: 28). Moreover, on March 11th, 1930, Aurel Vasiliu “reported  to 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the motives he had laid out before (…) have been 
confirmed by the developments in the last few years” (Budura 2005: 28) therefore, “taking 
into consideration the present relations between China and Russia, it is obvious now that 
Japan supports Russia, and given Moscow’s current attitude toward Romania, any 
rapprochement with China (…) could be interpreted (…) as a provocation” (Budura 2005: 
28). Romanian authorities decided once again to let the establishment of diplomatic 
relations with China lie over.  
Although scholars like Ion Buzatu saw this refusal as unfounded, flattering the Great 
Powers in spite of China (as already mentioned, originally, the Great Powers didn't rush to 
recognise the new  nationalist government in the hands of Chiang Kai-shek) in my regard, 
the refusal of the Romanian government to establish official ties with China in the 
beginning of the 1930's, could be tackled with from a different stance.  
First of all, one should bare in mind that Romania's political condition was considerably 
unstable: in fact, Carol II, the son of King Ferdinand I of Romania, renounced his right to 
the throne on 28 December 1925 in favour of his son Michael, who became King in July 
1927. Three years later however, in 1930, he returned to Romania and, throughout a coup 
d’état drafted by Prime Minister Iuliu Maniu, he took back sceptre from his son Michael, 
assuming the King of Carol II for the next ten years. Deriving from a severe crisis in 
Romanian politics and society, that were unable to find a central institution to act as 
mediator, this event represented an instinctive, almost natural scenario. The new king 
immediately took measures to reinforce his throne, firstly by changing almost the entire 
staff at the palace and replacing it with trustworthy body politic and secondly, by enhancing 
his personality cult through megalomaniac practices. It follows that in 1938, King Carol II 
was able to materialise his aspirations, by putting an end to the democratic regime in 
Romania and replacing the liberal constitution of 1923 with a totalitarian one, which 
highlighted the new sovereign's concept of state leadership. In fact, Romania immediately 
embarked on the path of dictatorship.  
Secondly and analogously, in 1930 China was facing or dealing with an extensive war 
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 between the central government and various powerful warlords, as well as an intense war 
against Japan just a year later. Both the difficult socio-political circumstances in Romania 
and China and Aurel Vasiliu’s letter  - as Romanian Minister to Tokyo between 1927-1929 150
- to the Romanian Foreign Affairs Office in March 1930 - stating that the establishment of a 
Legation in China was absolutely unnecessary, considered the fact that it could have raised 
Moscow's suspicions regarding Romania's stance towards China and the Far East - could be 
regarded as the reasons for which the issue of enabling relations came to naught for the 
second time. For the Romanian foreign policy, the Asian opportunity could not be actualised 
because of the former's Euro-centrist strategy, which implied an attitude towards China that 
was vehemently affected by the economic and financial policies of both the European 
powers and the United States towards China.  
However, not only the political and diplomatic ties with China were standing still during 
this interval. While visiting Romania in 1930, Jiang Zuobin, the Chinese diplomatic 
representative to Berlin proposed the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs to buy large 
quantities of wheat from Romania, in spite of the United States of America. However, a 
year later, when the Chinese diplomat requested an answer to his proposal to the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the leadership of Gh. Mironescu, both the Romanian and 
Chinese representatives acknowledged that the suggestion had been lost for the whole time, 
in the ambiguous and tricky realm of bureaucracy (Buzatu 2004: 80).  
Nevertheless, from a social and cultural perspective, Iolanda Țighiliu offered valuable 
information that depicts the Romanian community living in Shanghai in 1931, as actively 
involved in the creation, organisation of a Romanian Cultural Centre. Her account reveals 
that already since 1928, the first steps for the foundation of “Eminescu” Cultural Centre, 
had been made by the Romanian inhabitants of Shanghai, while the purpose of this 
intellectual club was that to offer the chance for Romanians living in China to gather 
together and read books and journals in Romanian language. After some confusion in 
 Excerpt from Aurel Vasiliu's letter:  “Currently, I take the liberty to emphasise this fact, Romania should 150
refrain from any action which Moscow, known in bad faith, could interpret as a challenge. The Legation in 
Tokyo must continue to act as a vigilant and patient observation post. [...] Now, more than ever, it should be 
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Romanian Academy “Nicolae Iorga” History Institute, Bucharest, vol. 1, 2004, pp. 189-192.
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 choosing the name of the cultural centre, Țighiliu provides data regarding Romanian 
Minister to Tokyo, Gheorghe Stoicescu's letter of 20 April 1931 concerning the strategic 
idea to establish that kind of centre in Shanghai. The initiative was considered admirable 
and “even though away from home, and having no official representative in China able to 
defend the interests of the Romanians who are quite numerous, they have created this 
project to meet occasionally and read Romanian books and newspapers, in order not to 
forget their mother tongue” .  151
Stoicescu’s impressions of the Chinese city were also outlined by Țighiliu, who described 
Shanghai as“the largest centre of propaganda, from where Russian and Chinese communist 
organisations operate in countries around the world throughout the citizens of each 
country. Hence, the activity of the members of this circle was closely monitored, in order to 
determine if the project was the result of real love for the country or served as a cover for 
other subversive activities” . Yet, the outbreak of military operations in China and Japan 152
in 1937, exposed the lives of the Romanian community in Shanghai, that never ceased to 
stimulate the organisation and enhancement of institutions able to amplify their union and 
homogeneity.  
In May 1939, on behalf of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Chinese Minister to 
Prague, Lone Liang, sent to his Romanian counterpart in the Czech capital, Gheorghe 
Lecca, an official notice representing the Chinese suggestion to establish diplomatic ties 
between Romania and China, together with the proposal to conclude a preliminary, but not 
restraining, friendship agreement between the two governments . Moreover, the accord 153
anticipated the displacement to Bucharest of the Chinese Legation to Prague, as a result of 
the Reich government's demands that foreign legations in Berlin transformed the legations 
in Prague in consulates general during the Sudeten crisis (1938).  
Additionally, in July 1939, the Romanian ambassador to Paris and former Prime Minister, 
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 Gheorghe Tătărescu, gave evidence of the same Chinese interest to initiate official relations 
with Romania and to further conclude a commercial and friendship treaty (Buzatu 2004: 
82). The Romanian government, with Armand Călinescu as Prime Minister and Grigore 
Gafencu as Minister of Foreign Affairs, eventually accepted the Chinese Nationalist 
government proposal to assign ex-Minister to Prague, Lone Liang, as Minister 
Plenipotentiary to Bucharest, adding however that “signing a preliminary accord in the 
guise of a friendship treaty, is not believed to be necessary at this purpose” but “will 
comfortably receive future suggestions with the purpose above, from the Chinese 
government” (Buzatu 2004: 83).  
In the context of the establishment of official bilateral ties with the Chinese government, 
Lone Liang's official speech in Bucharest also highlighted  some of the essential coordinates 
of Sino-Romanian tendencies: the potential of bilateral economic cooperation as well as 
China's sympathy towards Romania, as a result of N. Titulescu's position at the League of 
Nations in the context of the Japanese aggression in Manchuria and the creation of the 
puppet state Manchuko . Thereof, the actualisation of diplomatic ties with China (as the 154
thirty fifth state out of sixty four, which Romania was establishing diplomatic relations and 
legations with) expressed the result of Romanian authorities' efforts to bring in the 
international arena the acknowledgement of the country's independent political entity and 
Chinese delegates' endeavour to create significant alliances with European countries and the 
West. 
During the interwar period, one of the emblematic personalities of Romanian politics in 
international relations was Nicolae Titulescu, statesman, diplomat and repeatedly minister, 
as well as president of the League of Nations. He has permanently represented Romania in 
the League of Nations since 1921, and was elected twice (1930/1931) President of this 
organisation. In this capacity, he struggled for the maintenance of the borders established by 
the treaties of peace, of good neighbourly relations between large and small states, for the 
respect of the sovereignty and equality of all states in international relations, and for the 
common security and prevention of aggression. Titulescu based his entire activity on the 
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 fundamental issues of Romania's foreign policy. Accordingly, he considered Romania's 
political strategy in the international arena to be defined by the concept “from national, 
through regional, to universal” .  155
Between 1931-1932, the Japanese Empire conquered Manchuria; this is a historical fact 
upon which the League of Nations, lacking energy, initiative and authority, had no 
influence; on the contrary, I would say, considered the fact that until the end of 1931, the 
attitude of the major Western powers was more encouraging than  condemning towards the 
Japanese aggression. But the situation in the Far East evolved detrimental to the 
expectations and hopes of the ruling Western political circles, while the international public 
opinion began to understand the Japanese expansion projects. Resultantly, the League of 
Nations asked both the Chinese and Japanese governments to take urgent action for a 
ceasefire and to sit down for negotiations. The debates that took place in the Extraordinary 
Assembly of the League of Nations were very inflamed, the positions adopted by the major 
powers envisaged restraint, indecision and ambiguity. Referring to this episode, Titulescu 
bitterly stated “unfortunately, at least until today (9 March), the major powers' positions 
are of exasperating passivity. Some because they do not want to take responsibility, others 
(...) because in this way, will be able to sustain that the only security is national military 
force. Let's hope that this passivity is fleeting, otherwise we enter a new series of 
unpredictable complications and multiple repercussions” . Small and medium states, 156
always in danger to become victims at the mercy of any great power, have condemned the 
violation by Japan of the international law, of the peace treaties, and of any other agreement 
and convention.  
The speech held by Titulescu on 7 March 1932 was carefully listened by everyone, as it 
constituted a model in the art of diplomacy: “The conditions under which this dispute 
presents itself now at the Assembly, despite the efforts of the Council, (...) make of the Sino-
 Hrișcu, M., “A critical approach to the diplomatic activity of Nicolae Titulescu (1932-1936)”, 155
Transylvanian Review, 19 (4), December 2010
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 Japanese conflict a problem even more alarming” , undermining “the role and 157
effectiveness of the League of Nations as a tool for development and maintenance of peace 
between nations” . Moreover, the Romanian diplomat stressed the necessity to respect, 158
unanimously and unconditionally, the Pact of the League of Nations, and article 10 
especially, as it constituted the cornerstone of the entire organisation; “any weakness in 
relation to article 10, any hesitation regarding its full implementation would crush our 
institution” . In the end, he asked everyone to respect the Kellogg-Briand Pact  because, 159 160
by “prohibiting war as an instrument of national policy (...) creates for the signatories of 
this pact an identical obligation to that of article 10 in respect to the territorial integrity of 
each state” . The first delegate of China sent the Romanian diplomat a gratification letter, 161
as well as a telegram from the Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai. The latter stated, among 
other things that “although their [Chinese] confidence in the Pact of the League of Nations 
was deeply shaken, the voice of justice has been heard through the voice of Romania” . 162
Hence, through an impeccable logic, Titulescu pleaded for the Republic of China and 
against the Japanese aggression. “In this situation (...) if the League of Nations does not 
strongly proclaim the great principles underlying the Pact or the international modern life, 
it will cease to exist, and all its past laborious activity will appear as an illusion in the eyes 
of those who believed in it” .  163
The League of Nations thus proved unable to live up to its mission, but Romania, through 
Titulescu's voice, proclaimed itself as a sincere follower of international morality. In fact, 
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 the victim of the Japanese aggression, China, approached repeatedly the Romanian 
government in that period, with proposals to establish diplomatic relations and requesting, 
in that precise circumstance, the signing of a treaty of friendship. Still, Nicolae Titulescu 
was not the only one to clearly take a stance or feel sympathy for China: the Romanian 
mass-media too, expressed compassion and sensitivity for the Chinese crucial political 
situation, mostly in regard to Japan's rupture of the Manchurian territory and about the 
League of Nations' powerlessness. In this regard, on 25 December 1931, an article was 
published in “Facla” journal, under the title “War of the two chrysanthemum”; the paper 
identified the aggressor, Japan, that has violated all the treaties and has fully abolished her 
reasons and pretexts, and the victim, China, for which he instantly empathised.  
In addition to this, in the context of the international organisation of the Global Congress 
against the War in Amsterdam, on August 28th, 1932, another expression of affinity towards 
China was illustrated by the formation of a Romanian committee of action against the war 
and by the launching of a pacifist call, signed by fifty Romanian intellectuals, professors 
and publicists. Moreover, in the Bulletin produced by the Committee against the war, Sun 
Yat-sen's widow and future Honorary President of the PRC, Song Chingling, published a 
letter that was due to bring to light the cruelty of the Japanese militarism and imperialism 
against the one million victims of Chinese workers and peasants (Buzatu 2004: 89).  
From an artistic perspective in the interwar period, the desire for mutual understanding was 
also expressed throughout Romanian philosopher and writer Lucian Blaga’s work “Tao” 
and Romanian literary critic, historian and novelist George Călinescu’s drama “Shun” 
pleading for a democratic governance, while works of Romanian writers like Mihail 
Sadoveanu and Panait Istrati were translated into Chinese; the story “Love song”, by Mihail 
Sadoveanu, translated and published in 1935 by the great Chinese literary man, Sun Xun, 
through the German language, was a special moment at that time. Moreover, it is relevant to 
mention the poem recitals of the Romanian poet Mihai Eminescu in Beijing, the staging of 
Eugen Lovinescu’s Shattered Citadel in Tianjin in Chinese language, the recital of Li Bai’s 
poems in Bucharest, as well as the performance of the opera Wang Gui and Li Xiangxiang 
in Timisoara in Romanian language (Budura 2005: 34-35). 
Returning to the end of the 1930's, the content of the letter of credence that the first Chinese 
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 diplomat to Bucharest, Liang Lone, displayed in October 1939 also held that “Romania and 
China detain huge natural resources that can and must be used effectively as a basis for the 
enhancement of commerce between the two countries, for obtaining prosperity and a 
harmonic completion of their mutual needs” . However, even with the support of the 164
Chamber of Commerce, Sino-Romanian trade was almost insignificant during the four 
decades of the 20th century. According to Liu Yong, the Minister of Foreign Trade of 
Romanian People's Republic Ion Kun, conveyed in an article in People's Daily in 1950, that 
the Romanian shipment exported to China in 1937 was less than 10 tons, mostly consisting 
of natural resources such as petroleum, wheat and other grains that China necessitated in 
order to satisfy the domestic consumption. Furthermore, just a year later, in 1938 Romania 
imported 15 tons of load and exported nothing to China (Yong Liu 2006: 47-48). 
On 23 November 1940 Romania joined the Tripartite Pact, and just months later, in June 
1941, the country was entering WWII side by side with Germany, Italy and Japan, hence 
entrusting to recover its territories taken by the Soviet Union - Bessarabia and Northern 
Bukovina, Hungary - part of Northern Transylvania, and Bulgaria - Southern Dobruja. 
(Buzatu 2004:89). In addition to this, with the economic treaty that Romania had signed 
with Germany an year before that (March 1939), the latter had gained significant leverage 
on the former, which was instead only trying to maintain its neutrality when the second 
World War was triggered.   
However, in the beginning of the 1940's, Romania saw Paris, its crucial warranter, surrender 
to Germany. Additionally, threatened by the Soviet Union to be deprived of even more 
territories than Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, the Romanian government, already 
under fascist control, eventually felt disposed to become an Axis power. Indeed, since King 
Carol’s abdication on September 6, 1940, Bucharest had been controlled by fascist Prime 
Minister Ion Antonescu and the Iron Guard. Only three days later after joining the Tripartite 
Pact, general Antonescu's government recognised the puppet government that the Japanese 
had created in N-E China “Manzhouguo’’, while general Gheorghe Băgulescu, the 
Romanian diplomat to Japan, was appointed minister to Manzhouguo. As Budura 
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 enunciated, this event was only an anticipation of what was going to happen in less than two 
months, that is the recognition of the pro Japanese government in Nanjing, under the 
leadership of Wang Jingwei (Budura, 2005:10).  
In Romanian modern and contemporary history, this was considered as one of the greatest 
diplomatic blooper made by the foreign affairs leadership and the Romanian diplomats, by 
failing to realise the weight of the principle that pleaded for the international respect of 
territorial integrity. Therefore in March 1941, general Antonescu, together with his officials, 
accredited general Băgulescu, the Romanian minister to Japan, as simultaneous minister to 
Manzhouguo. Chitic revealed that on the same day, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the 
puppet state held “extremely grand red-carpet ceremony of presenting credentials for 
Băgulescu” (Chitic: 74-75). On October 29 1941, there was a similar ceremony in 
Bucharest, when Li Yiwen, the diplomatic representative of the puppet state Manzhouguo to 
Germany, presented his credentials  as minister to Bucharest. 
In the international arena, Japan’s expansionistic strategies had conduced the Nippon 
military to take over most of the Chinese prime cities (Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, 
Tianjin), as well as the capital of the Republic of China, Nanjing, in December 1937. While 
the Chinese National Government moved to Chongqing in order to withstand the Nippon 
aggression, the new puppet national government founded by Japan and headed by Wang 
Jingwei in Nanjing, was acknowledged internationally soon after, in July 1941. Amongst 
Germany, Italy and Spain, and by breaking every rule of international law, Romanian 
government in the hands of Antonescu, also recognised Wang Jingwei's puppet regime in 
Nanjing, the second of this kind in China that Romania was sanctioning. Once again, 
general Băgulescu was accredited as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to 
Wang's puppet regime in Nanjing.  
Thus, in the international arena, Romania's diplomatic position regarding China was 
extremely odd and unique at that point, as the former was holding official diplomatic 
relations with three different Chinese entities. In fact, the only autonomous Chinese state 
entity that Romania didn't recognise and didn't have official diplomatic relations with, was a 
region in North-West China, having Yanan as capital, in the hands of a Communist 
leadership close to Mao Zedong. Unsurprisingly, there were only few effective initiatives in 
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 Romania's foreign policy during the two years of accreditation to Bucharest of Lone Liang 
as minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the only legitimate Chinese government, 
with headquarters in Chongqing.  
Between 1939 and 1941, a protocol  and notes of Romanians living in Shanghai indicate 165
the existence of the Association of Romanians in China , an institution relevant for its 166
assemblies and for the participation within its forums of discussion of Romanian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, the representative of the Romanian Chamber of Commerce in the Far East 
and the Chinese Minister plenipotentiary to Bucharest, Lone Liang. Furthermore, upon 
Romanian request, a Romanian consulate having Wang’s puppet regime highly-
recommended civilian Qin Kuo-pao as honorary consul, was established in Shanghai in 
October 1941. Likewise, Mr. Li Fang was accredited minister to Romania by Wang’s puppet 
regime in September (Liu Yong 2006: 49-50). 
According to the Chinese scholar, the Romanian society also supported the Chinese War of 
Resistance against the Japanese aggression, both morally and materially, and in different 
occasions. For example, in 1939, the International Medical Association of Assisting China, 
with the headquarters in London, created medical teams to help the anti-Japanese war in 
China. In this context, two Romanian doctors decided to join the association and for almost 
seven years, Iancu David and Clejan Bucur (both members of the Romanian Communist 
Party), conducted an intense medical activity in extreme circumstances. Two years later, in 
1941, Clejan's wife Gizela also joined the team of doctors. She died, however, of heart 
failure in Yunnan, in 1943, leaving bitterness within the Red Cross Society of China (Liu 
Yong 2006: 52). Although the living and sanitary conditions were reprehensible, the “two 
Romanian doctors” that managed to return to Romania, “helped to improve existing 
medical condition in troops in which they worked, and to found hospital and medical 
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 station” where there weren't any already instituted (Liu Yong 2006: 53).  
When in March 1940, Wang's puppet national government was founded in Nanjing, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Chinese National government sent a note to all the 
ambassadors, envoys and charge' d'affaire to China, informing that “any dignified country 
in the world must be able to maintain the international law and justice, and never 
recognise, in jurisdiction or in fact, all the puppet organisations fostered by Japan on the 
Chinese territory (...) Those who did so, must bear responsibility for all the consequences 
arising thereby” (Yong Liu 2006: 50-51). 
As indicated before, the Romanian government led by Antonescu recognised both the 
puppet governments in China fostered by the Japanese aggressor in Manzhouguo and 
Nanjing, only one year after the diplomatic relations with China were built up. Thence, on 
July 10, 1941, soon after hearing the news that Romania had recognised and had established 
official relations with the puppet government in Nanjing, Lone Liang, the sole legal 
diplomatic representative of Chinese government in Romania, sent an ample note of protest 
to the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs. The note that stated “the action launched by 
the powers of the Axis showed very clearly that the forces of aggression have united within 
a block, determined to demolish civilisation and human liberties” (Buzatu 2004: 93), also 
meant the effecting of a crucial moment in the history of Sino-Romanian diplomatic ties: 
Chinese-Romanian bilateral political ties were indeed, instantly cut off. Resultantly, the 
United States of America, through their diplomatic administration in Bucharest, were due to 
handle the affairs relevant to the Chinese in Romania (Liu Yong 2006: 51). Lone Liang's 
note also mentioned the fact that the real, legitimate Chinese government would continue to 
oppose the immoral, evil forces of countries like Germany, Italy and Romania and last but  
not least, he resigned from his position. According to former diplomat Budura, “the speed 
of the relevant developments is reinforced by the fact that Marshal Ion Antonescu, 
Romania’s wartime leader, inscribed a resolution on the ministerial note proposing 
acknowledgement of the Nanjing pro-Japanese government, and while expressing regret of 
the act, explained it was imposed solely because of the constraints the political-military 
alliances of the time” (Budura 2005: 31). Moreover, on the 26th of July 1941 the Romanian 
ambassador to Tokyo asked that Mr. Li Fang was accepted as Chinese minister to Bucharest 
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 and on the 8 October, Mihai Antonescu, Foreign Minister during WWII, signed a decree 
that established Romania’s honorary consulate in Shanghai, while Mr. Bao Jinguo was 
designated honorary consul. Consequently, Romania was having at that point diplomatic 
relations with the pro-Japanese cabinet of Nanjing and the puppet regime of Emperor Pu Yi 
of Changchun, not with China’s National Government in Chongqing (Budura 2005: 31).  
Only in the aftermath of WWII, when Romania's new communist government was set up, 
that the puzzling diplomatic relationship between the two countries was gradually resumed. 
However, China was coping with an ambiguous political and diplomatic status, while 
diplomacy in the international arena was generally outlined by confusion and 
disorganisation. First of all, different scandals regarded Băgulescu, the Romanian Minister 
to Tokyo and to the Chinese puppet states. Secondly, the Romanian Consulate to Shanghai 
under the leadership of Qin Kun-pao, completely disappeared after running mostly on paper 
than in reality and last but not least, the cultural institution known as the Romanians' 
Association in Shanghai under the safeguard of Romanian legation to Tokyo and counting 
eighty-one attendees, was as well disintegrated. Resultantly, until 1949, when relations 
between Romania and China were legitimately restored at all levels, Romania’s interests in 
China were represented, besides the USA, by the Swedish Embassy (Buzatu 2004: 93-97).  
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 III. Sino-Romanian Relations 1949-1969 
III.1 The fatality of the Romanian Monarchy and the establishment of the Romanian 
People’s Republic (RPR) 
As already succinctly anticipated, in light of the new concerns triggered by the end of 
WWII in the international arena, Romanian and Chinese authorities faced further pressure 
in their pursuit to restore diplomatic relations between Bucharest and Nanjing. However, for 
a better perceptiveness of the Romanian - Chinese ties during the mid decades of the 20th 
century, it is necessary to delineate exclusively the relevant features of the two countries’ 
domestic operations and international orientation during and in the aftermath of the conflict. 
In a clash of planetary proportions such as WWII, each participating state had encountered 
specific situations, with progress or regress, advancement or decline, which are roughly 
understandable. As for Romania, it is feasible to identify different stages of its involvement 
in the international conflict.  
Following the outburst of WWII, the Kingdom of Romania under King Carol II would 
firstly adopt a position of neutrality (September 1939 - May 1940), non-belligerency further 
(May 1940 - August 1940) as a result of the Fall of France - Romania’s main warrant of 
territorial integrity - in May 1940, non-belligerency de jure but de facto aligned with the 
Axis Powers, considering that Germany was expected to provide the guarantee that France 
and Britain could not (September 1940 - June 1941), belligerency next to the Axis Powers 
(22 June 1941 - 23 August 1944), and belligerency next to the United Nations and against 
the Axis during the last year of WWII  (23 August 1944 - May 1945).  
The Romanian leadership was unaware of anything when all turned “for the worse in 
August 1939, when the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed a Non-Aggression Pact and 
soon thereafter concluded a secret protocol to the Pact. Under the terms of the secret 
protocol, the two signatories divided Eastern Europe into spheres of influence and pledged 
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 not to interfere in each other’s sphere” . Consequently, in September 1939, Soviet armed 167
forces “set up a brutal occupation regime in eastern Poland and moved en masse into the 
three Baltic states, where they forced the local governments to comply with Moscow’s 
demands and eventually replaced them with puppet governments that voted for “voluntary” 
incorporation into the Soviet Union. The same pattern was evident in the formerly 
Romanian territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, which the Soviet Union 
annexed in June 1940” . 168
Therefore, in the summer of 1940, when the leadership in Bucharest was careful to avoid a 
potential ingress in the war, the territorial controversies triggered by the Soviet ultimatum 
and the deprivation by the latter of almost all of the geographic area earned by the former in 
the backwash of WWI , caused the Romanian authorities’ tumble and fall and the 169
subsequent consolidation of far-right movements and fascist groups. Things went from bad 
to worse as King’s Carol coerced abdication in September 1940 placed the country in the 
hands of these fascist factions seeking for, and finally obtaining Romania’s transformation 
from monarchy into a fascist regime and the configuration and establishment of a fascist 
dictatorship under Marshal Ion Antonescu and the Iron Guard, on a path facing the Axis 
camp . 170
Under the new king, Michael, King’s Carol son, and with the Iron Guard acting as the only 
legitimate party, Romania joined the Axis powers on November 23rd, 1940. For 
Antonescu’s government, the battles within the Axis materialised with the recovery of the 
lost territories of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina. However, by 1944 the country was 
facing air raids and ground offensive by the Allies, and was already invaded by advancing 
  Mark Kramer, “Stalin, Soviet Policy and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe 167
1944-1953”, CEEOL, Issue No. 31, pp. 53-100, 2010
 Ibidem168
 Through the Second Vienna Award, besides Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina occupied by the Soviet 169
Red Army, on August 30 Northern Transylvania was given to Hungary as a result of the German-Italian 
mediated compromise between Romania and Hungary, while on September 7, through the Treaty of Craiova, 
Southern Dobruja was ceased to Bulgaria under German hale (Buzatu 2004: 89)
 For more information see Dennis Deletant, “The Coup of 23 August 1944”, pp. 230-245, in “Hitler’s 170
Forgotten Ally: Ion Antonescu and his Regime, Romania 1940-1944”, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
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 Soviet armies.  
In this faculty, in August 1944 Romania, former ally of Germany, having failed to 
counterbalance the Allied forces and with the very existence of the state at stake, changed 
sides in the war as a result of the Royal coup launched by King Michael on August 23rd of 
the same year. The King speech revealed that Romania had ceased all military actions 
against the Allied troops, had accepted the Allied peace offering and had declared war on 
Germany. Through the armistice provided by Great Britain, the United States and the 
USSR, and signed by Romania on September 12, the latter went under media, 
communication, post and civil administration occupation of the Allied forces represented by 
the Soviet Union. The territories of Bessarabia, Northern Bukovina and Hertza would again 
emerge as part of the Soviet Union until its dissolution in 1991, when they would become 
part of the newly independent states of Moldova and Ukraine.  
However, even after 1944 and until the first couple of months of 1945, Romania would still 
be considered an enemy by the Soviet authorities, albeit under the Red Army’s military 
occupation. On top of that, fearing the Soviet reverberation and for security reasons, the 
Romanian society as well as the best part of the political elite, communists or not, believed 
that only a foreign policy of collaboration and friendship (with the enemy) could have in 
some way rectified Romania’s earlier position in the anti-Soviet war . In such 171
circumstances, the 23 August 1944 coup could be perceived both as the perfect answer to 
the greatest part of socialists’ ambitiousness to deploy the mighty forces of the Romanian 
Communist Party (PCR) in the anti-Axis combat in order to overthrew the pro-German 
government of Antonescu, and as a  milestone in Romanian history by delineating the 
beginning of the age of construction of the Romanian socialist society. 
In Eastern Europe, the discourse of communist parties’ assuming total control in the 
political sphere between 1944 and 1947 and the establishment of totalitarian regimes 
through ideology and hostility, as well as the transfer and proliferation of the concept of 
revolution under the menace of the Soviet tanks and Red Army has been widely tackled 
with by historiography. Henceforward, it is possible to identify several works of Romanian 
 Elena Dragomir, “Cold War Perceptions. Romania’s Policy Change Towards the Soviet Union 171
1960-1964”, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015, p. 24
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 and international scholars dealing with the reactions of the leaders in the international arena, 
diplomats, international communities and actors representing democracy (such as the 
United States and Great Britain) regarding the gradual Romanian process of communisation 
at a societal level. Thanks to new archival material from the US and United Kingdom and 
through methods of comparative analysis of archival material and historiographic evidence, 
the investigations pointed out that both the US and Great Britain adopted a position of 
isolation  and “defence” regarding the instalment of communist regimes under the Soviet 
Union’s leadership in Eastern Europe. As Constantin Buchet pointed out, in order to 
understand the Anglo-American positions regarding the political transformations in Eastern 
Europe, one should bare in mind the Italian ambassador and expert of Soviet affairs Pietro 
Quaroni’s 1945 statement regarding the Anglo-Saxons acknowledgement of both the Soviet 
right to impose, in Central and Eastern Europe, governments faithful to it, and the Soviet 
leadership’s subsequent approbation of the opposition in Romania, Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia .  172
On the same line, Larry Watts pronounced himself for an American non-policy  in the 173
Balkans and Eastern Europe. Henceforward, with little interest showed by the Western 
powers, France included, to conclude military alliances with Eastern Europe, Romania 
turned to Poland, and the two countries signed a treaty providing mutual security against 
foreign aggression. However, as this agreement turned out to be fruitless when WWII was 
triggered, Romania decided that an alliance with Germany could have neutralised the 
menacing USSR. But the last coalition failed as well, and under these circumstances, for a 
defeated and internationally isolated country under Soviet military occupation like Romania 
at the end of 1944, there seemed to be only one solution, that is a Romanian pro-Soviet 
foreign policy.  
On September 30, 1944, Ana Pauker - future Minister of Foreign Affairs between 1947 and 
1952 - considered that Romania “was to perish for good if friendship with the USSR did not 
become the basis of the state’s future grand strategy”. According to Dragomir, “the USSR 
 Constantin Buchet, “Tehnici de capturare  a puterii in Europa de Est 1944-1947”, p. 47 in Arhivele 172
Totalitarismului, Anul IV, nr. 11-12, 2-3, 1996.
 Watts Larry L., “On the eve of the Romanian Revolution (IV) The Romanian Nuclear Threat”, January 24, 173
2016, available at <http://larrylwatts.blogspot.com/2016/01/> accessed on 03.11.2016
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 was a vindictive neighbouring giant, powerful enough to put Romania in its right place with 
a single move of the hand, in a context in which neither the USA, nor Great Britain could or 
wanted to get in the way of the Soviet Union as far as Romania was concerned. Because 
Romania had fought and lost the war against the USSR, now she had to redeem herself and 
to accommodate the Soviet Union’s demands, otherwise she risked loosing her 
independence” . Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca and Petru Groza, who believed 174
that only the Soviet Union was able to immediately support Romania in the economic, 
political and military spheres, would bring forward similar political convictions in March 
1945.  
Within the wider socio-geopolitical framework, the events that anticipated the instauration 
of Petru Groza’s government on Soviet pressure on 6 March 1945, depicted a more general 
aggravation of the European geopolitical configuration (brought by the Yalta Conference in 
February 1945, that sacrificed the fate of Central-Eastern European countries) as well as of 
the socio-political domestic structure generated by the last Romanian governments’ lack of 
capacity for self-coordination. Indeed, except some attempts by King Michael and 
Gheorghe Tătărescu in the beginning of the Soviet military occupation (Vice-president and 
Minister of Foreign Affairs) to contrast the violation of human rights, the new Groza 
Cabinet (appointed by Andrei Vâşinski, deputy of the Soviet minister on Foreign Affairs) 
did not come upon strong opposition. As Dragomir stated, “when the Groza Cabinet came 
in power in March 1945, there were no diplomatic relations between Romania and the 
USSR. The Romanian-Soviet diplomatic relations were re-established in August 1945, in the 
context provided by the Potsdam Conference and by the continuous Romanian proofs of 
loyalty to the USSR” .  175
Moreover, she argued that the “Romanian officials interpreted the re-establishing of the 
bilateral relations as a sign that the many economic, military and human sacrifices that 
Romania had made after 23 August 1944 in order to “earn” the Soviets “trust” had finally 
began to yield results and as a proof that Romania needed to continue its pro-Soviet 
 Elena Dragomir, “Cold War Perceptions. Romania’s Policy Change Towards the Soviet Union 174
1960-1964”, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015, pp. 25-26
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 policy” .  176
Nevertheless, although the new government in the hands of the Romanian Communist Party 
(PCR) would hasten to orchestrate the first stage of sovietisation and to carefully observe 
and follow Moscow’s course in terms of domestic and international affairs, Moscow would 
recurrently appeal for the “democratisation” of the country in return for their credence in 
Romania’s endorsement and statements of loyalty and companionship. In conformity with 
Dragomir, the new Groza administration hurried to launched a democratisation process “by 
shutting down newspapers and periodicals critical to the government or to the Soviet 
Union, by dissolving the NPP and the NLP, by annihilating the organisations seen as anti-
Communist or anti-Soviet, by purging those considered fascists, war criminals and enemies 
of the people from the public life. Such proofs of loyalty to the Soviet Union were 
accompanied though by attempts to obtain from the USSR alleviations of the economic and 
political burdens imposed upon Romania” . 177
Gradually, by 1947, with the military assistance of the Red Army and the Soviet political 
elite, the Romanian Communist Party had managed to take full control of the state power. 
Indeed, by manipulating the  parliamentary elections of 1946, by arresting the leaders of the 
National Liberal Party and the National Peasants’ Party and by forbidding the existence of 
any opposition party, pro-Moscow Foreign Affairs Minister Ana Pauker, Prime Minister 
Petru Groza and the leader of the PCR Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej, having achieved a 
thorough consolidation of the Communist Party, finally pulled ahead King Michael’s 
abdication on December 30, 1947 . On the same night Romania abolished monarchism 178
and what had begun just two years earlier, on 6 March 1945, was concluded with the 
proclamation of the People’s Republic of Romania (RPR) following out a socialist system 
due to prevail for almost half a century.  
With the end of the second World War, the initial phase of the Cold War between the Soviet 
  Ibidem176
  Ibidem177
 Dragoș Zamfirescu, “Semnificațiile semnării tratatului Româno-Sovietic din 4 februarie 1948”, p. 88, in 178
Arhivele Totalitarismului, Academia Română, 3-4, 2008 Institutul Național pentru Studiul Totalitarismului.
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 Union and the former allies of the West, Central and Eastern Europe witnessed fundamental 
geopolitical, social and economic transformations. Besides the RPR, countries like Albania, 
Bulgaria, Poland, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Hungary all embarked on the 
socialist path, and except for Yugoslavia, the rest of the states embraced the model of 
economic and political system as well as foreign policy strategies claimed by the Soviet 
Union. Since the beginning of February 1948, when the first Romanian delegation visited 
Moscow and signed the twenty years Romanian-Soviet Treaty of friendship, cooperation 
and mutual assistance and until the last days of 1989, Romania has been a satellite state of 
the Soviet Union, carefully pursuing the latter’s direction in foreign affairs issues 
particularly in the first fifteen years of its existence as a popular republic.  
The February treaty that completely isolated Romania, leaving it with no space for 
manoeuvre in terms of international relations, represented a crucial measure for the future 
establishment of the Warsaw Treaty (May 1955).  
Indeed, after the first peace of the puzzle was set, it didn’t take long for the Kremlin to 
complete the consolidation of the camp of peace, democracy and socialism - the Iron 
Curtain, by signing the same treaty with the other socialist countries in the Central and 
Eastern bloc, except for Tito’s Yugoslavia.  
Anyhow, as the study does not aim to elucidate the complex process of Romania’s transition 
to communism, I would conclude the very short part dedicated to it by relying on Petruța 
Vătăman’s concise but clarifying assertion regarding the East European political stage in the 
aftermath of WWII. Accordingly, “in the early postwar Romania's situation was not much 
different from that of the “popular democracies” of Eastern Europe, which is characterised 
by the brutal involvement of the Soviet Union and the servility towards the Communist 
Party, which assumed the task of building socialism upon the Stalinist model”  179
 Vătăman, Petruța, “Romanian Position on the Military invasion in Czechoslovakia in 1968”, Journal of 179
European Studies and International Relations, attainable at <http://rseri.srpsec.ro/wp-content/uploads/2011/04/
ROMANIAN-POSITION-ON-THE-MILITARY-INVASION-71-80.pdf
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 III.2 The Far East and Sino-Romanian interruption of diplomatic ties between 1940-1949 
Meanwhile, in the Far East China had prevailed in the Anti-Japanese war by September 
1945. In that period, enjoying the support of both the United States and the Soviet Union 
(sealed through successful strategies and policies of international coalitions) Jiang Jieshi 
(Chiang Kai-shek), leader of the nationalists, had no reason to fear Mao or the Communists. 
However, the global political and military tension that led to the Cold War in the aftermath 
of WWII, turned this/his favoured condition into an unfavored one. In fact, the leader of the 
Kuomintang was bind to pick one of the two sides. Of course, he would chose the more 
powerful. Hence, China remained until 1949 the battlefield between the forces of the 
National Government in the hands of the United States supported Kuomintang, and the 
Communist Party’s armies in the hands of Mao Zedong, that, according to the Chinese 
Communist leader and contrary to what was believed to be a natural proceeding, received 
no moral or material support from the USSR. Accordingly, “Stalin met with (Winston) 
Churchill and (Franklin D.) Roosevelt and decided to give the whole China to America and 
Jiang Jieshi. In terms of material and moral support, especially moral support, Stalin 
hardly gave any to us, the Communist Party, but supported Jiang Jieshi. This decision was 
made at the Yalta Conference” . Still, in 1949 the CPC (Communist Party of China) 180
finally succeeded in defeating the National Government and ending the civil war, while 
surviving Nationalist forces retreated to Taiwan. Enjoying a huge masses support, the CPC’s 
leadership, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, proclaimed the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
on October 1st 1949 and thereof, the new born socialist republic would be acknowledged 
straightaway by all popular democracies throughout the world.  
Until today, because of insufficiency in archival documents and because there are no 
contemporary diplomats able to elucidate the lack of Romanian and/or Chinese data 
regarding the relations between the two countries between 1941 and 1949, historians and 
researchers have not been able to provide an accurate understanding of the context in which 
Sino-Romanian diplomatic relations were triggered in October 1949.  
 Zhang Shu Guang and Chen Jian, “The Emerging disputes between Beijing and Moscow: Ten Newly 180
available Chinese documents 1956-1958”, CWIHP Bulletin 6/7, 1995-1996, p. 149
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 Moreover, scholars have also been interested to investigate to what extent the Soviet Union 
might have influenced the new socialist republic of Romania’s attempts to resume relations 
with China in this period, but it also proved to be a dead end, again for insufficient 
information. However, ex-ambassador and sinologist Budura has provided a possible (and 
realistic from my standpoint) interpretation of this obfuscated state of affairs by asserting 
that “since Romania’s diplomatic relations with the pro-Japanese government in Nanjing 
were no longer of consequence, Bucharest was interested in resuming diplomatic ties with 
the national Chinese government, the legitimate representative of the republic at that time, 
with which Romania had fostered relations before July 1941” (Budura 2005: 32).  
Hence, he asserted that “a feasible explanation is that the Soviet leadership deliberately 
stalled the Romanian attempt, awaiting the success of the ongoing people’s revolution in 
China”, albeit “doubts remain as Joseph Stalin and the other Soviet leaders only began to 
consider the possibility of victory by the Chinese communists against Chinese nationalists 
in 1948” (Budura 2005: 32). Scholar Ion Buzatu instead, provided two possible approaches 
for the understanding of the lack of any type of relations between the two countries in this 
period of almost a decade. Firstly, he interpreted it as the indisputable result of the careless 
and opportunistic Romanian diplomacy’s politics towards China and secondly, and most 
likely in his opinion, the non-relations between China and Romania between 1941 and 1949 
could be explained as the outcome of the two states persistently engaging in and having to 
deal with internal conflicts for power with the end of WWII (Buzatu 2004: 99).  
Nevertheless, whichever might have been the reasons for these shortcomings and however 
the evermore present Soviet authority might have manipulated the potential efforts of the 
Romanian side to restore relations with China, what is known for a fact is that Romania was 
the third country in the world to acknowledge the new born People’s Republic of China, on 
October 3rd 1949, following Moscow’s lead. Through mass-media communication and 
more precisely through the main journals of the time, “Scânteia”, “România Liberă” and 
“Scânteia tineretului”, the Romanian leadership applauded the Chinese communist victory 
and the proclamation of the People’s Republic (Buzatu 2004: 97). 
 The official acknowledgement however, arrived for the Chinese political elite through the 
Romanian Foreign Minister Ana Pauker’s letter. Indeed, on October 3rd 1949, Pauker sent a 
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 telegram to her Chinese counterpart, welcoming the proclamation of the PRC and 
announcing that the government of Romanian People’s Republic would like to establish 
bilateral diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. In her letter, the minister 
added that RPR was convinced that these relations would contribute to the consolidation of 
the socialist camp, of the principles of peace and democracy for which the Soviet Union as 
a great common friend, stands as leader, as well as for the fight against imperialism (Liu 
Yong 2006: 62-63, Budura 2005: 33, Buzatu 2004: 97).  
Two days later, on October 5th 1949, Premier Zhou Enlai and Chinese Foreign Minister 
telegrammed the Romanian counterpart in Bucharest that the PRC was honoured to receive 
the Romanian government’s answer and was determined to set up bilateral diplomatic 
relations between the RPR and the PRC and to immediately proceed to the opening of 
diplomatic missions in the two capitals, Bucharest and Beijing (Buzatu 2004: 98, Budura 
2005: 33, Liu Yong 2006: 63). Although this would be remembered as the official date that 
marked the beginning of Sino-Romanian diplomatic ties, scholars of socialist international 
relations, Romanian and Chinese historians and sinologists will always bare in mind the 
year 1880/1881 as liable for the mutual recognition of the two countries, Imperial China and 
the Kingdom of Romania, and for the “superior understanding of the law values called to 
regulate interstate relations, irrespective of distance, countries’ size and weight in the 
world” (Budura 2005: 33). 
However, what came into being in 1949 and would last for four decades, was a new nature 
of interstate bilateral ties. In fact, the evolution of Sino-Romanian relationship, the quality 
and quantity of the exchanges and cooperation at diplomatic, political, economic, 
technological and cultural level from this moment on, should be read in terms of the 
transformations brought by the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern European 
countries, China and the USSR. Indeed, in the beginning of the Cold War Romanian and 
Chinese regimes aligned themselves with the Stalinist reconstruction of the socio-political 
and economic systems and objectives, based on the common ideology that was the Marxist-
Leninist vision of the world.  
Therefore, only by keeping record of the Romanian and Chinese postwar reshaped domestic 
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 and foreign policies, that led the two countries to build up socialism and communism, and 
hence to delineate mutual understanding, assistance and support positions, the promotion of 
national interests within the international bipolar context triggered by the Cold War, can 
Sino-Romanian ties in and after the 1950s be outlined. It will be thus illustrated that after 
their establishment, Sino-Romanian ties did not flourish immediately, but they developed 
gradually and their proliferation has always depended on external circumstances related to 
the new geo-political divide of the international arena.  
Nevertheless, the establishment of “diplomatic relations between the People’s Republic of 
Romania and People’s Republic of China represented a beginning that would cut across 
distances in spite of the absence of wide-scope contacts, exchanges and cooperation in the 
economic, political and cultural fields, or the lack of adequate means (institutional, 
material and human) of communication between the two nations” (Budura 2005: 33). 
III.3 Romania and China resume diplomatic relations.  
The first steps towards cooperation in the fields of Culture and Education in the 1950s 
Following the Kremlin’s position in the socialist camp, the first Romanian ambassador to 
China Theodor Rudenco arrived in Beijing on 17 February 1950 (Budura 2005: 202), and 
on August 8th the same year, Wang Youping, the first Chinese ambassador to Romania 
reached Bucharest, where he was received with “warm ceremonies of welcome” (Liu Yong 
2006: 65). It would be the starting point for the common struggle of world peace and 
cooperation in the fields of politics, economy, culture and technology, while the activities 
and contributions of the embassies in both China and Romania that enjoyed far-reaching 
tasks, would also work to involve central organisations, friendship associations and cultural 
institutions in the Sino-Romanian cooperation.  
For example, the first letter of Theodor Rudenco to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Bucharest after his accreditation as ambassador to China in March 1950, pertained his 
concern for the lack of the celebration of national day in both Romania and China, while 
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 other socialist countries like Czechoslovakia and Hungary already enjoyed mutual national 
festivities and exhibitions in Prague, Budapest and Beijing. His worries also involved the 
need for a Romanian economic delegation to be established in Beijing and the necessity to 
find a solution for the Romanian shortage in informative material - like journals, cinema 
and artistic documentaries - that Chinese very much requested from all popular 
democracies . Other similar letters, holding different sort of requests, would soon follow 181
through. Accordingly, in June 1950 the Romanian Ministry of Arts agreed to the Chinese 
proposal to exchange movies between the RPR and the PRC  and just a month later, in 182
July the two countries began the exchange of hundreds of academic works, artistic 
compositions and literature, such as translations from the Chinese to Romanian language 
and the other way round .  183
The Sino-Romanian cultural relations were triggered on 12 December 1951 by the signing 
in Beijing of an agreement of cultural cooperation aiming at “strengthening the friendly 
relations, promoting the mutual understanding between the two peoples, consolidating and 
developing their cooperation in the cause of safeguarding the world peace by the way of 
closer cultural cooperation” (Liu Yong 2006: 72). Moreover, exchanges and cooperation 
between the two countries’ educational systems - especially through institutes for research 
in science and art - were initiated through annually extendable governmental or individual 
projects.  
However, the most important achievement for the Sino-Romanian cooperation in 1950 was 
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 in the educational field, and it consisted of a Chinese proposal for mutual exchange of five 
scholarship students in the two capitals starting from August 15, 1950 with the purpose of 
șlearning Chinese and Romanian languages . Just six years later, this exchange would lead 184
to the mutual establishment of the first Romanian and Chinese language, literature, history 
and geography departments in the two countries, in both the University of Beijing and the 
University of Bucharest .  185
Henceforth, several Romanian graduates of this department would become diplomats or 
experts in the furtherance of international bilateral relations. In 1955 a mutual exchange of 
lecturers had also been triggered on the basis of the cultural cooperation agreement. In this 
case, both the Romanian and Chinese language lecturers would  stay in the each other’s 
country for a period of two academic years (1956/1957) and would benefit from free 
transportation from China to Romania and the other way round (host country paying the 
trip), free dwelling (host country managing the payments), and a salary paid by the host 
country in accordance with the home country wages policy . In 1953 and 1954, the RPR 186
and the PRC signed another agreement to wider the cooperation in the cultural field, this 
time on mutual broadcasting, film distribution and exchanges of informative materials such 
as journals and newspapers .  187
Moreover, for Sino-Romanian ties, the 1950s represented a quite favourable time for 
 “1950 iulie, 6, Beijing. Telegramă a lui Tudor Rudenco, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 184
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Externe, Arhivele Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 300
 “Agerpres” and “China Nouă” were Romanian and Chinese major national press agencies, while 187
“Scanteia” and “Renmin Ribao" were respectively the RPR and PRC’s main party journals. 
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 massive cultural and artistic exhibitions, with mutual large scale artistic performing groups, 
theatrical representations and a very acclaimed display of visual presentations (such as 
movies and documentaries).  
For example, according to Liu Yong, in September 1950 the exhibition “Romanian People’s 
Republic Striding Forward to Socialism” opened in Beijing as the second largest exhibition 
held abroad by socialist Romania, after the one held in the Soviet Union. In this context, 
Zhu De and Zhou Enlai, as well as other Chinese leaders attended the exhibition’s opening 
ceremony. The same scholar pointed out that in December of the same year, as a result to 
the Romanian side’s invitation, an exhibition entitled “New China” was held in Bucharest 
by the Romanian external cultural association (Liu Yong 2006: 72-73).  
In the same way, according to a report of the Romanian Embassy in Beijing, the Romanian 
movie “Life defeats” (rendered in the Chinese language) was watched by no less than 
1.701.894 Chinese spectators during 1953, while Popescu Doreanu’s article “The cultural 
exchange between the RPR and the PRC”, published in 1953, in occasion of the two years 
anniversary since the signing of the Sino-Romanian cultural agreement - in December 1951 
- was translated and published in the Chinese Communist Party’s journal “Renmin Ribao”, 
along with other articles like “The development of science in the RPR” in the Chinese 
journal “Science for masses”; “The last day of my stay in Bucharest”, written by Gao 
Yubao, a famous soldier-writer and published in the “People’s Liberation Army Journal of 
Literature”, “The Youth in the RPR”, published by Chițu Florea in “Gazeta 
tineretului” (“Youth Gazette”), as well as E. Frunză’s article “Unforgettable days”, 
published in “Renmin Ribao” . 188
In 1951, the Romanian Committee for physical education and sports sent to its Chinese 
counterpart an invitation letter for a Chinese athletics team to participate at the International 
Championship for athletics held in Romania. The Chinese team was asked to participate as 
a symbol for the Chinese struggle for international peace, along with teams from the USSR, 
the Popular Republic of Bulgaria, the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary and teams of 
 “1953 decembrie 31, Beijing. Raport de activitate al Ambasadei Române la Beijing pe trimestrul IV al 188
anului 1953” in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. Documente” [Sino-Romanian 
relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 
262-268
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 socialist sports centres and organisations from France and Finland .  189
Moreover, a year later, in 1952, a 216-person song and dance Chinese ensemble went to 
Romania in a performance tour attended by Gheorghiu Dej, Groza and other Romanian 
leaders and a 205-person chorus of the Romanian army visited and performed in China for 
two months and a half, for an audience of a total 250.000 people. In conformance with ex 
Ambassador Budura, the Romanian army’s chorus was received with great enthusiasm in 
China and was even considered superior to the Hungarian and Czechoslovakian armies’ 
chorus by Ambassador Rudenco. Chairman Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and Zhu De attended 
the entire spectacle .   190
Two years later, in September 1954 a 270-person chorus of the Chinese People’s Liberation 
Army visited and performed in Romania. The chorus had such success that the Romanian 
Grand National Assembly decided to offer The Star Of Romanian People’s Republic medals 
to the members of the Chinese chorus. Again, in 1956 a Romanian folk chorus “Ciocârlia“ 
visited China for a four months’ performance tour, and was received with intense and eager 
enjoyment. The Romanian’s army artistic ensemble “Doina”, the Theater association for 
children of both Timişoara and Craiova, the song and dance ensemble “Cununa 
Carpaţilor”, the folk ensemble from Mureş and Maramureş, as well as the Romanian’s 
State Philharmonic Orchestra have provided the Chinese audience with many beautiful 
pieces, songs, dances and traditional exhibitions .  191
However, many other artistic performances and spectacles followed throughout China, 
especially in Beijing, and they all enjoyed a significant attention from the media, with the 
consequent publication of praising articles and photos (Liu Yong 2006: 74-75).   
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Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 238
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 Another interesting aspect of the Sino-Romanian ties in the cultural field was defined by the 
mutual knowledge of the two countries through the long mutual journeys performed by 
famous Romanians in China and noted Chinese in Romania. For instance, scholar Ṣtefan 
Milcu, scientist Elie Carafoli, historian and archaeologist Constantin Daicoviciu, and 
writers like George Călinescu (in his 1953 “Am fost în China nouă” - I have been in New 
China), Ovidiu Drimbă - World History and Eugen Barbu - Diary in China, described their 
experiences in, and provided a better understanding of, China and the Chinese society and 
culture respectively. The Chinese poet and Ist president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences 
Guo Moro is only one of the artists, scholars and scientists that visited Romania during the 
1950s, contributing to the exchange of arts between the two countries (Buzatu 2004: 104).  
According to Chinese scholar Liu Yong, another interesting point of view regarding China, 
Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party was offered by the major communist journal 
“Scânteia”’s reporter Călan, after his trip to the Chinese capital in 1954. In an interview at 
the Chinese embassy in Bucharest, the journalist pointed out his beliefs and impressions 
regarding his visit to China, but most importantly he outlined his thoughts concerning the 
CPC’s relations with the Chinese people as very tight, whereas the CPC enjoyed a 
remarkable prestige amongst the Chinese society.  
Călan compared the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) and the CPC’s stardom by 
considering the huge difference in numbers of national population in both Romania and 
China, to draw the conclusions that the RWP is not nearly as popular as the CPC. He also 
seemed to appreciate the fact that many Chinese cadres within the CPC had experienced 
long-term struggle and thus had many skills in spreading out the Marxist based theory of 
socialist construction in China, while the Romanian party committee members had not been 
taught or instructed to develop such theoretical expertise until Romania’s liberation in 
August 1944 (Liu Yong 2006: 82). 
Regarding the Sino-Romanian bilateral cultural cooperation, a telegram of April 1956 from 
the Romanian Embassy in Beijing to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs provided 
knowledge concerning the Romanian diplomats’ preoccupation for the organisation of large 
and small exhibitions in the Chinese capital, as well as their determination to set up public 
commemorations of Romanian artists, poets and scientists or theatrical productions in the 
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 presence of Chinese audience.  
Thus, among other things, large exhibitions such as “Arta plastică” (“Plastic Arts”) or 
“Realizările primului plan cincinal” (“The achievements of the first five years’ plan”), 
theatrical representations and translations like “Iarba rea” by Aurel Baranga, 1952 (“Bad 
grass”), “The Lost Letter” of I.L. Caragiale (1953), “The poor” and “Ancuța’s cellar” (both 
1955), as well as the future “Came a mill on the Siret River” (1959) by Mihail Sadoveanu, 
“Minerii” (“The Miners”), 1951, by Dan Desliu or “Selected poems” by Maria Bănuș 
(1959) and Romanian movies such as “Pictorul Grigorescu” (“The Painter Grigorescu”), 
“Alarmă în munți” (“Alarm in the mountains”) and “Afacerea Protar” (“The Protar Affair”) 
were introduced to the Chinese spectators with the explicit aim to strengthen the two 
countries’ cultural ties throughout a greater knowledge of the Romanian artistic, intellectual, 
educational or societal practises . 192
From the moment that China joined the socialist camp, one of Beijing’s major foreign 
policies was to establish friendly relations with Eastern European countries. Resultantly, ten 
friendship associations of China with different socialist countries were set up 
simultaneously on 31 September 1959, Romania included.  
The newly founded Sino-Romanian Friendship Association, similar to the other nine, was 
represented by twenty political and cultural personalities headed by a president, several 
vice-presidents and a secretary general, that formed the board. Hence, the association 
comprised the vice-minister of the Ministry of Culture, the vice-president of the Chinese 
Federation of Literary and Art Circles Liu Zhiming as president, while the vice-presidents 
included Jin Zhonghua - journalist and expert of international affairs, Lu Ping - vice-
president of Beijing University, and Mei Yi - scholar (Liu Yong, 2006: 69). The institution’s 
goal was to create social groups of friendship and collaboration that could enhance the 
initiation and success of partnership through mutual visits, participation to seminars, 
classes, bilateral meetings and exchange of information for the common Sino-Romanian 
understanding.  
In short, between 1949 and 1958, China would translate and publish approximatively 
  Petru Apachiţei, “65 Years of Diplomatic, Economic and Cultural Relations between Romania and China 192
(1949-2014)” in Paul Nanu (ed.), “Romania in the World. Contacts and Reception”, Turku 2014, pp. 129-139
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 seventy kinds of Romanian books and more than 800 000 volumes of mostly literary works. 
In the same period, more than eighty kinds of Chinese books, mostly ancient and modern 
Chinese literature have been translated and published in Romania. “Selected Works” of 
Mao Zedong was as well included in these translations (Liu Yong 2006: 75).  
According to sinologist Budura, during his diplomatic activity as member of the Romanian 
Embassy to Beijing in 1958, besides the Romanian proposal for cultural collaboration with 
the Chinese counterparts throughout the establishment of a Romanian-Chinese Friendship 
Association , the Romanian People’s Republic Academy and the Academy of the Peoples’ 193
Republic of China signed an accord of cultural cooperation in order to facilitate the 
expansion of the number of publications and exchanges of scientists and economists, as 
well as of materials appertain to the two countries .  194
In addition, as stated by Liu Yong and Dan Cătănuș, a year later, in April 1959, a Romanian 
cultural delegation would visit China in order “to investigate the Chinese experience in 
combining education with productive labour and masses culture” (Liu Yong 2006: 87). 
III.4 Bucharest and Beijing familiarise themselves with each other:  
Earliest bilateral exchange of visits 
In the diplomatic field, between 1950-1959, when both sides celebrated the Liberation Day 
(for Romania on August 23rd) or the National Day (for China October 1st), the leaders of 
the RPR and PRC sent letters of greetings to each other and festivities within the embassies 
in Beijing and Bucharest were held each year with the participation of secondary 
 “1958 octombrie 9, București. Telegramă a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe către Ambasada României la 193
Beijing privind înființarea Asociației de prietenie Româno-Chineză” in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-
Chineze 1880-1974. Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor 
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 authorities.  
Nevertheless, for different reasons related to domestic difficulties , the exchanges of high 195
level leaders began quite late, and the first Romanian representative to “break the 
ice” (Buzatu 2004: 103) was now ex-Prime Minister Petru Groza who visited China in 1954 
as Chairman of Presidium of the Romanian Grand National Assembly. According to 
Budura, “Chairman Mao Zedong invited President Petru Groza in a private capacity to 
China to help him solve a major problem, that is to help persuade banking, industrial and 
trade milieus in China to accept the socialist makeover scheduled for 1956. The Chinese 
leader’s initiative and the agreement of the Romanian leadership had a special significance, 
since it implied derogation from the “universal and infallible Soviet experience” . 196
In addition, the two first secretaries of the Romanian Workers’ Party Central Committee 
Gheoghe Apostol and Gheoghe Gheorghiu-Dej visited China in September 1954 and 
September 1956 respectively (the latter leading a delegation to attend the Eighth National 
Congress of the Communist Party of China - CPC). Both visits reflected a new sort of 
relations between the socialist countries, that emerged from concepts such as people’s 
friendship, mutual respect and the same social system that had as main goal the 
strengthening of the international unity between the countries in the socialist bloc and the 
consolidation of international peace (Liu Yong 2006: 78).  
Nevertheless, while Apostol’s conversations with Mao Zedong reflected the Chinese 
leader’s curiosity towards Romanian history, culture and civilisation, Romanian’s relations 
with Turkey and Yugoslavia, and produced knowledge about the cooperative transformation 
of the Chinese agriculture, Dej’s visit resulted in the Romanian leader’s praise of the CPC 
as model of creativity enriching Marxism-Leninism in accordance with the Chinese 
historical condition .  197
 One justification might be that in 1950 China got involved in the Korean War 195
 R.I. Budura, “Romanian-Chinese Relations” p. 409, in New Sources, New Findings: the relationship 196
between China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, CASS Forum, 2014,  pp. 269-270.
 “1954 decembrie 25, Beijing. Raport de activitate diplomatică al Ambasadei României la Beijing pentru 197
perioada 1 septembrie - 25 decembrie 1954” in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. 
Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele 
Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 272-285
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 Moreover, the  memorable talks between Dej and Mao Zedong also involved the sketching 
of the principles of socialist construction in China and issues regarding the acquisition of 
knowledge, management and technology from the capitalist countries. Dej also outlined 
Romania’s economic and financial relations with the US and provided the Chinese leader 
with assistance in case Mao wished to get in contact with the American entrepreneurs. Last 
but not least of the considerations made by the two leaders, concerned the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union’s abuses towards both China and Romania (Budura 2014: 410).  
A month later after Dej’s return from China, in October the CC of the RWP decided that 
Romanian experts in the production of colorants, lacquers and dressing should be sent to 
PRC to study the methods and materials used by the Chinese in these domains. Moreover, 
experts in polygraphy and engineers, technicians and experts in the construction of the 
bridges and the production of ceramics and porcelain were as well to be send to China in 
order to study the issues that the Romanian side encountered in the printing of coloured 
journals, in the construction of the bridges and the production of high quality pottery and 
porcelain respectively .  198
From April until May 1957, Constantin Pârvulescu, President of the Romanian Grand 
National Assembly went to China, as a return visit to Peng Zhen’s stay in Romania as vice 
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National People’s Congress (Liu Yong 
2006:78). The talks with Chinese political elite regarded the finding of solutions for 
questions of socialist transformation of agriculture, the peaceful transformation of capitalist 
industry and commerce as well as the cooperation with democratic parties. However, issues 
concerning the unity and uniformity within the Chinese people in the struggle for the 
realisation of Marxist-Leninist revolution were emphasised too (Liu Yong 2006:87). 
A year later, in 1958 the Romanian government delegation to China was leaded by Chivu 
Stoica, Chairman of the Romanian Council of Ministers. The Romanian delegation met 
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai and the talks elucidated matters of anti-rightist struggle, Mao’s 
view regarding the concept of continuous revolution, the more general Chinese and 
Romanian position regarding the construction of socialism as well as the international state 
 Arhivele Naționale Istorice Centrale (ANIC), fond CC al PCR Cancelarie, dosar 117/1956. Protocol Nr. 51 198
al Ṣedinței Biroului Politic al CC al PMR, 12 octombrie 1956
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 of affairs triggered by the Hungarian incident (1956).  
The visit, which was of great significance for the Sino-Romanian cooperation in the 1950’s, 
ended with the signing of Joint Statements by the two governments. In a wider sense, the 
statements outlined the friendly relationship between the RPR and the PRC, and the 
Romanian and Chinese governments’ tasks to make efforts for the advancement of 
cooperation in politics , in economy  and regarding culture and society  (Budura 2005: 199 200 201
349-352). Yet, more specifically the meeting dealt with Sino-Romanian resolution to 
support the Soviet proposal for a summit conference on the latter’s decision to cease nuclear 
weapons tests, on the dissolution of military blocks in Europe and Asia and their 
replacement with collective security systems  as well as on the support of the Polish 202
government’s proposal for an atom-free zone in central Europe.  
In addition, the Chinese government gave full support to Romania’s peaceful proposal for 
the organisation of a high level conference of the Balkan states on collective security and a 
firm support for the Indonesian and Algerian people’s struggle for national sovereignty. The 
demand that US and more generally UN military forces should be removed from Korea at 
once and the Romanian - Chinese pledge to continue the the efforts for a strong solidarity 
and cooperation amidst the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union were as well, 
closures of the Joint Statement signed by Romania and China during Premier’s visit Chivu 
Stoica to Beijing in April 1958. At the end of the meeting, Romanian Prime Minister invited 
Zhou Enlai to visit Romania and albeit the latter will not be able to come to Romania as he 
had assured, he would show great interest in developing closer Romanian-Chinese 
 For instance, the talks exposed the Chinese concern regarding the infiltration of right wing elements in the 199
political arena, albeit the “revisionists” representing only 0,05% of the entire Chinese population had been 
“isolated”; the Chinese leadership’s value for the principle of “continuous revolution” or the latter’s 
observation of the “two Chinas” question in the international arena
 Such as the Chinese pensiveness for issues like the fast rise of the number of the population and thus, the 200
alimentation questions triggered by it: the consumption of cereals, rice and oil instead of meat; in the oil 
industry, arguments regarding the Chinese petroleum production; topics concerning fields such as the Hydro 
Electrical Industry, the agricultural Industry, the Chinese employment, the establishment and expansion of 
Small, Medium and Large enterprises, etc
 For example the increase of solidarity between the two countries and peoples, exchanges of academics, 201
scientists and artists, common knowledge about Romanian and Chinese culture, etc
 Indeed, a month later, in May 1958 Soviet troops will be withdrawn from Romania, after 14 years on 202
Romanian soil
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 collaboration on the basis of Chinese policy of friendly cooperation with Eastern European 
countries (Liu Yong 2006: 87).  
In the same manner, a few months later, on 29 September 1958, a letter of the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian Embassy in Beijing would reconfirm, in the 
international arena, Bucharest’s leadership stance regarding the American hostility towards 
Beijing. Thus, by building their foreign policy on the principle of non interference in other 
countries’ domestic affairs and by demanding each and every socialist government for 
support, the Romanian political leadership protested against the US severe provocation 
towards Beijing regarding the Taiwan matter and demanded the withdraw of the American 
troops from the island of Taiwan. Moreover, on the one hand, in line with the RWP’s 
camaraderie strategies towards the CPC, it is also valuable to mention Bucharest 
government’s struggle to back the Chinese in the question of the PRC’s reinstatement of its 
legitimate right within the UN and, on the other hand, Beijing’s substantial assistance to 
Bucharest’s diplomatic plans and endeavour regarding the question of world peace . 203
In October 1959, on the 10th anniversary of the Chinese National Day, Emil Bodnăraș, in 
his quality of first Vice-chairman of Council of Ministers, led the Romanian party and 
government delegation to China in response to the Chinese Labour Union delegation's visit 
to Romania for the 15th anniversary of the Romanian Liberation Day two months earlier, in 
August 1959. Besides the standard consuetude of observing and gathering information 
regarding the host country’s socio-economical situation, the Romanian delegation also tried 
to determine the state of affairs in Sino-Soviet relations that, at that point, had already 
begun to tremble .  204
Following Ion Gheorghe Maurer’s four visits to China in 1964, 1966, 1967 and 1969, in his 
quality as member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Romanian 
Communist Party (PCR) and chairman of the Council of Ministers, Nicolae Ceaușescu, 
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 general secretary of the PCR Central Committee and president of Romania, visited the PRC 
on five occasions 1971, 1978, 1982, 1985 and 1988. Additionally, the three premiers of 
Romania Manea Mănescu, Ilie Verdeț and Constantin Dăsclăescu visited China in 1978, 
1980 and 1983 respectively (Liu Yong 2006: 75-78, Buzatu 2004: 103-104).  
These visits however, will be tackled with later, in the context of socio-political and 
economic transformations dictated by the major events that occurred in the socialist camp in 
the 1960s and 1970s, such as the Sino-Soviet split, the Romanian policy of controlled 
dissidence-detachment-independence towards the USSR and the consequent Sino-
Romanian rapprochement, as well as the Sino-USA phenomenon of normalisation of 
relations with the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s. 
The first Chinese high level officials to visit Romania were the vice chairman of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) Marshal Zhu De and Peng Zhen. They 
attended respectively the Second and Third Congress of the Romanian Workers' Party in 
1955 and 1960. In his welcoming speech among other things, the Chinese leader Zhu De 
endorsed the RWP’s success in the application of the socialist construction policy as well as 
Romania’s national economy development based on agricultural and industrial enactment of 
five and ten years’ plans . Additionally, during bilateral talks, Zhu De and the Romanian 205
leader Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej exchanged information and impressions regarding a 
“certain discontent with the USSR’s attitude vis-a-vis their states” .  206
Peng Zhen’s visit instead, tackled with questions of socialist construction in Eastern Europe 
and Romania, and defined the Chinese achievements and experiences resulting from the 
implementation of certain policies in industry and commerce (Liu Yong 2006: 86). 
In addition Zhou Enlai, vice chairman of the CPC Central Committee and premier of the 
State Council, would attend the funeral of Gheorghe Gheoghiu-Dej, first secretary of the 
Romanian Workers' Party Central Committee, in 1965 and would lead a Party and 
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Comunist Chinez care a participat la Congresul al II-lea al Partidului Muncitoresc Român” in Budura, R.I. 
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 Government delegation to visit Romania in 1966. The Chinese premier had visited 
Bucharest in 1954 as well, during a larger tour in the East European socialist capitals, and 
on that occasion the discussions with Bucharest authorities had involved general issues of 
party and state relations within the communist bloc. Basically, as early as in 1954, Zhou 
Enlai’s interest in spotting allies inside the Iron Curtain was rooted in the escalating 
divergence between the two communist giants, the Soviet Union and China .  207
Furthermore, the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee Deng Xiaoping, the 
member of the Political Bureau, and member of the Secretariat of the CPC Central 
Committee and vice premier of the State Council Wan Li, and the member of the Political 
Bureau and secretary of the Secretariat of the CPC Central Committee Qiao Shi would 
attend the 9th, 13th and 14th Congress of the Romanian Communist Party in 1965, 1984 and 
1989 respectively.  
Moreover, Li Xiannian would go to Romania to attend celebrations of the 20th and 30th 
anniversary of the Liberation of Romania in 1964 and 1974 in his capacity as vice premier 
and would go there again as Chinese president in 1984 to attend the celebrations of the 40th 
anniversary of the Liberation of Romania. In 1978, the chairman of the CPC Central 
Committee and premier of the State Council Hua Guofeng would visit Romania. Later on, 
in 1983 General Secretary Hu Yaobang  would also pay a visit to Romania, and three years 
later in 1986, Premier Zhao Ziyang would go to Romania as well. 
III.5 Sino-Romanian bilateral trade agreements.  
Launching cooperation in the scientific and technological fields  
In the economic field, Sino-Romanian inter-government exchanges and trade began in 
1950, as result of PCR’s demands for petroleum products, equipments for the extraction and 
 Florian Banu, Liviu Țăranu, “Aprilie 1964 - Primăvara de la București. Cum s-a adoptat Declarația de 207
Independență a României", Editura Enciclopedică, București, 2004, p. 54
 148
 refinement of petroleum as well as railroad materials. Ambassador’s Theodor Rudenco 
letter of 17 October 1950 to the RPR Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides valuable 
information regarding the Chinese requests for import from the RPR for both 1950 and the 
following year. Hence, regardless of the fact that Romania had no commercial 
representative in China to tackle with the Sino-Romanian trade at that time, Beijing 
prepared a list of Romanian products to be imported in the PRC and Chinese articles to be 
exported in the RPR in 1951.  
The Chinese demands consisted of 100.000 tones of kerosene, 100.000 tons of diesel oil, 
70.000 tons of gasoline and about 800.000 tons of different kind of oils, accompanied by 
descriptions, designs and technical information for the railroad materials and the 
equipments for the extraction and refinement of the petroleum. In exchange, the PRC was 
offering tungsten, natural rubber, wool, silk, tea . Moreover, Ambassador Rudenco’s letter 208
revealed that consequently to a conversation he had with the Chinese Director of Foreign 
Commerce, it seemed like the PRC really needed RPR’s help and counted on Sino-
Romanian trade, especially considered the Chinese military situation in both Korea and 
Taiwan and its difficulties to supply itself from capitalist countries . In 1950, the trade 209
value amounted to US $ 270.000 and it was almost entirely a unilateral exchange, from 
Romania to China.  
However, a year later the two countries signed the first trade contract, and in July 1952, the 
first trade delegation from China visited Romania to sign the first bilateral and annually 
renewable trade agreement. Only later, in July 1958 the two countries would sign a long-
term trade agreement, for the duration of four years, until 1962 (Liu Yong 2006: 69). 
Therefore, albeit difficulties caused by the distance between the two countries, beginning 
with 1952 the Sino-Romanian economic and commercial ties developed rapidly, with trade 
volumes increasing swiftly  and reaching US $ 31.060.000 in 1956 and US $ 59.520.000 210
in 1960. The products that “China mostly imported from Romania were petroleum and 
 A.M.A.E., fond Telegrame, Pekin, septembrie - decembrie, 1950, nepaginat. 208
 Ibidem209
   In 1952 by nearly five times compared to the trade volume in 1951210
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 petroleum products, power station equipments, petroleum drilling equipments, cement 
factory equipments, tractors etc (…) the main goods that China exported to Romania 
included: rubber, jute, rice, rapeseed, leather products, mineral products, fabrics, 
cotton” (Liu Yong 2006: 69-70). Therefore, approximatively half of the Chinese exports in 
the 1950s consisted of cotton and rubber.  
On 9 January 1953, the new Romanian Ambassador to Beijing Iacob Coțoveanu sent a 
telegram to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the signing of a new 
Commercial Agreement followed by a Scientific and Technological Cooperation Accord 
between the PRC and the RPR. The accord stipulated that the bilateral trade and 
cooperation in the scientific and technological field amounted to 21 million roubles for each 
country , with Romania importing tinplate, tinfoil, cast iron, asbestos, molybdenum, 211
cotton, jute, hemp, rubber, and tung oil from the PRC and exporting drilling equipment, 
wells, cranes, windlasses and petroleum products to China . However, by the beginning of 212
1959, the commercial trade volume materialised through contracts would be clearly 
exceeded, reaching approximatively 200 million roubles and delineating a significant 
difference between the volume of exports to the PRC - approx. 120 mil. roubles, and the 
volume of imports from the PRC - approx. 90 mil. roubles (Budura 2005:15).  
According to a report of the Romanian Embassy in Beijing, the imbalances of the Sino-
Romanian bilateral trade could only be set right by dint of Romanian imports of traditional 
consumer goods from the PRC (products such as cotton, oilseeds, rubber) equivalent to 
what the Chinese both suggested and expected, from their Romanian counterpart . 213
The same year, in September 1953, the two countries also established a Joint Council of 
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 Scientific Cooperation holding meetings of Romanian and Chinese representatives for five 
years, between 1953-1957. Through the creation of the Council, the two countries were able 
to dispatch experts in the other country, to mutually exchange materials and to communicate 
their experiences, thus allowing an intense cooperation in the scientific and technological 
fields. Agriculture, textile industry, typography, light industry and construction industry -
especially bridges - have been the Chinese main interest areas of investment in Romania, 
while the latter offered expertise and resources for Chinese petroleum industry, 
microorganism application and electrical power plants (Liu Yong 2006: 70). For instance, 
the construction of the first Romanian power plant in China, occurred at Xinwen, in March 
1957 (Țighiliu 2006: 169). 
According to Liu Yong, in February 1954, on Chinese government invitation, a Romanian 
group of technicians and engineers went to China to help reform the Yunmen oil field, that 
had suffered extensive damages due to the terrible climate causing shortage of materials, 
injuries and illness. The Romanian experts remained in China for more than one year and 
worked day and night, no matter the climate conditions, to pass their knowledge and 
experience of drilling to the Chinese counterpart. Four years later actually, during Chivu 
Stoica’s visit to China in 1958, Premier Zhou Enlai would make a statement reminiscing 
about the Romanian highly appreciated aid to the Chinese petroleum industry (Liu Yong 
2006: 72).  
Besides, in conformity with the Chinese scholar, Sino-Romanian cooperation was also 
extended to the field of Postal Services and Telecommunication in 1955, through the 
signing of an Agreement in Bucharest in July (Liu Yong 2006: 72).  
Both a note of the Romanian Embassy in Beijing to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, as well as a first page article released by “Canton Daily” journal in March 1957, 
indicate the importance, for the development of Sino-Romanian bilateral maritime trade, of 
the “Dimitrov” ship’s anchorage in Huangpu Port, Guangzhou, the first Romanian Merchant 
Vessel ever to enter a Chinese port. According to Budura, the grey-coloured merchant vessel 
of 4,691 tons of dead weight and about 5,000 of loading tonnage was quite noticeable in the 
Chinese seas, thus “as she cutter(ed) into the quietness of the Pearl River, and drawing 
near the ward of Wampoa port, 200 odd workers and staffs of Wampoa Port’s 
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 administration with flags of brilliancy of colours in their hands, and part of them actuated 
in the lion-dance, lined up along the wharf for welcome” . Eight years later, in May 1965, 214
the first Chinese commercial high tonnage ship would enter the Romanian port of 
Constanta.  
III.6 Ideological differences.The impact of the emerging Sino-Soviet rift and the rising 
Soviet - Romanian dissent on Sino-Romanian ties in the 1950s 
After having outlined the major events in the evolution of Sino-Romanian diplomatic, 
cultural and economic bilateral ties, the readers’ understanding of the relationship between 
the two countries in the 1950s can now only be fully achieved through a quick review of the 
international context. Indeed, the whole picture should be completed once the factors that 
influenced these relations in the middle decade of the 20th century have been as well 
delineated. Since the beginning, the international context enabled with the end of the 
Second World War, that is the global Cold War, had brought to the attention of the leaders in 
the socialist camp that a solution to overtake the economic problems caused by the Western 
blockade and aggression, should have been found. Thus, in response to the American 
establishment of the Marshall Plan in 1947, the Organisation for European Economic 
Cooperation in 1948 and NATO in 1949, the socialist countries headed by the Soviet Union 
and sharing the same Marxist-Leninist ideology would enhance diplomatic ties straightaway 
and would create a trade system and economic organisation (the Comecon, 1949) as well as 
a military alliance (the Warsaw Pact in 1955). However, beyond the regular issues of 
political and economic cooperation, the international socialist relations were basically 
dictated by the countries’ fundamental ideological dimension.  
Leninism, more precisely Marxism-Leninism was indeed the philosophy, the grounds for 
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 the existence of the two communist giants, the Soviet Union and China, that, on the one 
hand legitimised their political being and on the other, allowed them to put into practice 
their own project of assault to reality .  215
Nevertheless, in Central and Eastern European countries, the alliance with the Soviet Union 
has been the core for the socialist countries’ foreign relations since their earlier stage. Once 
institutionalised, these relations needed to be grounded in the (Soviet) socialist principles of 
people’s friendship, mutual assistance, cooperation, collaboration, solidarity and non 
interference in other countries’ domestic affairs, as well as the support to the struggle for 
international peace and for nationalist movements in the Third World.  
Hence, diplomatic, economic and cultural relations between the PRC and the socialist 
countries in Eastern Europe following the Soviet Union’s lead were as well, triggered and 
carried out on this basis. Romania in the first place, established bilateral relations with 
China basically due to the fact that the former closely pursued Kremlin’s line in both 
international and domestic affairs. Indubitably, considered the hostile Soviet strategies to 
take full control of Romanian political power in the 1940s and given the fact that the Soviet 
military presence in Romania lasted until 1958 (for fourteen years since 1944), it was only 
natural for the political elite in Bucharest to maintain submissiveness as central theme of its 
positioning towards the USSR. In fact, while the latter regarded the socialist camp as an 
instrument to oppose the USA led Western camp in its endeavour for global hegemony and 
for the preservation of its national interest, it also demanded obedience from the socialist 
members of the Warsaw Pact (to the expense of their national interest) in exchange for the 
support granted to them in domestic affairs, such as in their process of consolidation of the 
communist parties and in the reconstruction of their economies. 
Within the Iron Curtain the countries were supposed to suppress their consciousness, their 
political, economic and social awareness (such as the desire to maintain room to manoeuvre 
by sovereignty and independence) otherwise economic sanctions were applied and military 
measures were taken by the Kremlin. In fact, as Liu Yong observed, already during 
Gheorghiu Dej, Romania began to make significant efforts to expand economic cooperation 
 Emanuel Copilaș, “Implozia leninismului. O reevaluare a conflictului sino-sovietic din perspectivă 215
ideologică”, (p.94), CEEOL, Sphere of Politics (Sfera Politicii), issue: 141 / 2009, pp. 89-111
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 with the West and other countries in the world in order to cut down the trade with, and to 
lessen its economic dependence on, the Soviet Union. Thus, while the trade volume 
between the RPR and other countries increased by 10% between 1952-1957, the volume of 
trade between Romania and the Soviet Union decreased from 52.7% in 1954 to 45.2% in 
1957 (Liu Yong 2006: 106). In a few words, this was the general framework of the relations 
between Central and Eastern European countries and the USSR during the 1950s. However, 
this geopolitical top-down configuration started to shake when disagreements and tensions 
regarding the Soviet Union’s control started to raise within the communist parties of the 
Socialist camp. Indeed, with Stalin’s death in March 1953, several crucial moments marked 
the instability of the communist bloc, that by now had failed to appear as omnipresent 
grantor of mankind’s happiness and welfare.  
The first evident signs of trouble were given by the anti-Soviet labours’ strike in June 1953 
in East Germany (the GDR) and the economic related strike in Czechoslovakia, both 
concluded with a violent military intervention of the Soviet army and a huge migration from 
the GDR to West Germany . Just three years later, Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation - which 216
arose during the famous twentieth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
and helped relax Kremlin’s ideological and operational control of the other communist 
parties - led to a wave of violent clashes in Poland in the summer-autumn 1956 aiming at 
Wladyslaw Gomulka’s return to the CC and the Politburo inspire of Marshal Rokossovsky. 
In October-November the same year, a popular uprising broke out in Hungary, when 
hundreds of thousands of Hungarians demanded the resignation of the oppressive Soviet 
regime and the communist leader Imre Nagy pleaded for the normalisation of the Hungarian 
political setting and for Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.  
In just a few days, the Hungarian revolution was brought to an end under the Red Army’s 
military force and the Soviet tanks’ attacks, while the communist leader Nagy was replaced 
with János Kádár. However, these meaningful events in the USSR’s relations with the 
socialist states are not to be considered exceptions of the 1950s. By all means, following 
Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation process and adoption of a new policy of 
 “East Germany. The Workers’ Insurrection of June 1953”. Submitted by International Review 1970s on 216
November 1, 1978 - 05:00. 
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 peaceful coexistence, global events such as the Sino-Soviet split in the beginning of the 
1960s and the resulting border clash of 1969, the Cuban missile crisis (1962) or the Warsaw 
Pact-Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in the end of the 1960s (1968) should have never 
taken place.  
As already anticipated, Romanian-Soviet relations have been quite close during the 1950s, 
albeit some initiatives taken by the RWP to reduce Kremlin’s influence and the latter’s 
intervention in Romanian domestic affairs. For example, the year 1952 witnessed Ana 
Pauker and Vasile Luca’s - both regarded as epitomes of Stalinism - purge from the RWP, 
while in 1953 the CC of the RWP asked the Soviet Union to transfer some of the SOVROM 
mixed enterprises - tools of exploitation of the Romanian economy - to the People’s 
Republic of Romania.  
A year later, in September 1954, the Soviets would give all of their SOVROM shares back 
to the Romanian Peoples’ Republic. Many international and Romanian historians and 
scholars would consider both Khrushchev’s presence on the stage as leader of the socialist 
camp and the Romanian SOVROM accomplishment, as the gateway for a more independent 
national policy and a diplomatic victory respectively .  217
During the eleventh anniversary of Romania’s liberation in 1955, Gheorghiu - Dej would 
assert before Khrushchev the important role of the RWP during the 23rd August insurrection 
and would delineate the basic principles of the Romanian Peoples’ Republic foreign policy, 
as completely coinciding “with the five principles agreed upon by India and China during 
the negotiations between Zhou Enlai and Nehru” (Liu Yong 2006: 105). Moreover, in 
December the same year, the Romanian leader would point out for the first time the 
Romanian communist party’s lines for the maintenance of independence and preservation of 
initiative (Liu Yong 2006: 151). However, albeit these limited attempts in the 1950s, only 
gradually the RPR governance would embark on a new road that, through progressive but 
“extremely cautious distantiation line” towards Moscow , would witness the withdrawal 218
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 of the Soviet troops from Romanian soil in 1958 and would lead to the more commonly 
perceived as RWP’s Declaration of Independence of April 1964 . In fact, as many 219
historians have fairly expressed, the de-Stalinisation process had no effect on the RPR’s 
domestic and foreign policy (as it had in other Central and Eastern European states), for the 
cultural and political spring that articulated Bucharest’s stance in the international affairs in 
the after-Stalin period was still “primitive”, focusing only on Romanian political elites’ 
hunger to maintain domestic political power at any cost .  220
For instance, after following the different socialist parties’ reaction to Khrushchev’s secret 
report of February 1956, the Romanian communist leader Dej would notice the similitudes 
between the Chinese and Romanian standpoints regarding this issue and thus, in April of the 
same year, would deduce that after the CPSU, the CPC was the strongest communist party 
in the socialist bloc, enjoying “a true Marxist-Leninist leadership” . Furthermore, 221
Gheorghiu Dej’s speech  before voters in February 1957 could be examined both as an 222
example of Romanian communist leaders indefinite position in the global stage or as RWP’s 
public, friendly viewpoint, towards the great leaders of the communist world, the Soviet 
Union and China (Liu Yong 2006: 149).  
However, between 1960-1964 the RWP began to oppose Moscow’s strategies for 
cooperation between Central and Eastern European socialist states as Comecon and Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation members. Nonetheless, Bucharest’s stance was only manifested 
publicly during a meeting of the Politburo of the CC of the RWP on April 2nd 1964. That 
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 day Gheorghiu Dej announced his opposition to the Soviet proposals for international 
division of labour and the centralised planning of national economies by means of 
converting the Comecon into a supranational organisation. Moreover, the Romanian 
leadership denounced Moscow’s plans for the constitution of a foreign ministers committee 
“headed by the Soviet minister, which was supposed to coordinate the foreign policy of the 
socialist countries, a single command of the armed forces of the WTO’s member states, the 
war games organised on the territories of member states, and WTO enlargement in Asia by 
incorporating Mongolia” .  223
A year earlier as well, the RWP had spelled out its disengagement towards the Soviet policy 
of aggression and interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. In an article signed by 
Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer, that was published in the journal “Problems of Peace 
and Socialism”, the Romanian leader had highlighted “the legitimate goals and aspirations 
of the people (…), the prevalence of legal principles and international ethical standards”  224
. Moreover, in that occasion Maurer had expressed the Romanian communist party’s line to 
“maintain normal friendly relations with all major powers and with all the states in the 
world” . In fact, according to former diplomat and academic Vasile Buga, different 225
measures adopted in 1963 by the Romanian authorities marked the turning point in the 
Romanian-Soviet hereafter relations and reflected the beginning of an irreversible twofold 
process, the discard of the policy of enslavement to Moscow and the recover of national 
identity .  226
Meanwhile, differences of opinion regarding the Sino-Soviet disputes were also adding up 
to the already problematic context of socialist international relations caused, among other 
things, by the newly-trembling Romanian-Soviet relations. Moreover, thanks to recent 
available sources from the US, Russia, China and Romania, there is no uncertainty that the 
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 RWP used the aggravation of relations between the CPC and CPSU in its own interest, to 
strengthen its policy of detachment from Moscow and promote a national-guided foreign 
and domestic policy . The Sino-Soviet split (or schism in Western historiography) that 227
became public in the beginning of the 1960s, was not the first clash between the Soviet 
Union and China, on the contrary, border conflicts between the two countries have occurred 
since the first Opium War and the subsequent Russian occupation of huge Chinese 
territories, until the foundation of the Peoples’ Republic of China in 1949 . However, even 228
after this date the Soviet Union managed to both give moral and material support to the 
Chinese people, to the national revolution, to assist the CPC and the PRC, as well as to 
bring hardship to the Chinese nation and to aggressively contrast the CPC’s domestic affairs 
and the PRC’s operations in the international arena (Copilaș 2009: 93). 
First of all, it was not the territorial dimension that made the Sino-Soviet rift one of the 
crucial events during the Cold War. The multiple factors that led to the exacerbation of two 
countries relations, that is the ideological, geopolitical, economic, political, personal and 
even racial dimensions, have been the object of numerous studies and research projects in 
the Russian Federation, the United States, Europe and China. Some of these sources have 
supported the idea of a Chinese-Soviet breakup as early as 1950, by grounding their theory 
on Henry Kissinger’s hypothesis that Sino-Soviet hostility began with the CPSU’s 
aggressive attitude towards the CPC when the Korean War was triggered in 1950 (Copilaș 
2009: 94) or, by relying on Zhou Enlai and Mao’s speeches, that reflected the CPC’s views 
concerning the CPSU antagonistic, unkind and estranged behaviour towards the PRC and 
the CPC’s leaders, already during the anti-Japanese war and during the Communists’ civil 
war against Chiang Kai-shek and the nationalist forces of the Kuomintang .  229
In fact, a similar position was taken by Romanian scholar and former diplomat Ion Buzatu, 
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 who considered that Stalin’s distaste for the Chinese communists had its origins in the 
struggle for power within the CPSU between him and Leon Trotsky, during the 1930s. 
When Trotsky realised the betrayal of Chiang Kai-shek’s during the 1927 rebellion , he 230
continued to sustain only the Communist Party of China within the CC of the PCUS, and 
several times pleaded for the termination of support for the United Front consisting of 
Chinese nationalists and communists. Stalin, nevertheless, working his way up to the leader 
of the communist world, would invoke that the PRC, dealing with the initial phase of the 
class struggle, firstly needed to get through a bourgeois uprising before making a 
proletarian revolution. He was actually summoning the support to the United Front, and the 
maintenance of relations with Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang.  
As claimed by Buzatu, even after Trotsky’s removal from the CPSU  in his goal to foist 231
the Soviet Union’s national interests, Stalin would preserve his stance towards the CPC by 
almost constantly taking actions to undermine, and even sacrifice it. Therefore, already 
between the 1930s and the 1940s, Mao acknowledged Stalin’s equivocal attitude towards 
the Chinese leaders and party and, without interrupting or terminating the PRC’s relations 
with the USSR, immediately took measures to inflict a political strategy appropriate for the 
Chinese realities, that is a policy due to strengthen both the CPC’s military and influence, 
and to protect the Chinese national interests (Buzatu 2004: 107-108). 
Another solid perspective with regard to the Sino-Soviet split, was offered by the Chinese 
scholar Liu Yong’s, who articulated that the Soviet, American and British signed Yalta 
Conference, with its evident bias against China, had firstly long-term harmed the newly 
born PRC. Indeed, since the outset, on the one hand the PRC required the Soviet significant 
political and economic assistance, but on the other hand, the former permanently needed to 
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 reject and resist the Soviet intervention in domestic affairs. For example, after long 
negotiations, in 1954 the USSR transferred its stocks from four Sino-Soviet companies to 
the Chinese state and by June 1955, the Soviet troops were completely withdrawn from 
Chinese soil .  232
However, the ideological differences between the two communist parties of China and the 
Soviet Union began during the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU in 1956, when the CPC 
refused to acknowledge the principle of peaceful coexistence as the main line of Soviet 
Union and other socialist countries’ foreign policy. Moreover, according to Liu Yong, 
during the Polish and Hungarian Incidents, Beijing denounced Kremlin’s chauvinism as 
well as the greater part of the latter’s doctrines (Liu Yong 2006: 116).  
Furthermore, only few years later, in 1958, when the Soviets made proposals to establish 
long - wave radio stations in China and a joint Sino-Soviet submarine fleet, the CPC’s 
leadership response reflected both the Beijing political elites’ strong wish to keep distance 
from the “Big Brother’s” influence and the decline of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Thus, during 
his talks with the Soviet Ambassador Yudin in July 1958, Mao Zedong associated these 
issues to “a series of more general questions concerning the overall relationship between 
the two countries, revealing comprehensively (often in cynical tones) his understanding of 
the historical, philosophical and political origins of the problems existing between Beijing 
and Moscow. The Chinese chairman again emphasised the issue of equality, emphasising 
that Beijing could not accept Moscow’s treatment of the CPC as a junior partner” . 233
Moreover, since 1954, the Soviet Union had insisted that the PRC joined Comecon, but the 
latter has always politely refused Kremlin’s invitations.  
In fact, in 1958 when the CC of the CPC investigated the Comecon raised issues of 
cooperation between socialist countries as the main goal of the Comecon, and concluded 
that the PRC shouldn’t join the Council for China still had a backward economy, Beijing 
enlarged the trade channel with Eastern European by signing commercial agreements for 
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 three years (1959-1962) with Poland, Hungary and Romania. The latter also had a backward 
economy, that had compelled it to constantly rely on Soviet Union’s aid. In fact, as 
Gheorghiu Dej stated on 22 August 1954 during the ceremony for the 10th anniversary of 
Romania’s liberation, the country needed to make efforts in order to establish economic ties 
and commercial agreements with countries both in the socialist and the Western camp, and 
thus to diminish the Soviet interference (Liu Yong 2006: 106). 
In 1959, Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing during the 10th anniversary celebration of the 
Chinese National Day ended with uncommon, intense disputes between the leaders of the 
two communist giants. Indeed, it is believed that during these talks, when the Soviet 
authority urged Mao Zedong to comply with or agree to the Soviet strategy of loosening 
Soviet-American relations, the Chinese leader began to suspect for the first time that 
revisionism had arisen in the Soviet Union, while Khrushchev was regarded as “very 
immature. He does not understand Marxism-Leninism” (Liu Yong 2006: 118).  
Whether the Sino-Soviet disputes began earlier than 1950, or in 1956 with the de-
Stalinisation initiated by Nikita Khrushchev, with the outbreak of the Hungarian and Polish 
incidents and the Chinese Hundred Flowers Campaign, or again during the Moscow 
Conference of the Communist Parties in 1957 or throughout the 1958-1959 Chinese-Soviet 
quarrels during the initial phase of the Great Leap Forward Campaign, what is crystal clear 
is that the Moscow-Beijing rift - that finally erupted in border clashes in 1969 - would have 
huge effects on Sino-East European countries’ relations with the beginning of the 1960s.  
As already stated in the chapter dealing with Sino-Romanian cultural relations in the 1950s, 
Romania has always admired the Chinese experience for revolution and Bucharest has 
watched closely the evolution of the Sino-Soviet party and state ties, as well as the 
escalating Sino-Soviet dispute. At some point, Romania started to look to China for both 
moral and material support in its attempts to maintain Bucharest’s policy beyond the 
Kremlin’s reach and, in exchange, in conformity with scholar Liu Yong, China was the only 
socialist country that regarded from a distinct stance the phrase “the Soviet Union freed 
Romania” (Liu Yong 2013: 152). 
Additionally, in compliance with many Western scholars, when in 1955 the Soviets 
withdrew their troops from Chinese soil and Khrushchev adopted a normalisation policy 
 
 towards Yugoslavia, Romania seized this opportunity to draw up a request for the removal 
of the Soviet troops from its territory. Indeed, just three years later, during a visit in the 
Chinese capital in March 1958, the Romanian delegation leaded by Chivu Stoica proposed 
to the hosts the evacuation of the North Korean territory by the Chinese military troops and 
demanded support for the Soviet troops withdrawal from Romanian soil.  
According to Chinese researchers, a month later, when Warsaw Pact’s countries were 
meeting to decide how to proceed with this issue, both Chinese and Romanian governments 
released a common statement emphasising that the military troops’ station in Asia and 
Europe must be replaced with a common security system. Moreover, the two countries 
stressed that military bases created on other countries’ territories should be dissolved and 
troops withdrawn at once . In fact, the year 1958 witnessed both the tremendously 234
important withdrawal of the Soviet army from Romania’s soil and the Chinese Peoples 
Volunteers’ disengagement of troops from Korea . 235
Another illustration of the Romanian and Chinese leaders sharing the same common view is 
provided by a meeting in Beijing in September 1956, when chairman Mao Zedong 
expressed to his Romanian counterpart Gheorghiu Dej, his worries about the Soviet Union’s 
control and authoritarian position within the Cominform. Moreover, the two leaders 
exchanged opinions regarding trade of technology with the Western countries and discussed 
the disagreements emerged both within the socialist countries and in Romanian-Soviet 
relations (Liu Yong 2006: 107).  
To Mao’s reflections that the Cominform should have no longer existed for it had not been 
designed to respond to democratic dialog, Gheorghiu Dej stressed that Romania had always 
opposed the undemocratic Soviet control and influence, especially in regard to Kremlin’s 
desire to impose the one big nation doctrine. The Chinese leader instantly congratulated his 
Romanian counterpart for not having obeyed to Stalin’s orders.  Besides, in the end of the 
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 same year, another significant moment in the international socialist arena generated 
Romanian-Chinese leader’ mutual understanding and consideration when, during the Polish 
and Hungarian incidents, the Chinese leaders denounced the Soviet boldness to intervene in 
other parties’ and states’ domestic affairs. At that moment, Romanian leadership had the 
first chance to acknowledge the PRC’s distinct position in the socialist camp as well as it’s 
role in the anti-Soviet resistance (Liu Yong 2013: 152).  
Hence, generally speaking, the Sino-Romanian relations throughout the Cold War must be 
tackled with within the wider context of international socialist relations delineated by the 
triangle established by the PRC, the USSR and the RPR and the Sino-Soviet-Romanian 
relations they produced. Once it is clearly established that Sino-Romanian relations in the 
1950s followed a linear path - in correspondence with the unspoiled Soviet-Romanian ties 
and reasonable Sino-Soviet relations during this period - the only aspects that surfaced to 
alter the balance of a seemingly full-scaled interrelated triangle, were found in the declining 
CPSU-CPC relations after the second half of the 1950s (Sino-Soviet split), and straining 
CPSU-RWP ties with the beginning of the 1960s.  
In fact, while assessing Jersild’s and Baev’s works on the Sino-Soviet split, historian and 
expert of cultural studies for Eastern and Central Europe Stefan Troebst asserted that from 
1960, the increasingly open schism caused Moscow to tighten its reins in its own camp, 
while outwardly, the INTERKIT secret network, founded in 1967, was employed for the 
exchange of information on China and the CPC, between the CPSU and the communist 
parties in East Berlin, Prague, Budapest and Sofia, with the explicit exclusion of Bucharest. 
Therefore, he inferred that despite ideological issues or personal rivalry between the two 
leaders of the communist movement, Khrushchev and Mao, the epochal Sino-Soviet 
conflict in the communist world was not merely a bilateral predicament between Moscow 
and Beijing, but that the other CMEA states were directly involved as actors, “in pursuit of 
national interests which were by no means always in line with the block” .  236
That being the case, I will try to display how, with the beginning of the 1960s, both the 
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 Sino-Soviet rift and the Romanian-Soviet detachment would continue to affect these 
relations, and would trigger extensive, managed from above, Sino-Romanian bilateral ties. 
III.7 Bucharest’s relations with Beijing against the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet dispute in 
the mid 20th century 
As it has been explored so far, within the international communist movement, both the 
CPSU and the Soviet Union’s authority started to deteriorate in the wake of the February 
1956 de-Stalinization, during the alarming XXth Congress of the CPSU. As claimed by Dan 
Cătănuș, the eminent reveal of Stalin’s crimes had opened the path to contestation of the 
Soviet Union’s role as political leader of the communist world, as ideological centre of 
universal truth and as sole protector of Marxist-Leninist integrity.  
As a consequence, the sloping down of the CPSU would smooth the way for the CPC’s 
ascension in the first years of the 1960s and would reposition Beijing within the communist 
international movement, from a matter of esteem for China’s vast size, to a concrete fact 
(Cătănuș 2004: 13). According to the author, in the very beginning, in Romania there was 
hardly any detail regarding the two communists giants misunderstandings.  
However, in the context of increasing Sino-Soviet disputes on the one hand, and Soviet 
withdrawal of troops from the RPR - crucial for the RWP henceforth policy - on the other 
hand, Bucharest’s standpoint in the socialist international arena was notably shaped by 
loyalty and obedience to the CPSU between the fifth and the first years of the sixth decade 
of the 20th century. Romania’s plan for economic development was actually believed to be 
carried out better only by undertaking Khrushchev’s policy of peaceful coexistence and the 
spirit of Camp David. Unquestionably, Bucharest endorsed the latter, that encapsulated the 
possibility of understanding between the two global poles of the Cold War, in spite of the 
strategies of geopolitical confrontation amply promoted by Mao Zedong.  
Moreover, Cătănuș revealed that Chinese domestic experiments such as the “Hundred 
Flowers”’ campaign, the “Great Leap Forward” and the “people’s communes” springing 
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 from the latter, were regarded by the Romanian leadership as adventurist measures, all the 
more so authorities in Bucharest didn’t have abundant data regarding the ambitious Chinese 
stratagems, except for their propagandistic perspective (Cătănuș 2004: 13). As a matter of 
fact, the RWP’s orientation towards Moscow and the former’s support to the CPSU, in 
defiance of the CPC during the initial phase of Kremlin’s ideologic conflict with Beijing, 
would be outlined in distinct significant moments.   
First and foremost, in the aftermath of the “Bucharest Conference” or the 3rd Congress of 
the RWP in June 1960, by means of a letter of the CC of the RWP to the CC of the CPC, the 
leadership in Bucharest accused the Chinese counterpart of chauvinism, of unjustly 
considering the war as the only path leading to the victory of socialism, and thus of 
unnaturally exposing the leninist policy of peaceful coexistence led by the Soviet Union and 
other socialist countries. Moreover, by means of the letter, the CC of the RWP denounced 
the Chinese diplomatic authorities of putting considerable effort into spreading in all the 
socialist countries, propagandistic materials based on thesis contrasting the marxist-leninist 
thought. In this sense, the “Hundred Flowers” campaign was hold by the Romanian 
leadership to be offering “a tribune for the carriers of rival ideology”  and to be coming 237
“in contradiction with the demands of the consistent fight, intransigent against any 
manifestation of bourgeoise ideology, and thus totally unacceptable for the marxist-leninist 
parties” . In fact, on that occasion, the Albanian communist party’s delegates would be 238
the only ones in the socialist bloc to back Beijing. 
Secondly, during the socialist and workers’ parties Conference in Moscow in November-
December the same year, the Romanian delegation blamed the Chinese representatives for 
false attitude of holding the monopolisation of the truth and obliviousness concerning the 
plausible schism in the international communist movement (Budura 2005: 17). Moreover, 
during the same meeting, following Enver Hoxha’s ardent discourse, the Soviet-Albanian 
ties would instantly became distant and subsequently would lead to China’s ally, Tirana 
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 exclusion from the Warsaw Pact and the Comecon, in 1961.  
Last but not least, the RPR’s position as ally of the USSR would be again expressed in two 
occasions, during the IV Congress of the Albanian communist party - February 1961 - and 
during Dej’s visit at the XXII Congress of the CPSU - October 1961. In the first meeting, 
the Romanian delegation made up by Ṣtefan Voicu, Isac Martin  (members of the CC of the 
RWP) and Gh. Velcescu (Romanian ambassador to Albania), together with Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, the G.D.R., Mongolia, France, Italy, Cuba, Austria and Norway, 
clearly supported the CPSU’s approach, while Albania, North Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Myanmar (Burma), Thailand and Vietnam backed the Chinese line.  
After 1961, or more precisely after the XXII Congress of the CPSU, the Sino-Soviet discord 
began to approach its climax. In view of the fact that, during the Congress, Zhou Enlai - 
leading the Chinese delegation to Moscow - left the meeting when the Soviet leader’s 
Khrushchev started off a direct criticism of the Albanian communists, followed by Moscow 
and its East European satellites’ immediate break-off of relations with Tirana, Bucharest’s 
relations with Beijing embarked on a cloudy route. In fact, Romania made no exception 
when the moment of choosing sides arrived, and diplomatic and political ties with Albania 
and its Party of Labour were instantly ceased by the RWP. In Romanian historiography, 
Bucharest’s positioning towards Moscow in this stage of the Sino-Soviet conflict, was often 
seen as the sacrifice that the Romanian People’s Republic had to pay for the 1960 Soviet 
economic aid, that allowed Romania to put into practice its six years plan . 239
However, Gh. Dej’s undemonstrative attitude and his statements concerning the principles 
that should govern relations in the international arena - peace and equality of rights, respect 
for the independence and national sovereignty - during the XXII Congress of the CPSU, 
regarded both the capitalist and socialist worlds, thus proclaiming a more flexible, 
advocating national interests-RWP foreign policy line. Moreover, without taking any 
official stand, the RWP’s choice to expand peaceful relationships and economic and cultural 
trade with all states, reflected both the opening up policy that Bucharest had started to 
promote with Western countries, and the framework in which these collaborations were due 
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 to mature .  240
On this account, the year 1962 has been hailed as a milestone in Romania’s foreign policy, 
predominantly because of the communist party’s reorientation from the Soviet Union’s 
model and its reshaping in conformance to the Chinese, Western and the Warsaw Pact’s 
countries policy patterns. But what had driven Bucharest to change its convictions regarding 
the big brother Moscow? Firstly, when Khrushchev had expressed his intentions to increase 
the economic integration of the Comecon countries during the June 1962 Conference in 
Moscow, the leaders of the RWP - involved in critical plans for the industrialisation and 
modernisation of the Romanian economy - had explicitly displayed their disaccord apropos 
of Romania’s transformation into an agricultural country, infuriating the Kremlin tout de 
suite and consenting Beijing to begin the restoration of relations with Bucharest. A second 
critical juncture was produced in the autumn of 1962, when the Romanian president 
Gheorghiu Dej publicly objected the Cuban missile crisis and accused the Soviets leaders of 
concealing far-reaching plans and military tactics in Cuba to the members of the Warsaw 
Pact.  
Moreover, at the end of the plenary session of the CC of the RWP of March 1963, not only 
would the party get national support against its opposing factions and against the Soviet 
pressure regarding the Comecon, but it would be established that the RPR would regulate its 
foreign policy tendencies in line with the respect of the principles of independence and 
maintenance of own initiative. Indeed, from now on, the Peoples Republic of Romania 
would publicly denounce the Soviet Union’s control and interference in other countries' 
affairs and diplomatically, would look to strengthen relations with Bulgaria and Hungary. 
Another moment that outlined Bucharest leadership’s position with regard to China and the 
CPC was manifested during the Congress of the Polish United Workers Party of November 
1963.  
On that occasion, differently from the other delegations of the socialist parties of East and 
Central Europe that openly attacked non-participating Beijing, the Romanian 
representatives leaded by Gheorghiu Dej adopted a silent treatment, thus gladdening the 
 Dan Cătănuș, “A doua destalinizare. Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej la apogeul puterii", Editura Vremea, București, 240
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 Chinese, who would declare to be thoroughly satisfied by Bucharest’s stance. As a result of 
RWP’s revision of its economic strategies, in 1964 Romania’s bilateral trade with non 
socialist countries would reach 33% of the total foreign trade share, instead of the 20% 
quota for the year 1955 (Liu Yong 2013: 154-155). Consequently, Khrushchev would 
deepen the Soviet Union’s pressure over Romania’s economy and policy, up to the point 
that the Soviet leader would even threaten to reconsider the Hungarian requests concerning 
Transylvania and to replace the Romanian communist leader. In this context, except for the 
support received from countries like China, Yugoslavia and Albania, Romania would mostly 
find itself isolated in Eastern Europe (Liu Yong 2013: 155). 
On the other lateral of the triangle, the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute would be stressed  in 
the beginning of the 1960s, throughout an exchange of messages between the two 
communist parties of China and the Soviet Union. Indeed, more than twenty letters sent 
between 1960-1964 reveal the rivals’ viewpoints and criticism of the Chinese dogmatism on 
the one hand and the Soviet chauvinism on the other. On top of that, in 1962 the Xinjiang 
denizens migration to the Soviet Union, the difficulties brought by the Sino-Indonesian 
border clashes as well as the Cuban missile crisis would add further pressure in the two 
countries’ bilateral ties. The CPC, second most important in the socialist camp and enjoying 
a long reach experience in dealing with the CPSU and the Soviet Union itself, needed to 
defend and preserve Beijing’s sovereignty and dignity through effective strategies and an 
autonomous stance. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union attempts to muster more than 80 
worldwide communist parties into a siege to isolate the PRC and the CPC during the five 
congresses of the communist parties held in Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Czechoslovakia and 
East Germany, and to subdue the Chinese economy to a blockade, increased the tension at 
the Sino-Soviet border; truthfully, already in 1964 China risked the first potential Soviet 
military invasion. Therefore, facing with the same external pressure, Romania and China 
both needed to find an ally able to contend it (Liu Yong 2013: 156). As Cătănuș pointed out, 
in correspondence with the deterioration of Romanian-Soviet alliance (and Sino-Soviet 
relations I would carry on), both the relationships between Romania and the Western 
countries as well as Sino-Romanian and CPC-RWP ties, began to experience significant 
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 progress .  241
However, regaining some solid bonds was not going to be an easy task for the Romanian 
and Chinese communist parties and states, on the contrary, different specific but most 
importantly positive steps were to be undertaken by the government in Bucharest in order to 
achieve a full-scale change over and convince Beijing to transmit encouraging, favourable 
signs (Cătănuș 2004:16). Having said that, on 23 August 1962, during the celebration of the 
Romanian National Liberation Day, the Chinese message of congratulations to the 
Romanian authorities was far more supporting than the greetings in previous years. 
So, while the Romanian people were praised for the “huge economic success”, inside the 
Romanian Embassy in Beijing Marshal Chen Yi made a statement reminiscing about the 
two party and states “eternal friendship”, in complete harmony with their respect for the 
principles of equality within states and mutual brotherly support. In December the same 
year, a Chinese delegation would arrive in Bucharest to set up trade formalities between the 
two countries (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 60).  
Accordingly, the report for the first semester of 1963 at the Romanian Embassy in Beijing, 
drafted more sustained Sino-Romanian economic ties as well as an intensified media 
representation of Romania in China, indisputably in connection with the “change of the 
Chinese leaders’ standpoint regarding our country” (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 60). Therefore, 
after the signing of a commercial agreement in April 1963 with the PRC , in June 1963 the 242
Romanian and Chinese political elite signed a new Treaty of Cooperation in the Scientific 
and Cultural fields, both followed by different Romanian delegations’ visits in Beijing.  
From a political viewpoint, the two countries and parties relationship was simple, based on 
the respect of the Marxist-Leninist principles of equality, mutual aid and non interference in 
the other country’s domestic affairs. The same principles served as political, diplomatic and 
economic platform for the restoration of the Romanian Embassy in Tirana in March 1963, 
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 and the settlement of Romanian-Albanian commercial trade the same year.  
Besides, since it had broken-off relations with Moscow in 1960, Albania - that had been 
excluded from the Comecon by the Kremlin - had been enjoying very close relations with 
China, which was itself not more than an observer in the economic organisation (next to 
North Korea and Vietnam). On top of that, regarding the structure and membership within 
the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the leadership in Bucharest has always 
condemned the absence whatsoever, of any of the communist countries in the world, from 
the organisation (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 62). Hence, it is eligible to say that in the backdrop of 
the Sino-Soviet rift, after a period of unequivocal alliance with the CPSU in the beginning 
of the 1960s, the RWP, induced by the inaccuracies of a one-sided policy, adopted an 
unbiased stance, in respect of the communist international movement.  
Still, one should bare in mind that for Bucharest, the friendship with Beijing did not yet 
mean that the first had moved from the Soviet into the Chinese camp. For several reasons, 
Gheorghiu Dej tried to maintain a prudence policy while his country’s involvement in the 
conflict held on to a third, neutral stance (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 62). 
First of all, the Romanian leader could not have adopted an evident, prejudiced attitude as 
long as he knew that the Sino-Soviet dispute could have been ended at any minute by one of 
the two, or by both communist giants, thus leaving the People’s Republic of Romania 
isolated in, or externally and internally overcome by, one of the two spheres of influence. 
Secondly, an unfolded dissidence would have irritated Moscow too much, and consequently 
would have only provoked a disservice or even a self-condemnation.  
That being so, in June 1963, when the leadership in Beijing revealed their proposals and 
position regarding issues of the communist international movement throughout a 25 points 
manifesto, the CPSU - once questioned its hegemony in and unity of the socialist camp - 
began a series of strategies aiming at the exile of Chinese people from the USSR. In this 
context, Bucharest’s position of equidistance was manifested through the publication of 
both the Chinese and Soviet letters, representing the two states’ proposals for the resolution 
of international communist movement, side by side and enjoying equivalent span, in the 
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 Romanian communist party’s main journal “Scânteia” .  243
Romanian researchers have revealed that at that stage, the RPR was the only people’s 
democracy in Eastern Europe with the exception of Albania, that chose to undermine 
Kremlin’s suggestions in order to bring to light the various perspectives and contradictory 
lines that socialist parties were facing with behind the Iron Curtain, without however trying 
to harm the integrity of the communist world (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 64).  
According to the Romanian authors, another moment that outlined Bucharest’s position of 
neutrality concerning the Sino-Soviet split was the absence of the Romanian leader 
Gheorghiu Dej from the socialist countries’ meeting in East Germany on the occasion of the 
GDR’s leader Walter Ulbricht birthday celebration. So, while Bucharest optimally justified 
Dej’s absence from the consultations with somewhat rightful, health problems, at that 
moment Nikita Khrushchev was planning to transform the session into an anti-Beijing 
adherence (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 64). As they maintained, it was Ion Gh. Maurer, Prime 
Minister of Romania (needless to say, often under president Gh. Gh. Dej’s requests), the 
craftsman for the policy of equidistance/neutrality, by grounding the RWP’s line in the 
esteem for the principles of international socialism, unity in diversity, equality of rights, 
mutual benefit and aid, non interference in other countries’ affairs and respect for the 
territorial integrity of any country. Precisely these principles - based on the Marxist-Leninist 
theory and articulated in the journals Problems of Peace and Socialism and Class Struggle 
of November 1963 - would become the “Maurer doctrine” .  244
According to sinologist Budura, in December 1963 the Romanian ambassador to Beijing 
Dumitru Gheorghiu was invited for an audience with Liu Shaoqi, deputy chairman of the 
CC of the CPC and president of the PRC. During the private interview to which the 
ambassador had been “warmly and friendly” welcomed, the two representatives discussed 
the Chinese and Romanian points of view concerning “what the Chinese used to call the 
Khrushchev clique, Romania’s relations with the Soviet Union, the norms underlying 
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 relations between sister parties, the cult of Joseph Stalin” (Budura 2008: 45). According to 
Budura, on that occasion the Romanian diplomat was given the Chinese leader’s gratitude 
for the RWP’s “attitude of not participating in the anti-Chinese and anti-Marxist move led 
by Khrushchev” (Budura 2008: 45). 
However, merely one month prior to what is unofficially known as the RWP’s Declaration 
of Independence - which neither Moscow nor Beijing would publish - in March 1964, the 
Romanian Prime Minister Gheorghe Maurer - leading a delegation that included Chivu 
Stoica and future president Nicolae Ceaușescu - visited the Chinese capital in the attempt to 
mediate the Sino-Soviet dispute.  
According to different Romanian sources, during the seven-days talks, the Romanian 
representatives, although received by Mao Zedong and other high ranking Chinese 
government officials, would realise that the authorities in Beijing were not looking forward 
to meeting the Romanian counterparts, whom, in their view, were there to represent 
Moscow, and not Bucharest’s interests (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 68-69; Budura 2008: 48-50). 
Nicolae Ceaușescu drew Mao’s attention to the fact that the Sino-Soviet conflict was not 
only affecting the communist parties in Eastern Europe, but the ones in the West as well, 
and, considered that no socialist state or communist party in the world could claim to be 
holding the absolute truth on Marxism-Leninism, he denied Mao’s pretences of publicly 
admitting that the Moscow-aligned communist parties offended the Chinese officials . 245
Moreover, during the same bilateral talks, while analysing the Soviet hegemonic pretences, 
the CPC’s leadership would reminisce about Romania and the RWP’s hardships regarding 
the 1812 Soviet appropriation of the province of Bessarabia .  246
On the way back, after a short visit of North Korea, the Romanian delegation also met 
Khrushchev at Pitsunda (in the USSR), but the one-day conversation with the Soviet leader 
only resulted in the aggravation of the already existing tensions between the USSR and 
RPR, and the increase of mistrust between the two communist parties (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 
68-69; Budura 2008: 48-50). Eventually, the Romanian premier’s mission did not prove a 
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 success, and albeit the two countries’ prominent common interest in rejecting the Soviet 
hegemonic pressure, that consecutively would lead to long-term close-knitted relationship 
(Cătănuș 2004: 16), the RWP’s success only consisted in the severance, for a month, of the 
hostilities between the Soviet and Chinese communist parties (Buga 2012: 21). 
Still, the leadership in Bucharest attempted once again to contribute to bringing closer the 
two partakers in the conflict, when the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party 
transmitted to both the CPC and the CPSU a well-meant proposition to permanently cease 
public discord. Nevertheless, the political elite’s approach to end the hostilities between the 
two communist colossi resulted to be half successful as, on the 31 March 1964, only the 
Soviets accepted the Romanian proposal, while the Chinese decided to carry out a media-tic 
attack of the Kremlin in the CPC’s main journals. On reflection, despite the partially 
completed favourable outcome, the RWP’s operations provided the Romanian communist 
party with international prestige, with the latter appealing to the rest of the people’s 
democracies and Warsaw Pact members to join the campaign (Buga 2012: 21-22). 
Moreover, in Romanian historiography, the escalating Sino-Soviet split resulted in 
Bucharest’s leadership decisiveness to publicly state their position concerning issues of the 
international communist movement during the plenary session of the CC of the RWP of 
15-22 April 1964. More importantly, considered the similarities of the two documents that 
put under question Moscow’s authority, the Romanian authors Banu and Țăranu argued that 
the Romanian political elite had in mind the already mentioned Chinese “proposal regarding 
issues of  international communist movement” of June 1963, as model for the production of 
the RWP’s Declaration of Independence of April 1964. In their opinion, the Romanian 
declaration had different, positive effects on the Sino-Romanian ties, but of these, in my 
regard, the most important achievement was the regaining of the Chinese confidence by the 
Romanian authorities (Banu and Țăranu 2004: 69). 
Before proceeding with Bucharest’s approach during the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Sino-
Romanian bond during this stage, I believe it is necessary to sketch the most important 
aspects of the RWP’s “declaration of independence”, its name in Western historiography, for 
the document not only represented the Romanian communist party’s outlook on different 
subjects, such as security, peace and cooperation of socialist countries within the communist 
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 international movement, but it mostly attested the RWP’s henceforth independent policy 
and represented a gateway from Kremlin’s hegemony, by referring to topics such as the 
collaboration of states within the Comecon and the RWP’s ways to improve the unity of the 
proletarian movement. Hence, according to scholar Mircea Munteanu, the declaration 
entitled “On the Position of the Romanian Workers’ Party concerning Issues in the World 
Communist and Workers’ Movement, which was adopted at the plenary session of the RWP 
Central Committee on 15–22 April 1964, established that the Romanian party would guide 
its interaction with other Communist parties in compliance with the principles of 
sovereignty, independence, and equality.  De-Stalinisation and Soviet attempts to reorganise 
the Warsaw Pact in order to ensure a common foreign policy became the main challenges to 
the PCR’s legitimacy and flexibility” .  247
Another perspective concerning the RWP’s declaration was provided by the Romanian 
academician Florin Constantiniu, who deduced that the document - representing the highest 
point of the Soviet-Romanian dissent - marked the “successful induction of a policy that 
was begun in the aftermath of Stalin’s death and that would represent the foundation for the 
political strategy of the RPR both regarding relations with the USSR and brotherly parties 
as well as with other capitalist or non aligned states” . Internationally, the Romanian 248
political strategy for the building of a socialist society, for the improvement of relations 
with socialist and non socialist states worldwide through the anti-Soviet declaration was 
observed and acknowledged with great interest (and appreciation) both by Peking and the 
West (France, England and the USA). Some Romanian historians would regard the 
declaration as the RWP’s doorway into the Sino-Soviet polemic from a third position, and 
thus, would perceive it as Bucharest leadership's political ability to adopt a “pro-Chinese 
neutrality” that promoted national interests by appealing to the principles defining the 
relations between the socialist states .  249
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 If in the immediate aftermath of the RWP’s declaration the Soviet authorities maintained a 
reserved position in this matter, the CPSU’s leaders would manifest their resentment in 
occasion of a meeting between Khrushchev and Josip Tito in June 1964. Henceforth, 
Moscow would adopt a strategy of unceasing surveillance of the People’s Republic of 
Romania’s foreign policy operations, mostly in regard to the latter’s opening towards the 
USA and other Western countries, and in respect to the deviations from accorded 
perspectives within the international organisations (Buga 2012: 25).  
During the various, tensioned discussions between the representatives of the two communist 
parties of Romania and the Soviet Union (mostly during the visits of the members of the 
Political Bureau of the CC of the RWP’s in Moscow), Gheorghiu Dej underlined as 
unfounded the Soviet accusations of Romania’s anti Soviet attitudes, such as “the 
disestablishment of academic institutions specialised in the study of the Russian language, 
history and popularisation of relations with the East, the revision of the streets’ names, the 
persecution of Russian nationals, the existence in Romania of a Soviet agency, the 
formulation of territorial claims, the ignorance of the Soviet Union’s role during Romania’s 
liberation from the fascist domination, the Soviet-Romanian economic ties, the role of the 
Sovroms, the peculiar position regarding Comecon and Warsaw Pact cooperation and other 
international organisations as well as in the international communist and proletarian 
movement, the collaboration with Western countries, etc” .  250
In the end, the Romanian leader’s objectives of peace and harmony, of closing out the 
Romanian-Soviet dissent in July 1964, as well as the alteration brought to the leadership of 
the CPSU by Khrushchev’s forced resignation in October 1964, not only allowed the RPR 
to carry on its independent policy line, but its practice was well enhanced in March 1965 
when, following up Gh. Dej’s death, Nicolae Ceaușescu became First Secretary of the RWP 
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 and leader of the Romanian People’s Republic . In the Soviet Union, within a short while 251
since his nomination as the leader of the USSR and the communist world, Leonid Brezhnev 
displayed a more concussive attitude towards the RPR, that the latter would immediately 
exploit. Thus, in the end of October 1964, the Romanian authorities requested and 
(uncommonly, but ideally) obtained the withdrawal of the KGB advisors from Romanian 
territory, turning the country into the only socialist state that relinquished the Soviet 
advisors before 1989 (Liu Yong 2013:156). 
Anyhow, returning to the Sino-Romanian evident rehabilitation of relations during the Sino-
Soviet dispute, as stated by Banu and Țăranu, the major factor that influenced the CPC’s 
rapprochement to the RWP, was the awareness of the political elite in Beijing that the 
Romanian press chose not to publish the offensive anti-Chinese articles, that other countries 
in the socialist bloc had. Secondly, in July 1964, when Mao Zedong made a statement in 
front of the Japanese socialists regarding the annexations of territory by the Soviets in the 
aftermath of WWII and mentioned that the Romanian-Soviet territorial disputes (with 
respect to Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina) were in fact the Soviet dishonest 
appropriation of Romanian land, the event officially signalled a new stage in Sino-
Romanian ties. Of course, the Chinese leader’s assertion added fuel to the already sizeable 
Sino-Soviet fire and, on that account, the Kremlin asked Bucharest to publish a disclaimer, 
that the latter would refuse to carry out (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 70-71).  
On the Romanian politician Paul Niculescu-Mizil’s accounts and the Chinese academician 
Liu Yong later on, in the autumn of 1964, the Romanian delegation to China would be 
received with a distinctive protocol that was normally only granted to the Korean and 
Vietnamese delegations, and to none of the Warsaw Pact members, thus outlining the 
special nature of China’s relations with Romania. Additionally, the Romanian leadership 
was generally overwhelmed by Mao’s personality: in fact, when he spoke, the latter was 
considered to express verdicts, not sentences, and whenever he saluted the populace with 
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 his arm raised, he assumed the warlike attitude of a god .  252
Furthermore, to put it briefly, when Romanian president Gh. Dej died in March 1965, Zhou 
Enlai, in his quality of Chinese premier and vice-president of the CC of the CPC, joined the 
funeral and a year later, in 1966, he would lead the Chinese delegation for an official visit to 
Bucharest, the most important one since the two countries established diplomatic relations 
in 1949 (after Marshal Zhu De’s visit in 1955). Although in the end, the Chinese premier’s 
visit would shroud Sino-Romanian relations of controversy and would somehow estrange 
the two communist parties for almost two years, due to the two countries unwary public 
speeches regarding the Warsaw Pact Organisation and the Comecon, the Romanian refusal 
to let the Chinese criticise the USSR (Liu Yong 2013: 166-167) or Bucharest’s dissent “to 
sign an Albanian proposal calling on pro-Chinese parties to condemn the Soviet position as 
revisionist” , in the international arena, on the one hand, Romania would support the PRC 253
with regard to the Chinese territory of Taiwan, would keep fighting for the PRC’s recover of 
its rightful seat within the United Nations and, on the other hand, in the context of China’s 
break-off of diplomatic relations with Ghana and Indonesia (1966 and 1967 respectively), 
Bucharest would represent and guard Beijing’s interests in the two countries.  
Henceforth, the RWP would attempt to “normalise the relations between the Chinese 
communists and the European and Latin-American parties” (Budura 2005: 42-43). 
Moreover, “a special effort was put forth to establish normalisation of relations with the 
Yugoslav communists, despite the Albanian-Yugoslav differences, in order to assure an area 
free of Soviet influence in the Balkans” (Budura 2005: 42-43) and, in occasion of the 
communist and workers’ parties meetings in Budapest in February 1968 and in Moscow in 
1969, the Romanian leadership would be the only ones amongst all the participants from 
socialist countries there present to speak in support of the PRC (Budura 2008: 57-58).  
Meantime, according to the former Romanian ambassador to Beijing, the PRC had outlived 
the withdrawal of Soviet specialists from its territory as well as the “cancellation of 
bilateral conventions and contracts related to the assistance for China and, despite 
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 economic difficulties caused by the poor harvests and low industrial production of 
1960-1961, had paid back all debts to the Soviet Union” (Budura 2008: 46).  
Later on, China, engaged in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution  that had driven 254
Sino-Soviet ties at the lowest point, would be apathetic about deepening the Sino-Romanian 
ties because of the far-left politics - “revolutionary ultra-leftism” (Liu Yong 2013: 168) - 
that had surfaced between the two communist parties and states.  
Accordingly, while the Romanian premier Ion Gh. Maurer tried once again to mediate the 
Sino-Soviet conflict during his visit to Beijing in 1967 - yet, with no effectivity - Beijing 
and Bucharest would only find themselves on the same side of the fence again in August 
1968, when Soviet and Warsaw Pact’s troops, with the exception of Romanian People’s 
Republic, invaded Czechoslovakia. Indeed, on that occasion, not only did the PRC publicly 
support the Socialist Republic of Romania  (RSR) against Moscow’s threatening attitude, 255
but, two days later after the invasion, during a meeting between Duma, the Romanian 
ambassador to Beijing and the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, the latter took on some 
responsibility for the two countries’ relationship coming to a standstill and asserted, 
however, that the consolidation of the Sino-Romanian ties was in all respects a consequence 
of China’s political convulsion during the newly launched (1966) Great Cultural Revolution 
(Liu Yong 2013: 168-169). 
According to Budura, the Chinese premier’s support “was followed by the declaration made 
by US President Lyndon Johnson, contributing to the Romanians’ spiritual comfort” and 
“publicly at least, the PRC would remain a steadfast Romanian ally throughout the 
crisis” (Budura 2005: 44). In this context, the former ambassador continued, “the invasion 
of Czechoslovakia triggered more comprehensive reflection on the Romanian-Chinese 
solidarity” and albeit “the documents available do not explain the Chinese reaction to the 
Romanians’ proposal on having a top-level meeting arranged right away, one can still infer 
that China’s availability to support Romania through goods exchanges increased. Of some 
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 significance in that context was the Romanian visit of a Chinese governmental and military 
delegation at head with the Chief of the General Staff, Huang Yongsheng, for whose 
reception Zhou Enlai personally thanked the Romanian government” (Budura 2008: 60).  
As a matter of fact, on the authority of Larry Watts, on that occasion, not only did Beijing 
openly disseminate its intention to support Bucharest, but “privately, promised to supply 
weapons; promises that it followed up with the transfer of arms, defence technologies and 
entire plants from Beijing to Bucharest (and possibly vice versa)” . 256
For certain, the conflict that eventually escalated into a historical Sino-Soviet territorial 
dispute in 1969, proved highly useful for the Romanian communist authorities in their 
employment of an extensive diplomacy, a fairly self-governance domestically and a relative 
freedom of manoeuvre in foreign policy. As Munteanu pointed out, “the Sino-Soviet armed 
confrontation on the Ussuri River in March 1969 increased Romania’s anxiety and 
reinforced Ceaușescu’s determination to prevent the Soviet Union from involving the 
Warsaw Pact in disputes with China. This was particularly important because the fighting 
in March was even larger than the skirmishes two months earlier, which had caused plenty 
of consternation in Bucharest. Armed clashes between the two Communist great powers 
were seen as a threat to Romania as well” .  257
Thus, in the international arena, Richard Nixon’s visit to Bucharest between August 2nd-3rd, 
1969, would be “the culmination of Ceaușescu’s drive for international recognition, 
especially by the United States, of the increasingly important role Romania was playing in 
international affairs” .  258
So, if in the very beginning of the 1960s Romania’s position within the dispute was from a 
third neutral position, assuming the role of mediator-arbitrator between Beijing - that 
distinguished the socialist states according to their degree of autonomy from the USSR and 
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 thus, looked at Tirana as the sole pure socialist capital - and the big brother Moscow, it is 
however feasible to assert that later, between 1963-1964, Bucharest’s leadership would 
develop a rather biased attitude, with Maurer and Dej embracing Marxist-Leninist thesis 
that exposed the CPC and RWP’s similitudes.   
In general terms, Romanian academicians argue that the latter’s revised stance has been 
dictated by pragmatism and not by the eagerness of a one sided attack, by the interest in 
putting an end to, or minimising a conflict that, could have shattered the very existence of 
the communist world, and not by (direct) hostilities towards Moscow’s regime. In fact, in 
Romanian and international historiography the Romanian People’s Republic was considered 
“the most influent communist small nation in international affairs” , while the RWP, 259
through its independent policy, was considered to have played an important role in the 
communist international movement. It was for the first time in the history of communism 
when the political strategies of a little party, that had managed to maintain relations with all 
the enemies of the USSR during the split - China, Albania and Yugoslavia - authorised it to 
talk from an equal position with the great powers .  260
Furthermore, the Chinese scholarship comes to support the idea that, for the whole of the 
Sino-Soviet split, Bucharest was the only socialist capital in Central and Eastern Europe 
that maintained good relations with the PRC. In a nutshell, when describing the relations 
between China and the eight Central and Eastern European socialist states, Ambassador Li 
Fenglin firstly pointed out that “these were subordinated to the Sino-Soviet relationship” . 261
Thus, Beijing’s position towards these countries was dictated “by the Soviet factor. Since 
these countries adopted different attitudes toward the Sino-Soviet disagreement, China 
devised different policies toward these countries. Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East 
Germany and Poland (…) took the Soviet side. Albania was opposed to the Soviet Union. 
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 Romania tried to mediate. Yugoslavia was a unique case (…) Romania maintained a neutral 
stand in respect to the Sino-Soviet disagreement, and its relations with China were always 
good” .  262
Zhu Ankang, former Chinese Ambassador to Hungary and Yugoslavia went even deeper in 
his analysis of China’s relations with Eastern European countries. Lust like Li Fenglin, the 
author believed that in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the Sino-
Soviet border clash, that tremendously aggravated the Sino-Soviet relations, Beijing’s 
relations with the Soviet satellite states in Central and Eastern Europe were also 
significantly altered, hence“our relations with Romania made some progress, relations with 
Yugoslavia began to improve and became normal, but relations with Albania changed from 
good to bad and gradually deteriorated” . Nonetheless, in his opinion, it is compulsory to 263
call to mind several episodes that have unquestionably influenced the Sino-Romanian 
relationship during the Sino-Soviet rift, like Bucharest’s call for China’s help in the light of 
a could-be Soviet military invasion of the Romanian Socialist Republic and Premier Zhou 
Enlai’s guarantee of support, later acknowledged by the Romanian prime minister as “the 
most crucial support to Romania at the most crucial moment” .  264
Another event that played a major role in the Sino-Romanian cooperation and relations was 
represented by the floods and the immediate earthquake in Romania in 1970. The massive 
devastations had left Bucharest no option but to ask “the international community for help. 
The Soviet reaction was cold and some people in the Soviet Union even wanted to use the 
opportunity to put pressure on Romania” . Beijing instead, would provide Bucharest with 265
“free material assistance worth more than 50 million RMB. In December, in response to a 
Romanian request, China also provided a long-term, interest-free loan of 200 million RMB 
and a free foreign currency loan of 100 million dollars” . One year later, during 266
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 Ceaușescu’s visit to Beijing, another 60 million dollars loan was to be given by the Chinese 
to the Romanian side. For these reasons, the diplomat argued, at each level, “from the 
leadership to the people, Romania was very grateful to China and believed that China 
sincerely assisted Romania” .  267
As Bucharest-Beijing ties were mutually beneficial, the PRC would henceforth benefit from 
the Romanian leadership’s relevant operations for the normalisation of relations between 
Washington and Beijing. The ambassador claimed that once it started to transmit American 
messages to China in the 1960s, ultimately leading to Kissinger (1971) and Nixon’s (1972) 
visits to Beijing, “Romania’s contribution was obvious. (It) consistently supported the one 
China policy and supported China to regain its rights in the United Nations” . Moreover, 268
“Romania actively lobbied some countries for this and made great efforts in persuading 
some Western countries to establish diplomatic relations with China” , making Beijing 269
appreciative for Bucharest’s assistance.  
Nowadays however, the question concerning Romania’s capacity for mediation during the 
Sino-Soviet break-up has been endowed with many facets, and international scholarship 
dealing with the phenomenon of communism and the Cold War, disclosed that it is obsolete 
to consider Romania a mediator in the conflict .  These perspectives rely on the fact that, 270
behind Romania’s conferment of international prestige has only and exclusively lied Gh. 
Dej’s goal to obtain some backup against the Kremlin’s pressure. As a matter of fact, both 
former Minister of Foreign Affairs Corneliu Mănescu and premier Gh. Maurer have 
divulged that in several occasions, like in 1963 in Bucharest (during a meeting between the 
former and the Chinese ambassador to Bucharest) and in 1964 (during the latter’s official 
visit to Beijing), Romania did not try to mediate between the two communist giants, but the 
purpose of the talks has only been to make the PRC understand the Romanian policy of 
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 sealing off the Kremlin’s influence, and thus gaining the Chinese support and enjoying good 
bilateral relations between China and Romania.  
Whether or not Romania has managed to fulfil the mediator/arbiter role in the Sino-Soviet 
schism or whether or not this has been its purpose from the very beginning, is not a matter 
to be elucidated here. What is certain though, is that both Romanian and international 
scholars have tackled with this issue for a long time, and they have all come to a 
conclusion: that the truth - authentication of different evidence, sources in order to draw 
some realistic conclusions - is somewhere in between and, while even new evidence does 
not enable a thorough, feasible examination of the topic, I should conclude by recalling the 
standpoints of Romanian academicians like Cătănuș, Banu and Țăranu. Thus, with regard to 
the Sino-Romanian political ties, it is suitable to assert that albeit “the April 1964 
transcription of the plenary session of the CC of the RWP revealed many differences of 
opinion between Bucharest and Beijing, the emphasis would be on what unites and not on 
what divides” Cătănuș 2004: 17). Naturally, by bearing that in mind, as well as the fact that 
the CPC - for its dominant position amongst the communist parties of the world - held the 
capacity to support the small East European socialist parties in international affairs, it is 
likely to deduce that “China’s place in Romania’s foreign policy has been a leading one 
after 1964, thus providing the Romanian communist leaders with a guarantee for 
independence in foreign policy and a backup against Moscow’s authoritarian 
tendencies” (Banu, Țăranu 2004: 74). 
III.8 Sino-Romanian relationship gains momentum.  
Bilateral cultural collaboration and exchange programs in the educational field in the 1960s 
In the sixth decade of the 20th century, Sino-Romanian cultural end educational ties 
witnessed significant progress, both through the extension of the already existing treaties of 
cooperation and by means of enacting new agreements between public institutions, 
friendship associations or thanks to the activity of the Beijing Federation of labour unions. 
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 However, as both Romanian and Chinese sources (almost entirely archival material) have 
revealed a massive amount of paperwork - giving thus evidence of the Sino-Romanian 
cultural exchanges - partly as a result of Beijing’s change of attitude towards Eastern 
European countries in the beginning of the 1960s, only some of them (the major ones) will 
be outlined in this chapter. Thus, during the first phase of the Sino-Soviet split, for both 
political and economic reasons, the PRC began to adopt a new type of dialogue with the 
socialist states, by accepting invitations from the socialist states’ embassies and by 
gratifying their requests, by admitting, to a certain extent and not always, their mistakes or 
inadequacies and by the desire of the Chinese governorship to organise more proper inter-
state exchanges.  
Thus, while many letters and notes referred to the activities carried out by the embassies in 
Beijing and Bucharest, other communications or bulletins reveal in details the tasks 
performed by public institutions and associations calling for festivities and 
commemorations of Romanian and Chinese writers and artists both in Bucharest and 
Beijing, claiming the visualisation of movies and documentary films for huge Chinese and 
Romanian audiences or, in accordance with the plans for Sino-Romanian cultural 
cooperation, providing information with regard to the teachers’ assignments for, and 
behaviour during, the Chinese language seminar at the University of Bucharest or the 
Romanian language course at the Institute for Foreign Languages of the Faculty of East-
European Languages in Beijing. 
For instance, a note sent in January 1962 by former Ambassador Budura, in his quality of 
appointee to the Romanian Embassy in Beijing, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, unravels that in the end of 1961 Romania sent one lecturer in the Chinese capital to 
teach the Romanian language (12 hours/week) to 16 sophomore Chinese students. Besides 
the general information regarding the Romanian lecturer’s academic duties , the note also 271
disclosed information regarding the lecturer’s lifestyle in Beijing, his dwelling (a little 
apartment in a hotel), his income (443 RMB), his medical assistance (free of charge) with a 
car at his disposal for job related matters, as well as some details regarding his cultural life, 
 Such as the impartation of two hours/week consultations, to give private lessons on the history of 271
Romania’s literature or grammar to his three Romanian speakers Chinese assistants, to guide the cultural 
activity in Romanian language
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 which advanced in the background of Beijing’s somewhat bounded alternatives. Moreover, 
the same note unfolded that in 1961, when the Romanian language department within the 
Faculty of East-European Languages in Beijing witnessed the graduation of its first Chinese 
students, a Czech, a Polish, a German, an English and a French language department also 
existed at the Institute for Foreign Languages, and for each of them a native foreign lecturer 
held classes for the Chinese students. However, not only in the Far East but in the socialist 
camp as well, most of the students were provided with the opportunity to learn the Chinese 
language and culture by native Chinese teachers: thus, Poland, Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia had one Chinese lecturer, while the GDR had four . 272
In the 1960s, several requests were made by the Romanian diplomats in China to the 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, alluding to the necessity of intensifying Sino-
Romanian cooperation in the cultural field, both as a result of the Chinese demands for 
educational, informational or artistic material relevant to the RPR or because of the 
Romanian diplomats’ insistence to undertake, like many other counties in the socialist 
camp, at least a small part of projects aiming at the increase of exchanges between the two 
countries and peoples.  
Thus, an explicit note sent in June 1962 by the Ambassador to Beijing Dumitru Gheorghiu 
unravels the latter’s demands that the Romanian government replied to the Chinese 
Academy’s proposals for cooperation as soon as possible and that Bucharest responded as 
whether or not five Romanian soloists, statutorily declared by the bilateral working plan, 
would be sent to Beijing for performances. Moreover, in the letter, which introduction 
outlined the Chinese’ political stance towards the Eastern European countries, the envoy 
asked the Romanian government to urge the sending of different Romanian movies and 
documentary films to the Chinese Corporation for Movie Broadcast (in the first half of 
1962, the Chinese only received two Romanian movies) as well as to push for Bucharest’s 
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 acceptance of some Chinese movies .  273
Furthermore, on April 13, 1964, a note of former ambassador Budura would reflect the 
Romanian embassy’s bustle to exchange a variety of books and publications between the 
Romanian libraries and the National Library of Beijing. Thus, in his capacity then as 
member of the embassy in Beijing, Budura’s visit to the Chinese Library would unfold the 
Chinese satisfaction for the cultural exchanges that had begun in 1950 between the Beijing 
Library and the Library of RPR’s Academy and since 1956, between the former and the 
State Central Library. However, albeit the Beijing Library collaborated and exchanged 
publications with other ten Romanian academic, educational institutions and universities, 
only the swap of books between the former and the two Romanian libraries already 
mentioned (the Library of RPR’s Academy and the State Central Library) were countless 
and had a permanent feature. As follows, while in January 1964, the State Central Library 
sent 65 books to the Beijing Library and the latter sent 30 to Romania (plus various journals 
and newspapers), in 1963 the Beijing Library received no less than 244 Romanian volumes, 
in 248 copies (of which dictionaries, lexicons, 105 periodicals in 872 copies and 10 
newspapers) in exchange for 120 Chinese volumes in 195 copies, 76 periodicals and 
journals in 1471 copies.  
Moreover, according to Budura’s note, at that date there were 1200 Romanian books in 
2000 copies in the Beijing Library, while other 700 volumes had not yet been shelved. Yet, 
in his view, as there were only few Chinese speaking the Romanian language, there was not 
enough access to the material, hence to knowledge, and therefore an obstacle to the 
escalation of Sino-Romanian bilateral cultural ties; the same issue, he argued, could be 
advocated for the Romanian counterpart, as there were too few experts of Chinese language 
in the RPR . 274
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 A record of June 22nd, 1964 would reveal the contacts between Hou Xizhu, Chinese 
secretary to the embassy in Bucharest and Dumitru Aninoiu, deputy director for cultural 
relations, with regard to the exchange of students between the PRC and the RPR. 
Accordingly, the note revealed that while Romania was prepared to welcome thirty Chinese 
students and an aspirant to study the Romanian language and literature, it was not ready to 
receive the three specialising Chinese teachers, as, at the time in question, it was not clear in 
which department or institution they should conduct their activities. Moreover, on the one 
hand, the note gave evidence about the Romanian intention to send three students to the 
PRC for the study of the Chinese language and literature, as well as details concerning three 
Romanian doctors’ wish to study the issues of industrial hygiene at their arrival in Beijing. 
On the other hand, the note communicated the Chinese’ desire that the folklorists going to 
the RPR firstly attended, as observers, the VII competition of non-professional artistic 
groups’ finale before continuing their visit for the expected actualisation of the exchange of 
experience . 275
While on March 18th, 1965, a letter of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
Embassy in Beijing unfolded that a second Romanian lecturer was urgently needed in 
Beijing, to teach the Romanian language and literature within the Beijing Institute for 
Foreign languages, in occasion of the establishment of the Romanian Language 
Department , another message between the two institutions would reveal the activity 276
carried out by the Chinese cultural delegation visiting Bucharest for negotiating and signing 
the bilateral Cultural Agreement. Thus, the letter sent by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs to the Romanian Embassy in China on May 18, 1965, would provide details 
regarding the members of the Chinese delegation and Romanians participating to the 
bilateral talks, as well as information regarding the Chinese delegation’s duration of their 
 “1964 iunie 22, București. Notă privind audiența lui Hou Xizhu, secretar 1 la Ambasada R.P. Chineze la 275
Bucuresti, la Dumitru Aninoiu, Director adjunct al Direcției Relații Culturale, privind schimbul de studenți 
între Republica Populară Română si Republica Populară Chineză”in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-
Chineze 1880-1974. Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor 
Externe, Arhivele Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 483-484
 “1965 martie 18, București. Telegramă a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe către Ambasada României la 276
Beijing privind trimiterea unui al doilea lector de limba română la Beijing pentru Institutul de Limbi Străine, 
unde va funcționa si o Sectie de Limba Română” in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. 
Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele 
Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 688
 187
 stay and their wish to have a general exposition of the RPR’s progress in the framework of 
institutionalised debates and conferences .  277
The thirteen articles’ Agreement on Sino-Romanian Cultural Collaboration , that was 278
signed on May 27th, 1965 in Bucharest, reckoned that the two sides would support the 
collaboration between Romanian and Chinese academies and scientific institution through 
mutual visits, mutual exchange of study, of experience, of documentation and conferences, 
as well as by mutual exchange of books, scientific publications and specialising material; 
Moreover, the agreement sustained the exchange of teachers, students and lecturers, of 
documentary materials regarding both countries’ history, geography, literature, culture, 
political life and economic situation; the mutual exchange of delegations and participation 
to reunions, festivals and competitions; mutual exchange of groups of artists (for concerts 
and spectacles), translation of Chinese and Romanian authors and publication of literature 
and scientific works from both the PRC and the RPR; the organisation of artistic, cultural, 
technological and scientific exhibitions, theatrical representations, soloist and chorus 
performances; the mutual support for collaboration between the two countries’ film 
enterprises; swap of material in the artistic and cultural fields; library and archives 
exchanges as well as exchange of scientific research; cooperation between the Chinese and 
Romanian press agencies as well as between broadcasting stations, and journalists’ 
exchange visits; the cooperation between the two countries’ ministries of health and 
ministries of sports; the mutual invitations to congresses, conferences and international 
festivals of Romanian and Chinese personalities in the fields of science, education, culture 
and arts; the mutual recognition of Romanian and Chinese diplomas and certificates of 
education. 
While on July 23rd, 1965, a letter of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
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 Embassy in Beijing would make known the PRC liberation army’s ensemble tour, 
consisting of 180 singers and dancers, to the Socialist Republic of Romania , on the 27th 279
of the same month, a letter sent by the same institution to the Romanian embassy in China 
would reveal information about the visit that a delegation of the Beijing city committee and 
the “Sino-Romanian Friendship” peoples’ commune would make in the Romanian Peoples’ 
Republic . 280
A note of August 5th, 1965 divulged the audience that Dumitru Aninoiu, deputy director for 
cultural relations, granted to Hou Xizhu, cultural attaché at the Chinese Embassy in 
Bucharest, in order to discuss the arrival, in the Socialist Republic of Romania, of a couple 
of tigers from North-Eastern China, as gift from Zhou Enlai, Premier of the PRC to Ion Gh 
Maurer, Romanian Prime Minister. The note also included information concerning the Sino-
Romanian cultural cooperation through theatrical representations in Bucharest and Chinese 
music groups’ visits to Romania, as well as some facts regarding the Chinese concern for 
the late sending of the second Romanian lecturer to the PRC and news about the visit in the 
RSR of eight Chinese students to specialise in the study of the Romanian language . 281
Moreover, in September the same year, a message sent by Marcel Popescu, vice-president 
of the Romanian Chamber of Commerce to Gheorghe Rădulescu, vice-president of the 
Council of Ministers, provided information pertaining to the opening in Bucharest of a 
PRC’s exhibition in September, on a reciprocality basis, antecedently established through 
Sino-Romanian bilateral accords. The Socialist Republic of Romania had already organised 
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 such an exhibition in Beijing in August 1965, and in twenty days, it had been visited by 
more than 750 000 guests, of which high level Chinese and Romanian leaders and officials, 
as well as residents from different Chinese provinces. The note also unveiled the Sino-
Romanian concord to set the PRC’s exhibition in Romania for 23 September 1965, at 10 
o’clock in the morning, within a 3500 square meters closed surface and a 2000 square 
metres outdoor platform . 282
An interesting note of February 9, 1967 from the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to 
the Embassy in Beijing would give away the Romanian government’s concern for the 
Chinese Embassy in Bucharest utilisation of propagandistic measures that contravened the 
diplomatic conventions of the Socialist Republic of Romania. Therefore, according to the 
note, the Chinese Embassy in Bucharest had exposed on the panel facing its head office, 
photos representing aspects of the Red Square incident in Moscow, and had given out 
offensive words against the USSR, under the title “Datoria de sânge trebuie 
răsplătită” (“Blood loyalty must be recompensed”).  
By dint of the note, the Romanian Ministry of  Foreign Affairs instructed the embassy in 
Beijing to urgently contact the Chinese side in order to induce the Chinese Embassy in 
Bucharest to eliminate the propagandistic evidence creating diplomatic difficulties with the 
Soviet side. Two days later, a note of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the 
Romanian Embassy in Beijing communicated the withdrawal by the Chinese Embassy in 
Bucharest of the propagandistic material from the display panel .  283
In addition, on August 8th the same year, thus in the context of the Chinese cultural 
revolution, the Romanian Ambassador to Beijing addressed a letter to the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with the aim to inform Bucharest’s leadership about the Red 
Guard’s campaign against the Chinese president Liu Shaoqi and his entourage, and the 
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 exchange of films between the PRC and other socialist countries (Romanian included) in 
the context of Mao Zedong mobilised Red Guard’s political, ideologic and military 
manoeuvres.  
Further on, the ambassador’s note would expound that many posters, emerged on the streets 
of Beijing and referring to movies that the PRC had imported from most of the countries in 
the socialist camp (the USSR, North Korea, Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and the Socialist Republic of Romania) as well as from different 
Western states, were disseminating sentences like “Malicious foreign movies bought by Liu 
Shaoqi’s faction”. Additionally, the letter identified the Romanian films that, as claimed by 
the student organisation’s social movement, did not sketch a denouncement of what was 
labeled as the “four olds”: old ideas, culture, customs and habits. For this reason, the movie 
“Valurile Dunării” (“the Waves of the Danube”) was believed to be a representation 
denying the party’s leadership struggle from illegality; “Citadela sfărâmată” (“Zerstörte 
Zitadelle”) was considered a glamorisation of the bourgeois; “Secretul cifrului” (“the Secret 
Code”) was regarded as an open display of the enemy’s capabilities in contrast with “our” 
agents’ inabilities, and “Porto Franco” (“Europolis”) was deemed as a movie praising and 
worshipping the omnipotence of the American dollars.  
The Romanian diplomat’s communication would end by highlighting Bucharest’s 
unfavourable position as a result of the latter’s dismissal as faulty in the Chinese posters, 
and by assuming that the advertisement, well planned in advance, articulated Beijing’s 
intricate political stance towards its bilateral cultural exchanges with both socialist and non 
socialist countries .  284
In fact, another message, pertaining to tangled Sino-Romanian cultural exchanges in the 
backdrop of the Chinese cultural revolution, was sent on May 9, 1968 by the Romanian 
Embassy in Beijing to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The communication 
revealed that, albeit the plan for scientific cooperation between the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences and the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania for the years 1968-1969 
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 was generally approved by the Chinese side, the Romanian academic institution could not 
receive an affirmative, official reply of collaboration, until every detail in the Romanian 
proposal had been rigorously analysed. In view of the ebullience within the Chinese 
cultural-scientific institutions and considered the Chinese reaction to the Romanian 
Academy’s project, the Romanian Embassy in Beijing suspected that a full visits agreement 
between the two academies, as well as the research assignments and exchange of experience 
in different fields resulting from the academies partnership, could not be fulfilled . 285
Similarly, a note of the Romanian Embassy in Beijing on October 5, 1969 to the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed the PRC’s appreciation for Bucharest’s understanding 
of the former’s impossibility to send military groups to visit Romania, in the context of the 
PRC’s domestic difficulties produced by the cultural revolution. However, the 
communication made known that the Romanian military group’s visit to Beijing between 13 
September - 4 October had been a success thanks to the highly respected behaviour of the 
troops and the Sino-Romanian drive for intensification of cultural ties .    286
III.9 Strengthening economic ties with the Asian capital.  
Bucharest-Beijing Intergovernmental Science and Technology Treaties and Agreements 
When, in May 1962 the Protocol regarding commercial ties and payments between the PRC 
and the RPR was signed in Beijing, Sino-Romanian trade volume was 14.1 mil. roubles (9.5 
mil. roubles imports and 4.6 mil roubles exports) with a total volume of Romanian imports 
5% higher than the previous year. While Romania mostly exported tractors and tank wagons 
to the PRC, it mainly imported raw materials like cast iron, abrasive, cranes, mechanical 
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 devices, machines, and handicrafts rather than traditional commodities (like cotton, oil, tin) 
that China lacked, primarily because the latter was already providing the capitalist markets 
with these products in order to absorb the foreign currency needed for the payment of the 
cereals they imported from the capitalist states . In addition, the same note sent in June 287
1962 by the Romanian Economical Agency in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
regarding the Sino-Romanian trade protocol, provides information concerning other Central 
and East European socialist states’ bilateral trade with the PRC. Thus, if in 1962, Sino-
Bulgarian bilateral trade amounted to 7 mil roubles (30% higher than the previous year) and 
the Sino-Hungarian bilateral trade to 24 mil roubles (13.5 mil roubles imports from the PRC 
and 10.5 mil roubles Hungarian exports to the PRC), the Sino-Polish total volume trade for 
the year 1962 came down to 35.7 mil. roubles. 
As maintained by Romanian author Betea, caught between the ideological conflict between 
Khrushchev and Mao, Gheorghiu-Dej ostentatiously simulated neutrality and speculated the 
dissensions between the two giants in his own interest. Besides the political bilateral talks, 
there has always been a mutual economic interest, and thus, while the visits of the leaders of 
the two countries’ increased, the commercial accords signed between Bucharest and Beijing 
proliferated analogously. In fact, on April 9, 1963, the Trade Agreement signed between 
China and Romania was supposed to increment the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade with 
140% .  288
With reference to the scientific and technological field, in June 1963, the PRC and the RPR 
signed in Beijing a Five Years Agreement on the Technological and Scientific Cooperation, 
having the aim to allow both countries to make use of the prominent solutions provided by 
the free, state of the art science and technology, and granting the possibility that the 
Romanian-Chinese Commission of Technological and Scientific Cooperation, founded in 
January 1953 and comprising members designated by the two governments, continued its 
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 activity . 289
Moreover, just a month later, in July 1963, a Convention with respect to the Scientific 
cooperation between the RRR’s Academy and the Chinese Academy of Sciences was signed 
in Beijing. The fifteen articles of the accord, delineating the major principles that laid the 
foundations for the bilateral cooperation, indicated that the two academies would cooperate 
scientifically according the principles of equality, mutual benefit and aid; they would 
exchange skills, practical and academic knowledge (through conferences); the academies 
would be able to make mutual invitations; the two institutions would mutually support the 
field research for their scientists; they would mutually exchange the working plans of their 
researchers; moreover, the academies would invite scientists to participate at their 
conferences or other significant academic activities; they would receive mutual support 
within international scientific organisations and congresses; by serving their scientific goals, 
the two institutions would also exchange publications, information, material, microfilms, 
etc; the tho academies’ libraries would exchange publications and would sign biannual 
plans of collaboration through delegations alternatively sent in Bucharest and Beijing. Last 
but not least, the convention sustained the exchange of projects for collaboration between 
the two institutions for the following two years . 290
An interesting letter regarding Sino-Romanian commercial negotiations aiming at the 
signing of a Commercial Agreement in 1964, was sent by Dumitru Gheorghiu, Romanian 
Ambassador to Beijing to Gheorghe Rădulescu, Vice-president of the Romanian Council of 
Ministers and Victor Ionescu, Minister of Foreign Trade. The communication revealed that 
already in the beginning of the meeting, the Romanian delegation to Beijing prosed to their 
Chinese counterpart a volume of trade for the year 1964, at least equal to the volume of the 
Sino-Romanian trade in the previous year. Moreover, besides the petrochemical products, it 
is revealed that the Chinese were interested in importing from Romania kerosene and fuel 
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 oil, as well as some special oils, 20 000 tones of corn, machineries and drilling equipments, 
5 tones trucks and tractors, while the RPR needed to import raw materials, laminate, tin, 
mercury, chemicals, textile, sports shoes, glycerin, selenium from the PRC.  
However, as negotiations were still on between China, Italy and France and between the 
Peoples’ Republic of Romania and Mongolia, Korea and Vietnam for setting up bilateral 
trade with similar or new products, a finalised plan for the forthcoming Sino-Romanian 
exchanges could not be yet established, and the Romanian diplomats’s tasks to achieve a 
full measure agenda had to wait for the achievements of the Romanian delegation’s talks 
with Mongolia, Korea and Vietnam . 291
On December 9, 1964, the PRC and the RPR would sign a nine articles’ Agreement 
regarding the Sino-Romanian Trade for the forthcoming year, thus valid from January 1st,
1965 until December 31, 1965. The accord, worthing 22 Mil. roubles, would also stipulate 
that the payments, in conformity with the accord, would be effectuated by the Romanian 
side through the RPR’s State Bank, while the Chinese would operate the payments by 
means of the People’s Bank of China . 292
In the technological field instead, on June 22nd, 1967, a letter of the Romanian Embassy in 
Beijing to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs disclosed the exposition, within the 
English Bulletin of the Xinhua Agency, of the Romanian peoples’ attitude towards the 
successful Chinese hydrogen bomb experimentation. Hence, by making public a Bucharest 
report regarding the friendly and kindly reaction of the Romanian people to the Chinese 
positive experimentation of the hydrogen bomb, the Chinese Xinhua English bulletin of 
June 19, 1967, brought to public notice the Romanian leadership’s opinion that the PRC 
endeavoured to firstly crush the American and Soviet nuclear monopoly and to finally, 
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 permanently liquidate the nuclear weaponry . 293
In the end of the 1960s, various notes, letters, written communications or short messages 
transmitted by the Romanian Embassy in Beijing to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs unveiled details of the Sino-Romanian commercial ties and bilateral trade. 
Accordingly, a letter of January 5, 1969 of the Romanian diplomatic office in Beijing 
disclosed that, albeit the level established for the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade in 1968, 
equivalent to 83,3 mil. rouble, was not achieved, with no more than 74,6 mil rouble valuing 
merchandise being accomplished by means of the accord, the Sino-Romanian commercial 
ties were portrayed as normal. Moreover, by dint of the note, the embassy in Beijing 
informed the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the necessity to respect 
henceforth, the quality of goods traded, as well as the terms for delivery to the PRC, 
especially in the context of the forthcoming validation, in Bucharest, of the bilateral 
commercial agreement for the year 1969 .  294
A message on February 4th, 1969, provided disclosure regarding, on the one hand, the 
Chinese preparation of a proposal for imports from the SRR for the year 1969 (including: 
pipes, drain pipes, drilling tubes, tin, aluminium, petroleum, different oils, kerosene, 
salicylic acid, benzene, butane, methanol, plastic, polyethylene, trucks, tank wagons, 
various machineries, auto parts, corn, etc) and imparted, on the other hand, that the PRC 
had not yet put together a list of products to be exported in the Socialist Republic of 
Romania.  
However, the Romanian diplomat in Beijing Aurel Duma, would express that the PRC was 
putting efforts into satisfying the Romanian requests, in concomitance with their strive to 
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 meet the increased domestic needs as a result of the expanding Chinese industry .  295
Another message would unfold the Sino-Romanian negotiations for the signing of the 
Commercial agreement for 1969, consisting of 77 mil roubles bilateral trade, of which 37 
mil. roubles of Romanian imports and approximatively 40 mil. roubles exports to the PRC.  
The letter of July 4th 1969, expounded that, while the Socialist Republic of Romania’s 
imports from the PRC combined mostly raw materials and production materials (75%) as 
well as machineries, equipments and consumer goods (25%), the exports to the PRC 
integrated 32% of materials and raw materials and 67% of machineries and equipments. 
Moreover, the note would unveil the Romanian Embassy’s preoccupation for Beijing’s 
complaints regarding the long station (35 days) of the Chinese ships in the port of 
Constanta, therefore delaying greatly the bilateral plans for export. In these circumstances, 
not only was Bucharest requested to urge the finding of solutions for a more expeditious 
processing of the Chinese vessels egress, but the Romanian side was under obligation to 
review the quality of its exports to the PRC, especially with respect to the trucks and 
drilling equipments .  296
Besides, the aforementioned note contextualises another communiqué sent by the Romanian 
Embassy to Beijing to the Romanian authorities, outlining the difficulties encountered by 
the Chinese authorities because of the Romanian counterpart’s incapability to export the 
number of tank wagons established by means of the bilateral accord of March 19,1968. 
Consequently, of the 1000 pieces settled by the agreement, Romania had only sent, behind 
schedule, 300 pieces in 1969 (accounting for 1968), no piece accounting for 1969, and had 
only confirmed 250 pieces for 1970, thus producing enormous discontent for the Chinese 
department of commerce, that had to struggle to supply the huge industrial units that were 
counting on the Romanian tank wagons’ exports. In the end, the message urged the 
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 Romanian government to take into serious consideration the Chinese complaints, and to 
find solutions for the issue in order to maintain and further the Sino-Romanian commercial 
partnership .  297
III.10 Building mutual trust and deepening friendship in the political field 
According to former Ambassador to Beijing, Budura, in 1960 the Romanian political elite 
took notice of the “public controversy triggered by the Chinese publication of the brochure 
“Long Live Leninism”, which was preceded by criticism of “contemporary revisionism” 
with reference to the deeds of the Yugoslav leadership, by the Sino-Soviet dispute over the 
radio station and the fleet in the Pacific, by the USSR’S refusal to provide documentation to 
China on the manufacture of the atomic weapons, and by the reaction of China’s leadership 
to the visit of Nikita Khrushchev to Camp David” . Moreover, the archival material 298
provided evidence concerning the Romanian Peoples’ Republic awkward position in the 
occasion of the Bucharest Conference of the same year, when the CPSU made allegations 
against the CPC by means of a sixty pages long notification. However, by struggling mostly 
for the peace-keeping in the international communist and workers’ movement, the 
Romanian President Gheorghiu Dej then managed to adopt a neutral stance in the Sino-
Soviet dispute and thus, during the following conference of the socialist camp held in 
Moscow in 1960, the delegations of both the RWP and the CPC were the “active supporters 
of legal principles and norms designed to govern the relations between states and 
parties” .  299
 “1969 noiembrie 11, Beijing. Telegramă a lui Aurel Duma, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 297
oficialitațile române competente privind realizarea contractului referitor la exportul de vagoane cisterne în 
China” in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 
1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 986
 Budura, R.I., “Romanian-Chinese Relations”, in Vámos Petér (ed.), “New Sources, New Findings: the 298
Relationships between China, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe”, CASS Forum, Beijing, pp. 410-411.
 Idem, p. 411.299
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 Alike the majority of Romanian academics and researchers of socialist international 
relations, Budura’s understanding of the RWP’s leadership position in the Sino-Soviet 
conflict, that is of a collaborative orientation towards the leaders of the CPC, is determined 
by several facts.  
Accordingly, the sinologist suggested that the RWP’s political thinking should be read 
through the lenses of a (small) party which, unlike many others in South-Eastern Europe, 
“did not have Comintern origins” , but instead “derived from the claims and aspirations 300
of the workers’ movement in Romania (…), was connected to the striving of the Romanian 
nation and was promoted by struggling workers who had been jailed for thirteen years” . 301
Only by keeping this in mind, one can understand and interpret events like the Romanian 
withdrawal from the war next to the Axis powers before its “liberalisation by the Red 
Army”, or the significant episodes that were the removal of Comintern elements from the 
RWP’s leadership without generating hostile Soviet reactions, the RWP’s success in having 
Moscow withdraw the Red Army’s troops from Romania as well as the “romanisation of 
the party and state apparatus and the development of a policy entirely in the service of the 
Romanian people and its national interests” .  302
Later on, from 1960 to 1964, the Romanian political elite would put forward a policy 
known as the Peoples’ Republic of Romania independent policy, a deviation from 
Moscow’s directives (different however than Albanian or Yugoslav political strategies) 
based on the principles set up by Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe Maurer and delineated in 
1963, in an article published in the journal “Problems of Peace and Socialism”. The latter 
drafted the legitimate goals of the peoples, the opposition to the policy of force and 
interference in other countries domestic affairs, the prevalence of legal principles and 
international ethical standards, and created a favourable framework for Romania to 
“maintain normal, friendly relations with all the major powers and with all the states in the 
 Ibidem300
 Ibidem301
 Ibidem302
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 world” .  303
According to the same author, only in 1964, during the talks that the RWP’s leadership had 
with Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, the Romanian political elite would be communicated the 
Chinese’ stance regarding the Yalta Agreement’s outcomes, that is the American offer of 
five billion dollars to the CPC if the latter accepted the United Stares’ proposal of 
integration into America’s sphere of influence, or the CPSU leadership’s (Stalin’s) 
scepticism regarding the success of the people’s revolution. However, he proceeds, the 
RWP’s leaders never failed to notice Chairman’s Mao Zedong strategies of disapproving, 
and discrediting the Soviet model as well as his struggle, especially in the last years of his 
life, to put China “back on the track of the goals and ideals of the popular revolution” . 304
By ending the “tilt” policy, China would have the chance to become “a new power hub 
independent from the USSR, which would maintain relations with all states that treated it as 
an equal partner” . Moreover, it “would practice a growth model of its own and operate 305
with a power-structuring pattern in tune with its traditions” , thus asserting itself “like the 306
sun rising in the East” . In fact, he goes on, in view of the new Chinese course, Bucharest 307
did not criticise Beijing’s domestic policies, on the contrary, it backed the PRC against the 
backdrop of Soviet and Eastern European states’ hostilities, it offered a stable orientation 
with regard to the Chinese matter of Taiwan, provided (some) contribution to China’s 
normalisation of relations with the US and Yugoslavia, to the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between China and Western and African states and it helped to restore its 
legitimate right at the UN and other international institutions. In addition, the two countries 
would mostly cooperate in all areas of economic and social development and Romania, in 
return, would benefit from Chinese moral, political and even material support.  
To put it in a nutshell, beginning with March 1964, high-level Romanian-Chinese talks 
 Idem, p. 412303
 Idem, p. 413304
 Ibidem305
 Ibidem306
 Ibidem307
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 embarked on a direction that would help secure close, fruitful relations in the political, 
economic, diplomatic, technological and cultural fields. Henceforth, in different 
circumstances, the Sino-Romanian mutual political and moral support would become 
public: in July 1964, Chairman Mao hinted at Bessarabia in a mention to the territories 
forcefully seized by tsarist Russia and held by the USSR; in 1966, during Chinese Premier 
Zhou Enlai’s visit to Bucharest, the hosts showed to the Chinese counterpart that they did 
not wish to entangle in the public political dispute between the CPC and the CPSU; in 
August 1968, in the occasion of the Soviet and Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, 
Zhou Enlai would make a statement providing moral support to the Romanian leadership, in 
face of a possible Soviet military intervention in Romania . Moreover, in the summer of 308
1969, during the last international meeting of communist and workers’ parties held in 
Moscow, when Leonid Brezhnev informed his guests about the topic to be urgently 
discussed in the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet exacerbation of conflicts, that is the PRC and 
the CPC, Ceaușescu not only refused to criticise the Chinese communists, but he provided 
the party’s main journal “Scânteia” with a declaration that rendered Romania’s position of 
support towards China of worldwide interest (Betea 2013: 345-346). 
III.11 Reciprocated support: Bucharest and Beijing enhance diplomatic ties 
Hitherto observed, in 1960 the Sino-Soviet mutual denunciation became public in the 
socialist camp. Indeed, after Khrushchev and Peng Zhen’s open criticism regarding the 
CPSU’s ideological and political thesis, followed by the Soviet discredit of Chairman Mao 
Zedong as “nationalist, adventurist and deviationist”  as well as by Peng Zhen’s 309
stigmatisation of Khrushchev as a Marxist revisionist, “patriarchal, arbitrary and a 
 Idem, p. 414. 308
 Allen Axelrod, “The real history of the Cold War: A new look at the past”, 1st edition, Sterling, 2009,p.213309
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 tyrannical”  leader during the Third Congress of the Romanian Workers Party, in June 310
1960, in the course of the famous Bucharest Conference of the World Communist and 
Workers’ Parties, the leader of the Soviet Union Nikita Khrushchev would denounce the 
Chinese leadership once again by means of an eighty-page letter.  
On that occasion, Gheorghiu Dej and the leaders of the RWP, particularly for their condition 
as hosts, would face a delicate and uncomfortable situation, that of approving the Soviet 
groundwork. However, according to sinologist and former ambassador Budura, the 
“informative letter reached the Romanians on the eve of the conference, at 10 pm, and 
Nikita Khrushchev rejected Gh. Dej’s request that the proceedings be presided on a rotation 
basis by all the heads of the attending delegations. In fact, it was Khrushchev himself that 
presided over the proceedings” (Budura 2008: 42-43). As a result, the author goes on, four 
years later the Chinese leaders would state “that they knew what had happened, and that the 
Romanians had not been involved” (Budura 2008: 42-43).   
In the autumn of the same year, when the Drafting Committee and the World Conference of 
Communist and Workers’ Parties gathered in Bucharest, “the delegations of the RWP were 
ready to open a dialogue with those of the CPC, in order to calm down the tempers and 
guide the dispute into the track of principled settlement of relations between communists 
and workers parties, and between the communist countries” (Budura 2008: 42-43).  
Nevertheless, regardless of the RWP delegation’s efforts to open talks with the CPC, the 
Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh proved to hold a more pragmatic approach to the Sino-
Soviet negotiations. Still, once the the CPC’s delegation, headed by Liu Shaoqi and going to 
Moscow for a friendly visit, would be welcomed in an amiable manner, everyone - both 
Romanians and Chinese - would be happy with the result (Budura 2008: 43). 
Later on, in June 1963, Leonte Răuțu, member of the Politburo of the CC of the RWP would 
grant an audience to Xu Jianguo, Chinese ambassador to Bucharest. The bilateral talks 
between the two sides regarded the Romanian party leadership’s decision to make public, 
by dint of the Romanian communist party’s main journal “Scânteia”, a rendition of the June 
 Ibidem; For more information on Mao and Khrushchev’s cat and dog relationship see Troebst, Stefan, 310
Review on Lüthi, Lorenz M., “The Sino-Soviet Split. Cold War in the Communist World”, Princeton  2008 and 
Radchenko, Sergey, “Two Suns in the Heavens. The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967”, 
Stanford  2009 , in Connections. A Journal for Historians and Area Specialists, 03.05.2013, accessible at 
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 14th, 1963 letter that the CC of the CPC had sent to the CC of the CPSU, as it had been 
done with the March 30th, 1963 letter of the CC of the CPSU (Budura 2008: 45). Thus, by 
enabling the daily “Scânteia” to issue both letters, Chinese and Soviet side by side, the 
Romanian government was openly displaying its neutral stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute.  
However, only a month later, in July 1963, the Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow - which were 
meant to sort out the divergences - would not only prove a complete failure, but what’s 
more, the RWP’s leadership was asked by the Soviet Union to sustain the CPSU’s criticism 
towards the CPC’s attitude within the international communist movement, by the signing of 
an article that was to be pushed in the journal “Problems of Peace and Socialism”. In 
response to the Soviet request, not only did Gheorghiu Dej refuse to sign the article, but 
Romanian Prime Minister Ion Gh. Maurer would provide the journal with a short report 
“The Robust Foundation of Unity in the international communist movement” delineating 
for the first time, the RWP’s stance with regard to international issues and Romanian 
diplomacy, that is Romania’s proliferation of normal relations with all the states in the 
world, independently of their size (Budura 2008: 45-46).  
In the summer of the same year, the Romanian leader Gh. Dej invited the Chinese vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Zeng Yongquan to a dinner party in Romania, at Snagov. The 
meeting, attended by high-ranking Romanian statesmen, provided the opportunity for the 
Romanian leadership to disclose and discuss the strains that the RPR had to tackle with, and 
offered the chance to organise a meeting between Gh. Dej and the PRC’s ambassador to 
Bucharest Xu Jianguo. The bilateral talks, arranged for December 12, 1963 in Snagov, 
would delineate the RWP’s wish to begin a new type of relationship with the CPC, 
involving a new stage in the exchange of opinions and a more valuable collaboration 
between the two parties, states and peoples as well as an advanced dialogue concerning 
issues of international interest, such as the communist and worker’s movement.  
On 17 December 1963, the Chinese would reciprocate the meeting at Snagov with an 
interview invitation by Liu Shaoqi, deputy chairman of the CC of the CPC and president of 
the PRC, to Dumitru Gheorghiu, Romanian Ambassador to Beijing. The friendly bilateral 
discussions pointed out that the CPC was in sympathy with the RWP’s stance with regard to 
Khrushchev and his entourage’s economic, political and ideological strategies, as well as 
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 concerning Romania’s relations with the Soviet Union. Moreover, the Chinese president’s 
dialogue  with the Romanian diplomat also referred to the cult of personality of Joseph 
Stalin or pertained to far-reaching subjects such as the guidelines and models founding the 
socialist parties’ relations. The bilateral talks would end with the Chinese leader 
appreciation for the RWP’s attitude “of not participating in the anti-Chinese and anti-
Marxist move led by Khrushchev” (Budura 2008: 47-48) and the CPC’s willingness to 
intensify contacts and commercial and economic exchanges with the RWP and the Peoples 
Republic of Romania. 
The talks would trigger further numerous meetings between the representatives of the two 
countries. Thus, a delegation comprising members of the Politburo of the CC of the RWP 
(Ion Gh. Maurer, chairman of the Council of Ministers, Emil Bodnăraș, deputy chairman of 
the Council of Ministers, Chivu Stoica, secretary of the CC of the RWP and Nicolae 
Ceaușescu, secretary of the CC of the RWP) visited Beijing on March 1, 1964. The talks, 
held between 3-10 March, focused, on the one hand, on the Romanian leadership’s attempts 
to put an end to the Sino-Soviet public dispute by “using all available arguments and the 
combined persuasion of all its members to reach the goal it had been set” (Budura 2008: 
49) and, on the other hand, on questions like the preservation of unity of the socialist camp 
and the world communist movement, the two parties’ relations with the big brother’s CPSU, 
the CPC’s interest towards the Comecon’s enlargement to all communist countries and the 
development of “fraternal relations” between the Romanian and Chinese parties and 
countries (Budura 2008: 48-50).  
Since the Romanian delegation’s return from the aforementioned visit to Beijing, 
considerable and relevant exchange of views would be generated between high-level 
officials of the RWP and CPC, both directly and by dint of the extensive work of the two 
diplomatic institutions. Hence, simultaneously with the intensification of the Sino-
Romanian mutual support, major contacts materialised by March 1965.  
For example, on 10 April 1964, Gheorghiu Dej provided the new Chinese ambassador Liu 
Fang with a hearing in occasion of the latter’s handing over his credentials and on 5 June 
1964, the Romanian leader would have, once again, bilateral talks with the Chinese 
ambassador during the dinner party offered by the former at Snagov; on 17 July 1964 the 
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 Romanian ambassador Dumitru Gheorghiu was granted a hearing by Zhou Enlai, Peng 
Zhen and Chen Yi, while Gheorghe Apostol and Emil Bodnăraș also granted an audience to 
ambassador Liu Fang at Snagov on 28 July, 1964. On August 19th,1964, Gheorghiu Dej 
received the Chinese delegation headed by Li Xiannian, in Bucharest in occasion of the 
August 23 festivities; on September 29 and 30, as well as on 6 and 7 October 1964, there 
was a dialogue in Beijing between the Romanian delegation headed by Gh. Maurer and 
Zhou Enlai; on October 7, 1964 between Maurer and Liu Shaoqi and between Maurer and 
Mao Zedong on October 8, 1964  during the October 1st celebrations; the talks between the 
Romanian delegation headed by Ion Gh. Maurer and the Chinese delegation headed by 
Zhou Enlai, in Moscow in occasion of the November 7th, 1964 festivities; the Chinese 
ambassador Liu Fang’s meeting with Emil Bodnăraș on November 24th, 1964 as well as the 
audiences the latter granted to ambassador Liu Fang on January 1, 9 and 14, 1964. Last but 
not least, the meeting yield by Ion Gh. Maurer to ambassador Liu Fang on January 28, 1965 
and the consultations in Bucharest between Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Chinese delegation 
headed by Zhou Enlai, for the funeral of Gh. Gheorghiu Dej (Budura 2008: 52).  
According to the Romanian former ambassador, the subject matters of these diplomatic 
encounters were highly relevant for the mutual support of the two communist parties, 
including both political and economic areas of interest: the arguments for the termination of 
the public Sino-Soviet polemic, the Soviet discontent regarding the manoeuvres adopted by 
the RWP to lessen the “Russification of the Romanian society and open the latter towards 
the West” (Budura 2008: 53); the conflicts regarding the Comecon; Chinese willingness to 
enable Sino-Romanian commercial exchanges, as a gateway for Romania’s economic 
difficulties in the course of the latter’s policy to bear up Soviet pressure; Khrushchev’s de-
Sovietisation and the subsequent policy of the new CPSU leadership; the Soviet barriers to 
China’s attempts to get to be an atomic and unclear power; Albania’s invitation to take hold 
of its rightful place in the Warsaw Pact Treaty and the PRC, Korea, Vietnam and Mongolia’s 
invitation to become observers within the Organisation; the Soviet goal to organise a one 
military authority for the Warsaw Pact, superintending the member states’ foreign policy by 
means of a committee of foreign ministers; the Vietnam war and conflict-dialogue 
interactions, together with an outlook to the Vietnamese achieving their legitimate goal 
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 (Budura 2008: 53).  
In July 1965, a delegation of the CPC, headed by Deng Xiaoping, would participate in the 
4th Congress of the RWP. As maintained by Budura, the meeting would both warrant the 
special relationship between Romania and China and would certify the normalisation of the 
Romanian-Soviet relations with Leonid Brezhnev leading the CPSU delegation. However, 
the author pointed out, albeit the new RWP’s leadership fostered the Chinese solidarity, they 
were also quite self-assured of their abilities to promote their perspective within the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation. Thus, it would be Nicolae Ceaușescu, on September 21st, 1965, to 
initiate the reception of the Chinese ambassador by the secretary general of the CC of the 
PCR (Romanian Communist Party), with the aim to inform the Chinese counterpart about 
the discussions - which comprised a variety of the Romanian-Soviet dispute grounds and 
Romania’s appeal, by maintaining the Soviet shortcomings, for the normalisation of 
relations between the CPSU and the CPC - during the Moscow visit, of the Romanian 
delegation (Budura 2008: 56).  
On 12 February 1965, a letter of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian 
Embassy in Beijing would reveal the support that the Romanian Diplomatic Office in 
Montevideo granted to the Chinese commercial delegation in Uruguay , to the support that 311
the Romanian Embassy in Rome would provide to the Chinese commercial delegation in 
Italy , to the support provided by the Romanian side to the Chinese counterpart in Ghana, 312
in case of a break-off of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Ghana  as well as in 313
 “1965 februarie 12, București. Telegramă a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe către Ambasada României la 311
Beijing privind sprijinul pe care Oficiul Român de la Montevideo îl va acorda delegației comerciale a R.P. 
Chineze care va efectua o deplasare în Uruguay” in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. 
Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele 
Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 683
 “1965 martie 10, București. Telegramă a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe către Ambasada României la 312
Beijing privind răspunsul favorabil la solicitarea părții chineze ca Ambasada României de la Roma să sprijine 
reprezentanța comercială chineză” in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. 
Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele 
Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 685
 “1966 martie 19, București. Telegramă a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe către Dumitru Gheorghiu, 313
Ambasador al României la Beijing, privind solicitarea M.A.E. al R.P. Chineze ca, în eventualitatea ruperii 
relațiilor diplomatice chino-ghaneze, Ambasada României la Accra să preia apărarea intereselor R.P. Chineze 
în Ghana”in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. Documente” [Sino-Romanian 
relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 780
 206
 Jakarta, in case of Sino-Indonesian interruption of diplomatic ties . Furthermore, on 314
March 6, 1965, another letter of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian 
Embassy in China would disclose the requests of the Red Cross in PRC to be backed by the 
Romanian side against the representatives of the nationalist party led by Chiang Kai-shek 
during the Red Cross International Congress . 315
Additionally, a multiplicity of political issues in the communist international arena were 
discussed in occasion of the interview granted by the Romanian statesman Emil Bodnăraș to 
the Chinese ambassador, on 28 October 1965. The talks consisted of the Sino-Romanian 
exchange of views with regard to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons matter and 
included topics such as the Vietnam war, in connection to the US intention to terminate the 
hostilities, as well as the point of Kashmir as a result of India’s inadmissible drive . As 316
stated by Budura (and verified by the Romanian delegation’s short visit in Beijing in May 
1966 at their return from Hanoi, and by Premier Zhou Enlai’s visit to Romania few weeks 
later), from this moment on, Sino-Romanian dialogue would cope with wider areas of 
interest and both the states and parties would endeavour into perfecting their outlook in 
contrast to the international agenda .  317
The Chinese Premier’s visit to the RSR (Socialist Republic of Romania since 1965) in 1966 
would not only be a notable event, it was a historical moment that would determine the 
development of Sino-Romanian ties; indeed, Zhou Enlai was the second high level Chinese 
 “1966 iunie 1, București. Telegramă a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe către Aurel Duma, Ambasador al 314
României la Beijing, privind acceptul guvernului român ca, în cazul ruperii relațiilor diplomatice chino-
indoneziene, administrarea bunurilor Ambasadei chineze și apărarea intereselor chinezilor din Indonezia să fie 
preluate de Ambasada României la Jakarta” in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. 
Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele 
Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 787
 “1965 martie 6, București. Telegramă a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe către Ambasada României la 315
Beijing privind aspecte ale relațiilor bilaterale, printre care cererea Crucii Roșii din R.P. Chineză de a fi 
sprijinită de partea română împotriva reprezentantului Jiangkaișist la Congresul Crucii Roșii Internaționale” in 
Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 
1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 684
 “1965 octombrie 28, București. Notă asupra audienței lui Liu Fang, Ambasador al Republicii Populare 316
Chineze la București, la Emil Bodnăraș, prim-vicepreședinte al Consiliului de Miniștri al R.S.România, 
referiotare la aspecte ale relațiilor internaționale” in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 
1880-1974. Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, 
Arhivele Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 762-774
 Ibidem317
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 leader to visit Romania, after Marshal Zhu De in 1955. The bilateral talks between the 
leadership of the two countries would emphasise the Communist Party of China and the 
Romanian Communist Party’s drive to carry on the policy of communication and transfer of 
information with respect to domestic occurrences, international affaires and bilateral ties. As 
for the solidarity between the two countries, albeit some negligible dissension, the Chinese 
leader reaffirmed the PRC’s support to and solidarity with Romania, despite his allusion to 
Beijing’s lack of mechanisms to influence from inside the situation within Comecon and the 
Warsaw Pact Organisation (arguments of great interest for the Romanian Communist 
Party’s leadership, at a time when the Romanian republic found itself isolated from the rest 
of the socialist bloc). When, in the context of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Zhou Enlai’s speech 
began to include disapproving references to Moscow, the PCR’s leaders restated their 
unbiased position in the conflict and their wish to maintain normal relations with both the 
communist giants (Budura 2008: 57). 
According to the Romanian sinologist, the Romanian-Chinese bilateral talks would be 
resumed in the autumn of the same year, 1966 as well as in July 1967, during Ion Gh. 
Maurer’s informal visit to Beijing as head of a party and government delegation. In 
addition, in the autumn of 1967 another delegation of the PCR stopped in Beijing on their 
“way to and from Vietnam. That informal visit took place as the champions of the great 
cultural revolution were rising to the higher echelons of the CPC, which indicated their 
availability and interest in keeping up the dialogue with the Romanian leadership” (Budura 
2008: 57). 
Hence, the two sides’ bilateral talks regarding the concepts of independence and sovereignty 
were this time displayed in a different light than in the past, and, on that occasion, the 
Romanian delegation exposed that the enormous efforts made by themselves within the 
Comecon and the Warsaw pact, and in the context of the international communist and 
workers movement as well as in the security-building and cooperation process in Europe, 
had brought them “notable results” (Budura 2008: 57). Moreover, the Romanian delegation 
would take advantage of the meeting, to let the Chinese know that Romania had plans to 
build their own military basis in order to stop being contingent on the Soviet and Czech 
consignments, and to reinforce its electronics and electrical engineering industries. So, 
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 when asked for collaboration, the Chinese counterpart would prove available to take into 
consideration Romania’s proposals for economic and trade cooperation, but informed that 
they were not ready for long-term agreements in the context of unsure global peace 
preservation.  
Yet, what the author pointed out of this dialogue is not only the exchange of views and 
information regarding domestic matters, but the Romanian delegation’s expose concerning 
the American governmental circles’ interest in normalising relations with China, by 
claiming the achievement of stability in the international arena, as well as the apprehension 
of the moral standards of right and wrong.  Furthermore, the Romanian delegation would 
reveal their willingness to support the Vietnamese people and to intensify the diplomatic 
operations in view of the latter’s victory, and asked the leadership in Beijing if they wished 
any particular step to be done in order to have the PRC’s legitimate rights restored at the 
UN, in view of Romania presiding the General Assembly session. To Romania’s proposals, 
the Chinese counterpart would not oppose the coordination of aid to the Vietnamese, would 
endorse the PCR to urge the restoration of China’s rights within the UN, but would react 
with skepticism  regarding the American intention to find advantageous solutions to the 318
global matters triggered by the Cold War (Budura 2008: 58-59).  
The author also expounded that the autumn visit of the Romanian delegation, headed again 
by Ion Gheorghe Maurer, would provide anew the opportunity to restate the intention of 
enhancing the political and diplomatic support given to the Vietnamese against the 
American intervention, and would lay out the stage for negotiations on whether or not to 
participate in the Moscow meeting of the communist and workers’ parties during the 
October Revolution festivities. Thus, in a particular moment of both countries’ past, albeit 
some differences of opinion regarding Romania’s suggestion that the Chinese side also 
attended the meeting in Moscow, and the strained Chinese attitude during the bilateral talks 
as a result of the ongoing Chinese cultural revolution, the PRC’s position of friendship and 
solidarity with Romania would prove to be homogeneous (Budura 2008: 59). 
As already stated, the beginning of 1968 would prove to be a year of increased Sino-
Romanian commercial exchanges, a year in which significant events - like Romania’s wish 
 “ (…)There is no probability to improve Sino-American relations at present (…)”, Liu Yong (2006: 290) 318
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 to represent the Chinese interests in Indonesia and Ghana - would demonstrate the 
advancement of the two countries' diplomatic ties as well as a substantial mutual solidarity. 
Moreover, as both Chinese and Romanian sources have confirmed, in a time when “military 
clashes had already occurred along the Chinese-Soviet border” (Budura 2008: 59), the 
tragic event of the armed intervention in Czechoslovakia in August 1968 have contributed, 
through Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong’s speeches of denunciation of the Soviet invasion, to 
strengthen the support and solidarity offered by the PRC to the Romanian Socialist 
Republic. As a matter of fact, albeit in normal circumstances, Zhou Enlai would not take 
part in the festivities for the celebration of national days organised by the foreign embassies 
in Beijing, he did show up at the reception arranged by the Romanian Embassy in the 
Chinese capital, in order to express the PRC’s moral, as well as military support to the 
Romanian state and people. As a result of his speech and pelage for assistance, the Chinese 
radio station “China International” would begin its broadcast in Romanian language, every 
evening at 21 o’clock (Buzatu 2004: 116). 
A far-reaching moment for the Sino-Romanian support in the international arena was 
constituted by the visit to Budapest , in February 1968, of Paul Niculescu-Mizil (member of 
the PCR’s Political Executive Committee, and President Ceaușescu’s Fidus Achates), as 
head of the Romanian delegation to the Conference of Communist and Workers Parties of 
Europe. The leadership in Bucharest set out some precepts that were voiced by Mizil since 
the very beginning of the conference: hence, criticism from a communist party to other 
communist parties as well as comments regarding how each party managed domestic and 
international policy, would have not been accepted. The message, however subtle, clearly 
made reference to the tensions between the Soviet Union and China. According to scholar 
Lavinia Betea, Niculescu-Mizil’s task was to open discussions on topics like the 
endorsement, from the socialist countries present at the meeting, of the fight against 
imperialism; the invitation of the Yugoslav communists and the liberation movements 
representatives to the forthcoming international conference; the signing of documents 
supporting the North Vietnamese struggle and the adoption of decisions by unanimous vote 
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 and without criticising others, in international meetings .  319
Nonetheless, the conference would start off on the wrong foot, with both Soviets and East 
Germans launching serious attacks against China - which they accused of nationalism, and 
Romania - harshly criticised by the Moscow resident Communist Syrian Bakdash Khalid. In 
all respects, Romanians were attacked for both the refusal to position themselves against the 
Chinese Communists as well as for their pro-Israel foreign policy. The head of the 
Romanian diplomatic delegation would react with diplomacy to the allegations, and thus, 
would call for public apology from the detractors, menacing to leave the conference if 
otherwise. Albeit Bakdash's admittance of his blunder , immediately after being informed 320
about the progress of the meeting, at midnight, Ceaușescu convened a Permanent Presidium 
and called for the ambassadors of the socialist countries in Bucharest to discuss the issue. 
For Niculescu-Mizil, the supreme Romanian leader had another mission, parenthetically, 
not that easy to meet: he wanted all delegations to Moscow to distance themselves from the 
leader of the Syrian Communist Party, Khalid Bakdash’s position. Following Niculescu-
Mizil's disrespect for the Romanian solicitations, the PCR’s representatives would leave the 
meeting, resultantly giving rise to welcoming attitudes and public support from the 
Westerners, that discerned and enjoyed the effects of an obvious crack in the socialist camp. 
Moreover, the condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Romanian 
communist dignitary would deepen the rift between the PCR and the CPSU, on the one 
hand, and between the PCR and the communist parties allied to the CPSU, on the other. In 
fact, this became obvious in August of that year, 1968, when Romania was not invited to 
support the Warsaw Pact countries’ invasion of Czechoslovakia. What’s more important 
however, was the Romanian criticism of the Soviet military initiative, publicly expressed by 
both Niculescu-Mizil and Ceaușescu, and making - first and foremost in the eyes of the 
West - the Socialist Republic of Romania a dissident state in the socialist bloc (Betea 2013: 
295-300). The leadership in Bucharest and Beijing would continue the same political 
dialogue across 1969 as in 1968. In fact, during the X Congress of the Romanian 
 Lavinia Betea (coord.), “Viața lui Ceaușescu. Fiul Poporului”, București: Adevărul Holding 2013, pp. 319
295-300. 
 According to Betea, his apologies remained undocumented in the records of the meeting320
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 Communist Party (6-12 August 1969), the Socialist Republic of Romania’s leadership 
publicly reaffirmed the maintenance of brotherly relations with China, the intensification of 
relations with Western and Third World countries, as well as the preservation of stability 
between arab countries and Israel, and stressed the achievement of welcoming the US 
President Richard Nixon for an official visit to Romania on 2/3 August, as the first visit of 
an American president to a socialist country after WWII (Buzatu 2004: 117). 
On September 11, 1969, a letter of the Romanian Ambassador to Beijing, Aurel Duma, to 
the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Corneliu Mănescu, would reveal some details 
regarding the visit that a Romanian delegation, headed by Prime Minister Ion Gheorghe 
Maurer and returning to Bucharest from Hanoi (where they attended Vietnam President Ho 
Ch Minh’s funeral), made to the Chinese capital. The discussions between the premiers of 
the two countries, Maurer and Zhou Enlai, concerned the latter’s exposure of his meeting 
with Alexei Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR at Beijing Airport, 
a dialogue that had ended just a few minutes before the Romanian leader’s arrival. The 
Chinese premier expressed to his Romanian counterpart that the encounter with the Soviet 
leader had been the result of the Soviet request, and bilateral talks had dealt with urgent 
questions in Sino-Soviet relations, especially the boundary issue. Moreover, during the 
dialogue with the Soviet Premier, Zhou had stated that the debates between the PRC and the 
Soviet Union on question of principles should not prevent the normalisation of their state 
relations; that the two countries should not fight each other because of the boundary 
question, and that Sino-Soviet boundary negotiations should be conducted free from any 
threat. At Soviet suggestion, that the two sides signed a commercial agreement for the year 
1970 in order to improve the USSR’s trade balance, the Chinese counterpart clearly showed 
that there was no will to accept such a proposal, and inculpated the Soviets for the fact that 
bilateral commercial ties were disadvantageous. In the end, when the Chinese leader 
revealed to the Romanian premier that his dialogue with A. Kosygin regarding the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia had been, without doubt, antithetical - as the Chinese side, 
different from the Soviet position, could not find the military intervention justified because 
“socialism was in jeopardy” - Ion Gh. Maurer emphasised that in the communist arena, 
albeit the Soviets have distinct points of view concerning socialist international relations 
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 when compared with Romanians and Chinese, the Sino-Soviet meeting should probably 
lead to the finding of solutions for some of the problems . 321
In conclusion, as evidenced by the documents to which reference has been made, it is 
conventional to assert that the main hallmark of the Sino-Romanian ties in each and every 
field, both in the 1950s and 1960s, encompasses rising tendencies, in spite of some unbiased 
dissuading factors, like the distance between the two countries, their history, language, 
culture, traditions as well as the distinctness in the way of thinking of Romanian and 
Chinese people. However, as shown throughout the chapter, the evolution of such relations 
between China and Romania has not always been unbending, on the contrary, it has all 
along been afflicted by significant events in the international arena and expressly in the 
socialist camp. Since October 5, 1949 - when Romania, as the third country in the world to 
bring to fruition significant political and diplomatic operations, established diplomatic ties 
with the PRC - and until the early 1960s, Romania, like the other peoples’ democracies, 
acted in accordance with, or obeyed to, the Soviet model in the process to expand relations 
with the PRC. Besides the diplomatic missions, economic agencies affiliated with the 
embassies and offices of military attaches were set up, different economic and cultural 
agreements were signed and contacts, exchanges of various types and levels, as well as 
bilateral collaboration were encouraged and stimulated in the economic, political, scientific, 
cultural and educational spheres.  
Initially, Sino-Romanian relations were outlined by the principles of an uncut loyalty 
towards Moscow and Stalin, by the adoption of the Soviet model in each and every domain 
of activity, in the international arena, by an ideological common standing against the 
Western imperialism leaded by the USA, as well as by the drive to engage the Third World 
countries into adopting the Marxist-Leninist ideology and communist regimes through the 
support of the left-wing movements and leaders, once in a while educated in Moscow. Still, 
the beginning of closer Sino-Romanian ties is strictly connected to the significant events of 
 “1969 septembrie 11, Beijing. Notă privind convorbirea dintre Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Președinte al 321
Consiliului de Miniștri al R.S. România și Zhou Enlai, Premier al Consiliului de Stat al R.P. Chineze, cu 
prilejul escalei delegației române în capitala Chinei, venind de la Hanoi, unde a participat la funeraliile lui Ho 
Chi Minh, Președinte al R.D. Vietnam in Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. 
Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele 
Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 960-963
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 the second half of the 1950s, that is the 1956 XX Congress of the CPSU, when the Soviet 
leader Nikita Khrushchev announced the CPSU’s two new policy lines and theses (the “de-
Stalinisation”, by condemning the Stalin’s crimes, and “the peaceful coexistence” between 
the two antagonistic blocs), and the incidents in Poland and Hungary in the same year. By 
attending the congress, both the Romanian and Chinese side regarded the new Soviet theses 
as noncomplying for their political strategies, indirectly menacing the leaders’ domestic 
power and having devastating consequences on the Marxist-Leninist ideology.  
The Sino-Soviet split would come out public during the III Congress of the RWP, in June 
1960, when the Soviet leadership initiated an overt act of criticism towards the PRC and the 
CPC; for the first time on that occasion, both in the context and as a consequence of the 
RWP’s minimal and unpretentious distantiation policy towards Moscow, the Romanian 
leader Gheorghiu Dej adopted a position of support, however reserved, towards Beijing. 
From that moment on, between the aggravation of the Sino-Soviet relations and the 
escalation of the conflict to border clashes in 1969, Romania and China found more and 
more common grounds on issues such as the objections to the Soviet chauvinism and the 
rights of each country to preserve and support their national interests and parties’ 
sovereignty, leading to the improvement of their relations and intensification of the 
exchanges with regards to economy, policy, culture, military etc. Both countries would 
support each other and would attempt to resist the big brother, the Soviet Union. Romania 
will endeavour and succeed, in gaining a certain broader freedom for manoeuvre in the 
Socialist camp, would improve its international status during the tragic event of the Soviet 
invasion of Czechoslovakia, would side with Beijing with regard to the issue of Taiwan, and 
would continually press for China’s regaining its legitimate rights at the UN.  
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 IV. Sino-Romanian Relations 1969-1989 
IV.1 Contouring Bucharest’s position in the international arena under the regime of Nicolae 
Ceaușescu  
In 1965, following Gh. Gheorghiu Dej’s death, Nicolae Ceaușescu would not enter the 
world stage as a common communist leader; for the Western world, in the realm of 
diplomacy, he would be an independent “maverick”, a nonconformist, that tried to picture 
himself as a valuable and reliable head of state. Indeed, beginning with 1967, Bucharest 
regime’s foreign policy would take a different path than its Soviet counterpart, and the 
Romanian Communist Party would reinforce this image by offering services to the West , 322
by recognising West Germany, by refusing to cut-off relations with Israel after the Six-Day 
War in June, and by publicly supporting China in the Sino-Soviet split.  
Resultantly, by the end of the 1960s, Romania would be both envied and appraised for its 
prestige in the international arena, and would enjoy a significant support domestically. 
Through the consolidation of political power between 1965-1968, the denunciation of the 
Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and the trip to China and North Korea in 
June 1971, Nicolae Ceaușescu would firstly manage to eradicate any form of opposition to 
his government, to perceive and experience the fascination of nationalist attitudes as 
“efficient mechanism of social control, personalisation of power, and the incentive to re-
launch a campaign for industrialisation along autarkic lines” secondly, and last but not 
least to use the “ideological mobilisation to tie the elements of independence, autarkic 
industrialisation, personal power and moral Puritanism together by the use of ideological 
mobilisation and a cult of personality” . 323
At that time, Romania was dealing domestically with a constantly growing economy and 
was witnessing the spread of social expectations due to the liberalisation measures of 
  Like handling a secret communication channel between the US and Vietnam in 1967-1968322
 Adam Tolnay, “Ceaușescu’s Journey to the East”, Georgetown University, Ceaușescu.org., Retrieved 323
February 19, 2008
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 1971-1975. Indeed, in the socio-economic field, the investments made by the leadership in 
Bucharest increased tenfold (reaching 500 billions Lei) in comparison with the investments 
made for the first five years plan, and encompassed a modernised and diversified 
production, accompanied by justice improvements  and territorial administration 324
rectifications (Budura 2008: 31). 
Internationally, the Romanian leader managed to consolidate the Sino-Romanian mutual 
support, firstly by contributing to the P.R.C’s acquisition of the R.O.C.’s place in the 
General Assembly as well as its place as one of the five permanent members of the U.N. 
Security Council, secondly by notifying the American President Richard Nixon’s wish to 
visit China in order to discuss the issue of normalisation of Sino-American relations with 
the Chinese leaders - in this manner providing Bucharest with the certainty of security, by 
benefitting from the friendship of two great powers - and thirdly, by visiting China and 
North Korea and transforming this journey from an event concerning the expansion of 
bilateral relations in an affair with international implications and significations. As a result, 
the appreciation and fondness for Bucharest’s foreign policy by a great deal of states, 
whatever their ideological affiliation - that lasted until the end of the 1970s and the 
beginning of the 1980s - would allow the secretary general of the PCR to enforce the 
Chinese and North Korean societal model, through a gradual (1971) and oppressive 
(beginning with the 1980s) restriction of the economic and cultural freedoms . 325
However, with the Helsinki Accords of 1975 - pertaining to the respect and protection of 
human rights and European security - coinciding with the SRR’s obtainment of the “most 
favoured nation” clause from the USA, the former would witness a considerable reduction 
of its political influence, that would gradually lead to the deterioration, and finally collapse 
of its image in the international arena. If, in the beginning, the achievement of the most 
favoured nation clause resulted in Bucharest’s leadership compulsion to liberalise Jew 
emigration towards America, it progressively turned into the government’s obligation to 
respect human rights.  
 Like the government’s abolition of political detention and imprisonment, as well as lessened restrictions 324
for travels abroad
 Andrei Marga, “Cultural and Political Trends in Romania Before and After 1989”, East European Politics 325
and Society, Vol. 7, 1 (1993), pp. 14-32. 
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 Hence, concerned for the American unfair and undesired involvement in Romania’s 
domestic affairs by virtue of the clause, Ceaușescu would give it up in 1988. In the 
economic field, albeit Romania was not, altogether, a resource-abundant state, the 
communist leader would intensify the already coerced industrialisation of the country by 
importing iron ore and coal from China and the Third World, thus leading to Romania’s 
increase of the external debts, in the beginning of the 1980s, to more than 10 $ billion. 
Moreover, in the context of Bucharest being indebted to both the International Monetary 
Fund and the World Bank, Ceaușescu adopted several inappropriate economic strategies, 
like the increase of exports in concomitance with the reduction of imports, with severe 
consequences on the Romanian population . 326
Moreover, once the Romanian leader lost the support of the American businessman because 
of Bucharest’s political and economic strategies obstructing USA’s exports to Romania, 
Ceaușescu would endeavour to improve Bucharest’s relations with the Comecon and the 
USSR in order to stabilise the economy. In fact, when the revolution broke out in December 
1989, as a last resort, Bucharest tried to create a coalition of the communist states hostile to 
the reformist government of Mikhail Gorbachev .  327
Yet, for different reasons, Ceaușescu’s master plan would soon prove unsuccessful, and the 
creation of the united front of “rejectionists”, impossible. On top of that, domestically, 
Bucharest regime’s lack of popularity had reached an alarming rate because of the 
population’s prevent from having the basic necessities of life, while the “xenophobic 
communism”  had exhausted its mobilising values . 328 329
 Most of the Romanian population would end up deprived of food, electricity, heat, etc, by the middle of 326
the 1980s
 The leadership in Bucharest searched for support from CEECs, China, North Korea and Cuba.327
 Nicolae Ceaușescu’s protraction and amplification of nationalism that aimed at consolidating the 328
relationship between regime and society
 Emanuel Copilaș, “Politica externă a României comuniste: anatomia unei insolite autonomii” (pp. 88-89), 329
CEEOL, Source: Sphere of Politics (Sfera Politicii), issue: 152/ 2010, pp. 75-90
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 IV.2 The PRC from the Cultural Revolution to the “silent” revolution  
and the inception of capitalism during Deng Xiaoping  
Since the second half of the 1960s, the PRC will have to cope with a number of critical 
events triggered domestically by the fervent Great Cultural Revolution. If in 1966 Liu 
Shaoqi was being displaced as Party Deputy Chairman by Lin Biao, two years later, in 
October 1968, the President of the PRC and former second most powerful leader of the 
CPC, would be purged as traitor and “the biggest capitalist roader in the party”, removed 
from all his positions, and immediately arrested by Mao and his retinue; thus, in the 
aftermath of the IX Congress of the CPC in 1969, it seemed that the leading organs of the 
party had become a group comprising the entourage of the three most decisive figures: Mao 
Zedong, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai . 330
However, between the Ninth Party Congress and the visit to China of President Nixon in 
1972, in the context of a new crisis within the leading group, about one third of the 
members of the Political Bureau of the Party would be removed from their posts, the 
faithful Maoist Lin Biao included.  The latter’s purge, and the elimination of his supporters 
in the provinces, would be accompanied, on the one hand, by a large-scale rehabilitation of 
the party and state officials that had been discredited during the cultural revolution, and by a 
“bizarre campaign to eradicate the influence of Confucius and Lin Biao” . 331
In the global context, during the phase of “tripolarity” - that initiated in 1971 and ended in 
1989 and substituted the bipolarity stage USA-USSR between 1954-1970 - Beijing would 
endeavour into showing the world that it was capable of defending itself against its two 
potential threats, the Americans and the Soviets. Indeed, during this period, the PRC 
leadership would adopt political strategies that were defined by three prime concerns, that is 
the safeguard of independence, the openness towards the US and the opposition the Soviet 
Union.  
 Livio Maitan, “Party, Army and Masses in China, A Marxist interpretation of the cultural revolution and its 330
Aftermath”, London: NLB, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, London, 1976, p. 304.
 Ibidem331
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 However, the period of tripolarity in the international arena would not be unruffled until 
1989. It will observe two phases, the first one between 1971-1979, that witnessed an 
American-Soviet détente and a continuation of the Sino-Soviet hostility - thus with both 
China and the Soviet Union quite supportive of Washington, each of the two Eastern states 
struggling to get the latter’s support against the other - and the second one between 
1980-1989, that would follow through the American-Soviet antagonism and the Sino-Soviet 
loosening up the ties .  332
Consequently, the initial phase of the 1970s saw the first moves towards a Sino-American 
rapprochement, as well as the PRC’s replacing the Republic of China in the United Nations, 
in October 1971. Although in the year following Nixon’s visit, the PRC would also intensify 
its diplomatic relations with the imperialist and capitalist states of the “second world” (like 
Japan, the Federal German Republic, Greece and Spain), Mao Zedong's convictions that the 
two super-powers belonging to the “first world” - the US and the Soviet Union - were then 
the main source of instability and turmoils in the world, mainly resulted in Beijing’s 
maintenance of scepticism towards both of the “first world” states. Indeed, the PRC would 
both unite with and struggle against the Unites States, in order to, respectively, restrain the 
expansionist forces of the Soviet Union, and obtain the American recognition of the one-
China principle that put an end to the issue of Taiwan. Moreover, China - that according to 
Mao’s “Three Worlds Theory” belonged to the Third World of exploited nations - would 
firmly support the countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America in their struggles against 
hegemonism by countries of the second world. 
However, in order to gain a better understanding of the quick chronological run-through, 
outlining the recurrent replacement, and the final reconstruction of the Chinese political 
elite, that matured between the last years of the 1960s and the death of Mao Zedong in 
1976, it is required to rapidly look into the phenomenon that set in motion the process 
reshaping the PRC’s leadership, that is the Chinese Great Cultural Revolution’s campaigns. 
 “Despre interese geostrategice şi configuraţii ale distribuţiei puterii în zona Asia-Pacific”. Recenzie la 332
Michael YAHUDA, The International Politics of the Asia-Pacific, Second and revised edition, ed. Routledge, 
London and New York, 2004, 355 p., in Revista Institutului Diplomatic Român, Anul II, Numarul I (III), 
Semestrul I, 2007, Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Institutul Diplomatic Român, pp. 241-243. 
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 The “Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution” that lasted for ten years (conventionally 
1966-1976) and originated in the early 1960s, was an intricate social and political chaos, 
initiated by and between the top party leaders as a strive for power and influence within the 
CPC, with a tremendous impact over the whole Chinese nation. Still, as the international 
scholarship has established, the Cultural Revolution can not simply be regarded as inner 
party politics, as long as one bares in mind Mao and the party elite’s powerlessness to 
control, in many occasions, the Red Guards’ activities. From a historical perspective, the 
Cultural Revolution could be perceived as the culmination of Mao’s attempts to renovate 
China’s old party, state and society by means of large-scale mass mobilisation.  
In the aftermath of the disastrous “Great Leap Forward campaign” (1958-1961), resulting in 
the tragic death of more than twenty million people because of food shortages and famine, 
Vice-Chairman Liu Shaoqi and Premier Zhou Enlai, having procured for themselves further 
room to manoeuvre, would make political decisions and adopt economic reforms that - in 
spite of Mao’s indignation for the two leaders’ less committed appearance to his vision of 
communism, mass movement and revolution - would improve the Chinese damaged 
economy between 1962-1965. However, as soon as Chairman Mao would grasp that Liu 
and Deng’s policies’ implementation echoed the resolutions of the capitalist road, he 
endeavoured into motivating youngsters to condemn the party’s officials behaviour as 
dishonest and fraudulent. Thus, a new strategy was adopted by Mao and his close political 
circle , different than the one guiding the “One Hundred Flowers” campaign of 1957, 333
when the Chairman had relied on the Chinese intellectuals, not on young people, to criticise 
the Chinese leadership. Indeed, according to Mao, the class of intellectuals, influenced by 
the old society, had, by that time, embarked on the bourgeois and capitalist road, while only 
the unfeigned youngsters’ adherence to the principles of class struggle and continuous 
revolution could have given rise to an egalitarian, socialist society and could have overcome 
the country’s economic latency . 334
On that account, in 1966, as soon as they realised that different cultural productions were 
 Mainly his wife Jiang Qing and Defence Minister Lin Biao333
 Jonathan Spence, “The Search for Modern China”, New York: W.W. Norton and Company, second edition, 334
pp. 544-586 or by accessing Asia for Educators at  http://afe.easia.columbia.edu/tps/1950.htm#top).
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 publicly denouncing the Communist leadership, Mao and his wife called for a wave of 
criticism against reactionary bourgeois ideology and initiated the purge of the key figures, 
both in the cultural (bourgeois intellectuals) and political (corrupt authorities) fields, 
menacing communism and the revolutionary spirit. What it started with a poster 
denunciating the administration of the Beijing University by a top party official, it soon 
spread widely to all universities, and radical students started to condemn Party members 
whom Mao thought had turned bureaucratic, anti-revolutionary and smug. With the “Little 
Red Book” in their hands, the Red Guards initially attacked whoever they thought lacked 
revolutionary qualifications but soon ended up by adopting aggressive practices towards 
teachers, friends or even own families . 335
Albeit it was Mao who initiated the movement, once the masses were mobilised, the 
Chairman would no longer have the capacity to stop them from expressing themselves. In 
fact, once the instructions from above failed to control the lawlessness on the ground, the 
Red Guards would feel free to expose enemies as they wished. The revolutionary struggle 
would soon witness the annihilation of the four olds, that resulted in the vandalisation of 
Chinese temples, libraries, important works of art and buildings and the physical attack of 
authorities, teachers, schools’ management, members of the party, neighbours, friends, 
parents and relatives. During the first phase, the hysterical one, of the Cultural Revolution 
or class struggle, that lasted between 1966-1968, millions of Chinese would be terrorised by 
the Red Guards; intellectuals would face death, would commit suicide or would be beaten 
and imprisoned, especially in Beijing, Guangzhou and Wuhan. Anything that was not in line 
with Mao Zedong’s Marxist-Leninist thought was destroyed and violence proved to be an 
effective method to negate freedom of expression . 336
In this intense social turmoil, the Chinese leadership (Mao, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao and Jiang 
Qing) fearing a civil war, deduced that only the army could have restored control. However, 
it was not until the summer of 1968 that the People’s Liberation Army was able to repress 
the last conflicts within the university campuses and dissolve the Red Guards. Many 
  Ibidem335
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 Chinese denounced as counterrevolutionaries, that were sent to the countryside to purify 
themselves through arduous agricultural work, would be persuaded into worshipping Mao 
and Lin Biao on the one hand, and into denouncing Liu Shaoqi as a revisionist bourgeoise, 
on the other.  
Nevertheless, by 1970, Lin Biao had gained significant support of the PLA during the Sino-
Soviet border clashes in Northern China and had been appointed Mao’s successor at the 
National Party Congress of 1969. As a result, Chairman Mao would initiate a criticising 
campaign against Lin and his entourage, and would change the constitution in order to 
avoid the latter’s rise to higher positions. After being held accountable for an attempt to 
assassinate Chairman Mao, the Chinese scholarship disclosed that Lin had tried to flee 
China, in an attempt to defect to the Soviet Union, but he and his family died in a plane 
crash in September 1971. Following his death, a great deal of Western historians and 
international scholarship would tackle the Chinese official stance with skepticism, and 
would try to put together the evidence in order to provide a clear picture of the events 
leading to Lin’s death. The mysterious circumstances of Lin Biao’s death however, are not 
an issue to be addressed here .  337
What instead needs to be emphasised is that, with the latter’s death, Chairman Mao would 
secure his role as undisputed leader of the CPC. While the Cultural Revolution had caused 
confusion and disorganisation at a societal level, in the educational system - that witnessed 
the restoration of examinations as basis for access to universities only in 1973 - the Sino-
Soviet border conflicts resulted in the CPC’s political strategy of locating allies in the 
international arena and establishing relations with non socialist states (such as the US, after 
President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 and the signing of trade agreements with 
other Western countries).  
However, in order to secure and maintain the Chinese nation’s purification, devoted to 
Marxist values - that is Mao’s Cultural Revolution ideals, untainted by Western elements - 
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 the Chairman and his wife Jiang Qing, leader of the “Gang of Four” , would launch in 338
1973 another campaign, the “Anti-Lin Biao, Anti-Confucius”, that would last until the end 
of the Cultural Revolution in 1976.  
Subsequently, between 1974 - when the PRC’s most important and powerful leaders, Zhou 
Enlai and Mao Zedong began to suffer from chronic illnesses and thus incapable of 
governing - and 1976 - when they both died - China was governed by the four remaining 
authorities of the Cultural Revolution, with Mao’s wife Jiang Qing as leader. The latter and 
Deng Xiaoping, a more moderate and pragmatic party member, would soon initiate an 
inner-party struggle that would end with the arrest of the four leaders of the Gang, 
reminiscences of the Cultural Revolution, in October 1976, by the hand of the CPC’s 
second in command, Hua Guofeng. At this juncture, with Mao’s image untarnished in the 
aftermath of his death, and the Cultural Revolution brought to an end, it wouldn’t take long 
for the Chinese leadership to attain a crucial moment in history.  
In fact, the Chinese “socialist modernisation” by dint of the “opening up” to the West and 
“transition to capitalism” policies, would be achieved with Deng Xiaoping’s giving away 
his vision of economic reform during the Third Plenum of the 11th CC of the CPC in 
December 1978. Uncontested leader of China by 1979, Deng Xiaoping would spread out 
the four basic principles for achieving modernisation by leaving the state apparatus unspoilt 
(by keeping to the socialist road, upholding the dictatorship of the proletariat, upholding the 
leadership of the Communist Party, upholding Marxism-Leninism-Maoist thought) and 
guided the country to wider economic freedom, capitalism, and more solid ties with non 
socialist states . 339
 The Gang of Four was a group of four influential CPC figures during the last years of Mao Zedong’s rule. 338
It consisted of Mao’s wife Jiang Qing and her associates Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan and Zhang Chunqiao. 
They gained prominence during the Cultural Revolution and when Mao’s health began to shake, they gained 
control of several major government functions. With Mao’s death, the Gang of Four sought to take control 
over China, but eventually none of them took power. Instead, Mao’s choice was reform-minded Hua Guofeng, 
who denounced the lavishness of the Cultural Revolution and, in 1976, arrested all the members of the gang.
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 IV.3 Bucharest’s contribution to the Sino-American rapprochement (1969-1972)  
Besides the establishment of relations with the German Federal Republic, the continuation 
of relations with Israel after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (as well as the further smoothing of 
the path for negotiations between Israel and Egypt ten years later), or the backing of Beijing 
during the Sino-Soviet split, by the last years of the 1960s, having reduced its economic 
dependency on both the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc, Bucharest embarked on the 
path of multiple opportunities provided by the ingress to Western markets.  
The favourable economic backdrop wold shape the political sphere immediately, and the 
leadership in Bucharest - considered both the Nixon administration’s view of the Sino-
Soviet split as a strategical opportunity, and the Sino-Romanian amicable relationship as a 
promising mix of circumstances for an attempt to orchestrate the opening of the Sino-
American dialogue - would soon place itself, albeit for a short while, as a valuable peace of 
a puzzle in one of the world’s crucial geo-strategic and geopolitical games: the Beijing-
Washington détente, within the bounds of a tripolar system of international relations 
dictated by the great power triangle Washington-Beijing-Moscow .  340
Although Romania’s involvement in the Sino-American negotiations and normalisation of 
relations has been long debated by both Western and East European researchers as part of 
the Cold War studies, its evaluation and exposition within this study is indispensable for a 
coherent possession of the main hallmarks in Sino-Romanian cooperation and trends in the 
1970s. As a matter of fact, according to recent evidence from the Romanian archives, the 
Bucharest channel - albeit second most important after the Pakistani channel - can not be 
ignored, for “Ceaușescu’s success in publicly projecting a strongly independent position 
from the Soviet line, and especially its support of China in the Sino-Soviet split, was viewed 
in Washington as conferring on the Romanian leadership the needed credibility to pass 
important communication to the Chinese at a level where such communications would get 
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 appropriate notice” .  341
That being so, I will firstly attempt to delineate, in chronological order, the efforts made by 
both the Pakistani officials and the Romanian Communist Party’s leadership to contribute to 
the Sino-US rapprochement, and subsequently, I will try to identify the reasons for which 
“once the Chinese left it to the Americans to decide the channel through which 
communication would proceed” , the leadership in Washington would choose the Pakistan 342
secret channel for communication in spite of Bucharest. 
First of all, in the context of the Sino-Soviet ideological dispute being transformed in border 
conflicts, by the end of the 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s, the PRC’s leadership was 
facing three possibilities: to subordinate to the United States, to attempt the eradication of 
the bipolar system, or to isolate itself. However, having already experimented the isolation 
from the international network during the Cultural Revolution, Beijing could not take into 
consideration the policy of isolation, but it could try to unbalance the bipolar world 
represented by the US and the Soviet Union.  
Secondly, during the 1969 American election campaign, the anticommunist candidate 
Richard Nixon had declared to bring the United States of America out of the Vietnam war. 
Indeed, in his opinion, the reconciliation with China would not only have placed Moscow 
on a defensive position, but the rapprochement with the government in Beijing itself could 
have represented a way to put an end to the war in Vietnam. Thus, after a careful 
observation and analysis of the relations between China and the US, Nixon understood that 
the Chinese Nationalists from the Republic of Taiwan would never be able to take control of 
mainland China; hence, preparing the terrain for amelioration of relations with the PRC was 
Richard Nixon’s only chance to meet Washington’s national interests. Against this 
backdrop, when the Warsaw diplomatic channel - active between 1958-1968 - started to be 
regarded with mistrust because of Soviet infiltration and thus, proved inefficient for the 
preservation of dialogue between Washington and Beijing, the United States would launch 
the search for other, less visible but more effective mediums.  
 Ibidem341
 Ibidem342
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 Meanwhile, declarations concerning China came out for all to see, from the White House. If 
in July 1969, Nixon and Henry Kissinger delineated the United States’ strategic and 
unilateral initiatives towards Beijing , one of the most significant declaration from the 343
American government with respect to the PRC would arrive in September 1969, when the 
leadership in Washington showed out openly their preoccupation for a most likely Sino-
Soviet war. As Buzatu pointed out, from this moment on, it would not take long before the 
Americans and Chinese initiated “the ping-pong diplomacy” (Buzatu 2004: 119). 
Generally, international scholarship has regarded the Pakistani channel of dialog as the most 
important one due to the frequency and consistency of messages that have passed through it, 
and because by the agency of this channel, it was possible to organise Kissinger’s visit in 
China. The reasons for which, in the end, China and the United States preferred to dispatch 
messages through Pakistan, hinge mostly on the lack of credibility towards Bucharest. The 
truth is that Beijing regarded with scepticism all satellites of the Soviet Union, albeit cordial 
relations coupled the two countries, the PRC and the “independent” Romania.  
Thus, the concern that the information conveyed by means of the Romanian channel could 
reach Moscow, resulted in the Americans and Chinese’ extreme cautiousness in deciding the 
intermediary channels. There are however, different studies that suggest it was not the lack 
of trust in Bucharest’s leadership that made out of the Pakistani channel the best choice. For 
example, Mircea Munteanu pointed out that it was the Romanian leadership’s odd or 
mistaken decision to delay the communication of the Chinese to Washington 
(“communication breakdown” ) that resulted in Bucharest channel’s dismissal. 344
Nevertheless, by basing his theory on Henry Kissinger’s memoirs and the new evidence 
from the Romanian archives, the author does not exclude the possibility that the Chinese 
proved to be “too wary - to discuss rapprochement through the Romanians - perhaps fearful 
of Soviet penetration of even a country as fiercely independent as Romania”  and 345
 That included the removal of the interdiction for the American table tennis team to visit the PRC during 343
the Tokyo World Table Tennis Championship or the possibility to import Chinese manufactured goods for a 
value not higher than 100 $
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 concluded his study by asserting that albeit it would be impossible to unveil how much the 
leadership in Bucharest had informed Moscow about the Sino-American talks, for certain 
“the Romanian channel was much more open to Soviet influence then the Pakistani 
channel, something that both Washington and Beijing were keenly aware of” .  346
Therefore, before looking into the Romanian channel of dialogue between the US and the 
PRC, it is compulsory that I succinctly display the key contacts provided by the Pakistani 
diplomatic activity, as it was and still is, the most solid succour for the thaw in Sino-
American relations.  
On the occasion of a visit to Pakistan in the summer of 1969, the US President had 
mentioned in a discussion with his Pakistani counterpart, that the United States’ goal was 
not to isolate China on the international arena. In the aftermath of this visit, the US 
President’s National Security Advisor, Kissinger would meet with the Pakistani Ambassador 
to Washington, Agha Hilaly, in order to discuss the creation of a secure channel for dialogue 
with the PRC. It would not take long before loads of messages referring to Sino-American 
relations would flow through the Pakistan channel; the Pakistani authorities in Beijing and 
Washington, except for some episodes of delay, proved qualified to finding modalities to 
transmit the Chinese messages to the Nixon administration and reciprocally, the American 
information to the Chinese counterpart.  
Thus, while in November 1969, the Pakistan President Yahya Khan was in the PRC, two 
months later, in February 1970, the Pakistan Ambassador Hilaly was invited for a meeting 
with Kissinger at the White House. On this occasion, the former would inform Kissinger 
about the Chinese decision to cease considering Vietnam an issue for the normalisation of 
Sino-American ties. Moreover, on 25 October, 1970 a meeting took place between Richard 
Nixon, Kissinger and Pakistani President Yahya Khan at the White House, to discuss 
Chinese-American relations. It seemed like the most opportune occasion for the American 
President to firstly reassure, by dint of the Pakistan passage, the Chinese authorities that the 
United States was not seeking condominium in Asia in tandem with the Soviet Union, and 
secondly, to express Washington’s drive to take solid steps towards the resumption of 
bilateral contacts with the PRC.  
 Idem, p. 408346
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 Accordingly, he would voice the willingness to send two American senators as delegates to 
China . Many other letters, messages, and communiqués between 1970-1971 revealed the 347
Pakistani officials’ endeavour to convey the Chinese and American political elites’ messages 
that tackled with the placement to a higher level of the Sino-American ties. For example, on 
10 May 1971 Nixon would send a new message to the Chinese leaders by which he was 
approving high level direct negotiations between the United States and China, and delegated 
Henry Kissinger as special envoy to the PRC. The latter was authorised to discuss issues 
concerning Nixon’s upcoming visit to China, but, according to the US President, in order to 
fully guarantee the secrecy of Kissinger's visit to Beijing, it was necessary to use no other 
route but the Pakistani channel .  348
Zhou Enlai’s response message would reach the White House before the end of May; the 
Chinese leader’s message for Nixon contained, besides a blunt demonstration of gratitude 
for the Pakistani President’s efforts, information about the favourable reception in China of 
the American Secretary of State. Soon after, on June 2nd 1971, a Chinese communiqué, 
brought to Washington by the Pakistan Ambassador Hilaly, would reveal that Kissinger was 
expected in Beijing in order to discuss general issues of the Sino-American relations as well 
as the procedures for the withdrawal of the American troops from Taiwan in light of the 
forthcoming visit to China of the American President . The Pakistani operations as 349
channel of dialogue between the US and China would end in the aftermath of Henry 
Kissinger’s secret visit to the PRC, 9-11 July 1971.  
As already stated, in the last year of the sixth decade, the American administration 
endeavoured into identifying and availing themselves of more than one channel of dialogue 
to ensure the loosening up of Washington-Beijing ties. Thus, after a quick overview of how 
 “Memorandum from the President‘s Assistant for the National Security Affairs - Kissinger to President 347
Nixon”, Washington, February 23, 1970, available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/
frus1969-76v17/d70>, accessed on 23.08.2015
 “Message from the Government of the U.S. to Government of the People‘s Republic of China”, 348
Washington, May 10, 1971, available at <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d125>, 
accessed on 23.08.2015
 Yafeng Xia, “Negotiating With The Enemy. U.S. – China Talks during the Cold War, 1949-1972”. Ed. 349
Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2006, p. 155; Message from the Premier of P.R.C. Chou Enlai to 
President Nixon, Beijing, May 29, 1971. In: F.R.U.S., Vol. XVII, pp. 332-333.
 228
 the Pakistani channel worked, I will examine the substance, the political and diplomatic 
significance of the Bucharest channel of dialogue between China and the US by reviewing 
and analysing the Romanian leadership’s undertakings to play a part in the normalisation of 
relations between Washington and Beijing. Only when the operations of both the channels 
of communication, Pakistani and Romanian, have been investigated, one can deduce which 
mights have been reasons for the Bucharest channel’s fall through.  
By the end of the 1960s, albeit one of the goals of the US government was a rapprochement 
with the PRC, the Nixon administration was not willing to achieve it at the cost of throwing 
the world off balance, that is to say by provoking Moscow to imprudent measures. Hence, 
Washington sought for a mediator that had good relations with the Peoples’ Republic of 
China in the first place and secondly, that enjoyed autonomy from the USSR.  
Moreover, with its need to deepen the ties with the West in order to put an end to 
commercial restrictions and gain access to loans and American technology, Bucharest 
seemed, in the eyes of the American leaders, the perfect candidate to act as middleman. At 
that time, against the backdrop of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the Romanian Communist 
Party’s leadership was striving to safeguard its freedom to manoeuvre in domestic policy 
issues and to conduct a foreign policy independent from the Soviet influence.  
Although Moscow’s pressure on Bucharest was dictated by different reasons, it was mostly 
the economic mismatches - Khrushchev’s plan for an economic cooperative zone of the 
socialist countries and the resultant socialist division of labour, that called for Romania’s 
transformation in an agricultural  country and East Germany and Czechoslovakia’s turn into 
developed, heavy industrialised states - that eventually resulted in inter-party relations and 
foreign policy contradictions.  
The Romanian authorities’ first move to mediate the Sino-American dialogue arrived on 
June 3rd, 1969, when the Romanian Ambassador A. Duma informed the Chinese Minister of 
Foreign Affairs about the intention of some American senators to pay an unofficial visit to 
China. In their reply, on the one hand, the Chinese would mention that they longed for 
peaceful coexistence with all countries in the world, the United States included, but on the 
other hand, the same policy of peaceful coexistence could not function in relation with a 
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 state that occupied a Chinese territory and took on aggressive attitudes towards Beijing . 350
Further in this document, the Chinese would state their opinion with regard to the Nixon 
administration’s initiatives on foreign policy, considered more like a new method and less 
like a new policy of the American President to position Washington towards Beijing, in the 
context of the US failure to attain a positive outcome through the furtherance of force 
policies against the PRC . The Vietnam war had, indeed, proved it. Despite the fact that 351
the Chinese political discourse with regard to the bilateral ties with the US held no tiny 
significant alterations or improvements, they disclosed, however, an almost imperceptible 
disposition towards the initiation of dialogue with Washington, on condition that no 
American statesman visited the Chinese territory.  
The possibility of mediating the Sino-American dialogue by the Socialist Republic of 
Romania would be first debated during the American President's visit to Bucharest in the 
summer of 1969. Moreover, by dint of new archival documents relating to Nixon’s visit to 
Bucharest on August 2, 1969, it is possible to capture new insight into the complexities of 
that meeting and those talks, that hitherto were unclear. For example, the documents 
unveiled that the American government’s attitude towards Beijing, i.e. Washington’s refusal 
to recognise Communist China and its non-acceptance to the UN, was mostly dictated by 
Beijing’s (hostile) foreign policies towards its neighbouring countries rather than its 
domestic policies .   352
Without further ado, the Romanian political elite would inform the Chinese counterpart of 
the American attitude towards the PRC and the core of conversations between Nicolae 
Ceaușescu and the American President Richard Nixon, in occasion of the Romanian 
Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer’s visit to Vietnam on September 7th, for the funeral of 
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 President Ho Chi Minh . Maurer would communicate to Zhou Enlai details concerning 353
Nixon’s perspective on the escalation of the Sino-Soviet conflict and would assure, on 
behalf of the American government, that, in case of a Soviet military intervention in China, 
Washington had no intention to support the USSR. Indeed, on September 5th, 1969, the 
Nixon administration would issue an open statement indicating Washington’s pensiveness 
of a Sino-Soviet war, to which the American government could not stay impassive.  
On December 17th, 1969, Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister George Macovescu “met 
with Kissinger in Washington to discuss bilateral relations, the Vietnam negotiations and 
China” . On this occasion, he would inform the American Secretary of State about the 354
Chinese interest in the prospect of contacts with Washington, and the Chinese reaction 
regarding Nixon's visit to Bucharest.  
On the one hand, to American President’s questions regarding the Sino-Soviet relations, the 
Romanian delegation would state that the prospect for a complete normalisation of relations 
between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union was still afar, for both sides 
were tainted by mistrust. On the other hand, Richard Nixon would assert that the American 
government was worried the Soviet leadership might have been goaded into hostile action 
by Washington’s moves towards Beijing as well as by the former’s opening towards 
Bucharest . When Macovescu highlighted the Chinese leaders’ interest to have normal 355
relations with the West, Kissinger would deduce that the Chinese communists - albeit the 
captivating idea of a rapprochement with the US - were, however, not considering Romania 
as the ideal mediator between Beijing and Washington, and preferred the Pakistani channel 
for dialogue instead . 356
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 Undeniably, despite the friendly Sino-Romanian relations, Beijing did not fully trust the 
satellite states of the Soviet Union, and feared that the information conveyed via Bucharest 
channel could have instantly and faultlessly ended up in Moscow. In this circumstances, in 
becomes clear why - considering the Romanian channel of dialogue having only been used 
a few times during 1970 in comparison with its counterpart in Islamabad - in December 
1970 and January 1971, Nixon and Kissinger would take a “final decision (…) to use the 
Pakistani channel” .  357
Kissinger would send a message to the PRC through Bucharest channel for the first time in 
April 1970 and the communique urged the authorities in Beijing to provide a visa for the 
American senator Mike Mansfield, in view of his visit to China. Subsequently, on June 6th, 
there was a telephone conversation between Emil Bodnǎraș, Vice-President of the State 
Council and Zhou Enlai, regarding the floods in Romania and the resultant Chinese feasible 
assistance. However, during this conversation, when Bodnǎraș brought into question the 
issue of the Sino-American relations, Zhou Enlai replied that there was no message to 
convey to Washington (Liu Yong 2006: 300). Yet, since concomitantly the Pakistani channel 
was passing on messages in both directions, it leads into thinking that the Bucharest 
channel, regarded with suspicion, was deliberately kept off.  
Nevertheless, during the celebrations for the UN’s 25th anniversary in October 1970, where 
both Romanian and Pakistani delegations were present, the American President would take 
advantage of this opportunity to convey messages for the PRC by dint of the two channels 
of dialogue. In fact, during the private bilateral talks with the Pakistani President Yahya 
Khan and the Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu in the Oval Office, Nixon would state 
that the Sino-American bilateral ties were essential for the United States and that the 
American government was willing to send secret envoys to Beijing to organise the re-
establishment of relations .  358
Moreover, during this conversation with the American President, Ceaușescu would 
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 emphasise the Romanian political elite’s friendly and special relations with the leadership in 
Beijing and would draw the American leaders’ attention upon specific matters like the 
PRC’s admission to the UN, as well as on more general arguments, such as the Sino-
American ties. Furthermore, the Romanian President would expound that, in the course of 
that morning, he had received a message from Zhou Enlai whereby the Chinese Premier 
thanked Bucharest’s political authorities for backing the PRC in its struggle to regain its 
righteous seat at the United Nations. In addition, Ceaușescu would state that Zhou Enlai 
believed Washington would make the first steps in this direction, especially in the aftermath 
of the American invasion of Cambodia, and would add that Romania had experience in 
playing the middleman’s role as it was demonstrated by Bucharest’s endeavour and final 
success into persuading the Chinese to normalise relations with Yugoslavia after 15 years of 
unfriendly relations . 359
In November, Richard Nixon’s messages for the leadership in Beijing would reach China 
from both the channels of dialogue, almost simultaneously, albeit Bucharest had the chance 
to transmit the message faster. For example, albeit the Romanian Minister of Commerce 
Traian Burticǎ payed a visit to the PRC on 12 November, he would transmit no message to 
the Chinese side from their American counterpart on this occasion. A week behind schedule, 
Nicolae Ceaușescu eventually sent a letter to Mao Zedong through the Romanian Deputy 
Premier Gheorghe Rǎdulescu, describing to the Chinese leadership the settlements reached 
by the Romanian leadership in the aftermath of Ceaușescu’s trip to Washington and New 
York. The discussions between Zhou Enlai and Gheorghe Rădulescu on 21st November 
mainly focused on Sino-American relations and, in this regard, the Chinese Prime Minister 
asserted that at the bottom of the strained Sino-American relations laid Washington’s 
military occupation of both Taiwan and the Strait of Taiwan. Thus, in the Chinese premier’s 
regard, the only issue standing between Washington and Beijing’s concord was indeed, the 
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 issue of Taiwan .  360
Further on during the talks, however, some problems arose when Rǎdulescu, 
misunderstanding the Chinese message, was about to convey to the White House the 
following message from Beijing: “China is ready to welcome, for negotiations, Nixon’s 
special envoy to Beijing” . Once heard, Zhou Enlai rectified the Romanian statesman’s 361
note right away and pronounced the following: “Not only a special envoy could come, but 
Nixon himself should visit Beijing. If he can visit Bucharest and Belgrade, then he can also 
visit Beijing” .  362
Zhou Enlai would repeat the exact same message to the Pakistani President Yahya Khan, 
however wrapped up with Pakistani national elections and devastating floods in the country, 
Khan delayed the transmission of the message to Washington until the first days of 
December. It would be Ambassador Hilaly to finally convey the message to Kissinger on 
December 9, 1970. In this context, having been waiting for news from one of the channels 
for several weeks, the American administration had started to believe that it was the Chinese 
leadership that, once again, had delayed a response.  
Thus, if the Pakistani had reasons to hold up the communications, it is however, not simple 
to claim the same about the Bucharest channel. Indeed, it was not until January 11, 1971, 
that the Romanians would pass the message to the American government, when Corneliu 
Bogdan, Romanian ambassador to Washington, met with Kissinger and told him about Zhou 
Enlai's message. It was Bucharest leadership’s second time to delay the transmission of the 
message to Washington.  
Furthermore, according to Munteanu, as there is no evidence proving a Chinese demand 
that the Romanian side explicitly delayed the conveyance of Mao’s note to Nixon, this delay 
will be engulfed by speculation until new Chinese records will emerge to prove otherwise. 
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 Still, as he pointed out, whichever the reasons for the Romanian delay, “the Chinese also 
used other means to ensure that the US got the message. The invitation extended by Mao to 
American journalist Edgar Snow, and the coverage received by his visit and meeting with 
Mao in the Chinese press can also be interpreted as a message that the Chinese leadership 
was preparing for contacts with the US. The White House, however, missed the 
message” .  363
During his meeting with Ambassador Corneliu Bogdan on January 11, 1971, Kissinger 
would forward the Romanian Ambassador the same message that had previously been sent 
via Pakistan on December 16, 1970. Although the messages sent through the two channels 
would not be different in content, the manner in which they were transmitted was: indeed, 
through the agency of the Bucharest channel the message was conveyed orally, in 
comparison with the printed version conveyed by dint of the Pakistani channel. However, a 
memorandum of the meeting - reporting that Ceaușescu “had sent his vice-premier to 
Beijing (…) that Chinese Premier Zhou gave the Romanian a note saying the key issue with 
the US was the American occupation of Taiwan (…) and that the US President would be 
welcome to discuss the issue in Beijing” - was prepared by Henry Kissinger for President 
Nixon on January 12 . 364
It is reasoned to assert that on this occasion, as soon as Bogdan encountered the American 
Secretary of State to transmit the messages from the Chinese leadership, the decision of 
which channel to use subsequently, had already been taken at the White House. As a matter 
of fact, Nixon was sure about the fact that the Pakistani would prove eager to continue the 
middleman’s role and would accomplish this mission even better than the Romanian 
leaders, therefore, from this day forward, no message would be sent again by dint of the 
Bucharest channel (Munteanu 2007/2008: 408).  
The American Secretary of State highlighted the American administration’s preference to 
continue the exchange of messages via the Pakistani channel by arguing that the Romanian 
authorities’ diplomacy would face a delicate situation towards Moscow if the latter became 
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 aware of the PRC-US thaw. Moreover, Kissinger’s scepticism regarding Washington’s 
usage of the Bucharest channel would come out twice during the bilateral talks, the second 
time when the secretary of state preferred to maintain secrecy regarding the likelihood that 
the American President visited China. At this point, it is not only clear that he had chosen to 
discuss this issue personally, on occasion of his secret trip to the Chinese capital, but it 
represents, once again, the American administration’s bias for the Pakistani channel, the 
incredulity in the Romanian authorities, and the Sino-American tendency to take 
precautions against any risk. In addition, besides Romania’s barring from Washington’s 
affairs, the Chinese would also sever dialogue through the Bucharest channel.  
Indeed, when Vice Premier Rǎdulescu visited China again on March 23rd, 1971, to conclude 
the economic accords of autumn 1970, and to inform Zhou Enlai of Corneliu Bogdan’s talks 
with the American Secretary of State, the Chinese Premier would thank the Romanian vice 
premier, but would immediately point out that the same messages had already been 
conveyed via other channels and that “given the difference between the US and Chinese 
positions on Taiwan and Indochina, China had nothing to talk about with the United 
States” (Munteanu 2007/2008: 408).  
Hence, the Pakistani channel would make the arrangements for Kissinger’s visit to Beijing 
between 9-11 July 1971, whereas Bucharest was left out. During Ceaușescu’s visit to the 
Chinese capital a month prior to Kissinger’s trip, thus in June 1971, throughout the course 
of  talks with Mao, the Chinese leadership had asked the Romanian President what was the 
latter’s opinion regarding the “ping-pong diplomacy” but, apart from that, hardly any 
comments were made concerning the Sino-American rapprochement (Munteanu 2007/2008: 
408). 
Oddly enough, in the aftermath of Henry Kissinger’s visit to Beijing, more precisely on July 
16th, the Romanian Ambassador to China Iosiv Chivu would be summoned by the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to be notified about the American Secretary of State’s 
visit to China and the objectives of his visit: to discuss Sino-American related matters and 
to prepare Nixon's forthcoming visit to Beijing, that was due to take place before May 1972. 
Ji Pengfei, vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would apologise for informing 
Romania about the visit with a certain delay, but, he would explain, there had been a Sino-
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 American agreement to maintain the visit confidential until the publication of the 
communiqué. Nevertheless, in the name of the Sino-Romanian friendly relations, Pengfei 
wished the information was transmitted by Bucharest separately, and before the release of 
the communiqué, to the Romanian people, the Koreans, the Albanians and to Vietnam . 365
This event demonstrates once more the insufficient nature of the Bucharest channel for 
dialogue in the Chinese and American eyes. In fact, since the beginning, the preference for 
the Pakistani Channel was evident, and not only because the authorities in Islamabad had 
known, all along, the details concerning the Sino-American steps towards rapprochement, 
but they actively participated in the organisation of the American Secretary of State’s visit 
to China. Romania would publicly express its support for Nixon’s invitation to the PRC. 
Indeed, on July 21st, the Romanian Communist Party’s journal “Scânteia” published an 
extensive article regarding Bucharest’s position of support for this invitation and its 
beneficial consequences on the improvement of Sino-American ties. Following this gesture, 
the Chinese leadership hurried to thank the Romanian Communist Party for the friendly 
manifestation towards Beijing’s political strategy.  
As follows, Li Lianqing, Deputy Director of the Department for USSR and Eastern 
European countries within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, would reconfirm the 
Romanian comrades’ most valuable assistance and public support, especially in the context 
of escalating scepticism within, and even open attacks of, some communist parties in the 
socialist camp, with regard to both Richard Nixon’s visit to China and the CPC leadership’s 
political manoeuvres .  366
Following Kissinger’s visit to Beijing, Corneliu Bogdan, the Romanian Ambassador to 
Washington would firstly congratulate the American Secretary of State for his visit to the 
PRC and secondly, he would question Kissinger on whether the American Administration 
 “Telegramă a Ambasadei României la Beijing către C. Mănescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, privind 365
vizita pe care o va face în R.P. Chineză Richard Nixon, Preşedinte al S.U.A”, 16 iulie 1971, A.M.A.E., Fond, 
Telegrame, Pekin, vol. II, 1971, f. 293-295, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. 
Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele 
Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 1091. 
 “Telegramă a Ambasadei României la Beijing către G. Macovescu, prim-adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor 366
Externe, privind mulţumirile exprimate de partea chineză României pentru susţinerea publică a invitării în R.P. 
Chineză a lui R. Nixon, preşedintele S.U.A”, 27 iulie 1971, A.M.A.E., fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol. II, f. 
338-339, în R.I. Budura, op. cit., pp. 1091-192.
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 would still need Bucharest’s opinions, convictions or Romanian delegations’ trips to Beijing 
henceforth, considered the newly established direct contacts between the PRC and the 
United States. To the Ambassador’s enquiry, Kissinger would expand that, conversely, 
Washington would still count on the information provided by Bucharest.  
Furthermore, the Romanian Ambassador maintained that the Romanian President Nicolae 
Ceaușescu had highlighted the necessity to find feasible solutions for the issue of 
Vietnam . Basically, Bucharest’s middleman role was ended on January 11th, 1970, with 367
the meeting between Ambassador Bogdan and Henry Kissinger. The Romanian channel 
would still convey messages, however not because of Bucharest’s constant activities as 
mediator, but rather as a result of the messages having become echoes of the Chinese and 
American foreign policy ventures.  
In lack of evidence, it is impossible to establish what might have happened if the 
Romanians had conveyed in time the two communications they received from Beijing in 
September 1969 and November 1970, or whether the Chinese and Americans were prepared 
to use exclusively the Romanian channel, given their suspicion of the Romanian leadership 
to be swayed by Soviet penetration. Furthermore, Bucharest’s reasons for delaying the 
conveyance of the messages to Washington are nowadays still unknown, albeit international 
researchers have tried to find some explanations to this topic.  
Hence, there is no evidence to attest that Ceaușescu was asked by the Chinese to not pass 
the communication to Washington, or that deliberately, he might have held up the 
transmission in order not to be “held responsible by Moscow for bringing the Chinese and 
the Americans together” (Munteanu 2007/2008: 409). According to the author, “what seems 
clear from the documents is that Bucharest chose, for its own reasons, to delay passing 
Chinese messages to the White House. Even so (…) Bucharest’s decision did little to affect 
its relations with Washington. The Romanians were able to maintain open channels of 
communication with the White House, and continued to secure support from the 
administration on its requests for credits, and economic aid” (Munteanu 2007/2008: 409). 
In conclusion, speculations aside, the Bucharest channel’s importance lies in the fact that it 
 Memorandum of Conversation, san Clemente, California, August, 31, 1971, in Foreign Relation of U.S., 367
China 1969-1972, Vol. XVII, pp. 509-510. 
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 has assisted the American administration into understanding the Chinese position towards 
the Sino-American issues. Therefore it’s role is not to be neglected, as, alongside the 
Pakistani channel, however in a smaller proportion, supported the resumption of high level 
Sino-American contacts, and thus, contributed to the emergence of a new strategic power 
relationship within the international system, dictated by the Cold War . 368
IV.4 New Changes, New Challenges: 
Overview of the Sino-Romanian ties in the 1970s 
In the beginning of the 1970s, albeit Beijing’s acquisition of a prestigious position within 
the international arena as a result of the normalisation of its relations with both the US and 
Japan (September 1972), China was struggling domestically with the social disruptions 
generated by the Cultural Revolution. In fact, Lin Biao’s failed coup attempt, followed by 
his suspicious death, Zhou Enlai’s efforts to hold sway of the Chinese state affairs, to 
mitigate the harm produced by the Red Guards and to struggle against the Gang of Four 
over headship in China, while Mao, already unwell, was mostly committed to the political 
and ideological aspects of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, are only some of the 
facets of the Chinese internal circumstances at the time in question.  
Moreover, some of the Chinese internal events and conflicts for power like the death of 
Premier Zhou Enlai on January 8th, 1976 and of Mao Zedong eight months later (9 
September 1976), the third political crush of Deng Xiaoping - Zhou Enlai’s successor - 
during the traditional day of mourning at Tiananmen Square (5 May 1976), the emergence 
of Huo Guofeng as Chinese President, the Gang of Four - leaded by Jiang Qing, Mao’s last 
wife - coup attempt and their downfall on October 6th, 1976, were chiefly masqueraded by 
the leadership in Bucharest.  
Buzatu pointed out that, albeit internal Chinese affairs were hardly acknowledged in the 
 For more information regarding the Romanian contribution to the Sino-American rapprochement also see 368
Lavinia Betea (coord.), “Viața lui Ceaușescu. Fiul Poporului”, Adevǎrul Holding București, 2013, pp. 
260-269, 349-355. 
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 socialist countries, a letter sent by the Romanian authorities to Lin Biao months after his 
death as well as Bucharest’s appreciation of the Chinese leadership’s stability while the 
Gang of Four had been just arrested, or Ceaușescu’s decision to conceal the fact that the 
leader of the Gang of Four, Jian Qing, was Mao’s wife - worried that the latter might be 
resembled to Elena Ceaușescu - are noted facts. However, international relations between 
the PRC and the rest of the world were only slightly influenced by these episodes (Buzatu 
2004: 121-122).  
On the other hand, by not condemning Beijing’s internal and international operations, by 
providing both political and diplomatic support, and by intensifying the bilateral economic 
cooperation, the Socialist Republic of Romania had managed to fill the forth place in the list 
of countries best friends with China, immediately after Korea, Cambodia and Albania 
(Buzatu 2004: 122). Thus, if the 1970s stand for an era of opening up to the West for both 
Romania and China, for the Sino-Romanian cooperation, the same years would indicate the 
intensification of an already advanced partnership in the economic field, as well as a 
flourishing mutual financial, political and moral support, both in the context of the ravaging 
floods that affected Romania in 1970, and during the difficult and puzzling political context 
produced domestically by the Chinese cultural revolution and internationally, by the Sino-
Soviet split and border clashes of 1969, as well as by the Sino-American rapprochement in 
the first years of the 1970s.  
The escalation of the Sino-Soviet border conflicts had led to the Soviet creation of a 
military region in Central Asia. Additionally, considered that, by then, both Moscow and 
Beijing were nuclear powers, when Henry Kissinger visited China in the summer of 1971, 
the leaders in Beijing were certain that the PRC would have to confront a potentially more 
dangerous and immediate enemy than the United States. This would actually be one of the 
major reasons for China’s shift of main adversaries, from the United States to the USSR, 
and that would eventually contribute to the accomplishment of a Sino-American 
rapprochement, endorsed by President Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972.  
In response to Moscow’s hostile strategy towards Beijing, in April 1970, on occasion of the 
commemoration of the 100th anniversary of Lenin’s birthday, three Chinese journals 
(“People’s Daily”, “Red Flag” and “Liberation Army Daily”) would publish an article 
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 strongly criticising the USSR’s leadership for arrogating to themselves the name of Lenin in 
order to follow and practise their social-imperialism, social-fascism and social-militarism. 
(Liu Yong 2006: 309). To the Chinese allegations, the Soviet press would reply by 
publishing “Soviet-Chinese relations”, an open attack to the PRC - considered culpable for 
the break up of Sino-Soviet relations - and to the figure of Mao Zedong.  
As for Romania, it is clear that it had monitored the Sino-Soviet split from a third, neutral 
stance already since 1964, in concomitance with the deterioration of relations between 
Moscow and Bucharest. The reasons that lied behind the break-off of Soviet-Romanian 
relations were mainly dictated by Moscow and Bucharest’s differences of opinion regarding 
the Warsaw Pact Organisation (the Romanian Communist Party’s objections to the 
integration of the WTO military troops) and the relations between socialist countries (Liu 
Yong 2006: 309).  
Hence, on April 8th, 1970, the Romanian Communist Party’s main journal “Scânteia” 
would bring to public notice that the “Romanian press circles believed that Romania’s 
friendship and multilateral cooperation with China will definitely develop further, be in 
favour of the two countries’ peoples, and strengthen the whole socialist system, strengthen 
the unity of the whole system and the cause of peace and progress at the same time” (Liu 
Yong 2006: 310). In this context, besides the fact that Romania would be granted by China 
the highest non-conditional, irredeemable financial aid it ever received from another 
country, US $ 25 Million in the context of the floods’ devastations (Buzatu 2004: 118), the 
beginning of the 1970s would practically witness a stepping up in the Sino-Romanian 
diplomatic ties, with Zhang Hai-feng being appointed ambassador to Bucharest, for the first 
time in three years since the PRC had called down almost its entire diplomatic staff at the 
onset of the Great Cultural Revolution.  
As already mentioned, Chairman Mao’s attempts to re-establish control internally by 
summoning the IX Congress of the CPC in April 1969, were brought to an end when the 
new Party Constitution adopted at the congress placed Lin Biao as Comrade Mao Zedong's 
successor. The congress would legitimise the theory and practice of the cultural revolution 
and would solidify the position of Lin Biao and Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong’s wife, in the 
Party’s Central Committee.  
 241
 In these political circumstances, Romania’s availability to keep an intense bilateral dialogue 
with the PRC was confirmed by a high-level Romanian delegation visit, headed by Emil 
Bodnǎraș, to Beijing in June 1970, aiming at the obtainment of Chinese assistance for the 
Romanian defence power. According to former ambassador Budura, the Sino-Romanian 
arrangements concerning the construction of factories and plants producing technics, 
equipments, weaponry and munitions have remained confidential, with the exception of a 
specific enclosed by the telegraphic report, that came out in the aftermath of the encounter 
to provide an outline of the Sino-Romanian negotiations: “They gave us everything we 
wanted!” (Budura 2005: 24).  
Furthermore, the visit to China of the Romanian leader Nicolae Ceaușescu, secretary 
general of the CC of the Romanian Communist Party, and his wife Elena in 1971, would 
lead to the stabilisation of the Sino-Romanian ties in every sphere. However, during the 
conversations with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, a particular attention was payed by the 
two sides to the cultural field, that had previously witnessed a decrease of the bilateral 
cooperation as a result of the Chinese cultural revolution (Budura 2005: 25).  
As already mentioned, it was precisely in the aftermath of this visit and the one in Korea 
immediately after, that Ceaușescu decided to launch a “small cultural revolution” (Buzatu 
2004: 122) in Romania, by eradicating the already inconspicuous liberalisation period, by 
developing a fervent personality cult and by limiting the democratic rights of the people.  
The Chinese party and government delegation’s visit to Bucharest on August 23rd, 1974, 
headed by vice premier of the PRC Li Xiannian, on the occasion of Romania’s Liberation 
Day, would considerably stimulate the Sino-Romanian mutual support and bilateral 
exchanges. Moreover, a further significant moment for the bilateral partnership between 
Bucharest and Beijing would be the meeting between the Romanian President Ceaușescu 
and the Chinese President Hua Guofeng during the Romanian leader’s official visit to 
Beijing between 15-20 May 1978 .  369
In the political and diplomatic field, the 1970s witnessed, besides the cooperation within the 
international forums like the UN and the two countries adoption of the same position of 
 Arhivele Naționale ale României - Biroul arhive contemporane - Inventare online, Fonduri - CC al PCR, 369
Albume foto, Nicolae Ceaușescu. Vizite externe, inventar nr. 3289, adăugat in martie 2013.
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 support regarding prince Norodom Sihanouk’s regime in Cambodia, the Chinese backing of 
Romania’s position regarding the construction of security and cooperation system in Europe 
(Budura 2005: 25), as well as the previously expounded, Bucharest’s undertakings in the 
thaw of Sino-American relations.  
In this context, it is suitable to underline the significant establishment of the first direct 
airline between Bucharest and Beijing on November 27th, 1974, not only for its commercial 
effects, but for political reasons also, and the “completion of the government agreement on 
the transfer of land and the mutual construction of embassies in Beijing and Bucharest” 
three years later, in 1977 (Budura 2005: 45).  
Moreover, according to Nemeș, “besides the fact that the Romanian leaders supported 
China regarding the conflicts with the Unites States and the Soviet Union, Romania was 
also contributing to the development of the Chinese economy”  and analogously, China 370
was for Romania “a very important strategic and military partner. According to Viorel 
Isticioaia-Budura, the head of the Asia and Pacific Department within the European 
External Action Service and former Romanian ambassador in Beijing, Romania was after 
the Soviet Union the second modernisation partner of China” .  371
Furthermore, there is evidence that attests a great diversification of cooperation in the 
scientific and technological ambits, with the two countries' collaboration opening up to high 
technology in the petroleum and chemical industry, as well as in nuclear physics. For 
example, the two countries opened up for joint collaboration in the manufacturing and 
“thermal treatment of wheels of mono-block wagons or in the production of electronic 
computing machines, of forged bodies for mud pumps and eruption preventers (…) medical 
apparatus, production of synthetic benzene, dyes, and colloidal gold to decorate fine glass 
(…) applying acupuncture to cure certain handicaps” (Budura 2005: 46).  
With reference to the economic and financial aspects, an agreement was signed in Beijing 
on 20-26 November 1970 between the Romanian and Chinese authorities, providing 
Romania with two interest free long-term loans in yuan, aiming at the relaunch of the 
 Tudor Nemeș, “How did the Romanian revolution in 1989 affect the bilateral relation between the two 370
countries?”, Chinese, University of Southern Denmark, Faculty of Humanities, 2015, p.24
 Ibidem371
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 bilateral commercial trade. While the first loan, mounting to 100 million dollars, was 
granted in December 1970 and had to be reimbursed within three years, between January 1st 
1977 and December 31st, 1979, the second loan, of 200 million RMB, the equivalent of 
more than 50 million dollars, used by the leadership in Bucharest to purchase from the PRC 
equipment necessary to the national economy and to the Romanian defence industry, had to 
be cleared through ten annual equal base rates, between January 1st, 1981 and December 
31st, 1990 .  372
In order to guarantee an unassailable Sino-Romanian cooperation, the authorities in Beijing 
decided to provide the Romanian Socialist Republic with a a large group of Chinese experts 
that visited the country between 1971-1972, leaded by Jiang Zemin, future General 
Secretary of the CC of the PRC (1989-2002) and president of the PRC (1993-2003). Jiang 
contributed to the installing of new Chinese machinery in the Romanian factories and 
supervised the production of Romanian merchandise which was further sold on the Chinese 
market. Later on, from his position as President of the People’s Republic of China, he 
continued to support the Romanian-Chinese relations and cooperation (Buzatu 2004: 122). 
Thus, in less than eight years, albeit the poor quality of some Romanian products or the 
PCR’s lack of reliability and commitment to the legally binding contracts (Buzatu 2004: 
123), the bilateral trade would reach the incredible amount of almost 2 billion dollars, up to 
ten times higher than the amount of bilateral trade after 1990, the latter varying between 
200-500 million dollars per year, of which 70% representing Chinese exports to Romania 
(Buzatu 2004: 118). Additionally, on March 22nd, 1971, another accord would provide 
Romania with Chinese full equipments and technical assistance, resulting in the 
construction of 16 production unities on Romanian soil.  
If between 1965 and 1974, the bilateral support of the two countries and people would be 
mirrored through the numerous bilateral visits and contacts between the Chinese and 
Romanian party and state leaders, by mid 1970s no less than one hundred joint declarations, 
 “1970 noiembrie 25, Beijing. Acord între Guvernul Republicii Socialiste România și Guvernul Republicii 372
Populare Chineze privind acordarea de cǎtre China României a unui credit pe termen lung, fǎrǎ dobândǎ, în 
valutǎ liberǎ” A.M.A.E., fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol. III, f. 396, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-
Chineze 1880-1974. Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor 
Externe, Arhivele Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, pp. 1018-1019; “1970 noiembrie 25, Beijing. Acord între 
Guvernul Republicii Socialiste România și Guvernul Republicii Populare Chineze privind acordarea de cǎtre 
China României a unui credit fǎrǎ dobândǎ, pe termen lung” în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1019-1020 
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 agreements on mutual exchange, conventions, communiqués and protocols would be signed 
by the two governments in Bucharest and Beijing (Budura 2005: 24-25).  
Accordingly, the improvement in Sino-Romanian commercial cooperation would be 
confirmed in 1974, with the bilateral trade volume exceeding 1.6 billion Lei, of which a 
little more than 50% was represented by Romanian exports (841.805 million Lei) and 
792.112 million Lei consisted of Chinese exports. As in previous years, the goods 
exchanged between the two peoples’ republics mostly included chemical fertilisers, 
machineries, knotty system installations, power aggregates, ships, trucks etc. At this point, 
by completely agreeing with diplomatic adviser Buzatu, it is essential to assert that, on the 
background of  a favourable political context, the commercial trade between the two 
countries as well as the cooperation in different fields of interest, reached the highest point 
in the history of Sino-Romanian relations (Buzatu 2004: 122).  
In fact, the cultural cooperation maintained a significant exchange of the traditional tours of 
scientists and artists, expositions, soloist or groups’ dances and song performances, ballet 
ensembles, lectures and students’ exchange visits, swap of movies and documentary films. 
During the Chinese Cultural Revolution, albeit the militaristic restrictions inflicted by the 
red campaigners to the many facets of culture , Romania was the only socialist state, with 373
the exception of the Asian countries, that had its cinematographic productions broadcasted 
before the Chinese audience (Budura 2005: 46).  A captivating example to support the 
statement is the fact that when the Romanian movie “Ciprian Porumbescu” was broadcasted 
in China, abounding in beautiful actors and rendering some young love scenes - unseen 
aspects for Chinese audience at that point, long queues of people wishing to purchase 
tickets were formed, thus making the event an exclusive moment for the Romanian 
production. Likewise, the success of the Romanian athletes in different international 
competitions, comprising the PRC , have contributed to the shaping of a favourable image 
about the Romanian Socialist Republic and to the escalation of Chinese sympathy towards 
the Romanian people (Buzatu 2004: 123).   
 Just to name some: material culture - tools, artefacts and technology - language, aesthetics, education, 373
religion, attitudes, values, social organisation
 245
 IV.5 Top-level diplomacy: 
Romania and China increase mutual support, friendship and understanding in the 1970s 
Sino-Romanian diplomatic ties were broadened throughout the 1970s and, like in the 1960s, 
the Romanian authorities endeavoured into smoothing the way for the normalisation of 
relations between the PRC and different African countries.  
For instance, while a letter sent by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on January 
22nd, 1970, to the Romanian Ambassador to Beijing Aurel Duma, reports on Baba Gana’s 
solicitation, in his position as Nigeria’s deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, to enable 
commercial and diplomatic contacts between Nigeria and the PRC , on 14 April 1970, 374
another telegram sent by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Aurel Duma in 
Beijing, would reveal the strong interest of the Ghanaian government to normalise relations 
with China and would communicate the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs request to its 
Ambassador in Beijing to immediately inform the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
the circumstances . Furthermore, eight days later, on April 22nd, 1970, a message sent 375
once more, by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian Ambassador in 
Beijing, would bring to public notice the Indian authorities’ hope to improve relations with 
the PRC  as well as the Belgian government’s aspiration to resume relations with Beijing 376
just a few months later.  
 “1970 ianuarie 22, București. Telegramǎ a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe cǎtre Aurel Duma, Ambasador 374
al României la Beijing, privind solicitarea lui Baba Gana, adjunct al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe al 
Nigeriei, de a facilita contacte comerciale și diplomatice între Nigeria si R.P. Chinezǎ”, A.M.A.E, fond 
Telegrame, Pekin, vol. I, 1970, nepaginat în Budura, R.I. (ed.), “Relaţiile Româno-Chineze 1880-1974. 
Documente” [Sino-Romanian relations, 1880-1974. Documents], Ministerul Afacerilor Externe, Arhivele 
Naţionale, Bucharest, 2005, p. 991
 “1970 aprilie 14, București. Telegramǎ a lui Petru Burlacu, adjunct al Ministerului Afacerilor Externe, 375
cǎtre Aurel Duma, Ambasador al României la Beijing, în care se indicǎ sǎ transmitǎ la M.A.E. al R.P. Chineze 
interesul manifestat de Ghana pentru normalizarea relațiilor cu acest stat”, A.M.A.E., fond Telegrame, Pekin, 
vol.I, 1970, f. 49-50, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., p. 992
 “1970 aprilie 22, București. Telegramǎ a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe cǎtre Aurel Duma, Ambasador al 376
României la Beijing, cu privire la dorința exprimatǎ de India de a îmbunǎtǎți relațiile cu R.P.Chinezǎ”, 
A.M.A.E., fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol. I, 1970, f. 53-54, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., p. 993
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 Other moments are necessarily indicative of the Chinese consideration for a Sino-Romanian 
effective cooperation in the diplomatic field. For example, in a letter sent on June 28th, 
1971, under the insistence of the Chinese office for diplomatic affairs, the Romanian envoy 
to Beijing urged the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to send, without delay, both the 
Romanian Embassy’s construction plan and a construction expert to Beijing, in the context 
of the land for the building of a foreign embassy in Beijing being perfectly situated and thus 
highly requested by other embassies . 377
Moreover, different telegrams sent by the Romanian Embassy in Beijing to the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in July 1971, not only provide a clear picture of the Chinese 
authority’s position towards a potential Sino-American rapprochement, but most 
importantly, yield a fine impression of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs Ji Pengfei’s 
solicitousness and respect regarding Bucharest leadership’s friendship in the context of the 
organisation of Nixon’s forthcoming visit to Beijing.  
Thus, while the first letter informed the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the 
Chinese counterpart’s decision to disclose, throughout a communique’, Beijing’s position 
regarding the Sino-American relations only to the Romanian, Korean, Albanese and 
Vietnamese authorities, as a demonstration of friendly - brotherly relations with the peoples, 
parties and governments of these countries, the second telegram sent by the Romanian 
diplomat to Beijing to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs revealed the Chinese 
government’s gratitude for Bucharest’s public backing concerning the American President’s 
invitation to the PRC. Indeed, an article entitled “The perspectives of the Sino-American 
normalisation of relations for the sake of collaboration and international detachment” was 
published in the official newspaper of the Romanian Communist Party “Scânteia” on July 
27th 1971, leading to the utmost Chinese appreciation for Bucharest’s unique, unbridged 
and rationalised political support in the process for Beijing’s opening towards 
 “1970 august 4, București. Telegramǎ a Ministerului Afacerilor Externe cǎtre Ambasada României la 377
Beijing privind construcția clǎdirii ambasadei R.S. România”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol.I, 1970, f. 
211, p. 999 in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., p. 999
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 Washington .  378
Another significant moment for the Sino-Romanian cooperation in the diplomatic and 
economic field was represented by the Chinese request that the Romanian commercial 
office in Kuala Lumpur supported the Chinese commercial delegation visiting Malaysia. 
Precisely, by means of the letter sent on 17 August 1971, the Romanian embassy in Beijing 
pleaded the authorities in Bucharest to acknowledge Beijing’s solicitation and, without 
further ado, to provide the Chinese with a response, especially considered the latter’s 
urgency to convey secret messages to the Malaysian government. In addition, the telegram 
to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, communicated that the Chinese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had already been informed about Bucharest be lacking in an embassy in 
Malaysia and about the Romanian commercial office in Kuala Lumpur most likely holding 
no direct coded line with Bucharest. The letter concluded by urging the Romanian 
authorities to communicate whether or not Bucharest was willing or qualified to contribute 
to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the PRC and Malaysia, as it had 
previously  done between the PRC and Chile . 379
The newly appointed Ambassador of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Gavrilescu 
presented his credentials to vice-president of the Peoples Republic of China, Dong Biwu, 
during an audience of one hour and a half, on January 18th, 1972. In his speech, the Chinese 
vice-president addressed topics such as the two countries' valuable friendship, the Sino-
Romanian close bilateral party and state relations, the Chinese leadership’s admiration for 
the personal achievements of Romanian President Ceaușescu, as well as Beijing authorities’ 
reflections over the Soviets’ disagreement of the Sino-Romanian amicable partnership. 
Following the mutual greetings to both the Chinese and Romanian leaders, and the Chinese 
side expression of gratitude for Bucharest’s support of Beijing’s position within the U.N., 
the vice-president gave a short presentation of the economic situation in the PRC, and 
 “1971 iulie 27, Beijing. Telegramǎ a Ambasadei României la Beijing cǎtre George Macovescu, prim-378
adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, privind mulțtumirile exprimate de partea chinezǎ României pentru 
susținerea publicǎ a invitǎrii în R.P.Chinezǎ a lui Richard Noxon, Președintele S.U.A”, A.M.A.E, fond 
Telegrame, Pekin, 1971, vol. II, f. 333-334, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1091-1092
 “1971 august 17, Beijing. Telegramǎ a Ambasadei României la Beijing cǎtre Petru Burlacu, adjunct al 379
Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, privind solicitarea pǎrții chineze ca oficiul comercial român din Malayezia sǎ 
acorde sprijin delegației comerciale chineze care va vizita aceastǎ țarǎ”, A.M.A.E., fond Telegrame, Pekin, 
vol. II, f. 410-411, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1094-1095
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 highlighted the Chinese industrial and agricultural success in 1971, as well as Beijing’s 
failure in the expansion of the production of electrical energy and in the mechanisation of 
agriculture.  
The Romanian ambassador to Beijing made a short presentation of the situation in Romania 
in the industrial, agricultural and construction fields, and revealed to the Chinese vice-
president the Romanian authorities’ main economic issues as well as strategies for the 
upcoming year, the Romanian party and state preoccupations and projects in different areas 
of activity, as well as Bucharest’s preoccupations for the improvement of political-ideologic 
and cultural-educational activities . 380
In addition, different letters sent between 30 April and 3 May 1972, by both Emil Bodnǎraș, 
vice president of the State Council and the Romanian Ambassador to Beijing, Nicolae 
Gavrilescu, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, revealed details concerning the 
reception offered by the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai to the Romanian delegation headed by 
Bodnǎraș in visit to Beijing, and the bilateral talks held on that occasion. According to the 
telegrams, running in a cozy, friendly atmosphere, discussions between the two countries’ 
representatives referred to the Sino-Romanian ties and to the funeral of K. Nkrumah, the 
former Ghanaian president, who would have received adequate funeral rites in Guinea by 
dint of the support provided by the government in Bucharest .  381
Moreover, a message plainly outlining the evolution of the Sino-Romanian ties between 
1971-1972 as well as the feasibility of upcoming programs for collaboration in the cultural, 
political, economic and diplomatic fields, was sent by the Romanian envoy to Beijing 
Gavrilescu, to George Macovescu, vice-minister of Foreign Affairs on May 31st, 1972. 
Basically, the brief report realised by the diplomat aimed to highlight, retrospectively, the 
positive outcome of the Romanian party and state delegation’s visit headed by President 
 “1972 ianuarie 18, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, cǎtre 380
George Macovescu, prim-adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, privind prezentarea scrisorilor de 
acreditare”, A.M.A.E., fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol.I, 1972, f. 62-66, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 
1101-1103
 “1972 aprilie 30, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Emil Bodnǎraș, vicepreședinte al Consiliului de Stat și a lui 381
Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, cǎtre Ṣtefan Andrei, secretar al CC. al PCR și 
Corneliu Mǎnescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, privind recepția oferitǎ de Zhou Enlai, Premier al 
Consiliului de Stat, în onoarea delegației române conduse de Emil Bodnǎraș”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, 
Pekin, vol.II, 1972, f. 319-321, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1120-1121
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 Nicolae Ceaușescu to Beijing, on the expanding Sino-Romanian collaboration. In this sense, 
by means of the letter, not only did the Romanian envoy reminisce about Director of the 
People’s Liberation Army Li Desheng’s visit to the Socialist Republic of Romania or Emil 
Bodnǎraș (vice president of the State Council) and Gheorghe Rǎdulescu’s (vice president of 
the Council of Ministers) visits to Beijing, but mentioned other party and state, as well as 
journalists’, tourists' and experts’ delegations, that were due to make mutual visits in both 
Romania and China hereafter. From a political perspective, the ambassador’s account 
revealed that the Chinese side had no longer hesitated to describe Romania as a socialist 
state, or to speak about the CPC-PCR brotherly relations based on the Marxist-Leninist 
principles; on the contrary, the envoy remarked that in the aftermath of Ceaușescu’s visit to 
Beijing, not only did the party to party collaboration and friendship increased, but it 
irrefutably influenced and stimulated the dissemination of a certain image of the Romanian 
Socialist Republic in the PRC.  
Indeed, between 1971-1972, the propaganda organs of the CPC have dedicated much more 
attention (in comparison with the past) to the representation of several significant domestic 
events in Romania, to display some of the latter’s foreign affairs strategies and its position 
in the international arena. The Chinese media (the press, radio and television) praised the 
Romanian state leader for his personal achievements, for the building of the Romanian 
socialist state, the Romanian Communist Party, and the attachment of the Marxist Leninist 
principles to the international socialist relations. In addition, the Chinese media brought out 
Bucharest government’s accomplishments regarding the socio-cultural aspects and the 
augmentation of the living standards in Romania. Hence, all kinds of information materials 
regarding the Socialist Republic of Romania, as well as telegrams sent by party and state 
leaders had been published, together with the Albanian, Korean and Vietnamese collections, 
amongst the first materials in the Chinese press. One of the most important achievements, 
however, was the reemergence in the PRC of the official journal of the Communist Party of 
Romania, “Scânteia”.   
Consequently, the Romanian embassy in Beijing began to receive letters from Chinese 
nationals, expressing admiration for Nicolae Ceaușescu and his successful domestic and 
foreign policies. Moreover, the ambassador’s account provided a plain rundown of the 
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 increasing Sino-Romanian bilateral economic and trade relations between 1971-1975.  
Thus, at the end of 1971, when the Romanian and Chinese authorities signed a new 
commercial agreement for the forthcoming year, the Socialist Republic of Romania was not 
only the only socialist state in Europe to sign a contract with China before the end of the 
year, but mostly, was the only Soviet satellite state to sign a contract that stipulated a great 
improvement (of 25%) of the bilateral trade for the year 1972.  
Ambassador Gavrilescu explained that the Sino-Romanian trade volume contracted by June 
1st 1972, had reached 1 142 000 000 Lei foreign currency, and boasted a high probability of 
being further widened throughout the year. Moreover, on the basis of the long term 
cooperation agreement, in 1972 Romania agreed to export to China during 1973-1975, 
commodities amounting to 375 millions Lei foreign currency, mostly consisting of heavy 
machineries and equipments. At the same time, the Chinese welcomed and treated with due 
regard a high number of Romanian delegations of experts in economy, that utterly 
contributed to the Sino-Romanian mutual understanding of their economies and the 
enhancement of possibilities for collaboration and exchange of experience in the very 
different domains of the economy, such as metallurgy, chemistry, car construction, 
agriculture, light industry, etc .  382
Through the report, the ambassador also communicated that the Romanian “industrial 
exhibition organised in Beijing at the end of 1971, the first large manifestation of this type 
consented by China during the cultural revolution, enjoyed great success, and contributed 
to a profounder knowledge and popularisation of Romania’s achievements, of a stronger 
awareness of the fact that Romania offered great possibilities for the intensification and the 
diversification of the economic exchange” . Furthermore, he informed that in the scientific 383
and technological fields, the Sino-Romanian cooperation was extended through the signing 
of several accords and agreements between the Romanian and Chinese ministries, leading to 
the fulfilment of no less than sixty research topics in the fields of interest for the Romanian 
 “1973 ianuarie 9, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, cǎtre 382
Vasile Gliga, adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, privind schimburile comerciale Româno-Chineze în 
anul 1972”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1973, vol. I, f. 45-50, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 
1148-1150
 Ibidem383
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 economy .  384
The same favourable stance was taken by the diplomat when describing the Sino-Romanian 
cultural-scientific and sports collaboration. Besides a bilateral agreement regarding the 
Radio and Television Broadcasting, the two countries signed the renewal for cooperation 
between the academies of sciences in Romania and China (in existence since 1963) as well 
as different projects for cultural activities for the years 1972-1973. In the international arena 
instead, the two countries enjoyed a very close collaboration, mirrored by dialogue and the 
mutual exchange of opinions regarding both the foreign affairs - like the Stockholm 
conference on the environment - and the global joint actions - within the United Nations 
General Assembly, considered that China had regained its lawful seat in the UN in October 
1971, or within other international organisations where the PRC had not yet taken part .  385
While, with regard to the cooperation in the diplomatic and political fields, the report 
imparted significant knowledge referring to the Chinese and Romanian mutual exchange of 
delegations, especially in Agriculture and Metallurgical Industry, followed by the exchange 
of party activists and journalists’ delegations, in the political sphere, it provided information 
relevant to the intensification of the Sino-Romanian party and state relations, for which, 
considered the process of reorganisation going on in China during the cultural revolution, 
the Romanian side was supposed to display initiative.  
Moreover, the record tackled with issues of interest for the Romanian diplomacy, such as 
the preparations for celebrations of the forthcoming 25th anniversary of the Socialist 
Republic of Romania; the achievement of an increased mutual exchange of information and 
consultation, especially regarding the two countries’ ministries of foreign affairs; the 
organisation, under the aegis of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Trade, of a debate to deal 
with the extension of the Sino-Romanian economic ties; the necessity of a pragmatic 
response from the Chinese side to the Romanian cultural, scientific and media proposals; 
the necessity to focus on Ceaușescu’s journey to Asia, as well as on the effects of these 
 Ibidem384
 “1972 mai 31, Beijing. Telgramǎ a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, cǎtre 385
George Macovescu, prim-adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, privind evoluția relațiilor româno-chineze 
în perioada 1971-1972”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol.III, 1972, f. 184-192, in Budura, R.I. (ed.),op. 
cit., pp. 1125-1129
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 visits, through apposite material published in the Romanian press .  386
Other messages sent by N. Gavrilescu, Romanian ambassador to Beijing to the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs give evidence about the invitation to visit Romania, made by the 
authorities in Bucharest, to Ji Pengfei, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the latter’s 
acceptance  or about the CPC’s activists delegation, comprising ten persons, in visit to 387
Romania for an exchange of experience .  388
What the Romanian legate, however, wished to point out by dint of his second message, is 
not the fact that the Chinese delegation of activists aspired to gain experience in fields like 
the economic management or the political-ideological education of the working class, 
aiming at the strengthening of the Sino-Romanian friendly party and state relations, but, 
more importantly, that the delegation of activists itself would have been the first one to visit 
the Socialist Republic of Romania in the past years . 389
An intriguing telegram sent by the legate on October 5th 1972, is evidence of the manner 
and sequence in which the congratulations letters, sent by the head of states throughout the 
world to the leadership in Beijing in occasion of the PRC’s national day celebrations, were 
published in the Chinese press. According to the Romanian ambassador, when issuing the 
felicitations missives in the Chinese press, the authorities in Beijing clearly bore in mind a 
distinct scale of consideration, in harmony with the state’s relations with those countries, 
and the hierarchy consisted of three categories: while the first category encompassed the 
telegrams sent by the authorities in Cambodia, South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam), 
Pathet Lao (Laotian communist political movement that took over the government in 1975, 
and established the Lao People’s Democratic Republic), North Korea, Albania, North 
 Ibidem386
 “1972 iulie 3, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, cǎtre 387
Corneliu Mǎnescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, privind invitația adresatǎ lui Ji Pengfei, Ministru al 
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 “1972 august 26, Beijing. Telegramǎ a Ambasadei României la Beijing cǎtre Teodor Marinescu, șeful 388
Secției Relații Externe a CC. al PCR și George Macovescu, prim adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, 
privind delegația de activiști ai PCC care face o vizitǎ în România”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol. IV, 
1972, nepaginat in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1135-1137
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 Vietnam (the Democratic Republic of Vietnam) and Romania, the second category 
comprised the messages sent by leaders in afro-asian and Latin America countries.  
Other epistles sent by the leadership in Central and East European socialist countries, the 
USSR included, were only issued at last in the Chinese press. Interestingly enough, the 
diplomat stressed that, with the exception of the countries named in the first category, only 
Cuba and Hungary used the appellation “tovarǎș” (comrade), Yugoslavia “domn” (sir, 
gentleman), while Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and the German Democratic Republic 
(GDR) addressed themselves to the Chinese premier Zhou Enlai without any appellation. 
On the contrary, the message sent by the leadership of the Mongolian People’s Republic to 
the Chinese authorities, was addressed to the acting president of the PRC, Dong Biwu, to 
Zhu De, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and to the 
premier Zhou Enlai, and expressed the Mongolian authorities’ wish to enhance relations 
with the PRC on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist principles, as well as the hope to see the 
Chinese people successful in their socialist path, sections that no other letter included. To 
conclude, the envoy emphasised the lack of consistency of the messages sent by the 
Mongolian government, the letters sent by the USSR, by the king of Laos, by the president 
of Sierra Leone and the governor of Mauritius, to the authorities in Beijing, as, albeit 
addressed to “the president of the PRC”, they do not mention the recipient’s name . 390
The Romanian proposals for the intensification of Sino-Romanian ties in 1973 were 
revealed in a missive wrote by the Romanian Embassy in Beijing and sent to the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs on October 14th, 1972. Within the 23 points of the note, the 
ambassador’s blueprint included matters such as the exchange of party and state 
delegations, of party activists delegations, the exchange of experience between the central 
press organs and the theoretical journals of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) and the 
Communist Party of China (CPC), and the bilateral interchange of delegations for repose. In 
the political and diplomatic fields, the diplomat advocated the escalation of the bilateral 
contacts, of the collaboration and exchange of information between the two Ministries of 
 “1972 octombrie 5, Beijing. Telegramǎ a Ambasadei României la Beijing cǎtre Ministerul Afacerilor 390
Externe privind modul și ordinea publicǎrii în presǎ a telegramelor de felicitare adresate conducerii chineze de 
cǎtre șefii diferitelor state și guverne”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol. V, 1972, f. 31-32, in Budura, R.I. 
(ed.), op.cit, p. 1138
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 Foreign Affairs, both directly and within international organisations and the exchange of 
delegations between the Great National Assembly and the National People’s Congress of 
the PRC .  391
Regarding other fields of cooperation, the legate recommended the extension of the already 
existing commercial agreements, the implementation of bilateral judicial procedures 
(sanitary veterinary convention as well as a cultural-scientific and press exchange protocol), 
the outreach, or at least the complete realisation, of the protocol’s conditions regarding the 
Sino-Romanian commercial exchanges for 1973, the research for new possibilities of 
cooperation in the economic field (considering the alteration of the Chinese foreign trade as 
a result of the substantial increase of foreign competition in the Chinese market) and the 
opening of the international air line Beijing-Bucharest, Bucharest-Beijing, as well as the 
constant regulation of the maritime transportation between the two countries.  
Moreover, by dint of the message, the envoy suggested an increase in effectiveness of the 
Romanian economic delegations visiting China, the accomplishment of the protocol’s 
stipulations regarding the technical and scientific cooperation for 1973, the organisation to 
visit Romania of a delegation from the Association of the Chinese People for Relations with 
the Foreign countries, and the fulfilment of some cultural and scientific activities, according 
to the Romanian proposals in 1972 .  392
Last, but not least, the message outlined the ambassador’s wish to pursue and expand the 
Sino-Romanian cooperation in the field of radio and television broadcasting, the execution 
of the conditions imposed by the agreement of cooperation between the academies of the 
two countries, the bilateral exchange of high-school students, the enhancement of political, 
social and diplomatic strategies regarding the “popularisation” of the RSR in the PRC, the 
Romanian embassy’s intensification of documentation, aiming at a better, deeper, 
information of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially with regard to the 
Chinese domestic and foreign policies, and the improvement, in methods and techniques, of 
the entire Romanian diplomatic apparatus, as well as the expansion of relations with both 
 “1972 octombrie 14, Beijing. Telegramǎ a Ambasadei României la Beijing cǎtre Ministerul Afacerilor 391
Externe conținând propuneri pentru dezvoltarea relațiilor dintre R.S. România și R.P. Chinezǎ”, A.M.A.E, 
fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol. V, 1972, f. 102-106, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1139-1141
 Ibidem392
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 Chinese organisations and people . 393
A missive sent in December 1974, by the Romanian Ambassador to Beijing, Gavrilescu, to 
the Minster of Foreign Affairs Macovescu, provides information regarding the Chinese 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qiao Guanhua’s reflections over the Sino-Romanian relations 
and the Romanian Communist Party’s foreign and domestic policies .  394
Hence, according to the letter, the Chinese Minister made positive comments with respect to 
the Bucharest-Beijing cooperation during 1974, also as a consequence of Romanian 
President Ceaușescu’s visit to Beijing in 1971. Indeed, according to Qiao Guanhua, the visit 
made by the “great friend of the Chinese people”  had given a profound impulse to the 395
Sino-Romanian bilateral trade and to the mutual diplomatic, political, technical and 
scientific, as well as cultural exchanges.  
Moreover, the Chinese Minister praised the democratic spirit of the PCR and the way it 
handled difficulties both domestically and internationally, and summed up his belief that the 
maintenance of a significant economic development would provide the Romanian society 
with huge opportunities for advancement, and would increase Romania’s prestige in the 
international arena.  
In the end, after a rapid debrief on the conditions of the Romanian industry and agriculture, 
Qiao Guanhua expressed admiration for the “great Romanian people and the heroic 
Romanian Communist Party”  and raised his glass in a toast for the Romanian President 396
Ceaușescu and all the other leaders of the Romanian party and state. 
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 “1974 decembrie 24, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, 394
cǎtre George Macovescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, privind aprecierile făcute de Qiao Guanhua, Ministru 
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vol. V, f. 72-73, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1229-1330
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 IV.6 Official Romanian - Chinese contacts in the period  
from January 1st-October 10th, 1975  397
27th March - A one-day visit to Beijing, en route to Hanoi of the Deputy Prime Minister 
Gheorghe Rădulescu. Talks with Chi-kuei, a member of Politburo and First Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
6th April - A one-day visit to Bucharest, on the way from Mexico to Beijing of Chen Yun-
kuei, a member of Politburo, the Deputy Prime Minister. He held talks with the Deputy 
Prime Minister G.Rădulescu and Secretary of the CC Ștefan Andrei. 
10th May - The arrival of the Chinese delegation and state party activists to Bucharest, led 
by Sin Yuen-Bey, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Committee of Beijing. The 
delegation met with Secretary of the Central Committee of PCR losif Uglar. 
18th May - A trip to Beijing of the Romanian party and state activists delegation. Head of 
Delegation - Vasile Mușat, a member of the PCR Central Committee, secretary of the 
Regional Committee Vâlcea. 
23rd May - the Delegation of the Chinese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, 
headed by Minister Chun Fu-sian arrived in Bucharest. On 30th May the Head of Delegation 
was received by N. Ceaușescu. At the end of the visit they signed an intergovernmental 
agreement on cooperation in the field of posts and telecommunications. 
24th May - A visit to Beijing of a Romanian government delegation under the leadership of 
P. Niculescu, Political Executive Committee member, Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of 
Education and Higher Education. The delegation participated in the opening ceremony of 
the Romanian industrial exhibition in Beijing and was revived by Chou En-Lai. Niculescu 
will hold talks also with a member of Politburo, Deputy Li-ulen Sienn. 
30th May - A Chinese military delegation, headed by the deputy chief of the General Staff 
Siang Giung-hua, visited Bucharest on its way to Yugoslavia. The delegation was received 
by gen. Ion Coman, Deputy Minister of National Defence, the Chief of General Staff. 
 Intelligence Note, Polish Embassy in Bucharest, “Regarding Revival of Relations Between Romania and 397
the PRC”, October 15, 1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, D-I-R-0-2413-13-75,1. Obtained and Translated by Adam Burakowski. 
Available at Wilson Centre Digital Archive,  http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116929
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 13th June - Chinese military delegation, he aded by Tang San-zen, a member of the Central 
Committee, the commissar of political forces in Szenian, arrived in Bucharest. He held talks 
with Deputy Gheorghe Gomoiu and was received by Minister of National Defence Ion 
Ioniţă, as well as a member of NEC, secretary of the CC PCR - Emil Bobu. A Romanian 
party and government delegation, led by Ilie Verdeţ, member of the Political Executive 
Committee, the Secretary of the CC PCR came to Beijing. Immediately before the visit to 
Beijing, the delegation took part in the celebration of the 30th anniversary of the DPRK. On 
September 8th Verdeţ was received by Chou En-Lai. 
12th September -  Delegation of Chinese scholars with prof. Go-Chin Tzen was received by 
the Deputy Prime Minister Paul Niculescu-Mizil. The delegation participated in the Third 
International Congress of cybernetics. 
19th September - A delegation of regional party activists with the First Secretary of the 
Regional Committee RPIC Sălaj, Laurean Tulai, returned from China. 
19th September - Party delegation headed by Iosif Banc, deputy member of the Political 
Executive Committee, Secretary of the Central Committee of PCR went to China 
27th September - Delegation of Association of Romanian-Chinese Friendship, chaired by 
Paul Stephen, a member of the PCR Central Committee, secretary of CRZZ went to China 
27th September - A military delegation headed by Deputy Minister of G. Gomoiu went to 
China. A Chinese delegation led by Van Chi-Hui, a member of the Standing Committee of 
the National People's Congress came to Bucharest 
12th December  - A party delegation, headed by Comrade I. Banc, a deputy member of the 
CC, RPC secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Central Council of Workers' 
Control with regards to socio-economic activity, returned from China. 
IV.7 A friend in need is a friend indeed 
1970s: New peak in Sino-Romanian bilateral trade  
In June 1970, different letters, messages, communications, notes, reports and bulletins sent 
by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Romanian Embassy in Beijing disclosed 
particulars concerning the essential commodities and medicine that the Socialist Republic of 
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 Romania expected to receive from China against the backdrop of the devastating floods that 
struck the former in 1970 .  398
Moreover, the letter sent by the Romanian Ambassador to Beijing, on October 2nd 1970, to 
the Romanian vice-minister of Foreign Affairs, disclosed information regarding the 
departure to Bucharest of a Chinese delegation aiming at the ratification of a Sino-
Romanian technological and scientific partnership. The message communicated instructions 
and details with respect to the signing of the protocol for the 13th session of the 
Governmental mixed commission of collaboration in the technological and scientific field, 
and provided specifics concerning the petrochemical industry’s sites due to be visited by the 
Chinese delegation headed by Sun Xiaofang. In order to accomplish a most productive visit 
to Romania,  ambassador Duma suggested that arrangements were made so that the Chinese 
representatives could be received by high level delegates within the Romanian Ministries of 
Petroleum, Chemistry and Cars Constructions, as well as by political leaders such as the 
vice-president of the Council of Ministers . 399
Furthermore, a telegram from the Romanian Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign 
Trade unveiled the Sino-Romanian import-export agenda for the third trimester of 1970. 
The record brought out into the open that by virtue of the new contracts, worth 48,7 
millions Lei foreign currency and signed during the last trimester of 1970, the bilateral 
commercial trade has risen to a total volume of 793 millions Lei foreign currency, of which 
398 millions Lei foreign currency exports and 363 millions Lei foreign currency imports. 
thus maintaining a positive balance of trade for the Romanian economy. The remaining 32 
millions Lei foreign currency of Romanian exports were realised in foreign currency and 
used to export urea, a significant raw material for the chemical industry.  
Additionally, by the end of 1970, the various agreements between the two countries have 
 “1970 iunie 4, București. Telegramǎ a lui Corneliu Mǎnescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, cǎtre Aurel 398
Duma, Ambasador al României la Beijing, privind mǎarfurile care sunt deosebit de necesare în situația creatǎ 
de inundațiile catastrofale care au avut loc în România”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol. I, 1970, f. 
103-104, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 994-995
 “1970 octombrie 2, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Aurel Duma, Ambasador al României la Beijing, cǎtre Marin 399
Mihai, adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, privind plecarea spre București a delegației chineze conduse 
de Sun Xiaofang, adjunct al Ministrului Industriei Petrolului, pentru semnarea protocolului celei de a XIII-a 
sesiuni a Comisiei Mixte guvernamentale de colaborare tehnico-științificǎ”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, 
vol. III, 1970, f. 212-213, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1003-1004
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 led to a total volume of commercial exchange of 840 millions Lei foreign currency, in 
comparison with the 66 millions Lei foreign currency trade volume established through the 
signing of the economic accord for the year 1970. The telegram also gave facts about the 
quantity and quality of the goods exchanged, the insurance, rejection and delivery options 
and policies, as well as information regarding the Chinese high interest for the Romanian 
vessels, equipments and installations . 400
A report, realised by Gheorghe Rǎdulescu, vice president of the Council of Ministers, sent 
to Nicolae Ceaușescu and referring to the Romanian governmental delegation’s visit to 
Vietnam and the PRC between 15-26 November 1970, provides information regarding the 
prospects of Sino-Romanian cooperation in all fields. Thus, in respect to the intensification 
of collaboration in the economic field, the two countries disclosed a constant increase of 
bilateral trade - more than 4 times higher in 1970 in respect to 1963 - based on commercial 
accords, contracts and agreements. Regarding the Sino-Romanian trade for 1971, the two 
sides anticipated it to be 40% higher than the value of transactions agreed upon in 1970 . 401
Romanian exports                  Romanian imports             Total  (Mil. Lei foreign currency)   402
1963                82.9                                   84.7                                       167,6 
1964                95.6                                 107.8                                       203.4 
1965              159.8                                 131.2                                       291.0 
1966              204.6                                 190.4                                       395.0 
1967              236.6                                 198.9                                       435.5 
1968              254.6                                 260.9                                       506.4 
1969              231.0                                 254.1                                       485.1 
 “1970 octombrie 5, Beijing. Telegramǎ a Ambasadei României la Beijing cǎtre Ministerul Comerțului 400
Exterior privind realizarea planului de export și import pe trimestrul al III/1970”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, 
Pekin, vol. III, 1970, f. 224-228, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1004-1006
 “1970 decembrie 12, București. Raport întocmit de Gheorghe Rǎdulescu, vicepreședinte al Consiliului de 401
Miniștri, adresat lui Nicolae Ceaușescu, Secretar General al P.C. Român, referitor la vizitele delegației 
guvernamentale române în R.D. Vietnam și R.P. Chinezǎ, 15-26 noiembrie 1970”, A.N.I.C, fond C.C. al 
P.C.R. - Secția Relații Externe, dosar 98/1970, f. 6-35, in Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1021-1042
 Ibidem402
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 Moreover, if in the financial field, the two sides discussed the terms and conditions for the 
already mentioned two free loans that the PRC would grant to the Romanian Socialist 
Republic, during this meeting, other significant issues, pertaining to the economic and 
technological cooperation, were covered: for instance, the Romanian delegation suggested 
that both Bucharest and Beijing should put some efforts into launching partnerships in the 
cars construction industry, metallurgical industry, mining industry, petroleum industry, 
chemical industry, construction and materials industry, as well as light and food industry .  403
In addition, a telegram sent on January 4th 1971 by Ambassador to Beijing Duma, to vice 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Marin Mihai, provides valuable details regarding the Sino-
Romanian bilateral trade throughout 1970. The Romanian diplomat reports that the visit to 
Beijing of the governmental delegation, headed by Gheorghe Rǎdulescu, vice-president of 
the Romanian Council of Ministers, have had a fruitful and constructive effect on the Sino-
Romanian economic ties, transpired in the improvement of the loan agreement and the 
advantageous distribution of Chinese equipment on trust, as well as in the closing of a long 
term Sino-Romanian commercial accord for the duration of three years, between 
1972-1975 .  404
Besides, the ambassador announced that the volume of the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade 
for the year 1970 arose to 852 millions Lei foreign currency, approximately 60% higher that 
the volume of exchanges under contract during the previous year, 1969, with Romania 
maintaining a positive balance of the economic trade. Counting on the Romanian 
ambassador’s telegram, almost 70% of the total volume of Romanian exports was 
represented by machinery and equipments, while the rest of 30% was constituted by raw 
materials, semi-finished products and constituents; moreover, the structure of the Romanian 
imports was favourably distributed as follows: 40% was represented by raw materials, semi-
finished products and constituents, 20% of indispensable food products, 29% of fabrics, 
11% of cars and consumables. Additionally, the diplomat reported that in general terms, 
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 during the 4th trimester of 1970, the Romanian beneficiaries did not make complaints 
regarding the quality, packaging and overall appearance of the goos imported as a result of 
the bilateral commercial agreement, thus, negotiations for both a commercial agreement for 
the year 1971 and the three year commercial accord between 1972-1975, were to be 
discussed during a Chinese delegation’s visit to Bucharest expected to happen in January 
1971 .  405
Another significant moment for the cooperation in the technological field between the 
Socialist Republic of Romania and the PRC was represented by the signing, on March 22nd, 
1971, in Beijing, of a protocol regarding the Chinese provision of full equipments and 
technical assistance to Romania. The six articles of the protocol delineated Beijing’s 
obligations regarding the expenses for the delivery of equipments and materials, the basic 
training of the Romanian probationers in China and the work conditions of the technicians 
that would go to Romania . 406
Moreover, a telegram sent on June 29th, 1971 by the Romanian Embassy in Beijing to the 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is indicative of the Sino-Romanian commercial 
exchanges throughout the second trimester of 1971. In conformity with the report, the total 
value of bilateral trade agreements until June 1971 mounted to 1056 millions Lei foreign 
currency - of which 531 millions Lei foreign currency were represented by the Romanian 
exports and 525 millions Lei foreign currency by the Romanian imports - higher than the 
amount prescribed by the commercial accord and quantifying 994 millions Lei foreign 
currency. Almost every time, the machines and equipments constituted more than half of 
Romanian exports to China, while 92% of Romanian imports were represented by high 
value Chinese products. Moreover, the message unveiled knowledge regarding the Chinese 
and Romanian deliveries and the quality of the products given in exchange; thus, while 
Bucharest came up against difficulties in providing the Chinese counterpart with the goods 
on time and received complaints for supplying malfunctioning merchandise, the Chinese 
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 exports were, almost without exception, on schedule and without major faults .  407
Besides, Beijing and Bucharest endeavoured to facilitate the expansion of industrial 
cooperation by exchanging experts in the field; hence, twenty Romanian skilled engineers 
were due to visit the PRC in July in order to finalise the installation of the industrial 
machinery and equipment, while a group of Chinese experts was waited in the Socialist 
Republic of Romania to elucidate and complete the technical conditions for the outlining of 
the first sixteen industrial installations consented.   
The telegram would also disclose some details regarding the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade 
for 1972. Thus, until June 1971, the two countries had signed technical and commercial 
contracts amounting to 115 millions Lei foreign currency, of which 86.6 millions Lei 
foreign currency stood for the Romanian exports and the remaining 27.4 millions Lei 
foreign currency were represented by the Romanian imports. Tank cars, locomotives as well 
as drilling equipments in the petroleum industry were highly requested by the Chinese, 
while the Romanian imports were mostly constituted by cotton, silk, wool textiles and pine 
rosin .  408
In the end, the letter notified the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Romanian 
Embassy in Beijing had supported the organisation of the Chinese exhibition in Bucharest 
and had closely regarded the Romanian delegates’ visits to the Chinese capital  - totally 
more than fifty experts during the second trimester of 1971 - aiming at the signing of 
technical and commercial treaties.  Besides, the Romanian diplomat advanced some trading 
propositions that could have strengthened Bucharest-Beijing’s commercial and technical 
cooperation and suggested that future Romanian delegations involved a smaller number of 
experts .   409
Additional significant data regarding the Sino-Romanian commercial trade was provided by 
the telegram sent by the Romanian embassy in Beijing to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
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 Affairs on January 5th, 1972. As specified by the message, in 1971 the total volume of the 
Sino-Romanian bilateral trade reached 1.159 millions Lei foreign currency, and thus 44% 
higher than the total volume of exchanges during 1970, and 15% higher than the volume 
stipulated by the commercial accord for 1971 .  410
The structure of the exchanges was divided as follows: 58% of the Romanian exports were 
represented by machineries and equipments, while the other 42% consisted of raw 
materials; the Romanian imports like commodities and semi-finished products amounted to 
70%, while the other 30% constituted various genre of goods. Moreover, the brief report 
unveiled that, as a reaction to the Chinese complaints for the quality of the Romanian 
exports, Bucharest improved some items of the trucks, the drilling pipes as well as the sheet 
metals, and, in addition, disclosed some information concerning the Sino-Romanian 
technological and scientific cooperation. In this field the two countries’s exchange was 
realised on the basis of a 32 out of 34 items protocol .  411
In the end, the message of the Romanian embassy to Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs disclosed information regarding the Sino-Romanian trade expected for 1972. Thus, 
on the basis of the bilateral commercial protocol, the total volume of bilateral exchanges 
due to be achieved in 1972, had already reached 1123 millions Lei foreign currency - 11% 
higher than the total volume of trade in 1971 - with a balance of trade favourable, as in the 
previous year, for both countries .  412
However, following its adherence to the UN in autumn 1971, the Chinese foreign trade 
volume had witnessed a clear increase, and had reached approximatively 4.5 billions 
American dollars by the end of 1971. In these circumstances, the Romanian embassy to 
Beijing suggested that, in order to ensure an imports volume in harmony with the exports, 
the authorities in Bucharest should focus to direct all of the RSR’s import requests to the 
PRC, and, in the future, to pay great attention to the quality of the exports (that shall be 
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 thoroughly tested and shall not exceed the world market prices) .  413
On April 6th, 1972, the Socialist Republic of Romania and the Peoples Republic of China 
signed in Bucharest a groundbreaking bilateral air transport agreement, a contract to 
liberalise commercial civil aviation. Based on the socialist principles of respect for 
independence and national sovereignty, non-interference in other countries' domestic affairs, 
equal rights and fraternal mutual assistance, the fourteen articles’ accord aimed to facilitate 
the Sino-Romanian friendly partnership by expanding the two countries’ relations in the air 
transportation field. The enterprises appointed to make capital out of the services concurred 
on the stipulated route (Beijing - a city in Xinjiang - Teheran - Ankara or Istanbul - 
Bucharest - Belgrade - Tirana) were the Romanian Air Transportation - TAROM and the 
General Administration of Civil Aviation of China .  414
A telegram sent on July 3rd 1972, by the Romanian Ambassador to Beijing, Nicolae 
Gavrilescu, to both the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Romanian Ministry of 
Foreign Trade revealed evidence concerning the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade in the 
second trimester of 1972. Thus, on 30 June 1972, the total volume of contracted goods had 
reached 1.191 millions Lei foreign currency, 6.5% higher than the 1.119 millions Lei 
foreign currency anticipated by the accord, with a favourable balance for the Romanian 
export .  415
As maintained by the diplomat in Beijing, the Romanian export had witnessed an 
improvement with respect to the previous trimester, however, it still didn’t reach the 
standard agreed by dint of the contract, especially considering the Chinese allegations with 
regard to the quality of some pieces of tractors and trucks sent by the Romanian side. Other 
important details were provided by means of the message, such as an input concerning the 
volume of Sino-Romanian bilateral trade already agreed upon by the end of June, for the 
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 years 1973 (total 259 millions Lei foreign currency, Romanian imports 56 millions Lei 
foreign currency and Romanian exports 203 millions Lei foreign currency), 1974 (total 
133,43 millions Lei foreign currency, machineries and equipments), and 1975 (124 millions 
Lei foreign currency machineries and equipments), as well as data regarding a 30 millions 
dollars loan provided by the PRC to the Socialist Republic of Romania, which, according to 
the the envoy, after different consultations, had been rescheduled by the government in 
Beijing . 416
By dint of the telegram, the legate to Beijing provided the planning authorities within the 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade with guidelines for 
the Sino-Romanian commercial ties, by highlighting the importance of a stronger 
coordination of the visits to China by the State Enterprises for Foreign Trade ’s technical 417
and commercial delegations and elaborated on the strategies to increase the Sino-Romanian 
bilateral commercial ties, expected to reach 3 billions Lei foreign currency in 1975 by 
taking into account the significant imbalance of trade, favourable to Romanian exports . 418
Another message sent by Gavrilescu on 9 January 1973 to the Romanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, mapped out a definite sketch of the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade during 
1972. Thus, by dint of the report, it was unraveled that the total volume of Romanian-
Chinese commercial exchanges in 1972, reached 1 305,4 millions Lei foreign currency, 
approximatively 25% higher than the previous year, and reflected the general improvement 
of the state of deliveries to the PRC .  419
Moreover, the document revealed that, while the number of Romanian delegates visiting 
China was elevated, the efficiency of their visits was sometimes limited. However, as 
maintained by the ambassador, the Sino-Romanian high-level bilateral contacts between 
ministries was evidence of the escalating volume of trade, therefore, the note to the 
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 Romanian authorities in Bucharest encompassed the diplomat’s suggestions to carry on 
these practices. Additionally, the missive included details regarding the Sino-Romanian 
bilateral trade pledged by 31st December 1972, for 1973: 1 108 millions Lei foreign 
currency, of which 524 millions Lei foreign currency represented Romania’s exports and the 
remaining 466 millions Lei foreign currency stood for the latter’s imports. Having 
considered this information, the legate stressed the necessity to regulate the Sino-Romanian 
import-export balance of trade, and to endeavour into contracting the pork meat - 
approximatively 105 millions Lei foreign currency - in the future .  420
In the end, ambassador Gavrilescu’s exposed the bilateral cooperation in the technical and 
scientific fields. He imparted that of the 49 protocoled subject matters favourable to the 
Romanian side, only 29 had been accomplished by 31st December 1972. Resultantly, in 
order to obtain an increase in the economical efficiency of the technical-scientific 
cooperation, he solicited the Romanian authorities both to establish, within the new protocol 
due to be signed in Bucharest, a minor number of subjects regarding major problems, and to 
take measures for the immediate starting of negotiations and the closing of the new protocol 
for technical and scientific exchanges .  421
By dint of a report sent by the Romanian envoy to Beijing to the Romanian Foreign 
Ministry, it is disclosed that the Sino-Romanian commercial exchanges during the first 
semester of 1973 reached 1 340,9 millions Lei foreign currency, with a balanced import-
export value of approximatively 670,9 millions Lei foreign currency. Regarding the two 
sides’ wish to expand bilateral trade for the rest of the year, the ambassador’s report outlined 
the necessity that the authorities in Bucharest considered a top-priority the Romanian 
imports and the closure of the existing legally biding contracts, in order to put into practice 
a strategy for the enhancement of the bilateral exchanges .  422
In the technical and scientific fields, the record uncovered that out of 54 areas of 
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 cooperation between the two states, only 27 were accomplished, and, between 1972 and the 
day of realisation of the report, April 4th, 1973, none of the remaining areas of cooperation 
was brought to conclusion. In conclusion, the ambassador pointed out that - taking into 
consideration the PRC’s agenda for economic modernisation, hence, its investment in high-
level industrial equipment resulting in its becoming a competitive player in the international 
arena - the intensification of Sino-Romanian economic ties fully depended on the Romanian 
authorities’ capacity to adapt the exports to the demands of the Chinese market, thus, to 
improve the quality of the exported goods, to find new ways of consignment for the entire 
industrial equipments and to identify new forms of cooperation on third markets . 423
A picture of the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade for the first semester of 1974 is also provided 
by a report, sent on April 5th 1974, by the Romanian envoy to Beijing N. Gavrilescu, to the 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The document included both information regarding 
the Sino-Romanian legally binding contracts up until 31 March 1974 - estimated to be 
worth about 1670 millions Lei foreign currency, with exports, mostly machineries and 
equipments, representing 79%, and imports constituting 75% of the contingent goods - and 
the Romanian ambassador’s project and suggestions to guarantee the evolution of the Sino-
Romanian commercial ties during 1975 .  424
In the technical and scientific fields, the Sino-Romanian collaboration was deepened by 
means of the visit to the PRC, in December 1974, of a Romanian delegation leaded by 
Octavian Groza, Minister-Secretary of State, and aiming at the signing of the protocol for 
the sixteenth session of the Sino-Romanian mixed commission for collaboration in the 
technical and scientific spheres. The bilateral talks held at that point between Groza and Li 
Xiannian, vice-premier of the State Council of the PRC, covered political issues like the 
XIth Congress of the PCR, international affairs, hegemonism and other forms of coercion 
aimed against national sovereignty and political independence, that showed, beyond doubt, 
Beijing’s position of support towards Bucharest. Discussions developed and ended in a 
friendly atmosphere, with Li Xiannian harking back to his visit in Romania in August, with 
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 words of gratitude for the Chinese party and state delegation’s welcoming by the Romanian 
leadership, as well as with greetings for the Romanian President . 425
IV.8 A flourishing relationship 
The successful example of Sino-Romanian cultural cooperation 
On May 13th, 1971, Aurel Duma, the Romanian Ambassador to Beijing sent a telegram to 
the Romanian vice minister of Foreign Affairs, informing the latter on the Sino-Romanian 
cultural exchanges during 1971. Duma’s report covered different events, such as the 
Chinese organisation of a film gala inside the embassy in Beijing in occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the Romanian Communist Party, the Chinese welcoming in May or June 
1971 of a forty people Romanian folk ensemble or the organisation in Beijing of an 
exhibition of photography entitled “Romania in images” .  426
Moreover, the message conveyed details regarding the renewal of the Sino-Romanian 
cooperation in the field of television and radio-broadcasting, while, in the field of 
education, besides the collaboration between the Romanian and Chinese academies, the 
letter communicated the regulations for the visit in China of two Romanian students, as well 
as the reasons for the Chinese brief turndown of a Romanian lecturer’s position in China. 
The Romanian diplomat ended the telegram addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by 
confirming the tour of the Beijing Opera to Romania, and by justifying the Chinese refusal 
to the Romanian invitation at Bucharest’s international exhibition of photographic art; in 
point of fact, according to the envoy, the Chinese counterpart had expressed gratitude for 
the invitation but, unfortunately, had also admitted to be unable to honour the invitation 
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 because of the thorough reshaping of the field of photography in China . 427
Different telegrams sent in 1971 by the Romanian envoy to Beijing to the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide information about the visits conducted by various 
Chinese  delegations to the Romanian Socialist Republic. Hence, while a Chinese military 
delegation consisting of 17 persons and leaded by Li Desheng - member of the Politburo of 
the Communist Party of China and Director of the People’s Liberation Army - was due to 
arrive in Romania on August 22nd, after a short visit to Albania , a Chinese press 428
delegation comprising 7 persons was expected to attend the celebrations of August 23rd, the 
Romanian national day during the communist  era . 429
Moreover, a telegram sent on August 24th, 1971 by the Romanian ambassador Aurel Duma 
to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, released details regarding the Chinese 
perception of the Romanian National Day’s celebrations. According to the envoy in Beijing, 
the Chinese have demonstrated particular interest in the commemoration of Romania’s 27th 
years since it’s liberation from general Ion Antonescu’s fascist government, and thus, 
through an unceasing presentation both in the Chinese leading press and various radio 
programs - approximatively 20 articles with photos in the main Chinese newspaper Renmin 
Ribao and reportages - have disseminated to the entire Chinese people details regarding 
Romania’s domestic achievements as well as Bucharest’s accomplishments in matters of 
foreign affairs . In addition, the public broadcasting also included a movie display, 430
showing the visit to China of the Romanian party and state delegation leaded by Nicolae 
Ceaușescu. With the exception of the movie representing Prince Sihanouk’s of Cambodia 
visit to the PRC, the Romanian film would be the only one of this genre broadcasted in 
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 China at that moment .  431
Furthermore, according to the Romanian diplomat’s letter, the activities organised in the 
vicinity of the date August 23rd, such as “the reception offered by the Chinese Association 
for Cultural Relations with the outside world and the Chinese-Romanian Friendship 
Association, the visit made by the Romanian embassy to the people’s commune “Romanian-
Chinese Friendship”, as well as the ones organised by the embassy (press conference, 
reception on the evening of August 23rd) unfolded in a truly, sincere atmosphere of 
friendship, and enjoyed a high-level numerous participation” . As mentioned by the 432
former diplomat, “the Chinese part does not often organise such receptions, unless it wishes 
to highlight a very important event in the life of a friendly country” .  433
Thus, the participation of the Chinese party and state leadership to the reception proffered 
by both the Romanian embassy and the Chinese side, the greeting telegrams sent to the 
Romanian leaders Nicolae Ceaușescu and Ion Gheorghe Maurer by president Mao Zedong, 
vice-president Lin Biao and premier Zhou Enlai, are evidence of the high-level friendship 
relations between Romania and China. The bilateral talks in the course of the celebrations 
focused on several aspects that have sustained the increase of Sino-Romanian cooperation, 
such as the successful visit to China of the Romanian delegation leaded by Ceaușescu - 
firstly, with regard to the bilateral relations and secondly, with respect to the anti-
imperialistic struggle of the peoples worldwide - the importance of Romania’s foreign 
policy principles, its fight against external aggression and its policies for affirmation of 
national sovereignty, the support provided internationally to the PRC regarding both the 
reestablishment of its legitimate right to the UN and the disentanglement of the difficult 
situation in Indochina, as well as the common struggle for international peace and the 
respect for the principles of international law. However, presumably one of the most 
important achievements for the Sino-Romanian cooperation at a cultural level at that stage 
was the publication, on August 23rd 1971, of the volume “Long live the friendship between 
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 the Chinese and Romanian peoples”, displaying the visit to China of the Romanian party 
and state delegation leaded by Nicolae Ceaușescu . 434
Other messages sent by the Romanian authorities in Beijing to the Romanian officials 
holding sway of the cultural relations between the Socialist Republic of Romania and the 
Far East, conveyed details regarding the visit to China of a Romanian tourist group  or 435
revealed Bucharest government’s proposals for the Sino-Romanian bilateral cultural 
exchanges for the period 1972-1973 . Such procedures included the actuation of numerous 436
bilateral projects, as the invitation to China of a delegation from the Romanian Institute for 
Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the organisation of a documentary photography 
exhibition in Beijing on occasion of the 25th anniversary since the proclamation of the 
Socialist Republic of Romania, the exchange of experts in medicine and playwright, the 
organisation in Romania of Chinese painting and photography exhibitions, the arrangement 
of movie galas in both countries, etc . 437
In the same fashion, whilst a telegram sent on September 2nd 1972, by the Romanian 
Embassy in Beijing to the branch managing the cultural relations within the Romanian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gives evidence about both the invitation to visit Bucharest in 
1973 of the Chinese pianist Li Mingqiang, and the Sino-Romanian project for collaboration 
in the field of public health and medical sciences for the years 1973-1974 , further 438
messages provide intelligible insight into the Sino-Romanian cooperation between 
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 academies within the same period , about the amiable and fruitful visit to Bucharest of the 439
Chinese Academy of Science’ delegation  or about the successful gala spectacle offered in 440
Beijing by the Romanian folkloristic ensemble “Banatul” . According to the legate, the 441
performance, which was live broadcasted by the Chinese media, enjoyed a strong 
appreciation by the Chinese audience, especially given its official rendition (high-ranking 
participation), and the elevated number of spectators.  
In the opening session of the gala spectacle, both Yang Zi, vice president of the Friendship 
Association of the Chinese people with the Foreign Countries and the head of the Romanian 
ensemble, underlined the unceasing flourishing course of the Sino-Romanian ties, while 
Zhu De, Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, gave 
prominence to the Romanian Communist Party’s endeavour to accomplish the five years’ 
plan before the deadline and underlined Bucharest leadership’s endeavour to the 
preservation of the socialist principles, mostly national sovereignty. As the performance 
ended, the chairman and Ambassador Gavrilescu exchanged mutual greetings to the 
Chinese and Romanian leadership . 442
Other letters sent by the Romanian embassy in Beijing to the Romanian Foreign Ministry 
revealed particulars concerning both the visit to Beijing of a Romanian cultural delegation 
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cǎtre Vasile Gliga, adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, privind spectacolul de gală al ansamblului 
folcloric “Banatul”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, vol. VI, 1972, f. 128-130, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., 
pp. 1146-1147
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 leaded by Dumitru Popescu, President of the Council of Socialist Culture and Education  443
and the meeting in the Chinese capital between the Romanian ambassador Nicolae 
Gavrilescu and the leadership of the British company Rolls Royce . Besides the 444
cooperation between the British corporation with Romania and Yugoslavia, the last message 
provided insight regarding the Romanian authorities’ initiatives to support a forthcoming 
collaboration between the PRC and the British company.  
A report sent in April, 1973, by the Romanian Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs outlined the Sino-Romanian bilateral cultural activities throughout 1973. 
Accordingly, the report sketched the visit to China of the Romanian delegation leaded by 
Dumitru Popescu, the visit to Beijing of the Romanian Radio-television delegation, the 
setting up in Beijing of a Romanian exhibition of photography and an exhibition of 
Romanian craftsmanship. Moreover, it unveiled the organisation in Bucharest of two 
Chinese painting and vestiges exhibitions, a tour in Romania of the Shanghai circus, the 
mutual exchanges of delegations in the sphere of medicine, journalism, as well as the 
reciprocal exchange of ten students .  445
Moreover, an interesting exposé, outlining the Sino-Romanian bilateral cultural exchanges 
for 1974-1975 was sent by Gavrilescu to the Romanian Foreign Ministry on March 14th, 
1974. By dint of the letter, the envoy disseminated the Chinese response, voiced by Xiao Te, 
deputy director for the Press Administration, to the Romanian request for intensification of 
the Sino-Romanian bilateral cultural exchanges between 1974 and 1975 .  446
 “1973 martie 13, Beijing. Telegramă a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 443
George Macovescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, privind vizita la Beijing a delegației culturale române 
conduse de Dumitru Popescu, membru al C.C. al P.C.R, președinte al Consiliului Culturii și Educației 
Socialiste”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1973, vol.II, f. 60-61, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 
1154-1155
 “1973 martie 13, Beijing. Telegramă a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 444
George Macovescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, privind întrevederea pe care a avut-o cu conducătorii 
firmei britanice “Rolls Royce” referitoare la acordul de cooperare cu România”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, 
Pekin, 1973, vol. II, f. 62-63, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1155-1156
 “1973 aprilie 2, Beijing. Telegramă a Ambasadei României la Beijing către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe 445
privind acțiunile culturale bilaterale pe anul 1973”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1973, vol. II, f. 196-197, 
în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1157-1158
 “1974 martie 14, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, cǎtre 446
Ministerul Afacerilor Externe privind schimburile culturale româno-chineze pe anii 1974 și 1975” A.M.A.E, 
fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1974, vol. II, f. 148-150, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1172-1173
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 Accordingly, after a short presentation of the situation in the PRC, Xiao emphasised that the 
Chinese official organs, organisations and institutions were involved in the campaign to 
criticise Lin Biao and Confucius, and thus, authorities in Beijing only endorsed limited 
cultural relations with foreign countries, especially during 1974. Moreover, considering the 
friendly Sino-Romanian party and state relations, the Chinese side asked for the Romanian 
leadership’s understanding with respect to the short number of forthcoming bilateral 
activities accepted by the authorities in Beijing: a Romanian popular art exhibition and the 
visit to China of a small group of delegates, for a period of three weeks; the visit to China of 
a Romanian delegation of two or three activists in the cultural and educational fields; the 
visit to the PRC of Iași “A. I. Cuza” University’s Rector; the visit to China of a Romanian 
teacher of Chinese language, to improve academic performances, for forty-five days; a 
bilateral exchange of twenty students for the academic year 1974-1975; the visit to Romania 
of a Chinese delegation from Beijing University; the visit to the Socialist Republic of 
Romania of two Chinese historians invited by the editor-in-chief of the Romanian 
publication “Magazin Istoric” (“Historical Magazine”); the visit to Romania of a Chinese 
teacher of Romanian language, to improve academic performances, for forty-five days; a 
bilateral exchange of students and the acquisition of Romanian movies by the Chinese 
side . 447
Furthermore, a review realised by the envoy on June 3rd, 1974 for the Romanian Foreign 
Ministry, outlined the Romanian leadership’s preparations in view of the approaching 
exhibition to Beijing. Besides general details regarding the setting up of the date, location, 
area and capacity of the rooms for exhibition, the letter provided knowledge in respect of 
the necessity to translate and issue in the Chinese language every single item of the 
Romanian commercial propaganda - brochures, catalogues - as well as the needfulness to 
present on television some Romanian commercial guided movies and slides, assisted by a 
Chinese spokesperson .  448
Other messages dispatched by the envoy during this years yield expertise referring to the 
 Ibidem447
 “1974 iunie 3, Beijing. Telegramă a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 448
Cornel Pacoste, adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, privind organizarea expoziției de la Beijing în anul 
1975”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1974, vol. III, f. 129-130, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op. cit., p. 1181
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 visits in Romania of several Chinese delegations working towards the intensification of 
Sino-Romanian friendship and cooperation in the cultural field, such as the visit to Romania 
of a delegation from Beijing University, aiming at broadening the collaboration with the 
University of Bucharest , the ten-days visit to Romania of the delegation of the People’s 449
Commune “Sino-Romanian Friendship”  and the visit of a Chinese Youth delegation in 450
October 1974 . 451
Albeit not frequently, the Sino-Romanian friendship also faced some difficulties. For 
example, a missive sent in December 1974 by the envoy to Beijing to the Romanian 
Foreign Ministry, unfolded the content of a memorandum handed by Yu Hongliang - 
Deputy Director of the Department for the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries 
within the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs - to the ambassador himself, and concerning 
the anti-Chinese hallmarks of the Soviet book exhibitions in Romania . The document 452
revealed the Chinese authorities’ preoccupation for the books and publications aggressively 
criticising both foreign and domestic Chinese policies, denigrating the great leader of the 
Chinese people, President Mao Zedong, and uncovering the hostile operations of the Soviet 
revisionists towards the Chinese people and the CPC and questioned the Romanian 
authorities’ ability to put an end to Moscow’s propaganda against the government in 
Beijing. In conformity with the memorandum, beginning with 1973, the Chinese embassy 
in Bucharest had six times - for six different anti-Chinese Soviet exhibitions in Romania - 
tried to remedy the situation, but it found no proper support from the Romanian authorities. 
 “1974 august 10, Beijing. Telegramă a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 449
Cornel Pacoste, adjunct al Ministrului Afacerilor Externe, privind vizita în România a unei delegații a 
Universitǎții din Beijing”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1974, vol. III, f. 427-428, în Budura, R.I (ed.), 
op. cit., p. 1188
 “1974 august 26, Beijing. Telegramă a Ambasadei României la Beijing către Ministerul Afacerilor Externe 450
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fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1974, vol. III, f. 506-507, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., p. 1220
 “1974 octombrie 8, Beijing. Telegramă a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 451
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1974, vol. IV, f. 157, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit, p. 1223
 “1974 decembrie 2, Beijing. Telegramǎ a Ambasadei României la Beijing către Ministerul Afacerilor 452
Externe privind Memorandumul Înaintat de Partea Chinezǎ referitor la Expozițiile Sovietice de carte 
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1974, vol. V, f. 11-14, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1226-1227
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 Hence, taken into consideration the Sino-Romanian friendship and the comradely bilateral 
ties between parties, peoples and countries, as well as both sides’ wish to preserve this 
relationship, the Chinese side urged the Romanian counterpart to consider the matter 
seriously, and resultantly, to provide a response to the former’s appeal . 453
IV.9 Mutual support and common goals. Boosting Sino-Romanian political ties in the 1970s 
Within the political field, it is required to mention the letter sent by Ion Gheorghe Maurer 
on June 5th, 1970, in his quality as President of the Council of Ministers of the SRR, to 
Zhou Enlai, Premier of the PRC, expressing Bucharest and the Romanian people’s gratitude 
for the assistance provided by the Chinese counterpart in order to minimise the 
repercussions of the catastrophic floods that shattered Romania in 1970 , as well as the 454
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai’s gratitude towards the Romanian president Ceaușescu, for his 
strong position of support regarding the PRC’s achievement of its legitimate rights in the 
UN, expressed during Zhou Enlai’s conversations with the Romanian Ambassador in 
Beijing Aurel Duma, and brought to public notice by means of a letter sent by the latter to 
the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in October 1970 .  455
Another important event for the Sino-Romanian political and economic cooperation was 
 Ibidem453
 “1970 iunie 5, București. Mesajul lui Ion Gheorghe Maurer, Președinte al Consiliului de Miniștri al R.S. 454
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R.I. (ed.), op.cit, p. 996 
 “1970 octombrie 24, Beijing. Telegramă  a lui Aurel Duma, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 455
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 represented by the high-level Romanian delegation visit to Beijing, headed by Emil 
Bodnăraș, in June 1970, already introduced in the subchapter “Overview of the Sino-
Romanian relations in the 1970s”. From the very first, the Sino-Romanian bilateral talks 
denoted the leaderships’s in Beijing high regard for dialogue, especially for the obtainment 
of information regarding the Soviet Union, the US attitude towards China, the prospects for 
the end of the war in Indochina and the prevention of the Cambodian coup’s effects. 
However, for the Chinese authorities, the high-level meeting represented an opportunity to 
intensify the CPC’s propaganda overseas, by broadening relations with communist parties 
worldwide, by attempting to normalise state relations with the USSR (on this account, the 
Sino-Soviet borderland detente was seen as the starting point) and by providing support to 
leftist, anti-imperialist forces in need.  
The Romanian delegation of the Grand National Assembly and the State Council was 
welcomed both with honours and friendship by the Chinese counterpart. Soon enough, 
Bucharest’s representatives would make comments regarding the Chinese increased 
solidarity towards Romania and would use the opportunity to express gratitude to the 
Chinese authorities for the 30% rise in commercial exchange expected for 1970. 
Furthermore, the list of goods expected by the Romanian Communist Party in order to 
attenuate the consequences of the floods, was another central issue of the conversations. 
With respect to this issue, not only would the Chinese assure that “the goods the Romanian 
party requested would be granted entirely free by the PR of China” (Budura 2008: 60-61) 
but, in keeping with instructions from Chairman Mao Zedong, the “shipping of such goods 
would also be free of charge. This grant amounts to 52.000.000 Yuans” (Budura 2008: 
60-61).  
Besides, in conformity with Budura, towards the end of the meeting, on the basis of the two 
countries’ “efforts to defend the attributes of the state, to protect the national wealth, secure 
the population’s prosperity and exercise the freedom of acting in keeping with national 
interests” (Budura 2008: 60-61) and considered, among other things, the proposal advanced 
by Emil Bodnăraș and immediately got off pat by Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong to open an 
“air transport link (…) through the South between Romania and China, which should not 
overfly the USSR” (Budura 2008: 60-61), the Chinese side would open discussions vis-a-vis 
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 the likeliness of future cooperation in the military field. 
Moreover, two telegrams sent in November 1970 by Ambassador Duma to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Corneliu Mănescu, provide information regarding the visit to Beijing of 
another Romanian governmental delegation, headed by Gheorghe Rădulescu, vice-president 
of the Romanian Council of Ministers. The first message conveyed details relevant to 
Rădulescu’s conversations with Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, with vice-premier Li 
Xiannian, with deputy minister of Foreign Affairs Qiao Guanhua, as well as with other 
Chinese representatives within the CC of the CPC, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the 
Ministry of National Defence. The talks, covering, in a general sense, matters of common 
interest, evolved in a cozy, friendly atmosphere. Specifically, in his discourse, Li Xiannian, 
Chinese vice-premier, focused on his admiration and felicitations towards the Romanian 
Communist Party, for its continuous struggle for Romania’s independence and national 
sovereignty, for fighting against foreign intervention, control and aggression, for supporting 
the Vietnamese,  Laotian and Cambodian people, and last, but not least, for Ceaușescu’s 
words of support towards Beijing, expressed during the last U.N’s session and sounding 
very much like: “the times of domination and dictatorship have decayed and peoples 
cannot be subdued any more” .  456
Additionally, in the context of both parts contending that the Sino-Romanian relationship is 
based on the Marxist-Leninist principles, the proletarian internationalism, mutual respect 
and absolute equality, the Chinese authorities emphasised that, no matter the circumstances, 
the PRC would always, firmly, support the Romanian people’s struggle against foreign 
aggression and oppression, for the protection of the national sovereignty, of the security and 
cooperation in Europe. In the first day of the visit, bilateral talks ended with hope and 
contentment for the intensification of the exchange of party and state visits, and with a toast 
for the Sino-Romanian friendship and brotherly coalition, for Nicolae Ceaușescu and 
Gheorghe Maurer.  
Besides the subject matters previously described, the second letter sent by the Romanian 
 “1970 noiembrie 21, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Aurel Duma, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 456
Corneliu Mănescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, privind vizita în R.P. Chinezǎ a delegației guvernamentale 
române conduse de Gheorghe Rǎdulescu, vicepreședinte al consiliului de ministri”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, 
Pekin, vol. III, 1970, f. 385-387, în Budura, R.I (ed.), op. cit., pp. 1014-1015
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 Ambassador to Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and recounting the second day of 
the visit to Beijing of the Romanian governmental delegation, contained Zhou Enlai and Li 
Xiannian’s  criticism of the American policy of aggression towards Vietnamese, Laotian and 
Cambodian peoples, the condemnation of the United States’ position regarding Taiwan, as 
well as the denunciation of the American imperialism in sustaining the Japanese militarism, 
considered a constituent part in the American policy of aggression, and thus seen as Asia’s 
worst enemies. As specified by the message provided by the Romanian Ambassador, the 
evening meeting concluded with the signing of two bilateral accords, one regarding the 
Chinese long-term loan to Romania, and the other one concerning the Chinese delivery of 
machines and equipments on the basis of a free long-term loan to the Socialist Republic of 
Romania .  457
On May 7th, 1971, on the occasion of the Romanian Communist Party’s 50th anniversary, 
the C.C. of the CPC addressed a telegram to the C.C. of the PCR. The CPC’s telegram 
evoked the significance and implications of the foundation of the PCR, seen in Beijing as a 
turning point for the revolutionary proletarian movements and for the national and social 
liberation. The Chinese praised the Romanian people for having obtained exceptional 
achievements in the socialist construction after the August 23rd 1944 liberation, and wished 
that the PCR successfully concluded the five year plan. Moreover, the telegram listed 
Bucharest’s principles of foreign policy, held in high regard by the Chinese leadership: the 
rigid opposition to foreign intervention, aggression and to imperialist subversion, the 
sustainment of independence and national sovereignty, especially with regard to Indochina 
and the three peoples (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia) engaged in a war of resistance against the 
American aggression, thus playing an important part in the revolutionary movements 
throughout the world. In the end, the telegram called to mind the Sino-Romanian long 
friendship, that has witnessed a progressive improvement and that would certainly, both 
between the parties and peoples, continue to do so on the basis of the Marxist-Leninist 
 “Romanian Government Delegation Visits China”, in Peking Review, No. 13, March 26, 1971. 457
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 principles of proletarian internationalism .  458
Between 1-9 June 1971, the Romanian party and state leader Nicolae Ceaușescu, 
accompanied by a large governmental delegation, visited the Peoples Republic of China as 
part of a larger Asian expedition, that saw Bucharest’s authorities en route, besides China, to 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. 
Sinologist Budura expressed that the visit to Beijing was regarded in Bucharest, in other 
European socialist states as well as in the Chinese capital, not only as a far-reaching event 
for the Sino-Romanian bilateral ties, but as a phenomenon that significantly forced itself in 
the international arena. In his opinion, the great impact of the high level meeting was not 
necessarily given by the critical circumstances affected in China by the undergoing Cultural 
Revolution, but mostly because of the PRC’s growing influence in the world. Indeed, 
Beijing had struggled to enter the path for modernisation in the economic and defence 
fields, while the military confrontations with both the US and the USSR had considerably 
decreased, leaving space for new foreign policies, aiming to normalise Beijing’s bilateral 
relations with Washington and Moscow, through the Ping Pong Diplomacy or the regulation 
of the Sino-Soviet border affairs. To a greater extent, during the first half of the 1970s, 
Romania benefited from a flourishing economy with growing socio-economic structures, a 
great regard for modernisation of production lines, the abolition of political detention and 
imprisonment and lessened restrictions for travels abroad (Budura 2008: 55-56).  
Moreover, “a new constitution, promulgated in 1965, abandoned the principle of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and included a list of civil rights comparable to those in 
constitutional instruments of Romania’s de-Stalinised allies (…) In June 1967, an PCR 
Central Committee plenum declared the opening of a new era of state-citizen relationships 
based on the vague notion of “socialist legality” and history was adroitly reinterpreted to 
lay the primary responsibility for past abuses of the Soviet Union” . As the author 459
proceeded, “this Romanian version of the “hundred flowers” resulted in a veritable 
 “1971 mai 7, Beijing. Telegramǎ a Ambasadei României la Beijing cǎtre Corneliu Mănescu, Ministru al 458
Afacerilor Externe, privind telegrama de felicitare adresatǎ de C.C. al P.C. Chinez Comitetului Central al 
P.C.R. cu prilejul semicentenarului P.C.R”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1971, vol. II, f.18-19, în Budura, 
R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1061-1062
 Walter M. Bacon, Jr., “Romania”, pp. 178-179 (pp. 162-184) in “Communism in Eastern Europe”, Second 459
Edition, Edited by Teresa Rakowska - Harmstone, Indiana University Press, 1984.
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 blossoming of culture for the first time since 1945. Between 1968 and 1971 the artistic and 
academic communities reclaimed traditional inspirations and liberties” . 460
Additionally, the Romanian Communist Party’s opposition to the invasion of 
Czechoslovakia had significantly increased Bucharest’s prestige in the international arena. 
In fact, as already illustrated, between Nixon’s successful visit to Bucharest in August 1969 
and his historical visit to the PRC in February 1972, albeit the CPC’s conventional distrust 
in the Soviet satellite states, the Romanian leadership put efforts into the securement of a 
dialogue between Washington and Beijing, that would yield solid, legitimate Sino-
Romanian ties in spite of the Romanian channel’s minor influence (compared with the 
Pakistani) in the course of the Sino-US gradual process of rapprochement. 
According to historians and researchers of the Cold War and East European studies, at his 
return from the Asian journey, Ceaușescu described his welcoming in Beijing as very warm 
and friendly, with Chinese party and state leaders waiting all together at the airport, and an 
overall atmosphere of celebration in the middle of the streets and squares, with crowds of 
people holding slogans dedicated to the Sino-Romanian friendship: “Several hundred 
thousand joyous revolutionary people in Peking gathered at the airport and thronged the 
main streets of the city to give the distinguished Romanian guests a grand and rousing 
welcome” . During his nine-days stay, Ceaușescu met the Chinese political elite, Mao 461
Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, and the general line of the bilateral discussions was 
constituted by domestic and international issues, such as the difficult social situation 
inflicted by the Chinese Great Cultural Revolution, the socialist international relations or 
the American attempts to establish a dialogue with China .  462
Throughout the course of the meeting, in order to achieve the Chinese support from the 
inside, the Romanian delegation would plead once more for Beijing’s direct involvement 
 Ibidem460
 “Romanian Party and Government Delegation led by Comrade Ceaușescu visits China”, in Peking Review, 461
23, June 4th, 1971; For more information see also “Minutes of Conversation of the Executive Committee of 
the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party’s meeting”, June 25, 1971, ANIC, Central 
Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, Chancellery, file no.72/1971, ff.10-58, Translated by Viorel 
Nicolae Bută
 Adam Burakowski, “Dictatura lui Ceaușescu (1965-1989). Geniul Carpaților”, Polirom, Iași, 2011. 462
 282
 both in the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact Organisation’s affairs.  
Nevertheless, on reflection, the Chinese leadership’s resolution to remain detached - which 
could be summarised in the fact that the CPC’s struggle against social-imperialism would 
have been much more effective coming from the outside - was not unfounded: in fact, 
according to Budura, at that point Bucharest had less reasons to feel threatened, “especially 
after the 1970 talks with the USSR leadership” (Budura 2008: 56) and more likely cared for 
the reconcilement of the two conflicting parts, Beijing and Moscow.  
However, the Chinese support for Romania’s consolidation and assertion of autonomy in 
international affairs would be expressed through the renewal of former trade agreements 
and economic cooperation treaties, as well as in Beijing’s willingness to provide Romania 
with another advantageous loan. Regarding the Sino-American rapprochement, discussions 
between the Chinese and Romanian leaders were this time characterised by real and 
tangible assessments. In order to understand Bucharest’s position regarding Beijing’s 
normalisation of relations with Washington, Chairman Mao Zedong would ask the 
Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu if he liked the ping-pong game, and would be quite 
satisfied by the Romanian leader’s positive reply.  
Moreover, the two state leaders reminisced about China’s break off of relations with the 
United States on the eve of the Communist victory in 1949 or about Mao’s writings on this 
issue. Concerning the Sino-Soviet relations instead, the Chinese leader’s words would 
express a more productive thinking: he would urge the Romanian delegation to address 
greetings to the Soviet President of the Council of Ministers Kosygin, given the mitigation 
of the state of affairs and the starting point for regulation of issues at the Sino-Soviet border 
line, as well as the normalisation of state relations between the PRC and the USSR.  
In the end, the high level meeting would restore all the channels of communication between 
Romania and China (party relations included), and would place Romania first in the list of 
European countries having diplomatic relations with the PRC, immediately after North 
Vietnam and North Korea (Budura 2008: 56-57). 
Many researchers have adjudged Ceaușescu’s visit to China, North Korea and North 
Vietnam as one of the most important events in the history as a ruler of the Romanian 
President as, in the backwash of the Asian trip, the leader - who was fascinated by the 
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 Chinese model - began to experiment Beijing leadership's political and economic solutions 
on the basis of the “July Theses”, “a series of proposals to improve the political-ideological 
activity of the Marxist-Leninist education of party members and all Romanians” , that 463
would give rise to a mini cultural revolution in communist Romania . 464
A telegram sent on April 29th, 1972, by the newly-appointed ambassador to Beijing, 
Nicolae Gavrilescu, to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, provided salient 
information regarding Beijing’s reply to Bucharest’s proposal for wider bilateral exchanges 
between the Romanian Communist Party and the Communist Party of China during 1972. 
Hence, the message illustrated the C.C. of the CPC’s wish to exchange party activists 
delegations, in order to study the efforts, the toil of the CPC in the fields of industrial 
construction, of subways - Romanian Communist Party’s proposals, as well as the PCR’s 
grounding knowledge in the economic and political-ideological fields - Chinese proposals. 
The telegram concluded that the authorities in Beijing also fancied the idea to exchange 
journalists during the national day celebrations, and that in September, a Chinese party 
delegation comprising 8-9 persons - local party organs, ministers, as well as activists in the 
fields of culture, industry and agriculture - would visit the Socialist Republic of Romania .  465
On December 7th, 1972, the same diplomat wrote a letter to the Romanian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in order to inform the vice-minister about the discussions between Qiao 
Guanhua, Chinese vice-minister of foreign affairs, Nicolae Ceaușescu (General Secretary of 
the PCR and President of the State Council) and George Macovescu (Romanian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs) in occasion of Qiao Guanhua’s visit to Bucharest, at his return from a UN 
session.  
According to Zhang Wenqing, assistant of the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Qiao 
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 Guanhua’s trip to the Socialist Republic of Romania provided the authorities in Beijing with 
the possibility to get a better understanding of some critical matters in existence at that 
moment, such as the question of security and cooperation in Europe. In this context, Zhang 
Wenqing asserted that, for its unbiased position in international affairs, for its policies of 
unabridged independence, non interference in other countries’ affairs and the creation of 
proper conditions for tangible security and unrestrained cooperation, the leadership in 
Bucharest has hauled the empathy and support of small and medium states. The PRC, 
Zhang went on, would continue to carefully observe the European state of affairs, while the 
Helsinki consultations of 1972 proved to be, on the one hand, a forum for various states to 
express the urge for veritable cooperation and security in Europe and, on the other, 
evidenced the existence of contrasting standpoints and interests.  
The Chinese Foreign Minister’s assistant explained the reasons for which the Chinese 
premier Zhou Enlai would not be able to visit the countries he was invited to, asserting that 
the authorities in Beijing would send Ji Pengfei instead, the Chinese Foreign Minister, to 
honour the visits. In this context, he assured the Romanian side that Bucharest belonged to 
the first group - together with Albania and Yugoslavia - on the list of capitals to be visited 
between February-March 1973  and ultimately, made some considerations regarding the 466
favourable victories of the working parties in the parliamentary elections of Australia and 
New Zealand, countries with which the PRC wished to establish diplomatic relations . 467
Nonetheless, another missive sent on February 1st, 1973, by the Romanian Embassy in 
Beijing to the Romanian Foreign Ministry, would divulge the postponement of Ji Pengfei’s 
visit to socialist capitals around the world, Bucharest included, due to the preparations for 
 “1972 decembrie 18, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, 466
privind vizita ministrului chinez al Afacerilor Externe în România”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame. Pekin, vol. VI, 
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 the international conference on Vietnam, to which Beijing’s leadership was engaged in .  468
Again, by means of a message sent at the end of February 1973, Ambassador Gavrilescu 
notified the Romanian Foreign Minister about the Chinese position during a UN session, 
regarding the question of demilitarisation. More precisely, the missive communicated that, 
if in 1972, the Chinese representatives considered the demilitarisation to be a matter that 
only affected Washington and Moscow - for the rest of the world, the PRC included needed 
the militarisation in order to protect their independence - the beginning of 1973 witnessed a 
change in Beijing’s intransigent position. Indeed, according to the envoy, during the UN’s 
last sitting, two officials of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs depicted the issue from 
a different and more constructive approach, by emphasising Beijing’s will to consent the 
demilitarisation and consequently, to support the international concern for this area of 
interest.  
In this context, on the one hand, the Chinese emphasised their suspicion that both the 
United States and the USSR did not reflect on taking real measures for disarmament, for so 
long disseminated by the international arena, and, on the other hand, they understood the 
necessity to waken up the public opinion and struggle against the American and Soviet arms 
race. Moreover, according to the Chinese representatives, albeit numerous discussions on 
this issue had taken place, the global state of affairs had grown even worse than before 
WWII, and a triumphant solution was hard to find, considered both Washington and 
Moscow’s unwillingness to abandon their tendencies of hegemony and control, inflicted 
through military presence. However, the letter concluded, the Chinese government both 
acknowledged and sustained Romania and any other country worldwide that actively 
militated and took initiatives for disarmament . 469
Another interesting missive was sent on February 24th, 1973, by the Romanian legate to the 
Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, George Macovescu. In fact, the concise report 
 “1973 februarie 1, Beijing. Telegramǎ a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, cǎtre 468
George Macovescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, privind vizita în România a lui Ji Pengfei, Ministru al 
Afacerilor Externe al R.P. Chineze”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1973, vol. I, f. 228-229, în Budura, R.I. 
(ed.), op.cit., p. 1151
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 elaborated by Gavrilescu shed light - on the basis of the latter’s discussion with the Chinese 
deputy Foreign Minister Yu Zhan - on some points regarding Henry Kissinger’s visit to 
Beijing and the encouraging bilateral talks between the latter, the Chinese President Mao 
Zedong and premier Zhou Enlai .  470
In the aftermath of the American Secretary of State’s visit, a Chinese communique pointed 
out the reaffirmation of the position established by the Joint Communiqué of the USA and 
the PRC - also known as the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972: the two nations’ 
pledge to work together for a complete normalisation of diplomatic ties, the recognition of 
the government in Beijing as the only Chinese administration, and the preservation of 
Beijing’s standpoint with regard to the issue of Taiwan. As maintained by Yu Zhan, 
although negotiations and disentanglements regarding the Vietnamese question had been set 
in motion - the US troops withdrawal from the Vietnam war began in 1971 and ended in 
1975 - the normalisation of Sino-American bilateral relations presupposed the finding of 
solutions for the Taiwan matter. 
However, one of the results of these contacts was the decision to intensify bilateral Sino-US 
non-governmental commercial, scientific and cultural exchanges, while the foreign offices 
due to be opened in the two capitals would hold diplomatic privileges. The envoy’s letter 
concluded with Yu Zhan’s wish for an early Sino-US settlement regarding the Taiwan 
question, and his appreciation for the two countries’ good progress in relations, that, on the 
one hand, gratified the PRC’s “brotherly countries”, and, on the other, concerned the CPC’s 
hostile parties, that saw in the new policy of rapprochement with the United States, the 
Chinese adherence to an imperialistic Washington guided, partnership against Moscow . 471
According to Budura, in September 1973, the Romanian leadership sent a Romanian 
Communist Party delegation, leaded by Emil Bodnăraș, vice president of the State Council, 
to Beijing. The aim of the visit was to broaden and intensify bilateral Sino-Romanian 
relations, by investigating the possibilities of a long term economic agreement that 
encompassed a Bucharest-Beijing cooperation on third markets, the signing of a friendship 
 “1973 februarie 24, Beijing. Telegramă a lui Nicolae Gavrilescu, Ambasador al României la Beijing, către 470
George Macovescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, privind vizita lui Henry Kissinger la Beijing”, A.M.A.E, 
fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1973, vol. I, f. 399-400, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1153-1154
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 and collaboration agreement, as well as of a Solemn Declaration.  
To the Romanian proposals however, the Chinese side reacted with scepticism, considered 
the complexity and long-lasting attributes of the initiatives. Hence, the Chinese premier 
Zhou Enlai would motivate Beijing’s refusal with the fact that a Solemn Declaration 
between Bucharest and Beijing could have, on the one hand, instantly put to risk the 
Romanian people in case of a Soviet attack against China, and, on the other, would have 
challenged the Chinese leaders, who realised that the governorship, in a transitory stage, 
would be discordant with the permanent agreements proposed by the Romanian side, that 
instead required a lifelong Chinese partner and a stabilised, untroubled domestic scene. 
Nonetheless, the visit would prove useful for establishing new channels of communication 
between the PRC and Romania, and constituted a significant political and diplomatic event, 
given the large number of states all over the world, willing to start relations with Beijing 
from that moment on (Budura 2008: 34-35). 
Additional significant information regarding the Sino-Romanian political ties in the mid 
1970s was offered by dint of two letters sent by the Romanian Embassy to Beijing, to the 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in July 1974. While the first missive was a top-
priority, representing an invitation for the Romanian Foreign Minister George Macovescu, 
to visit the People’s Republic of China between 6-10 August 1974, the second message 
stood for a Chinese commercial delegation request to be assisted by the Romanian Embassy 
in Brazil, considered the lack of diplomatic relations between Beijing and Brasília .  472
Moreover, a missive sent in August 1974 by the Romanian envoy yield knowledge in 
connection with the invitation to the Chinese leadership to send a party and state delegation 
in occasion of the 30th anniversary of the Romanian national day, and, resultantly, the 
Chinese authorities’ message notifying and motivating their refusal to attend it. According 
to the Chinese reply message, albeit the close brotherly relations between the two parties 
and states, the CPC found itself in a difficult situation, having to cope with domestic 
complications triggered, on the one hand, by the poor health conditions of both comrade 
 “1974 iulie 26, Beijing. Telegramǎ a Ambasadei României la Beijing cǎtre Ministerul Afacerilor Externe 472
privind solicitarea părții chineze ca Ambasada României în Brazilia să acorde sprijin delegației comerciale a 
R.P. Chineze în Brazilia”, A.M.A.E, fond Telegrame, Pekin, 1974, vol. III, f. 389, în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., 
pp. 1185-1186 
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 Mao Zedong and premier Zhou Enlai and, on the other, by the complex undertaking of the 
five-years plan as well as the national movement to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius - 
began in 1973 - and thus, apologised to the Romanian leadership for missing the 
celebrations for the 30th anniversary of the Romanian national day, and confided in 
Bucharest authorities’ understanding. In the end, the Chinese message included the 
assurance that the CPC would organise demonstrations as well as several events in honour 
of the Romanian National Day celebrations and sent friendly wishes of success and 
healthiness to the Romanian leadership . 473
However, an additional message sent by the ambassador a few days later, would announce 
the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Chinese side had changed position, and 
albeit domestic difficulties, in response to Nicolae Ceaușescu and the Romanian party 
leadership’s invitation, would send a party and state delegation to Bucharest in occasion of 
the celebrations of August 23rd, 30th anniversary of the Romanian National Day. The 
Chinese delegation, leaded by Li Xiannian and comprising more than seven party and state 
leaders, due to arrive on the 22nd of August 1974, expressed the wish to continue to neglect 
relations with all socialist parties in Europe, with the exception of Romania, Albania and 
Cuba, the only countries having party relations with China .  474
Interestingly enough, indeed, before arriving to Bucharest, the Chinese delegation explicitly 
revealed that, if invited, they would refuse any kind of participation to collective 
manifestations under the aegis of “the great socialist family”, and would not have any type 
of contact with delegations from Japan, France, Italy, etc. In the end, the Chinese side 
requested the Romanian authorities to arrange a program for them only in Bucharest, and 
expressed that, along with the party and state delegation, both a Chinese workers delegation 
and a delegation of the Friendship Association with the Foreign Countries would also join 
 “1974 august 9, Beijing. Telegramă a lui George Macovescu, Ministru al Afacerilor Externe, cǎtre Nicolae 473
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în Budura, R.I. (ed.), op.cit., pp. 1186-1187
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 the August 23rd celebrations .  475
By dint of another report elaborated by the ambassador, it was revealed that bilateral 
discussion between Li Xiannian and Romanian President Nicolae Ceaușescu, comprised 
issues of Romanian and Chinese domestic policies with regard to the agricultural and 
industrial productions, achievements and impediments of the five years plans, international 
affairs, American imperialism and Soviet revisionism, international communist movement, 
Marxism and the proletarian revolution, Romanian and Chinese relations with the United 
States - in view of President Nixon’s resignation and the new Ford administration - the 
Soviet Union, Latin America, African, Asian and Balkan countries, as well as matters 
relating to the Vietnam war and questions emerged within the UN .  476
Last but not least, the conversations covered topics like the Sino-Romanian party and state 
relations, the cooperation between the two counties both bilaterally and within the UN, the 
movement to criticise Lin Biao and Confucius in the PRC, the presence of the Socialist 
Republic of Romania both in the Comecon and its military complement - the Warsaw Pact, 
Bucharest’s relations with Yugoslavia, Albania, North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia and 
Cuba, with the Italian, Spanish, Finnish and Greek communist parties, the state of affairs in 
Cyprus, the situation in the Middle East as well as the Romanian and Chinese positions 
regarding Japan, some arab countries - such as Egypt, Syria, Libya, Jordan - or concerning 
the conflict between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organisation - PLO . 477
Furthermore, details of the visit to the PRC of general-colonel Ion Gheorghe, Deputy of the 
Minister of Armed Forces and Chief of the General Staff in August 1974, as well as the 
bilateral talks held, on that occasion, with the Chinese vice premier Deng Xiaoping - that 
had assumed Zhou Enlai’s tasks because of the latter’s poor health - were revealed by a 
letter sent by the Romanian envoy to Beijing N. Gavrilescu, to the Romanian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, George Macovescu. Accordingly, the ambassador pointed out that the 
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 bilateral friendly discussions dealt with Sino-Romanian party and state relations, 
international affairs, the Romanian Communist Party’s socio-economical endeavours, the 
PRC’s comradely position with regard to the Romanian people and the unceasing assistance 
to the PCR in the struggle for independence and national sovereignty (Budura 2008: 35-36). 
Furthermore, the ambassador’s missive emphasised the Chinese wish to expand the 
collaboration between the Romanian and Chinese armies, and brought to the fore Deng 
Xiaoping’s preoccupation concerning the external pressure coming from the USSR towards 
countries like Romania, Yugoslavia and neighbouring countries. The bilateral talks, that 
mostly deepened questions of international affairs, also encompassed the two sides’ mutual 
understanding, especially as a result of the significant increase of the bilateral trade between 
1973-1974, of the Chinese long-term credits to Romania, of the intensification of 
cooperation in the technical, scientific and cultural fields, and as a reaction to the opening of 
the Tarom Bucharest-Beijing flight line and of the two embassies in Beijing and Bucharest 
respectively. Towards the end, before the two sides exchanged greetings, Deng reminisced 
about his 1965 visit to Romania, the attendance to the IX Congress of the PCR, and the high 
regard in which he was held by the Romanian leaders, that undermined - in his opinion - the 
Soviet authorities (Budura 2008: 35-36).  
According to Budura, the triumph of the liberation struggles in Indochina provided the 
Romanian authorities - “whose merits in this respect were undeniable - with a new 
opportunity to continue the dialogue with the leadership of the PRC. On their way back 
from Vietnam , in May 1975, Paul Niculescu-Mizil and the delegation he headed, stopped in 
Beijing for talks with Li Xiannian” (Budura 2008: 67).  
As evidenced by a record of the Polish Embassy in Bucharest, besides the bilateral talks 
with Li Xiannian, the delegation participated in the opening ceremony of the Romanian 
industrial exhibition in Beijing and was enlivened by the presence of Zhou Enlai . 478
Moreover, on September 5th, 1975, a Romanian party and state delegation leaded by Ilie 
Verdeț - member of the Political Executive Committee, Secretary of the CC of the PCR - 
and accompanied by general Gheorghe Gomoiu - deputy Defence Minister - arrived in 
 Intelligence Note, Polish Embassy in Bucharest, “Regarding Revival of Relations Between Romania and 478
the PRC”, October 15, 1975, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, Republic of Poland, D-I-R-0-2413-13-75,1. Obtained and Translated by Adam Burakowski. 
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 Beijing, from Hanoi, and was welcomed at the airport by Ji Dengguei, vice-premier of the 
State Council of the PRC, Geng Biao, head of the Department for Foreign Affairs of the CC 
of the CPC, and other Chinese political figures. Sino-Romanian bilateral talks, and mostly 
change of opinions, comprised matters of socio-economical as well as industrial 
development, the increase of agricultural and industrial production, especially in view of the 
Romanian authorities wish to provide a better living standard for the population, 
international political economy, like exchanges and relations between the countries 
members of the Comecon, the socialist principles and some theoretical and ideological 
aspects of the socialist construction, the two countries' relations with the United States 
(especially regarding the Taiwan question), the Soviet Union (mostly concerning the 
military expenditure and the Soviet revisionism), the Balkans and the unrest in the Middle 
East, UN affairs, etc. Last, but not least, the two sides expressed the wish to increase 
twofold the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade for the forthcoming five years or to beat natural 
calamities by mutual support, cooperation and solidarity .  479
Nonetheless, in the Romanian historiography, Ilie Verdeț’s September 1975 visit to the PRC 
and mostly his reception, by Premier Zhou Enlai, at the hospital where he was being treated, 
not only “came as hard evidence, rationally as well as emotionally convincing, to this truth: 
that remarkable Chinese personality received the last foreign guest of his life, and this guest 
was a Romanian dignitary” (Budura 2008: 68) but, this event would be recalled by 
sinologists, experts and researchers of Sino-Romanian relations, as evidence of friendship, 
camaraderie and empathy between the two peoples and states. Indeed, by dint of the 
memorandum left by Ilie Verdeț in the aftermath of the meeting - an expressive, truly 
realistic and over-sentimental literary work, evoking that very last visit to the Chinese 
premier - Romania and China seem to outshine the international relations and global affairs 
realm, and enter a minor sphere that glorifies a genuine and healthful brotherly bonding. As 
a matter of fact, during the last minutes of this final encounter, a debilitated Zhou Enlai 
would frame the future of the Sino-Romanian bilateral ties, with Deng Xiaoping as the de 
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 facto leader of the PRC, following Mao’s death: Zhou reassured Verdeț that, considered 
Deng Xiaoping’s position as defender and benefactor of the Romanian people, Sino-
Romanian relations from that day forth, could only have been characterised by friendship, 
precisely like in the past . 480
IV.10 Romania’s austerity measures versus China’s economic reform and modernisation.  
Overview of the Sino-Romanian relations during the last decade of the Cold War 
As already stated, although in the first half of the 1970s, the PRC’s project for normalisation 
of relations with the United States, Japan and other important actors in the international 
arena, proved to be successful - allowing the Chinese capital to experience a tremendous 
increase in prestige - domestically, Beijing was dealing with the final outbreaks of both the 
cultural revolution and of power struggle, such as Lin Biao’s failed military coup d’état and 
his subsequent controversial death while attempting to flee to the Soviet Union; the attempt 
to tear down Zhou Enlai through the outbreak of the movement to criticise Lin Biao and 
Confucius; the death of Zhou Enlai (January 8th, 1876) and successively, of Mao Zedong (9 
September 1976); successor of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping’s annihilation of power during 
the Tiananmen commemoration of the dead (May 5th, 1976) and the ascension as Chairman 
of the CC of the CPC of Hua Guofeng, loyal to Mao, who brought the Cultural Revolution 
to an end and ousted the Gang of Four (October 6th, 1976).  
However, taking into consideration the Romanian party and state as well as people's 
position of support towards their Chinese counterpart especially until the beginning of the 
1980s, not only the Sino-Romanian cooperation did not suffer from the political, social and 
economic repercussions of the Chinese internal crisis, but Bucharest’s relations with Beijing 
experienced, beyond question and for reasons to be found in the international political state 
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 of affairs, a drastic escalation of the political, cultural and mostly, economic exchanges, 
reaching the highest level in the modem history of the two countries. In fact, for a decade, 
Romania was 4th in the list of countries friends with China, after North Korea, Cambodia 
and Albania (Buzatu 2004: 122). 
Bilateral political and diplomatic contacts were raised to new heights, considered that the 
Romanian leader Ceaușescu and his wife Elena made two official visits to the PRC, one 
between 1-9 June, 1971 and between 15-20 May 1978, when the Romanian president was 
given a great number of distinctions, and was received with triumphal welcome by the 
Chinese people and political figures. These visits, as already stated, would give rise to a 
mini cultural revolution in the Socialist Republic of Romania, that ended a reasonable 
liberalisation period by the fencing in of the democratic rights of the people, and by 
establishing an ostentatious cult of personality . The Romanian leader also made official 481
and non-official visits to China in 1982, in 1985, and the last one in 1988, while three 
Romanian premiers Manea Mănescu, Ilie Verdeț and Constantin Dăscălescu visited the PRC 
in 1978, 1980 and 1983, respectively. 
Chinese high-level meetings in Romania were made by Zhou Enlai - vice chairman of the 
CPC Central Committee and premier of the State Council - who attended the funeral of 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej - first secretary of the Romanian Workers’ Party Central 
Committee - in 1965, and headed a Party and Government delegation to visit Romania in 
1966. The general secretary of the CPC Central Committee Deng Xiaoping, vice premier of 
the PRC Wan Li, and the member of the Politburo Standing Committee Qiao Shi, attended 
the 9th, the 13th and the 14th Congress of the PCR in 1965, 1984 and 1989 respectively. 
Moreover, in 1964 and 1974, Li Xiannian, in his capacity as vice premier, went to Romania 
to attend the celebrations marking the 20th and 30th anniversary of the Liberation of 
Romania and in 1984, as President of the PRC, he attended the same celebrations, in 
occasion of the 40th anniversary of liberation. In 1977, Jiang Zemin - Chinese President 
since 1993 until 2003 and noted admirer of Romania - payed a visit to Romania in his 
 For more information see Ioan Scurtu, “Revoluția Română din decembrie 1989 în context internațional”, 481
Editura Redacției Publicațiilor pentru Străinătate, București, 2009, pp. 55-58. 
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 quality as engineer and expert of industrial machineries ; he successively visited Romania 482
twice, in 1985 and 1996. Hua Guofeng, chairman of the CC of the CPC and premier of the 
State Council, General Secretary Hu Yaobang and premier Zhao Ziyang, paid visits to 
Romania in 1978, 1983 and in 1986 respectively . 483
The two countries have always mutually supported each other in international affairs and 
domestic development. As already demonstrated, Romania’s neutrality in the Sino-Soviet 
disputes  in the 1960s, inclined almost from the beginning to the PRC, which had the force 
to oppose the Kremlin’s leadership. Resultantly, economic exchanges, trade and specialists 
between the two states “reached considerable heights, favoured by the identity of 
ideological and political visions, feelings of mutual respect, and appreciation. Thus, 
communist China found in Romania perhaps the only European friend partner in that 
period of unrest. In 1978, trade reached 3.6 billion hard currency, Romania exported goods 
worth 1.7 billion hard currency (energy machinery, electro-technical goods, oil, cars, 
trucks, boats, rolled pipes, fertilisers, and other products), and imported goods worth 1.8 
billion hard currency (metallurgical coke, iron alloys, natural rubber, cotton and wool 
fabrics, knitwear,  footwear and other products)” . 484
Moreover, as Rădăvoi observed, the US $ 60 million credit granted by China to Romania in 
1972 was highly appreciated by a state “that was already experiencing economic problems 
due to excessive centralisation. To be noted that half of the loan was in goods - mainly 
cheap consumer goods - that flooded a market dominated by the low-quality indigenous 
products” . Albeit the poor quality of the Romanian exports, “the economic relations kept 485
developing and by 1980, Romania was China's most important trade member in the CMEA, 
with the 1980 volume of trade reaching 1.200 million US dollars, 50% more than the Sino-
Soviet trade. Romania was delivering to China oil equipment, other machineries and plants, 
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 metallurgical and chemical products, products of the timber industry, while China was 
delivering oil and again consumer goods - which, in early 1980s had become a scarcity as 
Romania was deeply affected by isolation and Ceaușescu’s  forced savings policy” . 486
As far as the cultural relations are concerned, it is relevant to state that both in the 1970s 
and the 1980s, the Sino-Romanian cooperation experienced a particular vivacity and 
enthusiasm. For example, not only the Romanian movies (as propaganda tool, supported the 
creation of a positive image of Romania within the PRC) which were the most requested 
and desired by the Chinese authorities in comparison with the cinematographic productions 
of other socialist states, but the Romanian athletes’ success in international competitions 
also contributed to the shaping of a favourable picture in China of Romania and the 
Romanian people (Buzatu 2004: 123).  
Furthermore, since the late 1970s until the end of the 20th century, many direct translations 
from Romania began to be more accurate or closer to the original. Of these, I would like to 
mention “Delirium” by Marin Preda (1978), “The water” by Alexandru Ivasiuc (1980), 
“Romanian Theatre” (anthology, 1981), “A swing in the sky” (anthology of 133 
contemporary Romanian literature, 1983), “The big break” by Mircea Sântimbreanu 
(1983), “All sails up” by Radu Tudoran (1983), “Selected Works” by Mihail Sadoveanu (4 
volumes, 1985), “Ion” by Liviu Rebreanu (1987), “Poems and Pamphlets” by Tudor 
Arghezi (1988), “Romanian fairy tales, stories and anecdotes” (1991).  
A few prestigious specialised periodicals such as “Universal literature”, “Yilin” (The 
Forest translation), “Foreign Literature” have also published classics and contemporary 
works of Vasile Alecsandri, Mihai Eminescu, Anton Holban, Vasile Voiculescu, Lucian 
Blaga, Geo Bogza, D.R. Popescu, Mircea Eliade, N. Stănescu, Ana Blandiana and Adrian 
Păunescu .  487
Apachiței also made a complete inventory of the Chinese researchers who investigated the 
Romanian literature since the 1980s, hence “The History of Romanian Literature” (1987) by 
Wang Minsheng, Institute for World Literature of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, 
 Ibidem486
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 “Contemporary Romanian Literature” by Professor Feng Zhichen, the Romanian language 
Department, Beijing Foreign Studies University and “Literary Sino-Romanian Relations”, 
by Professor Ding Chao, the same prestigious university. According to the author, “Literary 
Sino-Romanian relations” (…) is a comprehensive monograph. The author has done a 
thorough investigation, timing and a critical appreciation over the Romanian-Chinese 
relations in the field of literature, featuring separate works, writers, translators and 
translations, versions, editions, various aspects of translation and editing, as well as other 
forms of literary exchanges between China and Romania” .  488
Moreover, between 1980 and 1983, more than 4.000 Chinese specialists in political affairs, 
economics, technology, science, culture and tourism, visited Romania and, considered the 
latter’s promotion as “sister nation” in the Chinese official media, one can deduce why the 
Romanian republic - among other Eastern European countries - became a popular 
destination for the Chinese migration in the aftermath of the Cold War . The Romanian - 489
Chinese bilateral cooperation was additionally intensified by the opening of the already 
mentioned direct airline Bucharest - Beijing on November 27th, 1974, as well as by the 
construction in 1977, in the two capitals, of stylish and impressive embassies’ headquarters 
(Buzatu 2004: 123).  
Nonetheless, beginning with the 1980s, the Sino-Romanian cooperation started to be 
affected both by China and Romania's contrasting domestic reconstruction practices, as well 
as by the influence of external factors. For example, the “economic reform started in the 
PRC in 1978, after three decades of huge political, economic and social disorders (…) set 
off the country on a path of accelerated and uninterrupted growth, propelling it in the group 
of the most dynamic states of the world and within countries with large industrial 
orientation” (Russu, Bulearcă 2009: 49-50). 
The initiator and mastermind of the Chinese reforms, the paramount leader of the PRC from 
December 1978 until 1989, Deng Xiaoping became influential in the People's Republic of 
China's economic reconstruction following the Great Leap Forward (1957-1960), but his 
 Idem, p.133488
 Ciprian Nicolae Rădăvoi, “Factors countervailing immigrant phobia: a paradoxically successful case of 489
Chinese migration”, International relations, 2015
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 economic policies, contrasting Mao Zedong’s political ideologies, lead to his twofold purge 
during the Cultural Revolution. In the aftermath of Mao’s death, Deng outmanoeuvred 
Mao’s chosen successor, Hua Guofeng (who would remain nominal Chairman of the 
Communist Party of China until 1981) and managed to attain the final victory during the 3rd 
Plenary Session of the 11th C.C. of the CPC (18-22 December 1978 is considered a crucial 
turning point in post 1949 Chinese history), by debating the necessity to unloose the party 
leaders’ dogmatism as prerequisite to reform the economy, and the need to open up with 
respect to some ideological issues - such as the investigation of the political past, the 
attacks and coercions of those whose views contrasted with the CPC leaders’ believes - used 
during the Cultural Revolution. Moreover, Deng referred to the need to transform the 
responsibility system from a collective to an individual one, and to put into practice an 
awards and penalty system based on merit, which could create a competitive atmosphere 
conducive to progress . 490
By dint of these new theories, that both eradicated the old leftists thought and the penurious 
socialism, and promoted a sustainable economic growth on the basis of suitable pragmatic 
reforms, Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in effect payed regard to the gradual reshaping of the 
entire Chinese society. The enactment, by the end of the 20th century, of the “Four 
Modernisations” or “the four cardinal principles” with respect to agriculture in the first 
place, then industry, army and technology, as well as the determination to modernise the 
railways, the coal and steel industries, and - by replacing Mao’s system of ideological 
incentives - to provide material inducement to increase production that contented the 
Chinese workers and peasants, constituted the basis for Deng’s vision to strengthen the 
socialist regime shaken by the Maoist cultural and economic experiments. In spite of his 
reform stratagems - that in 1982 were encapsulated in the CPC’s new ideology “socialism 
with Chinese characteristics” - Deng was not regarded as part of the new and potentially 
revisionist communists, as was Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. On the contrary, 
having participated in the Long March (October 1934-1935) and having fought against 
Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalists, Deng has always been in the loop of the CPC’s drives and 
plans. In fact, not even the economic pragmatism, that made him so famous, can and be 
 D. Xiaoping, “Opere alese 1975-1984”, Editura Politică, București, 1987, p. 38.490
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 seen as a tardily prophecy; on the contrary, as already stated, in the early 1960s, as senior 
official of the CPC, he endorsed the same policy together with the former president of the 
PRC, Liu Shaoqi. That is why, his later reforms should be regarded as a confirmation, rather 
than a repudiation, of the old communist ideas. According to diplomat Ion Buzatu, Deng 
Xiaoping’s political and economic strategies led, soon after, to a constant and progressive 
foreign investment in China, firstly from the Chinese diaspora in Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
and later from the world’s most powerful economies, like the ones of the United States, 
Japan, Germany, France, Great Britain and South Korea (Buzatu 2004: 124-125).  
Meanwhile, in the Socialist Republic of Romania, Ceaușescu was about to embark on a new 
political project, characterised by self-isolation in the international arena and the 
intensification of nationalist attitudes through ideological, political and economic seclusion. 
Firstly, in the cultural field, the already mentioned July Theses (1971) triggered a mini-
cultural revolution that implied a rigorous control over the circulation of information of any 
kind, from the West towards Romania (the number of translations decreased significantly, 
while there were hardly any magazines, journals, or Western movies emerging on the 
Romanian market) whiles even those media products coming from the communist countries 
were carefully selected and censored. All these measures, combined with the limitation of 
the freedom of movement of persons across the Iron Curtain, gradually lead to an increasing 
self-isolation process, that, by overturning the moral principles, twisted the needs and 
aspirations of the people and caused moral suffering.  
However, beyond the political mobilisation through mass organisations and strict 
supervision of the ideological content of the cultural products, the state’s control was also 
exercised through other mechanisms, involving the intrusion into the everyday life and the 
maintenance of poor living conditions of the population. Economically, if the liberalisation 
of the mid 1960s had allowed the reappearance of small private family businesses and 
services, such as restaurants, bistros, bakeries, hairdressers, that, together with the private 
craftsmen, such as shoemakers, tailors, etc. formed a nucleus of the private sector in areas 
where the state was particularly insufficient, beginning with 1968 - under the pretext of 
poor management or illicit  enrichment - the liberalisation period  began to shake and, in 
1977, the repression reached all forms of production, trade and services.  
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 The early 1980s witnessed new measures for economic restrictions in agriculture (by means 
of a system that controlled the whole agricultural production and enforced a new 
collectivisation) that rendered each individual materially state-dependent. The new agrarian 
revolution was inscribed in a wider range of measures that, from the early 1980s, pushed 
Romania into a real war economy. In fact, key sectors of the economy were put under the 
direct responsibility of the military: the transport and telecommunications, the major ports, 
the national sites, the mines and, since 1985, the energy .  491
Additionally, in 1983, the minimum income guaranteed for all categories of employees was 
abolished, and replaced by remuneration based on performance, in a time of price 
explosion. If none of these measures actually contributed to the improvement of the 
productivity, they have instead increased the insecurity in labor relations.  
In the social field, next to the alimentary crisis (products like bread, flour, meat, sugar, oil, 
eggs, milk, were often unavailable) that exacerbated the phenomenon of queues, the year 
1982 generated other societal worries in Romania, with increasingly frequent interruptions 
of both gas and electricity, while the miserable state of the housings and the public 
transport, as well as the alarming ecological situation, contributed to the deterioration of the 
quality of life.  
All these, together with the lack of products such as soaps, detergents and medicines, 
resulted in the rapid degradation of health, the emergence of certain diseases of poverty, and 
the decrease - since 1980 - of the life expectancy. Mortality and infant mortality in 
particular, had become so high that, despite police measures taken in 1984-1985 with the 
aim to increase the birth rate, the population growth registered in 1988 was lower than in 
1966 .  492
The research has demonstrated that the 1980s austerity policy in Romania, surfaced as a 
result of Ceaușescu’s decision to pay back the foreign debt (approximatively US $ 14 
billion) of the Socialist Republic of Romania to the international creditors (International 
Monetary Fund), in conjunction with Bucharest’s need to supply the word’s industrial giants 
 “Comisia prezidențială pentru analiza dictaturii comuniste din România”, Raport Final, București, 2006, 491
pp. 603-605.
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 with raw material, at the time of economic inefficiency - that completely minimised the 
financial possibilities of agricultural and industrial refurbishment - produced a gradual 
decline of the Romanians’ living standards and a growing dissatisfaction of the vast 
majority of the population firstly, and led to the downfall of the PCR eventually .  493
Hence, as a result of the PCR’s unsuitable domestic policy initiatives, Bucharest both 
started to experience a gradual decline of authority and isolation in international arena, and 
witnessed the beginning of a downfall with regard to the Sino-Romanian cooperation. In 
fact, repulsed by the new Chinese alternative foreign and domestic policies, at first glance, 
the Romanian leaders would keep on displaying close liaison with the government in 
Beijing, but in actual fact, the PCR progressively initiated the censorship of positive 
information coming from the PRC - regarding mostly the successful market-oriented 
Chinese reforms and opening up  -since it was considered dangerous for the Romanian 
society (Buzatu 2004: 125).   
Moreover, if on the one hand, during the last years of the Cold War Ceaușescu limited 
criticism towards the Soviet authorities, on the other hand, the Chinese leaders expected the 
Romanian government to play a pro-Chinese key role in Eastern Europe, imagined the PCR 
maintained its position of support regarding the Chinese issue of Taiwan, and tried to strike 
a balance between Moscow and Beijing. Nevertheless, Beijing's expectations would not be 
fulfilled. On the contrary, Sino-Romanian bilateral trade immediately began to suffer when 
the discontented government in Beijing - on the path for modernisation through the theories 
of the socialism with Chinese characteristics - started to refuse the Romanian low-quality 
products, while Bucharest’s high-quality commodities continued their route towards the 
Western countries (Buzatu 2004: 126).  
Furthermore, research has demonstrated that during the second half of the 1980s, as soon as 
China - however gradually - began to improve diplomatic relations with the global powers, 
the Socialist Republic of Romania ceased to be Beijing's gateway towards the West. In fact, 
Ceaușescu’s catastrophic economic and political reforms, and his refuse to cooperate with 
 Ciobanu, Ceslav, “Mikhail Gorbachev: The Decay of Socialism and The Renaissance of Eastern Europe - 493
From the perspective of an insider”, International Forum for Democratic Studies, National Endowment for 
Democracy, William R. Nelson Institute for Public Affairs, James Madison University, Washington, DC, 2003, 
pp.6-9
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 the Western countries, would lead to Romania’s fall off in the worldwide diplomacy. 
Simultaneously, when Deng Xiaoping’s new socialist transformation that promised to lift 
China out of her poverty became effective, Romania’s economy started its decline. 
Interestingly enough, a CIA report of 1987 divulged that “China’s economic ties with 
Eastern Europe have grown rapidly in recent years and will probably continue to strengthen 
over the near term. The expansion in bilateral trade, which has more than doubled since 
1983, is based on both partners’ desire to barter for goods rather than expend foreign 
exchange, as well as on the attractiveness of the respective markets - a huge potential for 
East European sales in China, and a market in eastern Europe for lower quality Chinese 
goods that cannot be sold in the West” .  494
Moreover, while the report gave evidence of proliferating bilateral scientific and technical 
ties, with agreements covering the high technology extending over longer periods, in the 
political field the document anticipated closer Chinese-East European relations. 
Accordingly, albeit a trade deficit with the region in the 1980s, China’s trade with Eastern 
Europe increased from US $ 1.6 billion in 1983 to US $ 3.5 billion in 1986.  
In 1985 Beijing signed five-year trade agreements with all East European countries, “signed 
new accords involving a wide range of Chinese and East European organisations, and 
permitted ad hoc arrangements between Chinese and East European enterprises to expand 
(…) the Chinese Academy of Sciences signed agreements with the Bulgarian, East German 
and Hungarian Academies (…), agreements with East Germany and Bulgaria (…) extend 
through the year 2000, and China has signed five or 10 year agreements with Poland, 
Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary” .  495
Specifically, the report outlined that trade with Romania, “China’s second largest East 
European trading partner did not meet Chinese expectations last year. Although the 1986 
trade protocol called for an increase of 40% over 1985, trade actually increased only 5% 
(…) and China’s trade deficit with Romania was the largest among East European countries 
 “Sino-East European Economic Relations: Moderate Growth Expected”, 12 August 1987, Directorate of 494
Intelligence, C.I.A., Washington D.C., Declassified in Part-Sanitised Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/22, 
CIA-RDP04T00907R000300380001-9, report available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/
CIA-RDP04T00907R000300380001-9.pdf> accessed on 11.04.2015
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 last year, reaching 290 million dollars” . By and large, the document also disclosed that 496
“technical cooperation in industry has grown markedly (…) in such areas as electronics, 
telecommunication, coal, mining and geology”  and, according to the Chinese Ministry of 497
Foreign Economic Relations and Trade statistics, “last year China’s central trade 
corporations signed technology contracts with Poland, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia worth 270 million dollars - roughly 6% of total technology 
purchases” .  498
Nonetheless, after analysing the progress of the political relationship between China and 
Eastern Europe and investigating Beijing’s past and future objectives in the region, as well 
as the Chinese leadership’s political considerations (that is to increase its influence in 
Eastern Europe while reducing that of the Soviets), the report  concluded that “there are 
limits on the expansion of Sino-East European relations” , both because Eastern Europe 499
“must satisfy its obligations to the Soviet Union before allocating resources for trade with 
China”  and in view if the fact that “the Chinese are unable to use all of the East 500
European products” . Hence, “we believe China’s trade will continue to expand with East 501
Germany, Poland and - for a much smaller base - with Yugoslavia (…) in contrast, we 
believe China’s economic  relations with Romania, Czechoslovakia and Hungary - already 
showing strains - will falter” . 502
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                                   Table 1: China’s Trade with Eastern Europe 1983-1986  503
 
                    
                                Table 2: China’s Trade with Eastern Europe 1983-1984  504
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 All things considered, the two countries - Romania and China - remained trapped in a 
vicious cycle, where the different economic approaches adopted in Bucharest and Beijing 
had negative impacts on the political and diplomatic relations, which, furthermore, 
influenced negatively the economic, cultural and technological bilateral exchanges. In 
conclusion of this chapter I would like to underline that the visits to Romania of Mikhail 
Gorbachev, as leader of the Soviet Union and of the Chinese high-level delegations (Hua 
Guofeng, Li Xiannian and Zhao Ziyang), as well as Ceaușescu’s visits to the Soviet Union 
at the end of the 1980s would not contribute to change Ceaușescu’s intransigency with 
regard to economic and political adjustments, but would instead lead to the repudiation of 
the Romanian dictator’s authority in December 1989.  
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 V. Sino-Romanian relations 1989-2004 
V.1 Revolutions, social movements and the strive for democracy 
The Romanian case 
Albeit the Romanian revolution - in the same manner as other revolutions of 1989 in 
Central and Eastern Europe - has been tackled with by researchers all over the world, in the 
past twenty five years, it will continue to be a prominent argument for intellectuals to 
investigate, for their capacity to lead “to the decisive and irreversible transformation of the 
existing order” . In fact, as Tismăneanu encapsulated, “instead of autocratic, one-party 505
systems, the revolutions created emerging pluralist polities. They allowed the citizens of the 
former ideologically driven despotisms (closed societies) to recover their main human and 
civic rights and to engage in the building of open societies. Instead of centrally planned 
command economies, all these societies have embarked on creating market economies. In 
these efforts to meet the triple challenge (creating political pluralism, market economy, and 
a public sphere, i.e. a civil society) some succeeded better and faster than others” . 506
The origins of the Romanian revolution  lye undoubtedly in the socialist republic’s 507
profound and far-reaching domestic issues, derived from the systematic amassing of 
dissatisfaction and frustration within both the Romanian society as a rule, and each citizen’s 
daily life (as isolated forms), while the system itself had both dissipated its resources of 
credibility, and proved its limits. Nonetheless, it is comprehensible that a regime which was 
endeavoured with an impressive force of repression, could not have been removed without 
the benefit of a favourable international context for the reforming national forces. Thus, the 
global climate in which the Romanian revolution broke out and amplified, can be analysed 
 Vladimir Tismăneanu, “The Revolutions of 1989 and Their Legacies”, the Graduate Institute Geneva, 505
2009
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 revolution - a rapid, fundamental transformation of the state and social structure, accompanied by mass 507
uprising from below - definition according to The International Encyclopaedia of the Social and Behavioural 
Sciences, Elsevier, 2001
 306
 on two levels: the first one is represented by Moscow’s decision to try to reform the entire 
system of the communist Soviet bloc and, respectively, by the perception and reaction of the 
democratic West towards the changes caused by this decision. It is commonly known that 
on several occasions, in the aftermath of WWII, the Soviet control in the European areas 
under the Kremlin's influence was challenged by the dominated nations, already at the 
utmost of their endurance. As a matter of fact, albeit the miscarriage of the strives for 
liberation during the forty-five years of communist rule in Central and Eastern Europe, each 
Soviet satellite state had attempted to emancipate from the Kremlin’s grip . 508
However, by the end of the 1980s, the crisis of the socialist totalitarian system had reached 
its heights, and the Soviet Union found itself alone to compete, both economically and 
military with the West and its utmost rival, the United States, and to control the Eastern bloc 
states through the old methods dictated by the Brezhnev Doctrine . 509
It was in this context that the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev launched the widely 
known policies of glasnost (“openness”) and perestroika (“restructuring”), uskorenie (GDP 
- gross domestic product - growth) and novoe myslenie (new thinking) - due to become the 
new policies in the Eastern bloc’s socialist states as well - that pushed towards the 
reconstruction of the communist regimes of the Soviet bloc. Nonetheless, Gorbachev’s 
initiatives would open a breach between the Kremlin and the socialist capitals in Central 
and Eastern Europe, for the political regimes in the satellite states were dealing with huge 
credibility crisis that were coupled with profound economic emergencies.  
Thus, while the reformist communist leaders of Hungary and Poland believed that the 
Kremlin’s new orientation could also save the regimes in Warsaw and Budapest, and 
consequently aligned themselves with Moscow, other Eastern bloc countries remained 
openly skeptical and demonstrated distaste for reform. Moreover, previous experiences had 
 In 1956, in Poland and Hungary the uprisings were ended through the Soviet military force. In 1968, 508
Alexander Dubček’s series of reforms which aimed at improving economic conditions in Czechoslovakia and 
endorsed greater liberalisation - of the freedom of speech, movement, and greater political participation by 
non-communist organisations - culminated in the biggest military operation in Europe since the WW II, with 
the joint forces of the Warsaw Pact invading Czechoslovakia and restoring the unyielding communist order; 
Berlin, as well as other East-German cities witnessed several upheavals against the communist regime, that 
were brought to an end by the Red Army’s military intervention.
 Brezhnev Doctrine - term created by the Western media to describe the Soviet policy in Eastern Europe, 509
that affirmed the Kremlin's right to military intervene in the affairs of the communist satellite states when 
forces that were hostile to socialism struggled to bend the evolution of a socialist country towards capitalism.
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 demonstrated that although reform in the Soviet Union was compliant, the pressure for 
change in Eastern Europe had the potential to become uncontrollable.  
These regimes  owned their conception and preservation to the Soviet-style totalitarianism, 
backed by the Soviet military power and assistance. Anyhow, considering Gorbachev’s 
reform initiatives impermanent, conventional communist rulers like East Germany's Erich 
Honecker, Bulgaria’s Todor Zhivkov, Czechoslovakia’s Gustáv Husák and Romania’s 
Nicolae Ceaușescu obstinately bypassed the calls for change. Indeed, in reaction to the 
political changes occurring throughout Eastern Europe in the wake of the Soviet reforms, 
Ceaușescu adopted a policy of retrenchment, by rejecting the decentralisation of economic 
planning and management, the reintroduction of market mechanisms and private enterprise 
as incompatible with socialism.  
The Romanian communist leader also rejected much of Gorbachev's foreign policy: in fact, 
while the Soviets spoke of positive trends in East-West relations and progress in arms 
control, Ceaușescu’s statements proved his reluctance; in fact, he criticised the thesis for a 
Soviet-United States dialogue, stating that international situation remained complex and 
brimmed with the prospect of war. Progressively, Romania adopted a more aggressive 
position - than the Soviet Union and other members of the Warsaw Pact - on a number of 
East-West issues, while “objections to perestroika influenced its relations with other East 
European countries. It appeared that two major camps were emerging within the Warsaw 
Pact, with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany and Romania lining up against 
restructuring, and Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union favouring it” .  510
If bilateral talks between Gorbachev and Ceaușescu, both in May 1987 and in October 
1988, regarding the Romanian mistreatment of the Hungarian minority and Bucharest’s 
hesitation to increase corporation with other members of the Comecon, proved inefficient in 
refining the state of the Soviet-Romanian relationship, discussions between the leaders of 
the United States and the Soviet Union, George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev at Malta (2-3 
December 1989) regarded delicate matters like demilitarisation, the control of weapons of 
mass distraction and last, but not least, the circumstances created by means of reforming 
 “Romania - Soviet Union and Eastern Europe”, US Library of Congress, available at http://510
countrystudies.us/romania/75.htm accessed on 11.09.2016
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 policies in those socialist countries that had embraced the Kremlin’s proposals for reform. 
Furthermore, in the backdrop of internal adjustments in the Central and East European 
communist states, while President Bush alluded to Romania’s stillness, Raymond Selz, 
deputy of the State Secretary of US on European and Canadian matters, appreciated in a 
press conference that he could not “anticipate what is going to happen in Romania” since 
the country seemed “insensitive or immune to all changes happening in Eastern 
Europe” . In actual fact, Romania was already facing a precarious social condition, and 511
there was only a matter of time, in conjunction with the right set of circumstances, until the 
insurrection blazed out and shattered the country to the hilt. Hence, “whilst Ceaușescu 
continued to argue for reform of the Warsaw Pact and a reduction in its budget, his internal 
policies attracted widespread international criticism” .  512
In accordance with Deletant, it was indeed “the deteriorating human rights situation in 
Romania, that threatened US-Romanian relations in the early 1980s. The resulting US 
alienation from Romania in 1987 and Ceaușescu’s growing irritation with American 
expressions of concern about (his) treatment of his opponents led (him) in February 1988 to 
renounce the Most Favoured Nation status before suffering the indignity of having it 
withdrawn by Congress or by President Reagan” . Hence, the author concluded, as early 513
as two years before the Romanian revolution, “Ceaușescu’s action showed that he would 
not submit to pressure from any direction, West or East” . 514
Meanwhile, if the American president seemed receptive to Gorbachev’s methods of 
supervising the reshaping of the Soviet controlled polities, the Soviet leader both called for 
cooperation and shared responsibilities with his American counterpart for possible 
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 malfunctions that might have arisen during such wide-ranging transformations. Thus, in the 
aftermath of the meeting in Malta between the two world leaders, the impression was that 
the turn of events in Central and Eastern Europe was both acknowledged and consented by 
the US and the USSR, with the Soviet Union us initiator of manoeuvres to impose the 
remodelling of the communist societies, while the United States contemplated the processes 
taking place and mostly, provided understanding as well as the necessary political, and even 
material and financial support. Still, no matter how satisfactory the negotiations, as soon as 
the reformation processes escalated, Moscow enjoyed only a limited capacity to interfere 
with the political transformations in Central and Eastern Europe, and thus allowed the local 
political powers substantial room for manoeuvre. In fact, this made possible that local 
political groundwork - orchestrated by different groups, from Ceaușescu’s worshippers to 
the structured party opposition - became extremely important in the dynamics of the events 
of December 1989.  
Setting aside the strategies of the leaders of the two worlds, during the course of the East 
European reform process, the public exertion was radicalised in view of the fact that 
individuals were no longer satisfied by both the superficial changes carried out by the 
political elite and the enduringness of the society, and thus switched to operations that were 
to change the essence of the regime itself. The East Central European societies’ desire for 
reconstruction would be met with enthusiastic approval by the Western official media 
personalities and governmental and non-governmental associations, that promoted the 
respect for human rights and the restoration of democracy.  
In point of fact, in Romania in particular, academic investigation have mentioned France’s 
involvement in monitoring the events of December 1989 and in the evolution of the 
political regime in Bucharest in the following years (Duțu 2012: 76, 80). Moreover, many 
names have been appointed to the Romanian revolution, such as “the Stolen 
Revolution” (“Revoluția Furată”), “the Impossible Revolution” (“Revoluția Imposibilă”), 
“the Obscure Revolution” (“Revoluția Încâlcită”), “High-Level Betrayal” (“Trădare la 
Nivel Înalt"), and “Romanian Revolution Live” (“Revoluția Română în Direct”), and many 
theories emerged on the revolution, for reasons and set of circumstances that I will try to 
outline further. In fact, as Bonnemains maintained, for many the Romanian Revolution did 
 310
 not even exist, “it was a Coup d’état or a conspiracy: December 1989 and the conspiracy 
theory” . Nonetheless, besides the issues of the Romanian (counter)revolution - uprising - 515
coup having been orchestrated with the support of foreign involvement, an irrefutable 
consideration is that the outbreak, the establishment of its goals, as well as its advancement 
and outcome depended substantially on the ordinary people’s common wish for a better life 
by engaging as rebells, in a fight against their ruler. 
In accordance with Petrescu, the 1989 demise of communist regimes in East-Central Europe 
still poses difficult problems of interpretation, especially when considering the issues of 
timing, course of events and the nature of the revolutions (negotiated/non-negotiated, 
violent/non-violent) in six countries: Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, 
Bulgaria and Romania. However, of all above mentioned states, “the Romanian case 
remains the most controversial, since the events in that country contradicted the non-
violent, peaceful character of the 1989 revolutions in ECE” .  516
Beyond doubt, in 1989 the political and economic conditions in Romania were worse than 
in most of the Soviet bloc countries. Even so, the isolated attacks by insurgents in the 
Romanian socialist republic became complex collective acts of resistance only gradually, 
from the journalists’ and writers’ opposition to the leadership and the expression of their 
convictions by means of their works, to notes and messages expressing the aspiration for 
liberty sent by Romanian citizens to international broadcasters or democratic organisations, 
of which some in the socialist states.  
Thus, slowly but purposeful, common individuals, artists or industrial workers, undertook 
courageous gestures and called for the masses’ reaction. If, in Bucharest, some employees at 
the Casa Scânteii printing house (nowadays the House of the Free Press) set in print their 
own publication - entitled “Luneta”, a clandestine journal that militated against Ceaușescu’s 
dictatorship - and endeavoured into some acts of vandalism, in Brasov the painter Liviu 
Mareș set himself on fire on a ski slope, in front of foreign tourists, also to protest against 
the Romanian communist leader. Moreover, while in Suceava, three weeks prior to the 
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 revolution, a group of youngsters distributed a manifesto against the communist regime, in 
view of the organisation of the XIV Congress of the PCR, the workers of the biggest 
mechanical enterprise in Timișoara UMT (“Uzinele Mecanice Timișoara”) asked for 
Ceaușescu’s dismissal from his position as general secretary of the PCR. Similarly, on 
November 15th, 1989, in Timișoara, in the aftermath of the international football match 
Romania-Denmark (3-1), the Romanian supporters initiated a set of manifestations 
contrasting the communist rule, that fortuitously ended without any casualty . For these, 517
and for many other reasons, Oșca established that an in-depth analysis of the general 
dissatisfaction and discontent, expressed solitary or publicly, leads to the conclusion that at 
the end of the 1980s, Romania was witnessing the perfect conditions for the emergence of 
social movements that had the aim to overthrow the dictatorship regime in Romania . 518
Having said that, President Ceaușescu’s troubles would truly arise on March 11th, 1989 
when the BBC Radio, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America broadcasted a letter, later 
known as the “Letter of the Six”, signed by former communist dignitaries Gheorghe 
Apostol, Alexandru Bârlădeanu, Corneliu Mănescu, Grigore Răceanu, Constantin 
Pârvulescu, Silviu Brucan and criticising the communist regime. By means of this letter, 
public figures who had contributed to strengthen the communist regime and the personal 
dictatorship of Ceaușescu, not only brought to public notice the structural crisis of 
Ceaușescu’s administration, but suggested that the latter was, irrefutably, the cause of it. It 
constituted the first, concrete attempt to gradually influence the Romanian politics to open 
towards the West - like the USSR itself had started in 1986.  
Nevertheless, because of Ceaușescu’s immediate and determined reaction to arrest and 
interrogate part of the signatories, and through an accurate, full control of the regime over 
the media as well as an extensive presence of the Securitate (Romanian secret police) in all 
spheres, the letter did not enjoy a significant impact domestically, but it produced an active 
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 debate internationally . While politicians in the international arena were making plans to 519
taper off Bucharest’s difficult situation and to implement the Helsinki Accords (1973), and 
Washington was already disposed to military support Romania, Ion Iliescu, member of the 
CC of the PCR, considered an admirer of Ceaușescu by the international media, released a 
further letter, roughly criticising the Romanian leader. However, once again, the document 
had no effects.  
Later, on December 14th 1989, in Iași, the new formed political opposition group - the 
National Salvation Front - would launch a call for disintegration of the Ceaușescu regime 
and would issue a program entitled "Call to all Romanian of good faith” to deal with the 
nation’s most pressing issues: the improvement of the population’s living conditions and the 
respect for human rights. Romanian scholarships agree on the fact that, albeit its undeniable 
failure, the National Salvation Front’s attempt should be regarded as the starting point for 
true public and collective confrontations against the regime, foregoing the insurrection in 
Timisoara (Duțu 2012: 88-89). 
Started off on December 16th, the pretext for the uprising in Timișoara was provided by the 
remorseless police response to the requests of a Reformed believers’ crowd gathered near 
the Reformed Church, in solidarity with their ethnic Hungarian priest László Tőkés. 
Acknowledged both for his attitude against the regime, as well as for an alleged 
collaboration with the Securitate , bishop Tőkés had previously been ordered to evacuate 520
the church building in order to allow the establishment of the new pastor. Hence, on 
December 15th, parishioners gathered in front of the church arose the interest and curiosity 
of pedestrians, who, without further ado, decided to stay and take part in the manifestation. 
With the crowd enlarging rapidly and police patrols resulting ineffective in dispersing it, it 
didn't take long until the protesters switched to acts of vandalism, by breaking the windows 
of stores in the Opera Square, and thus providing the authorities with a reason for armed 
 Ioan Scurtu, “Revoluția Română din decembrie 1989 in context internațional”, Editura Redacției 519
Publicațiilor pentru Străinătate, București, 2009, p. 80.
 Curierul Național, Bucharest, 31st December 1994, in FBIS-EEU-95-003, 5 January 1995, 19; “The 520
archive of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989”, available on the Archive of the Romanian 
Revolution of December 1989, at https://romanianrevolutionofdecember1989.com/2010/12/15/timisoara-15-
decembrie/
 313
 interference . In the first place, on December 17th, 1989, Ceaușescu obtained from the 521
PCR’s Political Executive Committee (CPEx) the approval to use the military force in order 
to crush the rebellion in Timișoara, and then left for an official visit to Iran, thus leaving the 
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 resolution of the situation in the Western part of the country in the hands of his acolytes and 
his wife Elena. The statistics released two days later, regarding the number of people 
wounded or killed during the violent conflict generated more civilian protests and increased 
further the number of demonstrators in their struggle for a life of ease.  
Anyhow, at his return from Iran on 20 December, the communist leader became aware of 
the gravity of the situation, but the steps he took from that moment on would only 
exacerbate the crisis of his government. Surely, one of the most contentious idea, solution 
has been Ceaușescu’s plan to hold the rally on December 21st , 1989, entirely broadcasted 
by the official media. With the participation of tens of thousands of people in support of the 
regime, the rally aimed at publicly condemning the uprising in Timișoara - since, having 
been organised by several revisionist groups, it represented an attack to the country’s 
sovereignty by destabilisation - and at ensuring the Romanian citizens of the successful 
proletarian revolution, the strive for a multilateral development of society, a strong 
Romanian economy, boosted scientific and cultural fields, a more responsive system of 
governance, and a management making every effort to shape the new man and to promote 
socialist ethics and equity.  
However, as soon as the foremost leader started to be booed by the crowd, the live 
broadcasting was interrupted and, albeit his attempts to resume his speech - by promising to 
increase salaries, pensions, to provide social aid and state allowances for children - the 
masses’ blunt hostility would make him withdraw and would intensify the chaos. In fact, 
during that night, several hundred protesters shouting anti-Ceaușescu slogans across the 
Romanian capital and trying to resist the repression provided the military forces, once more, 
with the opportunity to intervene violently. The very same day spontaneous demonstrations 
broke out in other parts of Bucharest; amongst their slogans were: "Freedom”, “Timișoara” 
and "We want Free Elections". Moreover, considered the death under suspicious 
circumstances (presumably suicidal act) of the minister of National Defence, General Vasile 
Milea, on December 22nd, after his refusal to carry out the president’s order to shoot at the 
demonstrators, Nicolae Ceaușescu’s next step was to announce a state of emergency all over 
the country by means of the national television and radio. The government - the country, in 
his words, was at war with its own people. 
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 Thus, while military forces made efforts to block the access of the protesters to the premises  
of the Central Committee (from where Ceaușescu, with his family and acolytes ran the 
country), clashes between forces of repression and protesters asking for Ceaușescu’s 
dismissal expanded rapidly, causing additionally casualties. To bring to a close, it wouldn’t 
take long before revolutionaries broke in the Central Committee building, making the 
president abandon the command post and centre of operations; as a result, Nicolae and 
Elena Ceaușescu’s departure via helicopter from the roof of the C.C. would not only 
cogently portray the couple as fugitives, responsible for their crimes, but mostly, this long- 
awaited event would reflect his abdication in the Romanian nation’s eyes. For the masses, 
the joy had never been greater in the past twenty-five years of Ceaușescu’s dictatorship . 522
In the aftermath of the presidential couple's escape from the C.C.’s building on December 
22nd, the new appointed minister of National Defence, General Victor Athanasie 
Stănculescu defected from the communist party, joined the revolutionaries, and ordered the 
army to retreat at military barracks. Additionally, as member of the National Salvation 
Front, he would have a leading role in the organisation of the Ceaușescu couple’s trial and 
execution three days later. 
Free from the communist dictator, Bucharest vibrated with great energy; people burst into 
the television centre, took off the communist flags of the Socialist Republic of Romania and 
informed the puzzled and excited citizens about their freedom, about Ceaușescu's vacation 
of premises, while images of violent demonstrations across the country were broadcasted 
without interruption. In fact, both Romanian and international mass media covered and 
propelled the Romanian Revolution so, if in daytime the television transmitted the violent 
events near the Central Committee and terrorist acts across the country, in the evening, it 
aired Ion lliescu's communication of the National Salvation Front Council's Statement to the 
Romanian people. Not even the elevated number of the dead and wounded during the 
clashes between civilians, revolutionaries and Ceaușescu’s Securitate (state security police) 
mattered at that time of joy; democracy was knocking at the door.  
Indeed, from the balcony of the Central Committee headquarters, Petre Roman announced 
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 the victory of the revolution and the National Salvation Front - headed by Iliescu - started to 
enumerate, as fast as one's legs can carry one, a document that summed up the objectives of 
the revolution, a list of promises that would have rendered the Romanians' lives better: the 
institution of democracy, freedom and dignity of the Romanian people, the disintegration of  
the institutions created by the communist regime, the NSFC and the Superior Military 
Council's assurance to take control over the country, by creating local branches to provide 
local government. Nonetheless, in that specific moment, it probably didn’t matter much 
who (if anyone?) or what might have changed things, what mattered was that the Romanian 
dictator had vanished from sight and, whoever replaced him, could not have inflicted a 
greater pain. Inhabitants of many cities throughout the country colonised the streets in 
support of the revolution and, by chasing away the local authorities, took command of 
entire cities, communes, districts, industrial factories and institutions. In fact, it was plainly 
against this background that the National Salvation Front Council (NSFC) had been 
introduced as the revolutionary configuration that would have guided the country during the 
forthcoming months, would have organised free elections, and would have dissolved all the 
structures of the former regime. 
After fleeing the capital on December 22nd, in the first place the presidential couple 
organised a quick stop at their residence in Snagov, and then fled towards Târgoviște, but, 
before long, the helicopter was forced to land before it could reach its intended destination 
because of reports that the army would shoot it down. According to Brown, “the helicopter 
landed near Târgoviște, where (the couple) requisitioned a small Romanian-made Dacia 
car, which they drove around aimlessly until they were recognised by an engineer at a steel 
plant and arrested by a detachment of traffic police” . The communist leader Nicolae 523
Ceaușescu and his wife Elena were thus captured, taken into custody by the Securitate and 
held for three days. 
On December 25th 1989, things went out of control. The presidential couple was transferred  
from the Târgoviște Securitate headquarters to the military garrison under the command of 
Colonel Andrei Kemenici, and charged for genocide, destabilisation of the national 
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 economy, subversion of state power by organising armed action against the people and state 
power, the crime of destruction of citizen property by destroying and damaging buildings, 
explosions in the city, starving the people, destroying the national culture, as well as the 
attempt to flee the country on the basis of some funds over one billion dollars deposited in 
foreign banks. Besides, Nicolae Ceaușescu was accused for the bloody suppression of the 
revolution between the16th and the 22nd of December, 1989. Albeit “no written evidence 
was submitted, and no witnessed took the stand”, according to the judge, the victims of the 
genocide exceeded 60.000 victims . Moreover, the charges, “considered by the court 524
notorious and incontestable activities, which do not need to be proven, were characterised 
as genocide aiming at the physical and psychological destruction of the entire community in 
our country” . According to Grosescu and Ursachi, the reference to “genocide for the 525
events of December 1989 is in itself inadequate, in terms of both the Romanian criminal 
code and of relevant international conventions”  as the group affected by repression “was 526
a political group opposing the Ceaușescu regime, and not  a national, ethnic, racial or 
religious group as mentioned in the legislation” .  527
Therefore, albeit the number of casualties was substantial “invoking even a partial 
destruction of the national group would have been inappropriate, given that the entire 
nation had not taken to the streets” . That being so, in the aftermath of an absurd, 528
senseless trial, a legal fiasco, “a mockery of juridical procedures”  or a masquerade 529
(terms used by both the Romanian and international analysts who have judged the 
Ceaușescu trial as fabricated, ridiculous, a political assassination based on hazy allegations) 
that lasted little more than an hour, an improvised Exceptional Military Court convicted to 
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 death penalty the presidential couple by a sentence “that had been decided on before hand 
by the new political leaders. The trial of the Ceaușescu couple was the political trial  par 
excellence, in which both the judge and the defence attorney acted as accusers” . Against 530
the wearing backdrop of an ongoing revolution, at 14:50 on Christmas Day, Nicolae and 
Elena Ceaușescu were executed by a group of parachutists - brought from Bucharest by 
General Stănculescu - right in the courtyard of the military unit in Târgoviște . The NSFC 531
called for an immediate ceasefire in the country while the Romanian Television broadcasted 
the news of Ceaușescu’s trial and execution; before long, all the honours and titles awarded 
by Nicolae and Elena Ceaușescu were revoked, while subversive attacks were lessened all 
over the country. 
During the first plenary meeting of the National Salvation Front Council, on December 
27th, Ion Iliescu would assume office as President of Romania and Dumitru Mazilu as vice- 
president, while Petre Roman would be appointed Prime Minster of the provisional 
government. The new leadership of the country would be soon acknowledged by the United 
States, Hungary and the Soviet Union. The Western countries’s reaction to the events in the 
former Socialist Republic of Romania had been one of exultation; moreover, both the media 
and the leaders of European states would soon deduce that the collapse of communism in 
Romania had been the bloodiest amongst all the Warsaw Pact countries, in their fight for 
democracy . If, in a press release, the United States’ President at that time George W. 532
Bush, would reassure the Romanian leaders of American assistance, and would reveal 
Washington’s disposition to resume diplomatic and economic relations with Romania, King 
Carol I of Romania, exiled by the communists in the 1940s, would divulge his disagreement 
with regard to Ion Iliescu’s run for presidency. 
Debates still continue in Romania over whether the last weeks of December 1989 should be 
labeled as a revolution or a coup, especially considered that things were ought to calm down 
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 as soon as the chaos ended. However, for the new leadership in Bucharest, problems arising 
in the aftermath of the regime change would seem difficult to overtake. Ordinary people had 
embraced the cause of the revolution, had stood up under fire, and had demanded the 
removal of the dictator; and the tyrant had been indeed, removed. But the nominated for 
presidency Ion Iliescu and the National Salvation Front would soon take under their wings 
old members of the nomenklatura, in order to be assisted in the drawing up of a successful 
recovery plan.  
For instance, an issue that contributes to maintain the events after December 25th 1989 in a 
cloudy setting even nowadays, and that - within the academia - stands as proof of the pro-
Soviet conspiracy during and after the Romanian revolution, is represented by the 
circumstances (especially who and how?) that made possible for general Nicolae Militaru - 
a Soviet acolyte - to become Minister of Defence in a time of government change and of 
restoration of power. Moreover, a further point is instrumental in establishing whether the 
events at the end of 1989 in Romania have been a revolution, or a coup. While many 
scholars hesitate to put forward precise notions with regard to the abstract question of the 
origin and identity of the people who served in the army and the "terrorists" involved in the 
revolution, without prudence, Patrick Brown expressed that “much of the revolution seems 
to have been orchestrated by the army, and there are suspicions that diehard Securitate 
loyalists were not responsible for all the violence. The widespread perception that the army 
came to the aid of a popular uprising, against a dangerous and secretive foe, certainly 
made it easier for the old guard to become the new guard” . 533
The fraternisation of the army with the revolutionaries has been a focal point in the studies 
of the revolution and, in this regard, the Romanian literature encompassed two divergent 
understandings as for the army's role in the transfer of power. While the first thesis has 
supported the idea that the army (especially General Stănculescu) launched the coup in 
order to overthrow Nicolae Ceaușescu and then handed over the government to Ion Iliescu, 
the second thesis abandoned the idea of a military coup for the assumption that Ceaușescu 
himself produced a power vacuum, while the army had no clue to whom pass the power on. 
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 “According to this theory, of the spontaneous transfer of power, the crucial factor of the 
revolution has been the appearance in television of the leadership, thus creating the basis of 
authority of the new regime” .  534
Concerning the presidential couple’s trial, in “Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe from 
Stalin to Havel”, Vladimir Tismăneanu argued that, in order to preserve the power of the 
nomenclature, the court martial of Ceaușescu was carefully designed by the newly formed 
Power - the NSF - so that only the general secretary of the PCR and Romanian head of 
state, Nicolae Ceaușescu himself, was held responsible for communism, its depredations, 
and Romania’s whole misfortune. In the same line of thought, the Romanian poet, essayist, 
novelist and literary critic Cesereanu, expressed that Gelu Voican-Voiculescu - Deputy 
Prime Minister in the first provisional government and in charge of the secret service 
control after December 1989 - who actively participated both in the events of December 
1989 and, as delegate of the National Salvation Front alongside General Victor Athanasie 
Stănculescu, at the trial and execution of the communist leader on December 25th, once 
revealed that “Ceaușescu's death was the condition for the viability of our Revolution” . 535
Analogically, Voiculescu also supported the idea that the Army itself had been responsible 
for the terrorist phenomenon, hence, it had been involved in a coup attempt which failed: 
“the Army created the terrorist phenomenon as a diversion designed to maintain a state of 
tension that would give this institution the possibility to serve the new political power” .   536
Nevertheless, as many questions are still unanswered, others are to remain so, Romanian 
and international scholars will continue to investigate the puzzled realm of the Romanian 
revolution. What is plain and visible though, is that the fall of autocracies in Central and 
Eastern Europe and the rapid collapse of communism were provoked by exogenous factors 
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 in the first place and only secondly, by the less important endogenous constituents. This 
conclusion, according to Abraham, is based on the consideration that, albeit all the 
communist states witnessed (greater, smaller, organised or isolated) anti-communist 
movements, only when the certainty was reached that the military/army would not use the 
force against demonstrators, the revolutionary dynamics accelerated; Abraham maintained 
that this reflection applies to the Romanian case as well . The author explained that the 537
importance of the endogenous factors for the fall of communism in Romania is better 
observed in the way in which the earliest stage of the post-communist transition developed. 
Moreover, in the states where the collective memory of the anti-communist fight was 
successful, the transition to democracy happened faster and the economic reforms were 
deeper, while - on the contrary - in the states that witnessed the fall of communism as a 
result of the negotiations between the communist elites (Bulgaria) or where the integrity of 
the revolutionary change has been contested (Romania), the democratic process evolved at a 
slow pace. Albeit the legitimation of the anti-communist fight has been used after 1990 by 
the political elite in Bucharest to draw the international partner's support in the realisation of 
transition from the Soviet societal and economic model to liberal democracy patterns, in 
1990, Romania had an insecure government and enjoyed almost no external relations. The 
only relationships between Bucharest and the outside world were with the U.S.S.R. and the 
signatory countries of the Warsaw Pact. 
V.2 The Chinese case 
Besides the corrupt and anti-reform policies, the repression and violation of human rights 
and liberties, censorship, lack of private property, secret police abuse, religious bans, 
poverty, food and gas rationalisation, lack of privacy, massive industrialisation and many 
other abuses which are typical for a totalitarian regime, a negative impact in the 
international arena was constituted by Ceaușescu’s empathy towards the suppression of the 
democracy movement in the Tiananmen Square, commonly known in the PRC as the June 
 However, as already mentioned, new evidence from the Romanian Revolution’s archives has proven the 537
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 Fourth Incident, that occurred between mid April and June 4th 1989. 
Beyond any shadow of doubt, the events that led to the Tiananmen Square massacre 
developed gradually. When Deng Xiaoping became the de facto leader of China in 1978, he 
was aware of the fact that the country needed both economic and political reforms, 
especially considering the impacts of the Cultural Revolution on the entire party and state 
leadership system; in fact, Deng Xiaoping thought that both during, and in the aftermath of 
the Cultural Revolution, the control of the state was in the hands of few party and state 
leaders that, by accumulating power and significant roles inside the CPC, obstructed the 
practice of the party’s centralist democratic system . Moreover, his aspirations regarded 538
the separation between the state and the CPC, because of the latter’s tendencies to intervene 
in the governance of the republic and thus, instead of providing political orientation, it 
exercised full control over the state  by monopolising "all legislative, executive and 539
judicial powers, even including all economic and ideological and management power, 
central as well as local power” .  540
In his famous speech entitled “Emancipate the Mind; Seek Truth from Facts, and Unite as 
One to Look to the Future”, Deng mostly dwelled over democracy by opposing and 
“ingeniously revising” Mao's perspective on democracy. According to Yu Keping, Deng 
initially spoke “about the relationship between democracy and centralism and thought that 
the Party leaders laid undue stress on centralism while at present, we must lay particular 
stress on democracy because for quite a long time democratic centralism was not genuinely 
practiced: Centralism was divorced from democracy and there was little democracy” . 541
Furthermore, the Chinese leader "advocated economic democracy and producers' economic 
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 rights in terms of production and management”  by taking “realistic measures to 542
guarantee the individual democratic rights of workers and peasants, including democratic 
elections, democratic management and democratic supervision” . With the last statement, 543
by considering the democratic institutionalisation, Deng indicated that "democracy is 
gradually institutionalised and codified so that such institutions and laws will not change 
with alterations in the leadership or changes in the views or focus of attention of any 
leader” . Additionally, Deng's reforms also regarded the state and local legislative 544
branches. For example, while the National People’s Congress (NPC) - the national 
legislature of the PRC - benefitted from a moderate independence, in 1980, the local council 
elections in Beijing enjoyed the participation of several candidates for one position, who 
were then elected by direct vote. By and large, the aim of Deng Xiaoping's reform was to 
create a more open society; for its importance, his theory on democracy would be “written 
into both the Party Constitution and the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China as 
the guiding ideology which Chinese citizens and CPC members must follow and as 
principles to guide China's political reform” . 545
However, albeit Deng’s efforts to improve the Chinese economic and political spheres, there 
were plenty of Chinese people asking for a real democratisation of the society. These 
requests were given voice for the first time in December 1978, by a young activist named 
Wei Jingsheng, ex member of the Red Guards, who put a manifest on a long brick wall 
(known as the Democracy Wall) in Beijing, calling for a “fifth modernisation” - democracy, 
that was necessary for the realisation of the other four proposed by Deng Xiaoping. Soon, 
the democratic movement started by Wei would generate various demonstrations in other 
Chinese cities between December 1978 and January 1979; for example, in Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Hangzhou, thousands of youngsters that had been sent to the countryside for 
hard labour, marched in the streets and asked the government to respect the human rights. 
 Ibidem542
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 The government ended the demonstrations by arresting writers and editors that allowed the 
publication of illegal journals promoting democratic ideas. However, although Deng and his 
allies hoped that protests ended altogether as soon as the economic reforms were felt at a 
societal level, the groups demanding the society’s democratisation would not be 
immediately silenced. First of all, the new Chinese open marked economy had resulted in a 
sharp rise of food prices that affected the public officials tremendously and secondly, the 
structural changes within the workforce had had a negative impact upon many university 
and graduate students, who could no longer find work in their field of activity .  546
Beginning with 1985, these aspects, mixed with other dissatisfactions of the Chinese 
youngsters, would make the democratic movement resurface, and this time even stronger. 
The most important figure of the democratic movement in those years was university 
Professor Fang Lizhi, who put at risk his career by promoting democracy and the limits of 
socialism with Chinese characteristics through tours of the main Chinese universities. His 
words would have such an effect that in December 1986, the largest cities in China 
witnessed student protests for greater democracy. However, only a month later, in January 
1987, Fang Lizhi together with other Chinese intellectuals would be dismissed from the 
party because of their liberal beliefs . 547
Having said that, the issue of democratisation of the Chinese society emerged aggressively 
on the morning of April 8th, 1989, with the meeting in Beijing for an ordinary board 
meeting of the Politburo of the CPC. During that meeting, the seventy-two-year-old Hu 
Yaobang, president and secretary of the party between 1981/1982 - 1987 , had a heart 548
failure that was succeeded by a second fatal one, a week later, on April 15th. Hu had been a 
major designer of Deng Xiaoping's reform, but he had also been the victim of party 
opposition a little while back. In fact, no one could have foreseen that his death would have 
made him a symbol of liberal reform and clean government; hence, only a day after his 
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 death, a small-scale demonstration both commemorated him and called for the reassessment 
of his legacy. The protests that followed - initially using his death as opportunity to convey 
discontent with regard to the political change - would have led to the worst massacre in 
recent Chinese history, the Tiananmen Square massacre . 549
In the economic field, in first months of 1989, the Chinese Communist leaders could have 
been satisfied with the results achieved by the Chinese way to socialism, as the reforms 
launched by Deng Xiaoping, supreme Chinese leader since the end of the 1970s, had 
already produced a worthy outcome: a gross domestic product growth of approximately ten 
percent since the beginning of the decade, and a peak of fifteen percent in 1984 . 550
However, at the same time, such a rapid growth had caused problems that were more and 
more difficult to stem: in fact, China suffered under the weight of its own economic thrive. 
While corruption was endemic at all levels inside the CPC and crime was on the rise, 
environmental problems became pressing in the most industrialised areas of the country and 
the cultivated land in the countryside was gradually reducing due to erosion and poor 
investment in the irrigation systems. Alongside the fast-growing coastal cities (that often 
witnessed blackouts because the electricity grid was unable to provide the amount of energy 
required), the internal rural villages were still made up by mud shacks with no running 
water. Thus, as already stated, if in November 1987, Chinese students  manifested in 551
dozens of cities against corruption and democracy, other protests, that materialised in 
December, attracted tens of thousands of people in both Shanghai and Beijing.  
However, despite the sporadic use of violence, the reaction of the authorities had been 
relatively modest, but Deng Xiaoping ensured the party leaders that no drastic political 
opening was scheduled. Subsequently - when he decided to banish the Chinese elite less 
willing to compromise - Deng abandoned one of the major supporters of his pragmatic line, 
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 a leader who had helped him prevail during the tough power struggles following Mao's 
death - Mu Yaobang.  
Other protests followed in twenty-five different cities, in the first six months of 1988. In 
March 1989, a revolt in Lhasa, Tibet led to the introduction of the martial law in the region. 
Two hundred demonstrators were killed in subsequent clashes, and many thousands were 
arrested, but the repression, considered a success, casted the leader of the local Communist 
Party, the forty-six year-old future supreme leader Hu Jintao, in good light. At this point, 
“the death by heart attack of the popular pro-reform leader Hu Yaobang on April 15th fell 
like a spark into the highly flammable atmosphere of elite division and popular 
disaffection” . 552
The commemorations for Hu Yaobang sprang up in the Tiananmen Square, in Shanghai, in 
Nanjing and in Xi'an; all things considered, the elderly former leader was celebrated not so 
much for his actions as for what he represented. The protesters, guided by university 
students holding white banners (mourning colour in China) and singing songs promoting 
democracy and justice, marched towards the Tiananmen square. On April 17th, there were 
ten thousand people gathered in the square, filling with wreaths and flowers the Monument 
to the People's Heroes. Moreover, “Xinhua and other agencies provided top officials with 
more than one hundred reports on foreign reactions. The story of Hu Yaobang's death and 
the way the government was dealing with it received worldwide coverage, most of it 
favourable. The foreign press praised Hu for his pragmatism and honesty and commended 
the government for announcing his death promptly” . 553
On April 18th, hundreds of students in their early twenties began a sit-in in front of the 
Great Hall of the People. Amongst their requests there was the freedom of speech and press, 
the publication of information on the incomes of political leaders, more funds to education, 
the end of the anti “bourgeois liberalism” propaganda campaign and democratic elections to 
replace the unskilful governors. Student protests and strikes spread out in other Chinese 
cities as well: in Xi’an, for example, a crowd of ten thousand people set fire to the 
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 provincial seat of government. Hu Yaobang's funeral ceremony was held in Beijing, at the 
Great Hall of the People on the morning of April 22nd. Hundreds of people gathered in the 
square, and, as soon as the casket was escorted towards the cemetery, three demonstrators 
climbed the steps of the Great Hall and kneeled as if they supplicated the emperor. Behind 
them, police lines impeded other demonstrators to emulate their deeds; eventually, ninety-
eight people were arrested.  
As already mentioned, at that time the government in Beijing was in the hands of the 
paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. With Mao's death in 1976, the political line pursued by 
his successor Hua Guofeng, who purged the reformist figures from the CPC-Deng Xiaoping 
included - as soon as he gained complete power, could have been synthesised in the doctrine 
of the “Two Whatevers”, that referred to the statement “We will resolutely uphold whatever 
policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions 
Chairman Mao gave”  and thus suggested “that Mao’s decisions and predispositions 554
should still limit the alternatives considered by the Chinese leaders in the formulation of the 
country’s development strategy’’ . 555
By contrast, Deng Xiaoping believed that a different approach had to be taken into 
consideration, and which is perfectly expressed by an old, famous saying of the Sichuan 
province, that Deng reshaped according to his political and economic stratagems “It doesn't 
matter whether a cat is white or black, as long as it catches mice”. The mouse, of course, 
represented the economic growth and Deng’s general idea was to abandon the stolid 
ideological economic and political development strategies that had led to the disasters of the 
Great Leap Forward and the disruptions of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Eventually, the 
gradual but constant attacks by Deng and his allies of Hua Guofeng’s political strategies had 
led - in December 1978 - after two years of power struggles between the various political 
factions, to the unyielding victory of the seventy - four years old Deng Xiaoping, who 
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 became the de facto leader of communist China . 556
Returning to the Tiananmen Square events, on April 23rd 1989, confident that the student 
movement was a well-organised conspiracy aiming at the dismissal of the CPC and the 
entire socialist system, Deng took a firm stand against the protesters. Three days later in 
fact, by means of a rough condemnation of the protests by an editorial on People's Daily, a 
definite fracture between protesters and authorities was produced for the first time. While 
demonstrations continued in dozens of Chinese cities, various members of the army and 
mid-level cadres of the party believed that the protesters’ solicitations would be somehow 
taken into consideration (especially in remembrance of the 1919 May 4th movement, in the 
Tiananmen Square). In the Tiananmen Square however, on 12 May, almost a thousand 
people began a hunger strike while another one hundred thousand attended the protest.  
Presenting themselves as holders of the Chinese tradition, as honesty against corruption and 
as youth against a senescent ruling class, the students made it clear that they were prepared 
to continue the hunger strike to extreme out-turns. Protests became radicalised. Moreover, 
“to complicate matters for the Party leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev arrived on May 15th for a 
state visit. The purpose of the visit (...) was to restore full normalisation of relations 
between the Soviet Union and China after a thirty-year chill. The students were delighted by 
the visit and especially the additional international media coverage that accompanied him. 
They greeted him on his arrival with one poster that read, “We salute the Ambassador of 
Democracy” (…) “In the Soviet Union They Have Gorbachev, but What Do We Have in 
China?”   557
In these circumstances, to meet Deng Xiaoping Gorbachev was compelled to entered the 
Great Hall of the People from a side entrance, while the international media transformed the 
coverage of a diplomatic visit into a giant megaphone for the purpose of the protests. While 
the number of demonstrators on hunger strike increased to several thousands, Deng realised 
that the only way to end the movement was by using the force; in fact, on May 20th, he 
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 would impose martial law . 558
One day before, Zhao Ziyang, third premier of the PRC after Zhou Enlai and Hua Guofeng, 
and General Secretary of the CPC, had visited the Tiananmen Square to talk to the hunger 
strikers protesting students, and had formulated a moving and inspiring speech  that, on 559
the one hand had proven his kind ways, but, on the other hand, had marked his fall from the 
Chinese political arena, being purged almost immediately and actually placed under house 
arrest for the upcoming fifteen years. Jiang Zemin, who distinguished himself for his 
firmness against the protests in Shanghai, would became his successor.  
A large number of Chinese army divisions took the path towards the city and soon, the 
student movement erupted in the general atmosphere of a revolt. Moreover, a long cortege 
of workers - holding banners with slogans advocating the boldness to die for history to 
remember - arrived in the Tiananmen Square. At this point, the number of protesters had 
reached approximatively three hundred thousand.  
By the end of May, however, the Tienanmen Square protests seemed to have lost their 
impetus. The demonstrators lacked an indisputable leader to guide the course of events, 
while divisions emerged between those who - under the pressure of the incoming army - 
believed that it was necessary to withdraw from the square and those who wanted to push 
forward. Hence, the leaders of the movement (on both sides) were on the verge of collapse 
under the weight of responsibility and pressure, when the students of the Central Academy 
of Fine Arts came on the scene, and placed a ten meters high statue depicting the Goddess 
of Democracy in the square (facing the gigantic portrait of Mao) - thus reviving the 
protester’s spirits and sending a message to the government regarding their 
determination . 560
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 On June 2nd, Deng decided that the military had two days to end the protests and, in the 
early hours of the next day, demonstrators in the Tiananmen Square knew that the army was 
approaching. Shortly thereafter, a group of unarmed soldiers crossing the square - 
presumably with the aim to reach the weapons store from the other side of the square - were 
blocked by the masses and forced to listen to hours of talks about democracy, human rights, 
and the role of the army. However, in the morning after this unusual event, the first episodes 
of violence actually materialised: some Beijing residents started to launch stones against a 
group of soldiers, others were beaten, different students carrying weapons assaulted busses 
dispatching troops. At his point, while soldiers and policemen launched fumes and gas to 
disperse the crowd, the highest Communist authorities decided that the Tiananmen protest 
had to be ended by all means necessary . 561
Protesters carrying bats, knives, metal chains, and sharp bamboo rods watched soldiers 
invade the square and surround the Great Hall of the People. As the army began its advance 
through the suburbs of Beijing, much of the killings during that night did not actually take 
place in the Tiananmen Square, but around the city centre, where the armoured vehicles 
crossed the barricades and fired on the crowds, killing hundreds of Beijing citizens . 562
Between the advancing vehicles of the army and the protesters in Tiananmen Square there 
was only a blockade, constituted by a concrete barricade, two buses and a military burning 
vehicle. By eleven and thirty the first armoured vehicle tried to break through, but was 
blocked by both the concrete and the molotov thrown by the students; the second one, that 
succeeded in breaking the barricade, was eventually stopped by the crowds that killed two 
of the three soldiers inside the vehicle. 
The barricade, however, was not unbreakable and soldiers were constantly filling the square 
while loudspeakers repeated the government's messages of dangerous counter- 
revolutionary uprising in the Chinese capital, or of the People’s Liberation Army’s being a 
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 friend of the people and thus, no honest citizen must have feared. Next, soldiers went on 
shooting on people, knocking them down with sticks, and ambulances went back and forth 
throughout the night; students running against soldiers were shot down post-haste, some 
fortunate ones got up, others didn’t. Then, around four and thirty in the morning, the 
demonstrators had to face with hundreds of heavily armed soldiers, followed by the tanks 
and a military vehicle teared down the Goddess of Democracy. The south-east corner of the 
Tiananmen square was the final place to stand against the army but gradually, even the last 
hundreds students withdrew as soon as the tanks advanced towards them. At 5.40 am, on 
June 4th, 1989, the square was clear. 
On the whole, the government regained control in the week following the military seizure of 
the Square. However, troubles in Beijing continued for a long time: the famous man who 
tried to stop the column of tanks (Tank Man) on a wide avenue bordering the South side of 
the Tiananmen Square, and whose name and destiny are still unknown, accomplished this 
heroic gesture on the morning of June 5th, a day after the massacre. Thousands of people 
were arrested by the Chinese authorities in the following days, of which some were killed, 
others were first beaten, and then broadcasted on television as rebel counter-revolutionaries.  
In contrast with the statistics of several Western journalists that witnessed the Tiananmen 
Square massacre (counting hundreds or even thousands of deaths) during the night between 
3-4 June, the official Chinese version has maintained that no one was killed by the army’s 
firearms. Surely, as one cannot rely on assumptions, the real number will never be known, 
and in the absence of official sources, this argument will probably remain debatable. 
Protests continued for days in other Chinese cities, while news of the massacre spread out 
throughout the country despite the official media's censorship. 
No country in the world actually interrupted diplomatic relations with Beijing, albeit the 
“Western states’ imposition of arms embargoes on China following the 1989 Tiananmen 
Square incident” . On June 9th, Deng Xiaoping appeared for the first time on television 563
after Gorbachev’s visit and observed a minute of silence for the PLA soldiers - martyrs who 
died in the conflict. The Tiananmen massacre remains to this date an intractable topic for 
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 the Chinese leadership (who has never officially recognised any irregularities in the events 
of June 1989) and a puzzle for the Western world. When, in 1999, at the 10th anniversary 
since the Tiananmen Square massacre, Prime Minister Zhu Rongji was asked if he had any 
statement regarding the events, he replied that the date meant nothing for him. So as to 
impede his becoming a symbol like Hu Yaobang many years before, Zhao Ziyang - fallen 
into disgrace along with the policies he stood for, and put under house arrest in 1989 - 
received very little media attention on his death in 2005, after sixteen years in seclusion . 564
For a while, many people regarded the events in June 1989 as a symptom of the PRC 
embracing the American democratic system: they had built what seemed to be - but it was 
not - a reproduction in Beijing of the Statue of Liberty, they had sang songs like "We will 
win”, and leaders speaking English had given talks to American television networks. What 
no one considered though, was that students supported the reform of the Chinese 
Communist Party, not its abolition: their songs were patriotic (including the communist 
hymn ‘'Internationale’’) and their goddess of democracy was a universal symbol, not a pro-
American one. That being said, when the tanks were set in motion and the weapons sprang 
up, Chinese workers and common people sympathised with the students, while party 
reformers panicked and showed how brutal a repression can be. 
The Tiananmen Square protest and its repression had major consequences domestically, 
particularly inside the CPC and its subsequent policies and, above all, led to Deng 
Xiaoping’s formal withdrawal from the political arena on November 13th, 1989. In the 
international arena, on the one hand, Beijing’s leadership would be strongly condemned for 
its atrocities, but on the other hand, a large part of the West initiated the trade with, and 
investments in “New China”. In fact, in 1992, Deng Xiaoping embarked on a trip to the 
South of China - known as Deng’s South China tour, that aimed at the promotion of the 
reform agenda and economic liberalisation. The speeches made by the paramount leader 
during this trip - when he uttered the famous words kai fang, literally meaning open up - 
would be later developed to become the pillar of Deng Xiaoping’s Theory, according to 
which “revolution and reformation are both means to liberate productive forces; it is 
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 necessary to hold on to the one central task, two basic points principle; planning and 
market forces are not essential difference between socialism and capitalism, among 
others” . By providing important theoretical and conceptual questions, these principles 565
had “a crucial role in guiding and accelerating China's (economic) reform and opening-up 
as well as the socialist modernisation process” . 566
The economic and political legacy of Deng Xiaoping would be entrusted to Jiang Zemin, 
who was first General Secretary of the CPC (1989-2002) and later on President of the PRC 
(1993-2003). It is publicly known that during his South China tour, Deng had criticised 
Jiang's leadership, especially with regard to the slow implementation of market reforms. As 
a result, Jiang coined the term socialist market economy - as advancement of Deng’s theory 
of socialism with Chinese characteristics - to demonstrate that market reforms were carried 
on. Moreover, according to several international researchers, this was a manoeuvre that 
empowered him to become President of the Republic in 1993. 
Anyhow, Jiang Zemin's achievements cannot be overlooked. While the bilateral economic 
relationship between the EU (until 1992 the European Economic Community - EEC) and 
China has been unrivalled since Beijing shifted to a market economy in 1978 , 567
subsequently, during Jiang's mandate the Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) increased 
of 9%, while Hong Kong (1997) and Macao (1999) were returned to China and Beijing 
initiated its gradual rise as a global power - an example for this is the PRC's accession to the 
World Trade Organisation - WTO in December 2001 . 568
The rapid development of the economic relations between China and the European 
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 Economic Community (EEC) in the 1980s, that facilitated at the same time the political 
cooperation, is clearly demonstrated by the following two tables . 569
Hence, the process of globalisation provided the PRC with many opportunities of 
entanglement with the outside world and thus, of consolidating its role of global power, but 
it also brought forth challenges for the leadership in Beijing - mostly when dealing with 
crisis situations as a result of the population's pressure for political reforms that are ought to 
liberalise the Chinese society. That said, while enjoying normal diplomatic relations with 
most of the Western states and neighbouring countries, Beijing witnessed both an increase 
in the economic growth rate and an unprecedented modernisation of the society and, “with 
regard to development China was attempted to adopt economic values of the international 
community while emphasising on domestic revitalisation. By contrast, in the political realm 
regarding democracy and human rights - China consistently took a rather different attitude 
and did not attempt to adopt the international community's values” .  570
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 In general terms since 1989 on, “China switched to a foreign policy focusing on autonomy 
and independence, without maintaining a strategic relationship with any superpower”  571
and thus, the guiding thinking became that to become a major political power a state should 
keep “a low profile (...) while working hard for some years, to have more weight in 
international affairs” . This is probably the reason why Jiang Zemin’s foreign policy has 572
been sometimes seen as shallow, especially considering the leader’s reaction to the 
destruction of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade by an American plane during the Kosovo 
war. The fact that Beijing’s relationship with other countries in the 1990s was no longer 
decided by ideology, but rather by national interest, is confirmed by Jiang’s ideological 
formulation or socio-political theory, expressed through the “Three Represents Theory’’ (or 
the important thought of Three Represents); it referred to what the Communist Party of 
China stood for, and mostly it represented the development trends of advanced productive 
forces, the orientations of an advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the 
overwhelming majority of the Chinese people . 573
If in the mid 1990s, the Chinese economy was heated because of local Chinese officials 
being imprisoned for approving large projects without central government approval and 
thousands of workers were mobilised for emergency projects, the Chinese political elite 
oriented their development strategies towards a legislative reform (however not completely 
settled) aiming at the modernisation of the judicial system, at the permission to denounce 
the abuse of authority, while a major aspect tackled with by the legislative system was the 
promotion and protection of human rights and the legally obtained private properties. Thus, 
in the aftermath of Jiang Zemin’s government, the PRC was an important actor whose voice 
was both globally heard, and solicited. When Hu Jintao, his successor, took on the 
leadership, China was affirming itself as a global economic power that propagated its 
interests in the entire international arena. 
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 V.3 The sad state of affairs in post-revolution Romania 
Beyond the shadow of a doubt, 1989 was not a peaceful year, neither for China nor for the 
rest of the world. Thus, if the Tiananmen Square massacre undeniably damaged the PRC’s 
image in the international arena, for Nicolae Ceaușescu - who had eulogised the military 
intervention and had received Qiao Shi, one of the top leaders of the CPC, at the PCR 
Congress in August 1989, during which Ceaușescu was re-elected - the events of June 1989 
represented an opportunity to strengthen bilateral ties with Beijing. It was however too late 
for that, and the Romanian dictator failed to understand that - unlike Bucharest - in the 
aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests Beijing had, indeed, stiffened the domestic 
security policies and had legally condemned some of the participants at the events, but had 
never completely neglected the promotion of economic reforms and opening-up policies. 
Unfortunately, Romania would not “properly exploit the opportunities offered by the 
spectacular development of the PRC, and the economic relations between the two countries 
witnessed a drastic collapse after 1990, with a shy relaunching later” . In fact, in the 574
twenty years following the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the “Romanian trade 
mainstreams dominantly regarded Western European countries and the United States, with 
a reduced emphasis on traditional partners - the former Comecon States, Arab, African, 
Asian countries and, particularly, the PRC. Hence, if three decades back, the Sino-
Romanian bilateral trade was balanced, nowadays the trade balance is heavily negative for 
Romania” . 575
According to professor Li Wie, the official formula used by Beijing’s media to refer to the 
events of 1989 in CEE was “dramatic changes in Eastern Europe’’ , suggesting that for 576
 Corneliu Russu, Marius Bulearcă,“Chinese Economic Reform and the Romanian-Chinese Economic 574
Relations”, Buletinul Universitații Petrol - Gaze din Ploiești, Vol. LXI, No. 4/2009, 45-52, Seria Ṣtiințe 
Economice, pp. 49-50. 
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 the Chinese leadership, the "East European socialist regimes went through major and 
dramatic changes” . By means of its features (unexpected, bloody, live broadcasting) the 577
case of the Romanian revolution of December 1989 can only encourage Li’s statement. For 
example, the assassination of the presidential couple had a huge echo in the international 
arena. While many leaders of the world, prime-ministers and presidents, that had met 
Ceaușescu during sumptuous official bilateral visits, regarded his assassination as the 
golden opportunity - or probably the only opportunity - for some political figures to emerge 
victorious from the socio-economic and political crisis, in Beijing, the events of December 
in Romania provoked both empathy and skepticism.  
The Chinese leaders that had met  and cultivated Ceaușescu for more than two decades had 
initially overreacted, but, without further ado, two days after the assassination of the 
Romanian foremost leader, on December 27th 1989, Yang Shangkun (President of the PRC), 
Li Peng (Prime Minister) and Qian Qichen (Minister of Foreign Affairs), addressed 
congratulatory telegrams to Ion Iliescu, President of the National Salvation Front 
Committee (FSN), to Petre Roman (Prime Minister) and to Sergiu Celac (Minister of 
Foreign Affairs) for taking charge of Bucharest’s new government, and expressed their 
"respect for the Romanian people's right to choose their political regime as well as the wish 
to maintain and expand the friendly bilateral relations on the basis of the five principles of 
peaceful coexistence” (Buzatu 2004: 128).  
However, in Bucharest, the new leadership’s aloof reply to the Chinese proposals would 
freeze the Sino-Romanian bilateral relations for almost half a decade. According to Buzatu, 
the National Salvation Front - leaded by Iliescu - condemned as anti-revolutionaries the 
political factions that promoted the expansion of bilateral ties with Beijing, and grounded 
their standpoint in the belief that Ceaușescu had been bent on fleeing to China or North 
Korea in December 1989. Moreover, besides high-level initiatives to organise small 
demonstrations in front of the Chinese embassy in Bucharest in the context of an alleged 
recognition of Taiwan (in exchange for Taipei’s economic and Financial support) by the 
Romanian political elite, various denigrating media articles and damaging reportages 
emerged in the months following the Romanian revolution. Nonetheless, in order to 
 Ibidem577
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 understand the dynamics of the Romanian leaderships alteration of attitude towards Beijing 
in the beginning of the 1990s, it is necessary to sketch out the major hallmarks of the 
political practices and social phenomenons of the post-Decembrist Romania. 
As already mentioned, on December 22nd, the National Salvation Front took control over 
the country and announced an ideal program that initially gratified millions of Romanians; 
moreover, by means of the a key points communique, Romania, theoretically, reorientated 
itself towards Western values, both domestically and internationally. If two days after 
Ceaușescu’s assassination, on December 27th, Ion Iliescu (former member of the Romanian 
Communist Party) was recognised as the new president of Romania by the National 
Salvation Front Council, his new government was acknowledged internationally without 
hesitation.  
Still, as a result of the fall of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe - 
Romania included - former political parties and opposition parties began to re-emerge; thus, 
at the beginning of 1990, there were various political groups - such as the National-Liberal 
Party, the National Peasants' Party, the Christian Democrats - in Romania. Analogously, in 
January, when “the need for a new organism involving the legally constituted political 
parties and replacing FSN became evident, a first series of manifestations against the body 
began” .  578
Consequently, “counter demonstrations to show support for FSN followed, bringing 
together workers from Bucharest and miners from the Jiu Valley (....) The events escalated 
and the headquarters of the opposition political parties and of newspapers criticising the 
government, were vandalised” . It was merely in this context that the National Salvation 579
Front Council was replaced by a Provisional National Unity Council on the 13th of 
February, 1990. This new governing body, designated to control the country until the 
approaching elections in May, was equally made up by FSN representatives and members 
of other political parties. Hence, “February would still be the scene of turbulent events, 
culminating with anti-government protesters entering the Victoria Palace, the Government 
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 headquarters. The miners were once again brought to Bucharest, but by the time they 
arrived, the demonstrators had already been spread by the police and military and their 
intervention was no longer needed” . 580
April was clearly not a month of quietude but, on April 22nd, 1990 a large sit-in protest - 
later dubbed by Iliescu with the term “the Golaniad" - from Romanian derogatory word 
“golan" meaning “hoodlum” - was initiated by students and professors in the University 
Square, Bucharest. What precipitated one of the most fervent and earnest collective public 
appeal for true freedom and democracy, at a time when President Iliescu spoke of “multi 
party elections and original democracy”, was the NSF's decision to form a political party 
and to attend the May 1990 elections, despite its previous promises of non-participation. 
The University square was immediately and symbolically declared a “Neo-communism free 
zone” or the “Zone Zero” for democracy by students and workers attending the protest. 
Amongst the participants’ most ardent requests in the anticommunist rally were the 
observance of the point number eight in the proclamation of Timisoara (adopted on March 
11th, 1990, by protesters in Timisoara Opera Square) which forbade the candidacy for 
public office, for a period of three consecutive legislatures, to all activists of the communist 
regime and members of the Securitate. However, familiar with the realities of the left-wing 
totalitarianism, President of the NSF Iliescu did not accept any form of contestation and, in  
a session of the new governing body, the Provisional National Unity Council, Iliescu 
qualified the demonstrators shouting “Better dead than communist!” in the University 
Square, as golani.  
Anyhow, on May 20, 1990, with over 84% of votes, Iliescu and the NSF won the first free 
elections in Romania after WWII and accordingly, for some weeks, the situation in 
Bucharest calmed down, albeit protesters living in tents did not abandon the University 
Square. Next, “the attempts to negotiate a solution between the authorities and protesters 
failed (...) and patience towards the protests (...) was running extremely thin. On the 12th of 
June, at the Victoria Palace, seat of the Government, a decision was taken in this respect, 
with the Police, the Army and The Romanian Intelligence Service being called upon to 
 Ibidem580
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 terminate the manifestations” .  581
On the morning of June 13th, when the brutal intervention of the police forces occurred, 
there were several hundred protesters in the square. Hostilities increased the next day, when 
Romanian mineworkers who had reached Bucharest were asked by the recently elected 
President Ion Iliescu, to occupy and clean the University Square . In the following two 582
days, the masses of miners - carrying slogans like “death to intellectuals!” or “we work, we 
don't think!” - scattered terror and devastated the headquarters of both the opposition parties 
and the press that had adopted a critical attitude towards Ion Iliescu and his acolytes. 
“Protesters and pedestrians alike suffered severe battering, some were killed and many 
have been abusively detained on arbitrary basis, only to be released days or months later, 
with no explanation offered as to what had happened” . Subsequently, the President 583
would publicly thank the miners for their intervention. 
In conclusion, it is evident that the months following the Romanian Revolution of 
December 1989 were harsh times; in accordance with Dix, “the newly found liberty seemed 
to have taken people almost by surprise. Romania had to face almost forgotten traits of 
democracy - among them, the existence of a multi-party system, which implied the existence 
of opposition” . Moreover, “instead of being a partner of dialogue and a much needed 584
instrument towards building a healthy democracy, any opposition became a threat, a who is 
not with us is against us. This brought about a surprising return to the proletarian discourse 
of the 1950s-1960s. The demonisation of capitalism, of the historical political parties and of 
the intellectual elites did little to help the proper rebuilding of a democratic political 
system” . 585
On the contrary, as demonstrated, albeit they had achieved a resounding success in the 
elections, Iliescu and the Front, just like any communist government, were not willing to 
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 tolerate any real opposition; the latter had to be intimidated, terrorised, silenced at all costs 
and by any means. For Iliescu and his comrades, the opposition was meant to play a purely 
formal role, a garnishing facade opposition. As Dix maintained, “the miners were the 
perfect pawns in 1990. It may very well be they were truly convinced of the earnestness of 
their mission, being called upon to save Romania's new democracy from the threat of the 
hooligan-intellectuals, as the press of the time narrated the events” . Still, the extreme use 586
of violence, officially justified in the media by means of “the threat of a coup” premise, 
would lead “to an increasing wave of mistrust in the country’s hopes of fostering democracy 
and it drove many on the path of emigration. It is believed that up to a few hundred 
thousand Romanians left the country then” . 587
Even nowadays, questions regarding the Mineriads are still unanswered and studies 
concerning these anticommunist social movements in Romania are far from being closed. 
What is known, however, is that “after their incursions to Bucharest in 1990, the miners 
acquired a taste for taking matters into their own hands, and became players, instead of 
instruments of the game. Confident in their power as a mass, they continued to come or to 
threaten to come to Bucharest for their claims. Only that on these new occasions, their 
actions were directed against, and not in the support of the government” . Besides, in 588
conformity with the author, in the present climate, as the most part of the mines in the Jiu 
Valley have been shut down, they suffer from unemployment and poverty as well as by “the 
stigma of the Mineriads” . 589
During his first presidential mandate (between 1990-1992) Ion Iliescu would be replaced in 
the leadership of the party by Petre Roman. However, following some misunderstandings 
within the FSN, between the wing backing Iliescu and the wing supporting Petre Roman, a 
majority supportive group of President Ion Iliescu would split from the party and give rise 
to a new one, the Democratic National Salvation Front (FDSN) in 1992. After winning the 
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 1992 elections, FDSN went on to govern Romania unit 1996, with Ion Iliescu as president 
once more. In 1993 FDSN changed the name to Party of Social Democracy in Romania 
(PDSR) and, from 1994 to 1996 it ran the country in coalition with the right-wing 
Romanian National Unity Party  (PUNR), the Greater Romania Party (PRM), and the left-
wing Socialist Party of Labour. With the right-wing coalition Romanian Democratic 
Convention (CDR) winning the elections of 1996, Emil Constantinescu, became president 
of Romania. Nonetheless, after four years of governmental unrest and economic failure, 
unsuccessfully handled by the disintegrating CDR, PDSR would make a sterling comeback, 
winning the November 2000 elections, and thus making Ion Iliescu for the third time 
president of Romania. In 2001, PDSR merged with the Romanian Social-Democratic Party 
(PSDR), and the resulting party would become the current PSD. 
Returning to the Sino-Romanian relations in the 1990s, during the anticommunist 
manifestations between April 22nd - June 13th, some of the members of the opposition 
parties named a section of the University Square in Bucharest Tiananmen 2, and thus 
completely misunderstood the two different realities in China and Romania. Indeed, in 
accordance with Buzatu, while Beijing witnessed real, true, efficient pragmatic reforms, 
Bucharest's transition to democracy was only built on promises and shallow initiatives 
(Buzatu 2004: 129).  
Moreover, the former diplomat asserted that an evidence of the Romanian political elite’s 
confusion and ignorance at that time was represented by the official visit to Taiwan of a 
member of the Romanian Democratic Convention . For a while, Beijing would tolerate 590
the gaffes of the leadership in Bucharest, but eventually, these mistakes necessarily 
influenced the Sino-Romanian ties and the economic bilateral trade would witness a clear 
and fundamental drop, from US $ 1 billion in the mid of the 1980s, to US $ 388 million in 
1990. Moreover, Bucharest would take advantage of the baffled Sino-Romanian bonds in 
the beginning of the 1990s and would “fail to remember” the debts towards China, 
mounting to approximatively US $ 800 millions (Buzatu 2004: 129). 
 Electoral alliance of several centre-right political parties in opposition with the NSF, active between 590
1991-2000.
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 V.4 1989 as a turning point for Sino-Romanian ties.  
Bucharest’s diplomatic relations with Beijing in the last decade of the 20th century 
The year 1989 represented a turning point for the Romanian-Chinese bilateral ties. With the 
overrunning of the ancient regime however, the new Romanian leadership’s foreign policy 
was hardly stable or certain. At a time when Romania was entering an era of system change, 
along with intense social fervour and significant prospects, the government hesitated when 
dealing with the future of the country. In fact, being both geographically and strategically 
positioned between West and East, for a while, the Romanian political elite vacillated 
between the two sides. If, prior to 1989, Bucharest - involved in the Sino-American and in 
the Sino-Soviet conflicts - publicly supported the Bucharest-Beijing axe as an alternative to 
Moscow, with the events of 1989, the circumstances changed; while the Soviet Union 
vanished and China opened to the world, Romania lost its role as China’s gate towards 
(Central and Eastern) Europe. Clearly, Bucharest’s diplomacy tried to find new ways of 
cooperating with the West, yet, it concomitantly neglected the bilateral relations with 
Beijing, albeit the Chinese leadership openly expressed their support for Romania’s 
democratic transition. 
Hence, in the very beginning of the 1990s, albeit both China and Romania entered a 
complex and, periodically, agonising transition processes, the paths they opted for were 
substantially different. While Romania chose to set up a democratic society and a capitalist 
economy (by implementing a “shock therapy” kind of reform, centred on liberalisation and 
privatisation, which changed its economic structure in almost every way) having as main 
goal the adaptation to and the integration into NATO and the European Union, China 
decided on keeping its “political system and many of the institutions virtually unchanged, 
while focussing pragmatically on gradual economic reform and building a market economy 
with Chinese characteristics” . Simona Soare’s account comes to reinforce this idea, 591
while focusing on the Chinese and Romanian foreign policy strategies and the Sino-
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 Romanian relations. In the scholar’s opinion, in the aftermath of the 1989 democratic 
revolution, the Romanian governments tried “to maintain a close economic relationship 
with China, seen as a market for Romanian products and a source of foreign direct 
investments (FDI). However, with Romanian priorities in the 1990s steering towards the 
strategic goals of developing a functional democratic regime and a liberal, market economy 
that would facilitate its accession to NATO and the EU, and the worsening Romanian 
economic situation in the 1990s, the Chinese interest in Romanian markets and the bilateral 
political relation become increasingly marginal” . Hence, Soare stated, “the Romanian 592
political rhetoric during the Cold War period concerning the special Sino-Romanian 
relationship was slowly abandoned in the mid-1990s and was replaced by a liberal, 
democratic discourse towards China that endures today, albeit in a significantly toned-
down version” . 593
In this context, by means of the message sent on the 27th of December 1989 by the Chinese 
President Yang Shangkun to the new Romanian leader Ion Iliescu and to the Romanian 
Prime Minister Petre Roman, the PRC acknowledged the political changes in Romania and 
recognised the new democratic regime in Bucharest. From that moment on, the 
“maintenance of the Romanian-Chinese relations should not have had any 
impediments” (Nemeș 2015: 26), all the more that “China was willing to economically 
cooperate with Romania, even though the structure of the Bucharest regime changed 
drastically” . Moreover,  “the fall of communism in Eastern Europe created a shift in the 594
world order and the Chinese immediately understood. Romania was therefore assured by 
the Chinese that politics must not influence the economic cooperation. Therefore, Deng 
Xiaoping’s black cat, white cat theory was supporting China’s understanding about the fall 
of communism in Eastern Europe” .  595
That being the case, the two countries would gradually relaunch official diplomatic dialogue 
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 and restart bilateral official visits. If in August 1990 “Chinese deputy foreign minister Tian 
Zengpei visited Romania and came to a consensus with deputy state secretary of Romanian 
foreign ministry: the development of the Sino-Romanian relations was in the interests of 
both countries and it should not be influenced by the change of Romanian domestic 
situation” , according to Buzatu, “the Romanian president made an official visit to China 596
at the end of January 1991 and a working visit in the special economic zones of Southern 
China - Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Guangzhou - in March 1994, at his return from Japan” (Buzatu 
2004: 129). During the 1991 visit to the PRC, Romanian President Ion Iliescu held talks 
with General Secretary Jiang Zemin, Chinese President Yang Shangkun and Premier Li 
Peng. As claimed by Gao Ge, both sides expressed that they will continue to develop the 
existing relations of traditional friendship and cooperation transcending differences in their 
ideologies and social systems . During the visit, the two sides signed four documents 597
including a consular treaty.  
Additionally, the spokesman of the Chamber of Deputies Martian (July 1992), spokesperson 
of the Chamber of Deputies A. Năstase (December 1993), Prime Minister Văcăroiu (July 
1995), spokesman of Senate Gherman (November 1995), President Emil Constantinescu 
(September 1997), Senate spokesperson Petre Roman (September 1998), Spokesman of the 
Chamber of Deputies Diaconescu (July 1999), Senate Spokesman Mircea Ionescu-Quintus 
(July 2000), Senate Spokesman Văcăroiu (April 2002) and Prime Minister Adrian Năstase 
(June 2002 and May 2003) also visited China .  598
According to the Chinese scholar,  “President Jiang Zemin’s visit to Romania in the end of 
June and early July 1996, Romanian President Emil Constantinescu’s visit to China in 
September 1997 and Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Năstase’s visit to China in June 
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 2002 pushed the friendly and cooperative relations forward” . 599
In fact, according to an article in the online journal Hellenic Resources Network, the 
Romanian President Emil Constantinescu “arrived on Wednesday in Shanghai, where 
Romania was willing to open a consulate” ; there, he was “hosted by the mayor of 600
Shanghai and held talks with Chinese senior officials, President Jiang Zemin, Prime-
Minister Li Peng and the Speaker of the Parliament Qiao Chi” . During the official talks 601
with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, Constantinescu announced his intention to settle 
Romanian diplomatic representatives teams in Shanghai and Hong Kong for their important 
economic roles. The dialogue and exchange of opinions regarding the boosting of Sino-
Romanian bilateral relations and international issues of mutual interest were held in a warm 
and friendly atmosphere and were followed by the signing of a joint communiqué  and 602
four other documents. On that occasion, President Constantinescu reaffirmed Romania’s 
one-China stand on the question of Taiwan . 603
To honour Zhu Rongji’s invitation, Prime Minister of the PRC, the Romanian Prime 
Minister, Adrian Năstase, paid a working visit to China between 25 - 29 June 2002. The 
official talks in Beijing between the heads of the two governments covered both issues of 
bilateral relations and international matters of common interest, and led to the signing of the 
following bilateral documents: a Protocol between the Government of Romania and the 
Government of the People's Republic of China on the inventory of bilateral treaties 
concluded at state and intergovernmental level, between 1949-1989; an Understanding 
between the Ministry of Education and Research in Romania and the Ministry of Education 
of the PRC, on cooperation in the field of education, for the years 2002-2004; an Agreement 
 Gao, Ge, “The Development of Sino-Romanian Relations After 1989”, Global Economic Observer, 599
“Nicolae Titulescu” University of Bucharest, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Institute for World Economy of 
the Romanian Academy, vol. 5(1), June 2017
 “Romanian President Visiting China”, RADOR: News from Romania, 11 September 1997, available at 600
http://hri.org/news/balkans/rador/1997/97-09-11.rador.html  accessed on 09.10. 2015
 Ibidem601
 Ibidem602
 “China and Romania. Bilateral Political Relations”, 2004/02/16, Embassy of the PRC in Romania, 603
available at http://ro.chineseembassy.org/rom/zlgx/t66052.htm accessed on 31.07.2015
 347
 by Exchange of Letters between the Government of Romania and the Government of the 
PRC on the granting, by the Chinese government to the Government of Romania of a non-
repayable grant; Memorandum of Understanding on Collaboration between the National 
Securities Commission of Romania and the Securities and Exchange Commission in China, 
an Agreement of cooperation in the field of health, and last, but not least, a Protocol of 
cooperation and understanding between the Romanian Commercial Bank (BCR) and Bank 
of China. 
The two Prime Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the positive evolution of the 
traditional Sino-Romanian relations of friendship and cooperation and reaffirmed the 
decision of the Romanian and Chinese Governments to work for the further deepening of 
mutually beneficial cooperation relations between the two countries , in line with the long-
term desires and interests of the Romanian and Chinese peoples, the promotion of peace and 
regional and global development. The two parties emphasised their wish to further develop 
bilateral relations based on the principles of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit, 
non-interference in domestic relations, as well as other generally accepted principles of 
international law. Moreover, Romania and China called for continued high-level political 
dialogue, intensified contacts at governmental, parliamentary, local and non-governmental 
level, and to foster friendly exchanges and cooperation in all areas of mutual interest.  
The two sides underlined that, under market economy conditions, they wanted to boost 
bilateral economic and trade relations by agreeing to stimulate and support businesses and 
businessmen in the two countries through direct contacts and cooperation, third markets 
included, in areas of common interest such as: telecommunication industry, information 
technology, automotive and agricultural machine building, chemical, pharmaceuticals, 
pharmaceuticals, furniture production, wood products, textile industry and encourage 
companies that have the capacity to make investments or other collaborations in the fields 
of infrastructure, energy, civil engineering, road construction, cement industry, construction 
of pipelines for oil and gas transport. In this context, Prime Minister Adrian Năstase 
advanced a number of collaborative proposals to the Chinese side: the Establishment of 
joint enterprises to contribute to the development of scientific parks, similar to those in 
China, the financing and construction of highways in Romania with the support of Chinese 
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 companies and the Use of the Port of Constanta as the gateway in Europe for the Chinese 
commodities. The Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji appreciated his Romanian counterpart 
proposals, which were to be discussed further in the Joint Governmental Commission. 
Together, the two prime ministers reaffirmed the need to increase the efficiency of the 
Commission in boosting the actors directly involved in bilateral economic exchanges, 
especially the Chambers of Commerce and other economic associations, to amplify the 
direct ties between administrative and economic local units.  
While the Romanian side reaffirmed the endorsement of the one China policy principle and 
conveyed appreciation for Beijing’s promotion of peace, cooperation and stability in Asia 
and the world, the Chinese expressed their respect for the efforts made by the Bucharest 
authorities in view of the European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and underlined the 
important role of Romania in maintaining peace and stability and in strengthening security, 
both at regional and global level. Moreover, the two heads of the two governments held that 
terrorism, in any form, was a serious challenge to world civilisation and a threat to peace in 
the world. At the end of the high level talks, Romania and China restated their desire to 
intensify exchanges and cooperation aimed at fighting international terrorism and to 
support, in this regard, the efforts of the international society under the aegis of the UN 
Security Council. Last, Chinese premier Zhu Rongji accepted the invitation addressed by 
the Romanian Prime Minister Adrian Năstase to visit Romania.  
At the halfway point of his trip, premier Adrian Năstase visited Hong Kong and, at his 
return to Beijing, he paid a visit to the technological Zhongguancun Haidian Scientific Park, 
comprising almost seven thousand businesses, and considered to be the largest business 
incubator and an important technological and research base. At the end of the day, the 
Romanian delegation visited two companies in the Technology Complex and a meeting with 
Jiang Zemin, President of the Republic of China, and Qian Qichen, Deputy Prime Minister 
of the State Council, was settled for the next day .  604
On top of that, the Romanian Prime Minister’s second visit to China, in May 2003, bringing 
medical equipment during the SARS epIdemic, was described by the Chinese scholars as “a 
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 friend in need is a friend indeed” . 605
On the afternoon of 20 August 2003, few months after the Romanian Prime Minister’s 
second visit to Beijing, Romanian President Ion Iliescu held talks with the Chinese 
President Hu Jintao, during his third state visit to China. So, after the 1991 and 1994 visits, 
in a warm and friendly atmosphere, Iliescu met his Chinese counterpart at the Great Hall of 
the People for an “in-depth exchange of views on bilateral relations and international and 
regional issues of common concern” . In conformity with the report of the meeting, 606
Chinese President Hu “spoke highly of Sino-Romanian ties, and said the two peoples share 
a profound traditional friendship” . Moreover, President Hu observed that China and 607
Romania “have witnessed consistent and smooth development since the two countries 
forged diplomatic relations over 50 years ago. The leaders of the two countries visit each 
other frequently, promoting mutual trust and friendship. The bilateral cooperation featuring 
mutual benefit has expanded consecutively and resulted in remarkable achievements. The 
two countries have conducted all-round exchanges and cooperation in various fields, along 
with vibrant communication between the two peoples and regions of the two countries. 
China-Romania relations have maintained good momentum of development” .  608
Besides some standard remarks concerning the strengthening, the enhancement  of two 
countries’ political relations, bilateral high-level exchanges and governmental parliamentary 
and party exchanges, President Hu assured his Romanian counterpart that China would 
motivate the businessman from the two countries to intensify contacts and thus amplify 
bilateral economic and trade cooperation in the fields of science and technology, education, 
culture, tourism  and international affairs. 
Towards the end of the meeting, the two head of states exchanged compliments to each 
other. Thus, President Hu praised his Romanian counterpart for managing to maintain 
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 “political stability” in the country, for “scoring continual economic growth” and, among 
other things, he expressed appreciation for “Romania's consistent adherence to the One 
China policy on the Taiwan issue and other valuable support for China in international 
affairs” . In response, President Iliescu expressed his admiration for China’s 609
transformation over the years. Accordingly, he remarked that “especially since China 
adopted its reform and opening-up policies some two decades ago, China has recorded 
rapid social and economic development, and played an increasingly important role in the 
international arena” . Moreover, the Romanian President stressed that “as a good friend 610
of China, Romania is pleased at the country's remarkable achievements, and is ready to 
learn from China's experience” .  611
Furthermore, Iliescu restated Bucharest’s stalwart support for Beijing’s scrupulous position 
on the issue of Taiwan. At the end of the talks, he argued that Romania was “ready to make 
joint efforts with China to promote cooperation in politics, trade and economy, science, 
technology and education, to expand existing cooperation and explore new ways to push 
forward bilateral friendly and mutually-beneficial cooperation in an all-round way”  and 612
finally, the two sides signed the Joint Statement between the Governments in Beijing and 
Bucharest. Guideline for the future development of the Sino-Romanian relations, the joint 
declaration concerned the “enhancement of bilateral relations and international issues of 
common concern, and announced that both countries would develop comprehensive friendly 
cooperative relationship” . 613
After a quick overview of the major visits to China by the Romanian political elite, a 
chronological record of the finest visits to Romania by the Chinese leadership is obligatory. 
Thus, vice premier and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited Romania twice, in September 
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 1991 and September 1993; Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress (NPC) Peng Chong paid a visit in October 1991; Premier Li Peng (July 
1994); Vice Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference Qian 
Zhengying (October 1994); Vice Chairman of the NPC Standing Committee Li Peiyao 
(October 1995); Hu Jintao, as permanent member of the Political Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of China (November 1995) and as President of the PRC 
(June 2004); President Jiang Zemin (June 29th - July 2nd, 1996); Chairman Li Ruihuan of 
the Chinese People's Political Conference (May 1998); Vice Chairman of the National 
People's Congress Bu He (June 2000), State Council Wu Yi (February 2001); Vice 
Chairman Sun Fuling of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (October 
2001); Vice Chairman Chen Jinhua of the Chinese People's Political Consultative 
Conference (June 2002), and Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan (July 2002) .  614
According to Gao Ge, in July 1994 the Chinese premier Li Peng's official visit to Romania 
was the honouring of an invitation by the Romanian President Iliescu and Prime Minister 
Nicolae Vacaroiu. On that occasion, the two sides signed the “Joint Statement of the 
Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of Romania on Mutual 
Relations of Friendship and Cooperation”, that drew the attention to the development and 
deepening of friendly and cooperative relations in line with the interests of the people from 
the two countries and the contribution to maintain peace and stability both in the region and 
in the world. The document “also set the guiding principles for the development of relations 
between the two countries: (…) mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual 
benefit, peaceful coexistence and other recognised principles of international law, the 
friendly and mutually beneficial cooperative relations in the field of politics, economics, 
science and technology” .  615
Moreover, the Joint Declaration of the governments in Bucharest and Beijing emphasised 
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 “the rights of people all over the world to decide their own fate and choose the political 
system, economic system and the path of social development freely as well as the human 
basic rights and freedom should be respected”  and the political guideline grounding the 616
bilateral Sino-Romanian cooperation. Thus, with“the differences of ideology, economic 
model and development path”  not obstructing “the normal development of the relations 617
between the two countries” , Chinese and Romanian governments signed a Trade and 618
Economic Agreement as well, plus four other documents. 
As already mentioned, in November 1995, Hu Jintao, as member of the Standing 
Committee of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee paid an official visit to 
Romania. On that occasion, Hu Jintao stressed that “the Chinese Government, the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Chinese people wish to work together with the Romanian 
Government, all political parties and people of various circles to carry the Sino-Romanian 
friendly relationship into the 21st century, and the CPC wishes to continue to develop 
relations with various political parties of Romania on the four principles of independence, 
complete equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each others internal affairs” . 619
Furthermore, a year later, Chinese President Jiang Zemin paid a state visit to Romania from 
June 29th to July 2nd, 1996. During the dinner party offered by the President of Romania 
Ion Iliescu, in honour of Jiang Zemin, after a warm reception of the Chinese head of state, 
Iliescu thanked his counterpart for the friendly feelings towards Romania and the Romanian 
people, for his contribution both in the past and in the present to the development of 
friendship and cooperation between the two countries and peoples and payed tribute “to the 
great Chinese people, creators of material and spiritual values, of a unique multi millenary 
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 culture, that represents an invaluable contribution to the treasure of human civilisation” . 620
Moreover, Iliescu continued, “we particularly appreciate the great achievements made by 
the People's Republic of China in the economic reform and opening up processes of recent 
years” .  621
Thus, the finding of solutions for the rapid development of the Chinese society, ensuring 
economic, social progress and stability was, in the Romanian president’s view, beneficial 
both to the Chinese people and to the international peace, stability and cooperation. Pleased 
that the Sino-Romanian traditional friendship and collaboration relations, “grounded in the 
principles and norms of international law, on the long-lasting interests of the Romanian and 
Chinese peoples, on the esteem and respect they provide each other”  were in a gradually 622
ascending scale of evolution, president Iliescu claimed that the Joint Statement that the two 
sides were due to sign at the end of the meeting would “reflect the common political will to 
continue the traditional relations of friendship and cooperation between Romania and the 
PRC, as well as the basic principles, areas and ways of deepening the Romanian-Chinese 
cooperation, at this historical stage, thus creating a framework favourable to constant, long 
relationship of friendship and collaboration between the two countries and peoples” .  623
Moreover, with burgeoning trade and economic cooperation representing a basic constituent 
of bilateral relations, and the current situation being far from meeting the potential of the 
two economies - in the backdrop of transition to the market economy and privatisation 
processes in Romania, and sustained economic reform and opening up policy of the PRC -
the Romanian president suggested that both of the sides focused on supporting direct links 
between businesses and enterprises in the two countries. Additionally, Iliescu considered 
useful the improvement of contacts and direct cooperation between counties and provinces 
in the two countries and the opening of a General Consulate in one of the most dynamic 
 “Dineu Oficial oferit de Preşedintele României, domnul Ion Iliescu, în onoarea Preşedintelui Republicii 620
Populare Chineze, domnul Jiang Zemin” - Bucureşti, 29 iunie, 1996, available at <http://old.presidency.ro/pdf/
date_arhiva/673_ro.pdf> accessed on 27.06.2016, personal translation
 Ibidem621
 Ibidem622
 Ibidem623
 354
 areas of economic and financial development in the PRC - Shanghai in order to smoother 
trade and other areas of bilateral exchanges between the two states (technical, scientific, 
cultural, tourism, mass media and sports).  Regarding Bucharest’s international relations, 
the Romanian president elucidated that “with the vast majority of the population and 
political forces, both those in power and the opposition, support the full integration of 
Romania into European and Euro-Atlantic structures (…) our country remains a factor of 
stability, contributing to the promotion of understanding, cooperation and peace in this 
area. At the same time, we attach increasing importance to the development of collaborative 
relations with countries in other areas, including Asia - the most populous region in the 
world - with a particularly dynamic economic development” . In this circumstances, 624
Iliescu reaffirmed Romania’s prominent relations with Beijing, reiterated Bucharest’s 
consistent position of adherence to the one China policy - with Taiwan as an inseparable 
part of China's territory, and Taiwan's issue as a matter of Beijing’s domestic politics - and 
acknowledged the important role played by the People's Republic of China at the 
international level, including at the UN, as one of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council. 
Straight away, the Chinese President Jiang Zemin thanked for the toast offered by the 
Romanian President in his honour, and for the invitation to visit Romania, for which he was 
grateful. The Chinese head of state reminisced about the times when he used to work as 
general manager of Chinese specialist groups at the beginning of the 1970s, about the 
“splendid landscape and the hospitable people in Romania” that had left him a “beautiful 
unforgettable impression”;“(…) Walking again in these wonderful and rich lands, I feel as 
though I have returned home”  reflected Jiang Zemin, and then praised the Romanian 625
people, who were “hard-working, brave and talented”, and Romania for having “achieved 
remarkable successes” and, “by actively developing friendly relations with all the states of 
the world, making positive contributions to maintaining peace and stability in its region (…) 
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 played an active role in international affairs” . By the end of the talks, Jiang Zemin 626
would have outlined the effects of the economic reform and modernisation process 
implemented by Beijing’s leadership - through an appropriate correlation between three 
factors: reform, development and stability - and China’s contribution and responsibility to 
the safeguarding of world peace and stimulating joint development as permanent member of 
the UN Security Council and the largest developing country. Moreover, the core leader of 
the PRC underlined Beijing’s willingness to develop friendly and cooperative relations with 
all states on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence, a major pillar in China’s 
foreign policy.  
Last, but not least, Jiang Zemin reflected on the Sino-Romanian relations and the mutual, 
traditional friendship between the peoples of the two countries which resisted great 
hardships and has further strengthened on all levels. The leader then praised President Ion 
Iliescu, and other Romanian leaders, as well as many other Romanian friends who “made 
important contributions to the development of Sino-Romanian relations”  and expressed 627
the Chinese leadership’s wish to inspire and stimulate the peoples of the two countries to be 
good friends and good partners forever, “to bring about the friendship and cooperation 
relations between China and Romania in the 21st century, full of vigour and amplified at all 
levels. We are convinced” , Jiang Zemin concluded, “that the flower of Sino-Romanian 628
friendship will be even more splendid, and the fruits of the collaboration between China 
and Romania will be also richer” . 629
On the afternoon of June 13th, 2004, Romanian President Ion Iliescu greeted the Chinese 
President Hu Jintao and his wife, in the yard of the Presidential Palace in Bucharest, during 
the second meeting between the two heads of state within ten months (as seen above, the 
two leaders had met during Iliescu’s third state visit to China, on August 20, 2003). 
According to the report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, generally, the 
 Ibidem626
 Ibidem627
 Ibidem628
 Ibidem629
 356
 bilateral talks during the three days-state visit “were featured by sincere atmosphere, in-
depth theme and broad consensus. Both heads of state indicated that establishing a 
comprehensive friendly cooperative partnership between China and Romania is the 
common aspiration shared by both sides. The two sides will join hands to push for 
pragmatic cooperation and continue to promote bilateral ties so as to benefit the two 
peoples and enhance peace and development of the region and the world at large” . 630
Moreover, the two heads of states exchanged opinions regarding the development of 
friendly and traditional Sino-Romanian relations and cooperation in the past 55 years, the 
“frequent political dialogues in recent years”, as well as the “growth of economic and trade 
relations and increased exchanges in culture, education, science and technology” . 631
Firstly, and most importantly, President Hu emphasised the Chinese government’s guideline 
to strengthen collaboration between “governments, legislative bodies and the parties, 
deepen understanding and enhance mutual trust” by setting up a dialogue process between 
the two state leaders. Secondly, the Chinese president suggested his Romanian counterpart 
“to further leverage the guiding role of bilateral mechanism of mixed council for economic 
and trade affairs in a bid to serve as a bridge between the business communities of the two 
countries and to encourage and support mutual investments”  and thirdly, he proposed 632
President Iliescu to sustain and encourage the Month of Romania and the Month of China, 
the Week for Romanian movies and the Week for Chinese movies, as well as any sort of 
exhibition in each other's capital city, Bucharest and Beijing, to commemorate the 55th 
anniversary since the setting up of diplomatic ties between the two countries. In this 
context, the Hu Jintao recommended the Romanian side to use this opportunity in order to 
classify Romania as a tourist destination for Chinese citizens, and hence to intensify the 
Sino-Romanian cooperation in tourism.  
Last, but not least, the Chinese President encouraged the leadership in Bucharest “to further 
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 intensify bilateral coordination in international affairs so as safeguard regional and 
international peace and stability with concerted efforts” . Romanian President Iliescu 633
complied with the aforementioned Chinese proposals without exception and stressed his 
esteem for China’s development, its drive and resourcefulness, and underlined Romania’s 
strive to “improve its infrastructure in a bid to join in the European Union” as well as 
Bucharest’s adherence to the one-China policy. Crucial for the Sino-Romanian bilateral ties 
however, was the signing, by the two heads of state, of the “Joint Statement on the 
Establishment of an extensive Friendly and Cooperative Partnership”, as well as the 
enactment of four significant documents, that included a “Memorandum of Understanding 
on Bilateral Cooperation in Tourism”, a Credit and a “Cultural Cooperation Agreement”, as 
well as other protocols . 634
Gradually, the relaunching of Sino-Romanian bilateral official visits in the 1990s resulted in 
the signing of several bilateral treaties for cooperation, agreements, conventions and mutual 
communiques, however in fulfilment of a new juridical basis, de-ideologised through the 
abandonment of the exclusivist socialist ideology - central pillar for Beijing’s relations with 
the outside world before 1989 - and grounded on a more strategic thinking (Buzatu 2004: 
130), that generated a favourable environment for China's domestic development for 
perpetual competition in the world in the long-run . 635
Thus, an “Agreement between the government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
government of Romania for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal 
evasion with respect to taxes on income”, as well as a “Treaty regarding the judicial 
assistance in civil and penal matters” and a “Consular Convention” between Romania and 
the PRC were signed on January 16th, 1991 in Beijing. Additionally, on July 8th, 1991 the 
two sides signed a “Governmental Agreement regarding the Chinese delivery of goods, to 
Romania, by credit”, and a year later, on September 28th 1992 Romania and China signed 
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 an “Understanding for the revision of Appendix 1  of the Governmental Agreement signed 636
on July 8th, 1991 regarding the Chinese delivery of goods, to Romania, by credit”. 
In Bucharest, the two governments signed an “Agreement of cooperation in the field of 
tourism” on February 15th, 1994; a “Declaration of mutual agreement between Romania 
and China concerning bilateral friendship and cooperation relations”, an “Economic and 
Commercial Treaty” between the Romanian and Chinese governments, a “Treaty between 
the two governments regarding Cooperation in the fields of culture, education, science and 
sports” and another one regarding the “Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments” on July 12th, 1994. Additionally, on the 1st of July 1996, in Bucharest, the two 
countries signed a “Joint Declaration between the PRC and Romania”, a “Treaty regarding 
extradition” and an “Agreement concerning the scientific and technical cooperation 
between the Romanian and Chinese governments” . 637
After the signing of a “Joint Communique” on September 8th, 1997 in Beijing, on October 
14th, 1999 the Romanian and Chinese governments sanctioned an Understanding with 
regards to the granting, by the PRC, of a non-refundable loan amounting to 5 millions 
RMB  to the Romanian side, for the delivery of general goods or for the realisation of 638
projects approved by the two countries. Moreover, in 2001, Bucharest and Beijing ratified a 
“Protocol regarding the tackling with the remaining outstanding debts on accounts 
established on the basis of governmental bilateral agreements” (February 27th, Bucharest) 
and an “Agreement between the Romanian government and the Government of the Special 
Administrative Region Hong-Kong concerning visas” (December 18th,  Beijing). In 2002, in 
Beijing, the two sides signed an “Understanding between the Romanian government and the 
Government of the Special Administrative Region Macao regarding visas” (January 1st), a 
noteworthy “Protocol on the stock-tacking of bilateral treaties and agreements between the 
two states and governments within the period 1949-1989” (June 27th) and, a month later, in 
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 Bucharest, the Chinese and Romanian Ministries of Foreign Affairs signed a “Memorandum 
of understanding regarding bilateral cooperation” (July 8th).  
Last, but not least, it is relevant to mention the bilateral “Agreement of cooperation between 
the Diplomatic Academy of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the China 
Foreign Affairs University”, the “Understanding between the Romanian and Chinese 
governments with regards to the granting, by the Chinese side, of a non-refundable loan to 
the Romanian government, amounting to 5 millions RMB and representing excavators and 
concrete mixture”, as well as the “Romanian - Chinese Joint Declaration”, all three of them 
signed in Beijing, on August 20th, 2003 as well as a suggestive “Romanian-Chinese Joint 
Statement on the establishment of an all-encompassing partnership of friendship and 
cooperation”, on June 13th, 2004, just few months after Romania’s adherence to the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) on March 29th, 2004 . 639
V.5 A new beginning. Chinese migration to Romania between 1989-2004 
The issue of Chinese migration to Central and Eastern Europe, to the West and to the Soviet 
Union prior to 1990 or Russia - with the fall of the Iron Curtain, has been recurrently dealt 
with by researchers from all over the world. However, as this study is not aimed at 
investigating the intricate realm of Chinese migration (neither to Europe nor the Americas), 
it is necessary to point up, without further ado, the main features of the first wave of 
migration from East Asia to Eastern European states in transition, with a special focus on 
the Chinese immigrant communities in Romania after 1989. 
I should start by saying that the Chinese presence in CEE “can be placed in the theoretical 
framework pinned down by three keywords: globalisation, modernity, and mobility. The 
appearance of the Chinese element in the globalisation discourse, the post-1978 modernity 
rhetoric of the PRC, and the role and means of mobility accentuated within both discourses 
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 connect the case of Chinese migration to CEE to the larger picture of Chinese 
contemporary migration worldwide” . According to Nagy, with the post-1978 modernity 640
rhetoric having “conceived mobility as a necessary means through which, in manifold ways, 
civilisation, success, and development could be pursued” , the new Chinese migration is, 641
nowadays, predominantly consummated by “adventurous yet responsible, successful, and 
patriotic individuals, but, most of all, (…) modernising people” . 642
However, as the author maintained, “Chinese migrants view most of CEE countries where 
they reside as left behind, underdeveloped, less modern compared to the phenomenal 
modernisation they partially experience and largely imagine in PRC cities. In their turn 
many CEE citizens perceive Chinese migrants as underdeveloped, lacking civilisation and 
backward” .  643
By looking into the economic, cultural, political as well as religious dimensions yielded, in 
the present climate - thus “under new circumstances and with new actors” - by the triad 
globalisation, modernity and mobility, in “Fiery Dragons: Chinese Communities in Central 
and Eastern Europe, with special focus on Hungary and Romania”, Nagy conceived, 
through an analytical approach, a painstaking depiction of the Chinese communities of 
migrants in CEE, the identity of the migrants and the reasons behind the immigration, as 
well as ethnicity and integration of the Chinese Christian communities both in Hungary and 
Romania. In the end of the study, the author’s conclusion was that Chinese migration to 
CEE “not only colours the map of worldwide transnational migration, but also calls 
attention to the changes within the colourful map of worldwide Christianity and to the 
consequences this might have on the localities where these changes appear” .  644
Moreover, while it “highlights a shared post-socialist context and a shared Communist 
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 past, which play important roles in the encounters between Chinese migrants and locals 
(…), how Chinese migration contributes to new developments within the transitory 
communities of China and CEE still needs to be investigated” . 645
From a different perspective, Chinese migration expert Pál Nyiri asserted that the Chinese 
have a long history of migration and, in the beginning, their internal relocation from 
province to province, over centuries, was stimulated by better employment opportunities. 
Later on, economic reforms and the liberalisation of travel led to a Chinese immigration 
internationally, towards the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, that got stronger “and 
became more diversified in the years preceding the collapse of state socialism” . 646
However, the scholar explains, the “massive waves of forced and voluntary ethnic 
migrations (…) of labour migration from east to west and of shuttle traders after the end of 
the anciens regimes caught both their successors and Western neighbours unprepared. The 
Chinese, largely in the latter category, became one of the largest, fastest-growing, most 
important and most mobile migrant groups in the region” .  647
In the beginning, “Russia and Hungary emerged as the main hubs of this new Chinese 
migration” . As claimed by Ondreicsik, the two countries are important for divergent 648
reasons, hence, while “Russia is important because it has had a much longer history of 
importing Chinese labor than any other CEE country” , Hungary “only experienced an 649
influx of Chinese migrants starting with the last decade of the 20th century; yet Hungary 
was the first CEE country, apart from Russia, to have noticeable Chinese communities. In 
fact, the Chinese Diaspora in Hungary is still one of the largest in the area” .  650
However, in 1992, as a result of the re-introduction of the visa requirements on holders of 
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 official PRC passports in Hungary, Romania and the Czech Republic would become, just 
for a while, the most popular destination for Chinese immigration in Central and Eastern 
Europe, followed by Slovenia, Poland, Albania, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Russia, Lithuania, and 
later on Yugoslavia and Bosnia (Nyiri 2007: 49).  
It could be asserted that the political, economic and social transformations that were going 
on in China in the beginning of the 1970s, and the collapse of the Soviet Union as well as 
the fall of Communism in CEE, a large number of Chinese had to decamp from Moscow 
and move to Eastern Europe in search for a better life, security and more advantageous 
business conditions. In fact, many scholars agree on the fact that in the 1980s, Asian retail 
traders, traveling by train from Beijing to Moscow and carrying products to be sold in 
Moscow, had to cope with the arrival in the Russian capital city of a large number of traders 
hopeful of good fortune, like them, that caused competition to grow more fierce and finally 
led to the proliferation of the trading activities to Kiev, Budapest and Bucharest. These early 
traders formed the first wave of Chinese immigration to Eastern Europe.  
According to Ondreicsik, “following the reforms in China, Chinese businessmen started 
travelling to Eastern European countries in the 1980s as representatives of their companies, 
looking for new trade possibilities. These were the first Chinese migrants to reach the 
region during the Cold War, including Bucharest” (Ondreicsik 2012: 7). Nevertheless, as 
specified by Chen Xiao, between 1980-1983, not only Chinese businessman, but roughly 
“4,000 Chinese specialists in political affairs, economics, technology, science and culture – 
including the former Chinese president Jiang Zemin - visited Romania. These specialists 
and retailers from Beijing were among the first group in China to discover Romania as an 
attractive destination for immigration” . They came on official state business and it was 651
not until 1990, when Romania opened up, that Chinese citizens began to relocate to 
Romania autonomously. Likewise, Buzatu drew the attention to the fact that these people 
arrived in Romania for official state business, as any trade between Bucharest and Beijing 
was made through their respective governments. Moreover, the diplomat asserted that albeit 
the vast majority of them eventually returned to China, it is not peculiar that it was precisely 
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 this first group of transitory incomers that set the stage for what was to become a larger 
wave of migration a decade later. In fact, some of the Chinese who lived in Bucharest in the 
1980s started direct, personal contacts with Romanian businessmen, and gradually, in the 
1990s, initiated their own small businesses by seizing up relations with the enterprises they 
originally came to represent and thus, encouraged private entrepreneurship (Ondreicsik 
2012: 7).  
Nevertheless, in order to perfectly understand the phenomenon of Chinese migration to 
CEE and, specifically, to Romania, it is important to have a look at the immigration process 
as well as the policies adopted in Bucharest since it started allowing immigrants into the 
country. I should start by imparting what a large number of people are already acquainted 
with, and that is the fact that prior to the revolution of 1989 Romania, in the same way as 
the rest of the socialist bloc, was an inward looking state, hardly witnessing any migration 
to or from the country. With the exception of a small numbers of Romanian citizens, sent to 
work temporary and under very strict supervision by the authorities, to countries having 
close ties with Ceaușescu (in the 1970s, these were the German Democratic Republic and in 
the 1970s and 1980s, North African and Middle Eastern countries), the only permanent 
migrants leaving Romania were asylum seekers, mostly heading for Yugoslavia, Hungary or 
further, to the West. Clearly, the ones who managed to flee Romania during Ceaușescu’s 
regime were considered traitors, thus faced imprisonment or were put to death if they tried 
to regain access to the country. Moreover, while the families of refugees who remained in 
Romania had to deal with discrimination and persecution repeatedly from local authorities, 
some ethnic minorities were even disposed of in other countries (for example, West 
Germany paid the Romanian government to authorise ethnic Germans living in 
Transylvania to immigrate to West Germany). Therefore, with the situation worsening day 
by day during the last decade of Ceaușescu’s regime, Romanians formed by far the largest 
number of asylum seekers to Hungary.  
Nevertheless, the state did not only have absolute control over who left the country, but it 
also imperiously restricted who came into it. Thus, it is widely known that the majority of 
foreigners living in CEE countries prior to the end of the Cold War, Romania included, were 
students. The foreign student communities, mostly from Arab countries, living in Romania 
 364
 were highly concentrated around the universities of Bucharest, Iași, Cluj-Napoca and 
Timișoara (in 1982 there were approximately 20.000 such students in Romania, the majority 
of which were Arabs .  652
The fall of Ceaușescu’s regime in 1989 however, represented the preliminaries for a 
transition period that was accompanied by a number of political and economic changes, 
followed by Bucharest’s liberalisation of migration flows. Besides economic changes (the 
transition from a sluggish state-run economy to a capitalistic market economy), Romania 
experienced social changes, that had a great impact on migration flows to and from 
Romania. The sheer economic decline, rapid escalation of unemployment rates and high 
inflation in the aftermath of the revolution led, unquestionably, to a one way type of 
migration, that is the emigration from the country. The only exception was the Moldavian 
nationals who, during the earliest years of the 1990s, moved to Romania and requested 
Romanian citizenship in order to move further West, once they had Romanian passports. 
Still, following Romania’s economic recovery in the first half of the 1990s, the category of 
foreign citizens living within the country’s borders began to expand: repatriating migrants 
and businessmen became the primary actors of the immigration. While the repatriated was 
that group of people mostly from Germany, France, the US, Austria, Israel and Hungary, 
who fled the country during Communism and returned to their families after the communist 
regime’s collapse, the business migration referred  to that sort of immigrants who arrived in 
Romania mainly from China, Turkey, Syria, and Lebanon in the 1990s, to start businesses in 
the commerce and construction industries. This category formed approximatively 25% of 
the total of immigrants in Romania.  
After establishing diplomatic relations in 1949 and opening up Embassies in their respective 
capital cities in March 1950, Romanian and China signed various bilateral trade agreements  
that led to a rapid increase of the Sino-Romanian trade (that witnessed its peak in the 
beginning of the 1970s) and the two governments in Bucharest and Beijing actively 
promoted the political, cultural and technological ties. Thus, while it was mentioned that in 
the 1980s more than four thousand Chinese experts came to Romania, from an economic 
 Raluca Popescu, Georgiana Toth, “Imigranții din România - nevoi, probleme şi oportunităţi de integrare”. 652
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 perspective, in those years Romania was China’s most important trade member in the 
CMEA, with the volume of trade reaching US $ 1.200 million, that is 50% more than the 
Sino-Soviet trade . Moreover, what made the China-Romania bond even stronger 653
according to Chiriu and Liu is that, in opposition to other Central and East European 
countries, “Romania did not question the One-China Policy, avoided any formal contacts 
with the Dalai Lama or Taiwan, and was not interested in the human rights issue” . 654
Analogously, Romania’s vivacious promotion as a “sister nation” in the Chinese official 
media contributed to rendering Romania one of the top destination for Chinese migration in 
Eastern Europe. 
The first group of Chinese immigrants arriving in Romania were mainly young men, who 
settled in Bucharest and lived by selling - at domestic markets - cheap consumer goods they 
had brought from China, for high profits. According to Nyiri, with consumer goods being 
hard to find in post-Communist Eastern European societies, Chinese merchants had no 
problem selling their merchandise to Romanian customers (Nyiri 2007: 89).  
In conformity with Chinese scholar Chen Xiao, “the two dominant driving forces behind 
this immigration wave were two fashionable trends in 1980s China: to go into business and 
to go overseas” (Chen 2010: 9). In this context, when examining the Chinese involvement 
in merchandising activities, Xiao claimed that “the experience of Chinese traders in 
Romania compared favourably with their experience in Western Europe, and was 
representative of their overall experience in Eastern Europe” (Chen 2010: 9).  
Moreover, not only “Chinese merchandise was more highly valued in Eastern European 
countries such as Romania than in Western Europe” (Chen 2010: 9) but “middle class and 
even upper-middle class Romanians were well disposed towards Chinese products, making 
it possible for Chinese traders to thrive and develop commercial activities in 
Romania” (Chen 2010: 9).  
 Ciprian Nicolae Rădăvoi, “Factors countervailing immigrant phobia: a paradoxically successful case of 653
Chinese migration”, International Relations, 2015, p.4
Andrea Chiriu and Zuokui Liu, “Sino-Romanian Relations - From the First Ponta’s government to Klaus 654
Werner Iohannis’s victory in the presidential elections”, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences,Working Paper Series on European Studies of IES, CASS ,Vol. 9, No. 1, 2015 
 366
 If initially, the merchandise used to be brought to Budapest and from there redistributed 
throughout the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe, with more Chinese migrants - 
merchants moving to Romania and larger quantities of goods needed to be imported, a 
direct transitional network was required, in haste. Soon, goods were being imported directly 
from China via ships to the Port of Constanta, thus making the Chinese population in 
Bucharest one of the most powerful in Eastern Europe . 655
Various Chinese markets, bazaars opened up in the early 1990s in Bucharest and business 
went flawless; a hypermarket system similar to the ones in Budapest or Prague, emerged in 
Romanian capital city as well. According to Wundrak,“bazaars with booths and storage 
containers were set up to cover a large market area. The name ‘Piața Europa’ (Europe 
Market) is eponymous not only with the oldest of the smaller bazaars, but also as the term 
usually employed by Bucharest residents when referring to this market in general” . The 656
bazaar, specialised in bulk sales, acts as a magnet for merchants from all over Romania as 
well as from neighbouring countries .  657
Besides Piața Europa (1992) another market complex - called Red Dragon - comprised of 
six markets, was opened in 2003 in Bucharest. This market would soon become one of the 
prime trading points for goods “made in China”, with the merchandise being redistributed 
to Romania’s neighbouring countries Serbia, Bulgaria, and Moldova. The shops within 
these markets are, more often than not small, and engage from four to six people. Quite 
interesting is the fact that, different from Western Europe or North America - where the 
majority of the employees in Chinese business are Chinese people, in Romania half of the 
workers are Chinese, while the other half is Romanian (Chen 2010: 19). Gradually, more 
Chinese citizens moved to Romania, spread throughout the country - to Bacău, Iași, Cluj, 
Timișoara, Constanța - and  extended or variegated their sources of income or economic 
activities.  
 Wundrak, Rixta, “Emerging transnational migrant networks in Eastern Europe: The Chinese community in 655
Bucharest post-1989”, in Rosenthal, Gabriele and Bogner, Artur (ed.), “Ethnicity, Belonging and Biography: 
Ethnographical and Biographical Perspectives”, LIT Verlag, Berlin, 2009, pp. 203-228
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 From a cultural perspective, the Chinese seem to hold Romania to be more “similar” to the 
Chinese culture than the West European countries. As stated by Chiriac and Robotin, this 
apprehension might be justified by the close Sino-Romanian ties during Romania’s 
communist regime when, as it was shown in the previous chapters, industrial and 
technological goods (TVs, refrigerators), agricultural fertilisers, steel, as well as cultural 
goods - mainly Romanian films, popular in China in those days - were vast, but also due to 
the corresponding political ideology prior to 1989 . Moreover, with the number of Chinese 658
migrants reaching Romania rapidly increasing - thanks to an upgrade of the Sino-Romanian 
cooperative programs - economic bilateral relations witnessed positive impacts as well and 
in 2005, the volume of trade exchanges between Romania and China reached 1.3 billion Lei 
(Chiriac, Robotin 2006: 37).  
Nevertheless, the Romanians’ opinion regarding the Chinese migrants is not always 
positive. In fact, albeit the host people’s appreciation for the Chinese diligence, the media 
has succeeded - by means of numerous reports relevant to Chinese illegal business and their 
ties to the mafia - in inducing various stereotypes in the Romanians’ collective mind. 
Moreover, news about the deaths in suitcases or about clogging between the clans (abundant 
at the end of the 19th century) has made the Chinese ethnicities seen as intruders.  
As stated by Wundrak, “according to newspaper accounts in 1994, a ‘Chinese triad’ was 
suspected of murdering several Chinese (…) Many Chinese bodies discovered in suitcases…
which were thrown into a lake in Bucharest…or boiled until the flesh left the bones, have 
the signature of this group” . To this one should add the difficulty of the Chinese people 659
to learn the Romanian language, which made them to be regarded as obstinate, stubborn, 
not willing to communicate to the Romanian people and authorities. However, according to 
the representatives of the Chinese community, at individual level, the general attitude of the 
Romanians towards the Chinese is a friendly one (Chiriac, Robotin 2006: 38-39). 
According to both Nyiri and Chen Xiao, the largest part of Chinese migrants coming to 
 M. Chiriac and M. Robotin, “Necunoscuții de lângă noi, Rezidenți, Refugiați, Solicitanți de azil, Migranți 658
ilegali în România”, Centrul de Resurse pentru Diversitate Etnoculturală, Raport realizat cu spijinul King 
Baudouin Foundation, 2006, p. 37.
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 Romania in the 1990s were majorly from three provinces: Henan, Zhejiang, and Fujian. 
Some others came from Shanghai and Beijing, but they all brought their families with them 
only when they managed to save enough money to procure visas for them. In fact, “when 
the Agreement on Exemption of Visas for Holders of Diplomatic and Service (Official) 
Passports between China and Romania was signed in 1980s, Henan was the province where 
official Passports could be acquired easily and at low cost thereby allowing visa free travel 
by Henanese “Official” passport holders to Romania. According to first hand information 
from the Chinese community, each region accounted for approximately 1/3 of the whole 
commercial group” (Chen 2010: 16).  
Thus, from Henan province alone, more than 20,000 Chinese merchants holding official 
passports entered Romania in the 1990s, that is 1% of the Romanian capital city’s 
population. Out of these, between 6,000 and 7,000 remained in Romania, while the rest 
either moved further to Western Europe or returned to China. According to Nyiri, between 
1990-1993, no less than 38.967 Chinese citizens entered Romania (Nyiri 2007: 65). As 
mentioned by an official report, in September 2005 there were 3874 Chinese with a 
temporary residence permit, 251 with a permanent residence permit and 375 possessed a 
work permit. Moreover, the same report conveyed that between 1991 and 31st of July 2005, 
461 Chinese citizens applied for asylum (Chiriac, Robotin 2006: 43).  
With regard to the number of Chinese companies put on record in Romania, a volume 
edited by G. Benton and F.N. Pieke disclosed that between 1993-1995, the figures of 
Chinese enterprises registered with the Romanian Development Agency almost doubled, 
from 1091 to 2055. Regarding the number of Chinese citizens living in Romania, the 
Ministry of Labour and the General Directorate of Customs estimated that there were 
around 20,000 Chinese living in Romania in the 1990s. Therefore, if the estimations were 
correct, “the Chinese are the largest group of foreign nationals in Romania. It would also 
imply that more than 80% of Chinese in Romania are illegal residents” . However, by 660
comparing different statics and considering that the second half of the 1990s is regarded as 
the boom years of Chinese immigration to Romania, it should not look awkward if the 
 International Organisation for Migration, “Chinese Immigrants in Central and Eastern Europe: The Cases 660
of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania” in Gregor Benton and Frank N. Pieke (edit.), “The Chinese in 
Europe”, Palgrave Macmillan, 2014 -1st ed. 1998, p. 326.
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 number of Chinese residing in Romania was actually much lower than the data above.  
All in all, I would like to point out that the first Chinese communities in Romania, under 
scrutiny in this chapter, seem to have remained strongly connected to their homeland. In 
accordance with Wundrak, “their integration seems to be in close connection to the 
surrounding urban and societal environment. At the same time, the Chinese immigrant 
community is characterised by self-organisation” . In this sense, the scholar provide the 661
example of a Chinese businesswoman, who, besides leading an association of Chinese 
businesswomen in Bucharest, has also built a kindergarten. Moreover, just like many other 
international and Chinese migration researchers, she expressed that “Chinese people are 
strongly connected to local communities in the country of origin and to relatives there (…) 
During the spring festival (Chinese New Year), it is hard to find Chinese people in 
Bucharest, as they have all returned to visit their homeland” .  662
Since the beginning of the new millennium, Bucharest’s policies has allowed the Chinese 
migrants community to be dominated by the small group whose businesses flourish. 
However, as specified by Wundrak, the Chinese community of migrants somehow managed 
to force themselves into this collective existence characterised by danger, exposure, 
uncertainty but, through a process that is far from over, almost succeeded in incorporating 
themselves into the new Romanian society. “This was evident by 2003 as the Chinese 
immigrant community began to build modern shopping malls instead of the old open-air 
markets with which they had originally started their new lives” . 663
V.6 Small steps towards a promising cultural and academic cooperation 
I have mentioned in the previous chapters that before the Romanian revolution, Bucharest 
and Beijing signed two cultural agreements, in 1952 and another one in 1965. The third one 
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 was signed 1994. Besides the “government-to-government cultural exchanges, the two sides 
also vigorously encouraged and supported people-to-people exchanges (…) and the number 
of mutual visits by cultural delegations and groups reached twenty or so in each year” . 664
In 1995 Romania and China established the “Romanian Friendship Association with the 
PRC”, an organisation counting 37 subsidiaries and over 5000 members in 2017 that 
accomplished US $ 70 million of Sino-Romanian bilateral trade until 2014. The association, 
who’s president is Florea Dumitrescu, former ambassador to China between 1978-1983, 
aims at promoting the achievements of the Chinese civilisation, the traditional cultural 
values of the Chinese people, at providing information regarding the Chinese business 
environment, boosting the interest of Chinese investors in various Romanian cities. The 
association also make available scholarships, training and professional development 
scholarships in China, cooperation in the fields of education, research, scientific and 
technological development, research projects, creation of joint non-governmental 
companies in Romania and China, assistance to journalists, Romanian scientists and literati 
temporarily living in China.  
Furthermore, according to the PRC’s embassy in Romania, Chinese and Romanian 
education departments “have signed a series of agreements on educational cooperation 
over a long period of time, and the major agreements are those concerning the exchanges of 
educational delegations, students, teachers and experiences, and the direct cooperation 
between institutions of higher learning” . The section dealing with Sino-Romanian 665
bilateral relations of the Chinese Embassy in Romanian also points out that in July 1995, 
“the Chinese State Education Commission and the Romanian Ministry of Education signed 
the agreement on the mutual recognition of record of schooling, diplomas and certificates of 
higher education”  and in April 1998, “the education ministries of the two countries 666
signed the agreement on educational exchanges and cooperation for the period from 1998 
to 2001. In pursuance of the agreement, each side at present provides the other with 22 
 “China and Romania, Bilateral Political Relations”, Embassy of the PRC in Romania, 16.02.2004, 664
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 scholarships” . Moreover, the report reveals that between 1952-1999, 239 Romanian 667
students visited China on the basis of an agreement that has been renewed prior to its 
ending and allowing, beginning with 2005, over 600 Romanians to learn Chinese language 
and culture in several Romanian universities or within the courses of Chinese language, 
literature and culture offered by the Confucius Institutes in Romania. I will refer to these in 
the following chapter.  
Last, but not least, in September 2000, the two governments in Bucharest and Beijing 
signed the 2001-2004 program of bilateral cultural exchanges and in 2004, with the 
establishment of a Romanian Tourist Receiving Bureau in Beijing, Romania become an 
official tourist destination for Chinese citizens.  
V.7 Sino-Romanian economic ties in a decade of transition 
Following the collapse of the communist regime, Bucharest’s strategic goals to establish an 
effective democratic regime and an economic reform based on liberal, market economy that 
enabled its accession to NATO and the EU, had a significant impact over Romania’s 
economic ties with Beijing. In fact, beginning with the 1990s, Sino-Romanian bilateral 
trade dropped rapidly and reached its lowest point in 1999, with only US $ 191 million 
trade volume. Beginning with the 2000s, following the recovery of the Romanian economy, 
Sino-Romanian economic and commercial ties would witness a gradual increase, however 
they would never reach the trade volume between the two countries in the 1970s again.  
As one would expect, with Bucharest setting its foreign policy goals to become a part of 
NATO and the EU, there was a low likelihood of an upgraded Romania - China 
relationship. Indeed, joining NATO and the EU were demanding goals as besides the 
countless reforms that it had to implement, Romania also had to prove its Western partners 
that it had casted away former politics and was ready to speed up, to advance westward. 
Hence, especially in the immediate aftermath of the Tiananmen events, the leadership in 
Bucharest tried to keep distance from Communist China and resultantly, the economic 
relationship between the two countries remained mostly unchanged for a decade. Albeit 
 Ibidem667
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 Romanian and Chinese state and party leaders paid several official visits in the two 
countries’ capital cities and emphasised, on those occasions, that the promotion of 
governmental economic and trade cooperation was a substantial goal of the bilateral 
relations, Sino-Romanian bilateral trade volume suffered greatly, thus inducing me into 
thinking that, at that point, Bucharest leadership’s concern was to guarantee, to themselves 
and the world that, at least diplomatically, China and Romania maintained the traditional 
good, friendly ties. In fact, as shown by the table below, bilateral trade declined from US $ 
300 million in 1992 to US $ 208 million in 1996, and then to US $181 million in 1999 
(Nemeș 2015: 29).  
In spite of that, gradually, Romanian businessman and Chinese entrepreneurs from the 
private sector initiated a set of mutual visits to the PRC and Romania respectively, that 
aimed, for the Romanian side, at the acquisition of consumer goods at incredible prices 
from China and, for the Chinese - drawing on an unexperienced Bucharest government that 
allowed the emergence of foreign corporations on the basis of one hundred dollars joint 
stock - at the involvement in and noteworthy enlargement of the group of foreign investors, 
next to the Arabs, Turks and Iranians (Buzatu 2004: 130). Bucharest’s new, remodelled 
foreign policy implied that Romania’s political, economic and cultural relations with the 
outside world also suffered some changes before being unfolded . 668
Additionally, in order to promote economic and trade cooperation, Chinese and Romanian 
governments signed the Agreement on the Avoidance of Double Taxation and Tax Evasion 
(1991), the Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment 
(1994), the Economic and Trade Agreement (1994), the Agreement on Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation (1996) etc. In 1994, the China-Romania Committee on 
Economic and Technological Cooperation was changed to the China-Romania Committee 
on Economic and Trade Cooperation, with the annual meeting being held alternately in the 
two capital cities. Both governments also held economic forums and organised other 
activities to promote bilateral economic and trade relations.  
As maintained by Gao Ge, “since the mid-1990s, some Chinese companies have started to 
 For example, beginning with 1990, the Romanian government’s accounting system with regard to foreign 668
trade was adjusted to cash payments
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 invest in the field of telecommunications, pharmaceuticals, clothing, wood processing, 
bicycle assembly and cigarette industry in Romania. F&J Group, which registered in 
Romania in 1992, established a factory in 1994. China National Tobacco Corporation 
(CNTC) set up a joint venture, Sinoroma Industry Company in 1997. Eurosport DHS was 
established in Romania in 1998”  and Ricky Impex SRL, producing bicycles and scooters 669
in Ialomița county, a Southern region in Romania, was set up in 2002 . Still, in 1999 the 670
Sino-Romanian trade volume reached its lowest point in history (see Table 2) and only one 
year later, in 2000, the bilateral trade between the two countries would rise again, reaching 
US $ 753.06 million in 2002 and US $ 975.65 million in 2003 (see Table 1), hence 112.6% 
and 29.6% higher than the previous year. 
Table 1: Trade Volume between China and Romania, 2002-2015, million dollars  671
  Year          Trade           Export           Import                       Annual change (%)  
                                                                                          Trade        Export        Import  
2002        753.06           362.00             391.06                  112.6           44.6              276.9  
2003        975.65           505.55             470.10                   29.6            39.7                20.2  
2004       1383.96          1057.18           326.78                   41.9           109.1             -30.5  
While Chinese scholar Gao Ge divulged that “Niro Group, a joint venture with a 30% 
Chinese stake, spent €200 million to found a trade hub, Red Dragon near Bucharest” , 672
Pencea identified two important Chinese companies dealing with information technology 
(IT) which came in the early 2000s in Romania, “the state-owned company ZTE, the largest 
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 Chinese producer of telecommunications equipment, and the private company Huawei, the 
largest global provider of IT&C solutions” . The first company arrived in Romania in 673
2004 and Huawei was established one year earlier, in 2003 . According to Gao Ge, ZTE and 
Poșta Română (Romanian Post) signed an agreement “to help Romanian telecoms system 
transformation, which was the largest economic cooperation project between the two 
countries at that time” . 674
A significant moment for the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade was constituted by the 
establishment, in 1997, at the initiative of former Romanian ambassadors to China and with 
the support of the Romanian Association of Friendship with the PRC and the Chinese 
Embassy in Bucharest, of the Bilateral Chamber of Commerce and Industry Romania-
People’s Republic of China (CCRRPC) presided by Mr. Gabriel Ghelmegeanu. However, 
the organisation that legally worked since 1998, would be made redundant in 2011, when 
another Bilateral Association Romanian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce, led by Ioan 
Alexandru (former Wang Yan) would take its place as the legal organisation that supports 
the expansion of commercial ties between Chinese and Romanian companies, the initiation 
of meetings and commercial contacts between Romanian and Chinese economic agents, the 
organisation of governmental meetings between representatives of the two countries, the 
encouragement of direct activities to enhance businesses in the two countries’ markets, the 
alleviation of the process for the obtainment of business visas, the support for the Romanian 
enterprises’ participation in trade fairs and specialised exhibitions, and the organisation of 
economic missions of businessmen from Romania in other countries with the aim to expand 
and intensify economic exchanges.  
However, the graphic below shows the drop of an already meagre Sino-Romanian trade in 
the period 1990-2003. Furthermore, with the exception of the period 1992-1995, the trade 
balance has always been negative for Romania and, since 1994, “Romanian exports 
continually decreased until 1999, while imports from China slowly recovered and the trade 
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 balance became positive for Beijing once again in 1996” . According to Chiriu and Liu, 675
“this trend depended on a bilateral agreement reached prior to 1990 that envisaged 
Romania’s reimbursement of Chinese credit matured during the years before 1989” . 676
Moreover, in 1997 Beijing ended the custom preferential treatment allowed to Romanian 
exports, an event that, added to the poor effectiveness of Romanian companies, as well as 
with “their lack of knowledge of China’s market and culture”  and “the poor quality of 677
their products, provoked the crisis of Bucharest’s exports to China” .  678
Last, but not least, if the disappearance in 2004, of the Bucharest-Beijing direct flying route 
established in 1974 worsened Sino-Romanian contacts both in the economic sphere and the 
cultural one, the assessment of the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade during this decade mirrors 
Bucharest’s incapacity to efficaciously position itself in the international arena and carry out 
productive alliances with both the West and the Far East. 
Table 2. China-Romania trade, 1991-2004, in millions of USA $ (Nemeș 2015: 29) 
Year                Total                 Export               Import                  Balance  
1991                294,6                 139,7                154,9                    -  15,2  
1992                304                    230,4                  73,6                   + 156,8  
1993                497,3                 410                     87,4                   + 322,6  
1994                335,7                 275,6                  60,1                   + 115,5  
1995                261,8                 179,1                  82,7                   +  96,4  
1996                208,1                   92,9                115,2                    -  22,3 
1997                185,8                   58,1                127,7                    -  69,6 
1998                200,3                   22,8                177,5                   - 154,7 
1999                181                      36                   145                      - 109 
2000                258,7                   85                   173,7                   -  88,7 
2001                342,4                   89,1                253,3                   - 164,2 
Andrea Chiriu and Zuokui Liu, “Sino-Romanian Relations - From the First Ponta’s government to Klaus 675
Werner Iohannis’s victory in the presidential elections”,, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of 
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 2002                608                    216                   392                      - 176 
2003                831                    248                   583                      - 335 
2004               1012                   158                   854                      - 696 
After 1989, while Romania’ exports to China generally consisted of timber and wooden 
made products, base metals, iron, synthetic fibres and a limited number of Romanian Dacia 
cars, China mostly exported clothing and fabrics, footwear, food, chemical products, 
organic chemical products, toys, electrical appliances like air conditioners and computer 
technology (Buzatu 2004: 136). According to the Romanian diplomat, between 1990-2000, 
“China invested US $ 43,2 millions in Romania, being on the 18th place in the hierarchy of 
foreign direct investments (…) On the other hand, Romania invested just US $ 1,3 millions, 
investments accomplished by only 2 Romanian companies” (Buzatu 2004: 137). Moreover, 
the author revealed that in 1994, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 “China provided support to 
Romania by offering 5 bank deposits, each of them of US $ 100 million without, or with 
very low interest (…) and, in 1996, during the official state visit of the Chinese President 
Jiang Zemin (…) to Romania, the latter donated 5 million yuan, approximatively 600.000 
dollars to the Romanian government” (Buzatu 2004: 137).   
Besides the economic cooperation, China and Romania have maintained a stable bilateral 
relationship in the fields of science and technology. Thus, if in 1953, the two countries had 
signed the first agreement on cooperation in science and technology, followed by the 
establishment of the Inter-Government Scientific and Technological Cooperation 
Committee, during the 35th regular meeting of the Committee held in Bucharest in June 
1999, the two sides signed 66 projects of cooperation in agriculture, chemical industry, 
geology and mining, light industry, biology and metallurgy. 
V.8 Politically confused:  
Bucharest’s attitude towards Beijing in the last decade of the 20th century 
As already stated. since 1985, when he became the leader of the USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev 
launched an extensive economic and political reform program in which perestroika 
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 (restructuring) and glasnost (openness) turned out to be the two flagship concepts for that 
era. Gorbachev's new policy, however, worried both the conservative wing of the 
Communists within the Soviet administration, who believed those policies would ruin the 
Soviet Union, and the more radical reformer Boris Yeltsin - president of the Russian Soviet 
Socialist Republic - who, unsatisfied by Gorbachev’s slow and insufficient implementation 
of the reforms, resigned from the Communist Party in July 1990. In reaction to the Soviet 
leader’s dual revolutionary program, various nationalist manifestations emerged 
simultaneously in the republics of the Soviet Union which, after long negotiations, had 
eventually reached the terms for a new union treaty that would have transformed them into 
independent states within a federation led by a president and having common foreign and 
military policy. This treaty was due to be signed on August 20th, 1991.  
Nonetheless, a day before, on August 19th, the Communist conservatives headed by 
Gennady Yanayev, tried to get hold of the power by triggering a coup during Gorbachev’s 
holiday in Crimea. Hence, the president of the Soviet Union was put under house arrest 
while his enemies demanded his resignation and broadcasted his illness and willingness to 
vacate his post as president. The President of the Soviet Federal Socialist Republic of 
Russia, Boris Yeltsin - who, meanwhile, had taken refuge in the Russian Parliament - took 
advantage of the situation and made himself noticed by taking a stand against the coup. The 
scene that puts him on a tank,  giving a speech holding a megaphone in his hands, was made 
public all over the world and thus became the symbol of resistance to the coup and at the 
same time, a permit that legitimated Yeltsin both domestically and abroad. 
The poorly organised coup attempt had failed, and Gorbachev, who had been detained at his 
holiday home in Crimea, finally returned to Moscow. The damage to Gorbachev’s regime 
was, however, disastrous and the leader of the nation resigned first from his position as 
Secretary General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and eventually from his 
position as head of the Soviet Union. Boris Yeltsin would remove the Soviet flags from 
government buildings and would replace them with the pre-revolutionary Russian flag, he 
would take control of the state-owned television company and the main ministries and 
economic agencies, and, ultimately, with the Soviet Union dissolved on December 26th, 
1991 - as a result of the declaration that acknowledged the independence of the former 
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 fifteen Soviet republics and created the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - over 
the whole Russia.  
So, the beginning of the 1990s stood for the collapse of the USSR and resultantly, the 
emergence of  fifteen independent republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, the three 
Baltic Republics (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), the three Caucasian Republics (Georgia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan) and the Central Asia Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Tajikistan). In these circumstances, the government in Beijing did not rush to 
recognise the new born states, and, regarding the acknowledgement of the Republic of 
Moldova (Northern Bessarabia), the PRC - having always sustained both publicly and 
privately that the region was part of Romania - waited for the leaders’ reaction in Bucharest. 
Not only did the Romanian authorities rush to recognise the independence of the Republic 
of Moldova, but, in the unstable state of affairs, they immediately established diplomatic 
relations with Chișinău, as they did with any other capital of the new sovereign republics.  
The decision absolutely bewildered the authorities in Beijing, as they recalled Bucharest’s 
unfaded calls for Bessarabia’s unification with Romania. Reflecting upon their public, 
constant support to the Romanian authorities regarding this issue as well as at Bucharest’s 
former steady position regarding the issue of Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, the 
government in the Asian capital never understood the Romanian government’s choice, or 
why they did not even try to consider some diplomatic formulas that refrained from 
recognising de jure the territory, and thus leaving a door open for a future integration 
process (Buzatu 2004: 130-131).  
a) Bucharest’s position with regards to the issue of Taiwan and Romania’s relations with 
Hong Kong and Macao 
If, in the aftermath of the Romanian revolution of December 1989, the position of the new 
democratic leadership regarding Taiwan was quite bemusing, with the Romanian 
Democratic Convention (CDR) winning the 1996 elections in spite of the Romanian Social 
Democratic Party, the question became even more critical. On the basis of the “One-China 
policy”, for the political elite in Beijing there is only one state called “China” and, despite 
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 the existence of two governments that claim to be “China”, the countries establishing 
diplomatic or official relations with the PRC (Mainland China) must interrupt official 
relations with the ROC (Republic of China, Taiwan) and the other way round. Between the 
1980s-1990s communist leaders in Beijing carried out a series of intensive campaigns to 
persuade the nationalists in Taiwan to re-unify Taiwan and mainland China under the 
principle formulated by Deng Xiaoping, “one country two systems”.  
However, with the issue still persisting nowadays, neither the ROC nor the PRC 
government recognises the other as legitimate national ruler and Beijing sees Taiwan as a 
breakaway province to be reunified with the mainland one day. The Taiwan question 
remains the most important and sensitive issue in the PRC’s relations with the world, and, 
consequently, in the Sino-US relations as well. Accordingly, the Chinese embassy in 
Romania retains that “its resolution is extremely important for promoting constructive 
cooperative relations between the two countries”  because the “Taiwan's issue concerns 679
China's sovereignty and territorial integrity. There is only one China in the world, and 
Taiwan and the mainland are part of the same country” . Moreover, “all US governments, 680
whether democratic or republican, have committed themselves to both the policy of a single 
China and the three joint communique signed by the two countries. The Chinese side hopes 
that the US, in line with its commitment, will support China's peaceful reunification as it is 
in line with the interests of the two countries and the international community . 681
As claimed by Buzatu, in this context, the publication of the article entitled “Sindromul 
Chinezesc” (“The Chinese Syndrome”) by C. Avramescu - pleading for separate diplomatic 
relations between Romania and Taiwan and insisting on the visit of Emil Constantinescu, 
President of Romania between 1996 and 2000, in Taipei - leaded to a Romanian diplomatic 
gaffe and an overall confusion in the bilateral relations between Bucharest and Beijing. 
Eventually, during the Romanian president’s state visit to the PRC in September 1997, the 
 “Problema Taiwanului rămâne cea mai importantă şi cea mai sensibilă problemă din cadrul relaţiilor 679
chino-americane (2002/02/05)”, Embassy pf the PRC in Romania, 16.02.2004, available at http://ro.china-
embassy.org/rom/xw/t66126.htm accessed on 31.05.2016
 Ibidem680
 Ibidem681
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 Romanian government adopted a realist, pragmatic position that took into consideration 
both the Chinese requests and Romania’s national interest, and issued a Joint Communique 
which, among other things, stated that: “Romania reaffirms the existence of a single China - 
the PRC; the Chinese government is the only legitimate representative of the Chinese 
people; Taiwan is an inseparable part of China; the issue of Taiwan regards China’s 
internal affairs; Romania will not establish official relations with Taiwan; Romania might 
establish non-governmental economic, financial, technical-scientific, cultural relations 
between the Romanian and Taiwanese people, enterprises and organisations” (Buzatu, 
2004: 132).  
Unfortunately, the Romanian leaders’ diplomatic gaffes continued over the years. For 
example, the putting up of the Taiwanese official flag, the entitlement of Taiwan as the 
Chinese Republic instead of China-Taiwan (preferred by the PRC); the participation, in 
2014, of the Romanian president, as only European leader, next to the Taiwanese supreme 
leader, at the celebrations for the centenary of the Panama Canal (until recently, Panama has 
forged diplomatic relations with Taiwan, despite of China), or the visit of four Romanian 
deputies to the PRC in 2013, represent a likelihood of damage, albeit on a small-scale, of 
the Sino-Romanian bilateral relations (Buzatu 2004: 133). In the aftermath of the visit, as a 
result of the Romanian authorities’ (more specifically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
the Chamber of Deputies) public criticism, the Chinese Embassy both expressed 
appreciation and observed that such incidents should be avoided in the future.  
In these circumstances, Zhang Zheng, the press attaché of the Chinese Embassy in 
Bucharest communicated that the visit to Taiwan of the four Romanian parliamentarians not 
only “is not what the Chinese side wants to see, but it is what China opposes. We hope that 
the people involved will respect the essential concerns of the Chinese side, will fully realise 
the complexity and sensibility of the Taiwan issue and will avoid the repetition of these 
events that might harm the relations between China and Romania. The Romanian society 
also considers this event detrimental to the upward trend of the Sino-Romanian 
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 relations” , concluded Zhang Zheng.   682
On July 1st, 1997, thus 155 years after the 1842 Treaty of Nanking which ended the First 
Opium War, Hong Kong’s sovereignty was transferred from the United Kingdom to the 
PRC. Thus, the first Chinese major diplomatic success, defined “the Handover”, “the 
Reunification" or “the Return”, represented a strife-free transfer of power, control and 
responsibilities from the British to the Chinese rule. Two years later, on December 31st 
1999, a similar procedure was applied to Macao. Hong Kong’s restitution took place in 
accordance with the principle of "one country two systems", formulated by Deng Xiaoping, 
that provided an ad hoc status for both the territories in order to ensure a slow transition of 
the economic and legal systems from the British colony to the PRC (due to take place in 
2047, when Hong Kong ceases to be a Special Administrative Region). Clearly, a “peaceful 
rise”, functional to the economic growth and to the engagement in the globalisation process 
that paved the way for the maintenance of geopolitical balances, thus guaranteeing both the 
security throughout the Asian arena and the international order, was seen as the best and 
only way in the management of the passage of sovereignty .  683
As follows, the return of the British colony to the motherland had been sanctioned by means 
of the article 31 of the Constitution of the PRC: “Upholding national unity and territorial 
integrity, maintaining the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong, and taking account of its 
history and realities, the PRC has decided that upon China’s resumption of the exercise of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong, a Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) will be 
established in accordance with the provisions of Art. 31 of the Constitution of the PRC, and 
that under the principle of “one country, two systems”, the socialist system and policies will 
not be practised in Hong Kong. The basic policies of the PRC regarding Hong Kong have 
 Victoria Vioară, Claudia Stănescu (ed.), “Ambasada Chinei: Sperăm ca deputații care au vizitat Taiwanul 682
să evite repetarea întâmplărilor ce ar dăuna relațiilor chino-române”, vineri, 9 Aug 2013, available at https://
www1.agerpres.ro/politica/2013/08/09/ambasada-chinei-speram-ca-deputatii-care-au-vizitat-taiwanul-sa-
evite-repetarea-intamplarilor-ce-ar-dauna-relatiilor-chino-romane-13-51-08, accessed on 15.04.2015
 Danny Gittings, “Introduction to the Hong Kong Basic Law”, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, 683
2013, p. 315
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 been elaborated by the Chinese Government in the Sino-British Joint Declaration” . The 684
same strategy, that prepared for the future incorporation within the state of all the historical 
Chinese territories not subject to the sovereignty of the PRC, was used by the authorities in 
Beijing in the context of the establishment of the Special Economic Zones (Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shantou and Xiamen) in the early 1980s, that allowed “them to practice special 
policies and employ flexible measures in foreign economic and trade issues. The zones later 
became an important symbol of China's reform and opening-up” . 685
Albeit the British invested far more in their colony, Hong Kong, than the Portuguese ever 
did in Macau, the Chinese nearly doubled the size of Macau since its return in 1999. The 
later is an important economic and financial centre and, in recent years, has become the 
playground for Chinese and Hong Kong businessman, while enjoying the world’s most 
profitable casino resort and a flourishing tourism. However, Hong Kong's land area is 36 
times larger than Macau's, its population is 11 times larger, and its GDP is 5 times greater 
than Macao’s. Moreover, it is a known fact that the return of Hong Kong to the PRC was 
also much more meaningful for Beijing, for both the Chinese people’s pride  and for the 686
importance of Hong Kong as one of the world’s top financial centres.  
The Sino-British talks over Hong Kong, which had begun in 1979 in a rather defiant 
atmosphere, became much more cautious in 1982, with Margaret Thatcher’s visit to China. 
If, on the one hand - some argued - the British Prime Minister cared a lot for an agreement 
on the matter, Beijing, on the other hand, by taking advantage of the British dovish and 
pragmatic approach to politics, began negotiations from a hard stance, allowing the Chinese 
side to focus on PRC's sovereignty and administration over Hong Kong and resultantly, to 
the signing of an agreement that included its full restitution with no possibility of extension 
of the 99 years-lease (in 1898, the two sides had signed the Second Convention of Peking, 
 Yang Shangkun, President of the People’s Republic of China, 4 April 1990, “The Basic Law of the Hong 684
Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China”, available at www.basiclaw.gov.hk/
en/basiclawtext/images/basiclaw_full_text_en.pdf , accessed on 12.09.2016
 Yan (ed.), “1979: Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou Special Economic Zones. Special Report: Deng Xiaoping 685
in Guangzhou”, NewsGd, Last Updated November 2008, available at http://www.newsgd.com/specials/
30yearsreform/milestones/content/2008-11/20/content_4717182.htm , accessed on 28.07.2016
 As already stated in the first section of the study, the memory of the Opium Wars and the defeat at the 686
hands of the British, represented for the Chinese their greatest national humiliation
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 which included a 99-year lease agreement for the islands surrounding Hong Kong, called 
the New Territories) that only benefited the British side .  687
Nevertheless, although discussions between China’s Paramount leader, Deng Xiaoping and 
the Iron Lady, Margaret Thatcher were quite sharp, they led to the signing of the Joint Sino-
British Declaration between the British Prime Minister and her Chinese counterpart, Zhao 
Ziyang two years later, in December 1984. The declaration formally sealed the future of 
Hong Kong, that was due to return to China in July 1997. Hence, the historic agreement 
signed in Beijing that transferred the British colony of six million people to communist 
China, ended 155 years of British rule in the colony and launched a new era in trade and 
diplomacy between the two countries. Moreover, in April 1987, a similar accord - the Sino-
Portuguese Joint Declaration - was signed by the government in Beijing with the 
government in Lisbon; the agreement assented the transfer of sovereignty of Macau from 
the Portuguese Republic to the PRC in December 1999 (Buzatu 2004: 134).  
The ceremony for the handover of Hong Kong in the evening of July 1st, 1997 was 
accompanied by a sort of pomp and grand symbolism, however envisioned, considering that 
the worn empire was giving up its last great asset. Next to the Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin, present at the festivities there were Prince Carol, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, 
United Nations’ Secretary General Kofi Annan, and representatives from 40 countries, such 
as American, German, Russian, French, Japanese, Polish and Hungarian high-level 
politicians. According to Buzatu, the Romanian authorities were not invited at the event, 
thus indicating the authorities’ in Beijing poor consideration of Romania and Bucharest’s 
insignificant role in the international arena. The diplomat claimed that “subsequently, at the 
Romanian side’s insistence, the Chinese agreed to prolong the Romanian President’s visit to 
the PRC (8-12 September 1997) and to Hong Kong, hence becoming the first foreign state 
leader making an official visit to Chinese ruled Hong Kong” (Buzatu 2004: 134).  
The Romanian President’s visit to Hong Kong has been a success first and foremost in the 
diplomatic field, whilst the economic and bilateral commercial ties were - unfavourably - 
 For the transcript of Bernard Shaw’s interview with Margaret Thatcher, see June 30, 1997, On Sunday, 687
June 29, CNN's Bernard Shaw talked with former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, available on 
World News Story Page, “Transcript: Interview with Margaret Thatcher” at http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/
9706/30/thatcher.transcript/ 
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 significantly cut short. With that being said, during his state visit, President Emil 
Constantinescu made an announcement that “Romania will open a consulate in Shanghai 
and follow it with another one in Hong Kong (…) Constantinescu also announced the sale 
of 15,000 Dacia cars, modelled after the French Renault 12, to China” .  688
Additionally, a major achievement of the Romanian authorities in the following years would 
regard the visa issue. If concerning mainland China, the July 1981 Sino-Romanian Consular 
Agreement “was fined by the implementation of mandatory visa for simple passports, in the 
case of Hong Kong and Macao - by means of the December 2001 accords between the 
Romanian government and the governments of the Special Administrative Regions Hong 
Kong and Macao - the visa requirements were cancelled for Romanians and citizens from 
the two Special Administrative Regions for short stays (less than 90 days)” (Buzatu 2004: 
134).  
b) Romania’s standpoint with regards to the human rights in the PRC 
As Minzner encapsulated, the PRC “has an authoritarian political system controlled by the 
Chinese Communist Party (…) Following the 1949 revolution, party leaders led by Mao 
Zedong attempted to remould China. They imposed communist ideology, a state-run 
economy, and absolute party-state control over citizens’ lives. Such policies led to mass 
famine (the Great Leap Forward, 1958–60) and severe political turmoil (the Cultural 
Revolution, 1966–76)” . In 1971, the PRC became part of the United Nations, by 689
replacing Taiwan, that had represented it within the organisation’s forum until that date. 
This was perhaps the country's first decisive step towards its exit from a self-imposed 
international isolation since 1949. However, in order to undertake more substantial changes 
and to open up towards the outside world, China still needed time: in fact, from 1971 to 
1979, Beijing did not take part in any international human rights activity, did not participate 
to any convention nor it signed any treaty concerning the human rights matter. The 
 China News Digest, Europe/Pacific Regional News, CND-EP, No. EP97-019, September 24, 1997, 688
available at  http://museums.cnd.org/CND-EP/CND-EP.97/CND-EP.97-09-24.html , accessed on 11.12.2015
 Carl Minzner, “Countries at he Crossroads 2011: China”, FreedomHouse689
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 international community did not exert particular pressure on China during those years, 
firstly because the PRC was engaged in the Cultural Revolution and the West’s priority was 
still to support China's entry into the international system. For this reason, the human rights 
issues would be postponed to a later stage.  
In the late 1970s, the first generation of Communist Party leaders were replaced by a second 
Chinese leadership under Deng Xiaoping, who “launched the modern reform period”  690
that provided the basis for a rapid economic development in the country. The new 
government “relaxed economic and ideological controls, fuelling an unprecedented 30-year 
long economic boom. China has experienced a ten-fold expansion in GDP, replaced Japan 
as the second-largest economy in the world, and emerged as a world power” . During 691
Deng Xiaoping’s period, the Chinese government began to pay more attention to the human 
rights issue, which began to be discussed at official high-levels: in fact, the 1982 
Constitution introduced a list of fundamental rights similar to those provided by the Western 
constitutions and, albeit it was far from literally safeguarding the human rights, it definitely 
marked a turning point in comparison with the previous Chinese canons. Even 
internationally China started to engage more actively in the resolution of the human rights 
question: in 1982 it became member of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
and, between 1980 and 1989, signed and ratified seven human rights treaties, three of which 
were fundamental.  
This attitude, obviously placed China in a more vulnerable position, susceptible to the 
control mechanisms of the three basic treaties adopted, and thus, was exposed to 
investigations and criticisms regarding the human rights situation within its national 
borders. Additionally, the economic reforms launched by China exposed it even more to the 
outside world, by involving Beijing’s greater involvement in the global communication 
system, which, in turn, made human rights violations in China more easily to spot abroad. 
Increasingly, China began to be more criticised for its human rights practices, particularly 
by the United States. The rumours remained however moderate until 1989, when the violent 
 Ibidem690
 Ibidem691
 386
 repression of the Tiananmen Square protest for democracy and, of the Falun Gong spiritual 
movement after 1999 had important consequences on China's relations with the rest of the 
international community.  
For the first time, the Chinese government was openly accused by the European Economic 
Community (later EU), that imposed a number of sanctions, including the postponement of 
some programs for cooperation, the suspension of high-level ministerial contacts and the 
abolition of cooperation in the military field. The United States reacted in a similar way and 
began to bind the status of “the most favoured nation” to the respect for human rights and 
democracy. Particularly, the United States emphasised the arms embargo on China and, in 
the following period, the most favoured nation status was reexamined in the light of China's 
progress in respecting the human rights. China's first reaction to international criticism was 
self-isolation, and the Chinese authorities denounced the international community's right to 
interfere in Chinese domestic affairs. 
However, during the first period of isolation following the Tiananmen massacre, the 
Chinese government began a reorganisation process that saw the relaunching of human 
rights activities and initiatives. Beijing took a more active position at the International 
Human Rights Forum, the government adopted a number of laws concerning the human 
rights and Chinese law scholars were encouraged to pursue research in this area. In 1991, 
the Chinese government also started to publish reports on human rights in China, known as 
the “white papers” and containing Beijing’s official version on the human rights situation 
in the country. 
 From this moment onwards, China began to develop its own human rights conception, later 
defined as “Human rights with Chinese characteristics” and gained “some limited success at 
the Bangkok preparatory meeting for the 1993 Vienna World Human Rights Conference. But 
at Vienna, China was decisively defeated” .  692
Still, since 1993, international criticism of China's human rights situation has declined 
considerably. More and more developing countries supported China's positions and the 
theory that a country's specific historical and cultural characteristics should be considered 
 Saladin Meckled-García and Başak Cali (ed.), “The legalisation of human rights: multidisciplinary 692
perspectives on human rights and human rights law”, Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, London and New 
York, 2006, p. 68
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 when assessing a country's human rights standards. Political reforms, however, remained 
unsustainable. For example, the government continued to exercise its utmost control over 
politics and often eradicated the internal threats to the country's stability through excessive 
use of force and authority. The detention of political opponents and journalists criticising 
the government is a common phenomenon. The press is strictly state-regulated, as it is 
religion. The suppression of independence and separatist movements is often accomplished 
by the use of harsh methods.  
As already observed, the Chinese government handled the peaceful calls for political reform 
with imprisonment or house arrests, of both the protesters and the CPC members 
sympathising with the demonstrators. China's growing economic power, in turn, had its 
influence on Western countries as well, hence, maintaining an open and antagonistic 
approach to China was no longer seen as opportune and beneficial. The United States 
provided the first demonstration of this awareness: in 1994, President Bill Clinton declared 
the need to separate the considerations on the human rights situation in China from the 
“most favoured nation” clause. However, Washington continued for years to support 
resolutions against China under the UN’s Commission on Human Rights. 
Moreover, several co-operation projects have been carried out since 1997. On several 
occasions, the EU co-financed projects in China and the European Commission, which 
participates in the human rights dialogue as part of the EU's Troika, is the institution 
primarily involved in the management of cooperation programs and the promotion of 
human rights in China. One of the most important programs so far funded was the EU-
China legal and judicial cooperation program (LJC), launched in 2000, as the most 
important external assistance program ever carried out in China, aimed at upholding the rule 
of law. Other initiatives aimed at strengthening civic rights of citizens and local society 
include the EU-China Village Governance Training Program (VGT) and other projects 
aimed at promoting social and economic rights such as those made in the province of 
Yunnan. Since 2002, the EU-China Human Rights Projects Facility for Small-scale 
activities has also been launched to assist in the definition of innovative human rights 
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 projects . Both with regard to human rights dialogues and with regard to the EU-China 693
cooperation programs, attention is mainly focused on promoting the rule of law, seen as a 
necessary condition for concrete improvements in the sphere of human rights.  
Thus, during the 1990s, China entered the path for increased cooperation with the 
international community in the field of human rights: it accepted visits by various United 
Nations bodies within its own national borders; in 1995, it hosted the United Nations 
Conference on Women; it launched human rights dialogues with several countries; it freed, 
on several occasions, political dissidents. An important point in this path was certainly the 
signing of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the signing and 
ratification of the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights in 
October 1997 and March 2001, a multilateral treaty adopted by the UN General Assembly 
in  December 1966 aiming at the granting of economic, social and cultural rights.  
According to Romanian diplomat Ion Buzatu, while both the United States and the EU’s 
position regarding the issue of human rights in China and their measures defying Beijing 
seemed rational, conventional and even ordinary, it did not seem so when Bucharest - with 
its human rights situation only sorted out on the surface - took a stand against Beijing. If, 
during the 1990s, the Romanian leadership took advantage of the diplomatic procedure of 
abstaining, and thus silently supported China, between 1999-2001, Bucharest changed its 
perspective and, hoping to live in harmony with the US while negotiating its entrance in the 
EU, it “joined the American draft resolution to condemn China” (Buzatu 2004: 135).  
In this context, the Chinese authorities trusting in Bucharest’s abstention “by virtue of the 
bilateral traditional relations, remained shocked by the duplicity of the Romanian foreign 
affairs and diplomatic leadership” (Buzatu 2004: 135-136). Consequently, Sino-Romanian 
relations began to stagnate and Romania would be for a long time “considered by China as 
a country with a fickle and opportunist government” (Buzatu 2004: 135-136). Only later, 
“by taking into consideration the long-term interests in Eastern Europe, especially in the 
commercial field (…) China made a diplomatic step (…) showing that what had happened 
belonged to the past, and the two sides should look towards the future and make common 
 Roland Vogt (ed.), “Europe and China: Strategic Partners or Rivals?”, Hong Kong University Press, 2012, 693
p. 123
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 efforts for the enhancement of the Sino-Romanian ties” (Buzatu 2004: 136).  
However, because of political uncertainty and lack of vision, in the beginning of the 1990s, 
Romania lost its diplomatic influence in the international arena. What’s more, the political 
instability led to a gradual economic unsteadiness that influenced “not only the political 
relation between Romania and China, but also the economic one. An unstable diplomatic 
relation was a negative background for economic relations” (Nemeș 2015: 28). 
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 VI. Sino-Romanian relations 2004 - 2016 
VI.1 Allies but not partners? Romania’s foreign policy after 2004 and its implications on 
Sino-Romanian ties 
The fall of communism in 1989 paved the way for the re-establishment of Romania's 
relations with the foreign countries, the finding of new goals, the improvement of the 
working apparatus and the strive to establish a propitious position for Bucharest in the 
international arena, all the more so because the effects of the events in December 1989 had 
hard-pressed Bucharest’s foreign and domestic polices. If domestically, the Romanian 
political elite struggled to develop a constitutional democracy, the recognition of post-
communist Romania and its stabilisation in the sphere of influence of the new poles of 
power constituted a critical issue for Bucharest’s diplomacy and foreign affairs. Thus, the 
profoundly anti-Soviet public opinion turned, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, into 
an anti-Russian trend, so that the whole political class, with no exception, backed Romania's 
orientation towards the West. In this respect, it is due to mention the signing of the 1995 
Snagov Declaration, for, in that moment, the Romanian leadership set out unanimously 
Bucharest’s foreign policy key objective, namely to join the European Union.  
In the context of post-communist Romania being only a UN and CSCE (OSCE since 1995) 
member, the aspirations of the Romanian leaders who turned to the international 
organisations such as the Council of Europe, NATO and later to the European Union, were 
anything but peculiar. Moreover, not only did they transform the idea of joining the 
European Union into a political consensus, but the political class won over more than 70% 
of the population aspiring to the European integration and supporting the European ideal 
albeit the society had no clear idea about the realities and institutions of the community.  
The foreign policy issues confronted by Romania in the 1990s had a direct connection with 
the legacy left by the communist regime, hence reform was the idea that dominated political 
and diplomatic activity in its entirety in the last decade of the 20th century, and with its 
implementation Romania hoped to join the Western organisations. Indeed, in 1993, albeit 
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 several difficulties, Romania managed to became a member of the Council of Europe. The 
key concepts of the Romanian foreign policy, publicly voiced by the leadership in the 
Romanian capital city were, and still are, Atlanticism and Europeanism.  
However, although these concepts have led to the consolidation of the Romanian Euro-
Atlantic ideal, they have had a more restraining influence than a multilateralist one with 
regard to decision making in Romania's foreign policy. In fact, only with Romania’s 
accession to the EU in 2007, politicians in Bucharest realised that the setting and conditions 
were suitable to start promoting international relations with other regions, such as Asia. In 
order to become eligible for the accession criteria, Romania had to benefit from a strong 
neighbouring policy and had to prove that it enjoyed guaranteed borders and that national 
minorities on its territory boasted solid rights. Still, once it joined NATO (2004) and the 
EU, Romania witnessed the situation of having its foreign policy compelling to new rules 
and responding to unprecedented situations. Thus, Romania's accession to the EU 
influenced the Romanian foreign policy through the European concept of external action, 
which basically shaped the Romanian objectives as well.  
On the other hand, in the current context of the emergence of economic diplomacy, 
Romania set some foreign policy objectives beyond the community area, thus cooperation 
with China or the Caucasus states began to be regarded by the government in Bucharest as 
elements that can ensure better economic development. Therefore, it appears that the post 
1989 Romanian basic concepts of political affairs Atlanticism and Europeanism, have been 
replaced by the indispensable idea of multilateralism once Romania joined the EU. Albeit 
domestic and economic difficulties prevent Romania from becoming a regional power 
pawn, Bucharest participates in regional cooperation organisations, such as the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation Organisation, the Danube Cooperation Process or the South East 
European Cooperation Process, matures a regional cooperation in the Balkans and has been 
struggling to build a three-year joint platform for action with Poland and Turkey. Moreover, 
Romania enjoys a strong relationship with the United States, Britain and France, and its 
foreign policy - prone to be associated with security policy given that Romania’s security is 
guaranteed under the Euro-Atlantic cooperation mechanisms - encompasses the far-reaching 
plan of accession to the Schengen area. Generally, Romania’s foreign policy objectives 
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 between 2004-2012 have been relatively homogeneous, irrespective of the government in 
office (Liberal Democratic Party, National Liberal Party or the ruling two-party coalition) 
and they witnessed a slight inclination towards the improvement of relations with the Asian 
countries during the Social Democratic government of Victor Ponta, 2012-2015.  
China, on the other hand, has infallibly been consistent in maintaining good relations with 
most of the countries worldwide. However, for international relations experts it is evident 
that because the Romanian leaders feared close ties with China especially in the first decade 
after the revolution - for a situation like that might have generated a comeback to, or re-
establishment of, communism in both the media and public opinion’s perception - beginning 
with 2004 Beijing gradually started to give Bucharest a wide berth.  
Lilei Song asserted that the “Chinese soft power is still associated with propaganda and 
does not enjoy a positive connotation due to the region’s communist past. The memory of 
the communist period determines a negative stance that is even stronger that in Western 
European countries” . Moreover, from a political standpoint, Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai 694
considered that the “rapprochement with the EU after the fall of the Iron Curtain 
exacerbated the bias towards EU norms and values. This (however) contrasts with the 
accusation the West brings China in terms of sensitive issues”  and thus, Chinese and EU 695
standards and moral values are subconsciously seen as antagonist.  
That being so, the political and economic cooperation between Bucharest and the Asian 
capital during this period should be read through the lenses of domestic political 
discrepancies and transformations associated with the Romanian capital’s accession to the 
European Union. It is evident that the measures adopted in the EU-China relationship are 
both political and economic, still it is not clear why Western European states, endowed with 
significant influence in the international arena, have no reluctance in cooperating with 
China, while the trend for cooperation within the China-CEE format seems more restrictive. 
Moreover, with the Romanian media incessantly relying on external sources of information, 
 Weiqing Song (ed.), “China’s Relations with Central and Eastern Europe: From Old Comrades to new 694
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 Chinese realities reach the masses through the agency of a Western filter that makes 
negative facts and unfavourable realities prevail, while unbiased reflections rooted in the 
local knowledge of Chinese present economic, politic and social situation are more and 
more isolated.  
Although the “dominant channel of communication continues to be the mass media”  and 696
“the news don’t often bring to the forefront the strengths of the Chinese economy and the 
potential of bilateral cooperation” , in spite of the limited understanding of China and on 697
the fact that the people-to-people exchanges stay minimal, regardless of the fact that from 
highest to lowest level, everyone focuses “on China’s liabilities, not its assets”  and albeit 698
economic solutions proposed by Beijing smash into the barriers and restrictions imposed at 
EU level, as long as economic cooperation is not affected by political sensitivities, the 
Chinese political elite keeps looking for collaboration and searches for solutions with each 
and every state.  
Since it joined the EU on January 1st 2007, Romania adopted and implemented the 
institution’s “Common Foreign Trade Policy, opening the Romanian market for free trade 
with all the other Member States, but also with many third countries which had been 
partners in the Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed by the EU and the General System of 
Preferences (GSP), with China among its beneficiaries” . Consequently, the Romanian 699
economy witnessed “a sudden raise of imports and trade deficit from the very first months 
of membership, and Chinese goods becoming a major challenge for the local products and 
markets” . However, the two scholars revealed that Bucharest “couldn’t sufficiently 700
capitalise on the opportunities to increase more its own exports, and particularly its exports 
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 to China remained still too low and in need for an important boost” . Being a EU member 701
also implied that Romania benefitted, “besides the framework of the bilateral agreement 
with China, from the Strategic Partnership framework between China and the EU. In this 
context, the evolution of China-Romania exchanges clearly reveal that there still are many 
benefits untapped and many opportunities not turned to good account, both in their 
bilateral trade and in investments” . 702
It is obvious, according to Weiqing Song, that CEE countries’ economies place reliance on 
the EU’s internal market and funding sources and “in terms of trade, investment and 
European funds, the EU is considered essential for their development and technological 
catch up” . In the scholar’s opinion, the CEE political elites acknowledge that the 703
“opportunities potentially offered by China are dwarfed by those already provided by the 
EU. Besides, in some cases, expectations regarding cooperation with China are not met or 
there is a major difference between expectations and accomplishments” .  704
While these approaches decipher the limitations stipulated by the EU norms when CEE 
members of the supranational institution deal with China and the obstacles imposed by CEE 
policy-makers who choose the certainty of achievements over prospects or assumptions, as 
well as Bucharest leadership’s incapacity to exploit the opportune time and increase a 
balanced trade with China, a question still remains unanswered, and that is why Romania, 
as EU member state,  has not been able to benefit from the Sino-Romanian collaboration 
and why other EU member countries have? An example of Bucharest’s policymaking 
inconsistency and high-level decision making variations might yield an explanation. 
During the China-Central and Eastern European countries Summit held in Bucharest in 
November 2013 (the third of this type after the one held in Budapest in 2011 and the second 
in Warsaw in 2012), Chinese Premier Li Keqiang met Romanian Prime Minister Victor 
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 Ponta and President Traian Băsescu. On that occasion, the latter - former Romanian 
President between 2004-2014 - stated that China and Romania enjoyed “a traditional and 
excellent political relationship”. In the presence of the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, 
Băsescu emphasised that “Romania will never forget the position of the Chinese 
Government in 1968, nor the fact that China has always been a support for Romania, 
within the UN Security Council or in any international organisation” .  705
Moreover, the Romanian head of state also spoke of the special, political and economic 
importance that China can have in the region of confluence between the European Union 
and the Russian Federation and assured the Chinese Prime Minister that Romania 
manifested total openness to increase the presence of Chinese investments in the region, and 
no matter how large or small the value of investments were, China's presence in the region 
was a dominant aspect. “I am looking at the long-term interests, so it is important to 
capitalise on China's presence, to make some important Government projects. If the 
Government will be effective to present projects, I am convinced that the Chinese side will 
go ahead and finance the projects”  were the Romanian President’s words. At the end of 706
the speech, Băsescu outlined that Bucharest was interested in China's presence in the 
country for other reasons as well, for example to outbalance the pressures coming from 
Moscow; hence, although not the best thing,“China’s presence in the country is not the 
worst thing” , Băsescu concluded.   707
Again, this speech was made in November 2013. Precisely a year earlier, in November 
2012, Traian Băsescu had a different opinion about China and Sino-Romanian relations. In 
fact, a day before the parliamentary elections, the Romanian head of state gave the 
Romanian citizens the China fright, and warned the electorate to pay attention to whom they 
gave their vote, otherwise Romania risked to be trapped in the “grey area”, thus closer to 
China and Russia and distant from the US. Băsescu’s speech referred to the political leaders 
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 who constantly criticised the EU and the Union's leaders as well as Romania’s partnership 
with the US and the US Department of State. He gave prominence to the elections and 
insisted on the Romanian citizens’ choice, crucial for the future of the country: “Tomorrow 
is a decisive day! (…) the Romanians will confirm if Romania stays in the grey area, there 
where the political elite say we need to be closer to Russia and China, or we continue the 
consolidated road to Brussels and the partnership with America (…) In Europe and in 
partnership with America! Come to vote! The direction is Europe and the strategic 
partnership with the United States. There we will find security and future prosperity” . 708
Another reason for the decline of the Sino-Romanian cooperation after 2004 might be found 
in the Minister-Delegate for Commerce Iuliu Winkler’s statement in the beginning of 2007. 
In February 2007 Băsescu recommended the normalisation of trade relations with Beijing 
by increasing Romanian exports to China, seen as generator of Bucharest’s trade deficit. In 
fact, the Minister Delegate for Commerce, Iuliu Winkler had stated that Romania's trade 
relation with China was one of the sources which generated an important trade deficit in 
2006 when, of a total of US $ 2,4 billions bilateral exchanges, the imports from China 
amounted to a volume of US $ 2,18 billions and the Romanian exports were around US $ 
217 millions, thus resulting in a huge deficit of US $ 1,96 billion. On that occasion, 
Minister Winkler explained that “there are numerous elements behind this statistics 
situation. First, I would refer to the fact that the conjuncture, namely Romania's 
preparation for EU accession, the fact that on the threshold of this accession and the new 
situation in which the bilateral trade relation was replaced by the one of enforcement of the 
EU common trade policy by Romania, generated the Chinese exporters' interest to make 
stocks” . In the end Winkler added that the products consisted of textiles, clothing, 709
footwear, telecommunication equipments and chemical products. The next day, on March 
1st, 2007, the very same Minister Winkler claimed that the Chinese business community 
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 was unreliable, “last year, an economic mission from China came to Romania, initially 
talking about the signing of contracts of approximatively 140 million euros, and later, from 
140, we came to discuss of only 90 million euros contracts, and later, when I asked about 
the value of the contracts concluded with the Chinese side, I was told that it was around 50 
million euros” . Additionally, Winkler pointed out that the Chinese businessmen have 710
tricked the Romanian counterpart at the customs too, by undervaluing the goods in order to 
avoid paying taxes: “Now we have concluded agreements between the Romanian and 
Chinese customs because, as a result of last year's controls, the estimation of the value of 
merchandise declared at customs was around 7 times less” .  711
Of course, some may think, it is not difficult to lay the blame for the barriers to international 
trade, at the Chinese’ door. Hence, did the short periods of fruitful Sino-Romanian 
collaboration have been followed by multiple times of scarcity after 1989 only because of 
the pro-Western Romanian bias, or was the comprehensive climate, dominated by 
uncertainties, confusion, lack of orientation and seriousness both in Bucharest’s private and 
public sector that made of Romania a country that in 2014 - upon the celebration of 65 years 
of bilateral diplomatic relations with the PRC - had no business or company operative in 
China? Moreover, have the bilateral diplomatic, political, cultural and economic ties 
between Romania and China only been mirroring the state to state lack of substantial 
communication? Then, how should one interpret the role and the goal of the bilateral high-
level visits in the past ten years if, at governmental level there are some obvious vulnerable 
issues and the Romanian leadership’s political speeches as well as Bucharest’s diplomacy 
convince less and less, both domestically and internationally? Have the EU regulations been 
a serious impediment for strong economic China-Romania relations?  
A faultless answer to these questions is not easy to find, however practices and policy 
patterns, from non state actors - the private sector (businessmen), non governmental 
organisations (chamber of commerce and industry) - to state actors such as government 
representatives from economic and cultural offices might be able to provide sufficient data 
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 in order to puzzle out why any Romanian or Chinese exultation, satisfaction and claims of 
success regarding the economic ties between Romania and China are senseless, and far 
from the truth.  
For example, throughout exhibitions that aim at promoting Romanian products on the 
Chinese market, that witness the participation of numerous European states struggling to 
become the first partner of the Chinese side, the Romanian government, as guarantor of the 
China - Central and Eastern Europe format, underwrite various Romanian companies that 
defy the procedures and regulations demanded, thus producing insuperable disservices to 
the Sino-Romanian partnership. When approaching the Chinese market, the Romanian 
companies should asses their offer very well, in terms of quality, price and quantities they 
can offer; however, albeit there is a large range of Romanian products to be exported, more 
often than not quantities are a big issue and the Chinese partners are not interested in small 
amounts of goods. In fact, according to Romanian journalist and cognoscente of China Dan 
Tomozei, the Romanian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry officials stressed that, 
in order to penetrate the Chinese market, Romanian brands should adopt the exporters' 
solidarity approach, that is, instead of trying to gain foreign market advantages at the 
expense of their compatriots, Romanian companies should act like Western firms, who 
present themselves at international fairs under the national flag and not as individualities. 
Also, if one looked at the range of projects announced in Bucharest in the past ten years, it 
would be lured to think that Romania is scheduled to become an autonomous region of 
China, and billions of dollars are expected to fall out of the sky and revive the fragile 
Romanian economy. This happens because Bucharest usually announces its intent to initiate 
a project with Beijing, while the Chinese authorities, more discreet and tactful, announce a 
project only after it has been started, maybe even half-completed .  712
At this point, to provide a rationale for this standpoint, it is inevitable to refer to two 
interviews I have carried out for this study.  
 Dan Tomozei, “China poate fi o soluţie pentru schimbarea vitezei în România”, 5 septembrie 2014, 712
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 a) Personal interview : Is there an elephant in the room? 713
The first interviewee, Gabriel Ghelmegeanu, founding member of the Romanian Friendship 
Association with the PRC and President of the Chamber of Commerce Romania-PRC , 714
whom I interviewed on 12 December 2013, stated that Sino-Romanian relations are mostly 
based on “lots of declarations and statements, but we are too busy with political struggles 
to explain to Chinese investors what they should do in order to get into our market (…) our 
country does nothing concrete to attract investment from China, and although (they) have 
patience, in the meantime they can find to invest elsewhere. No one explains them how to 
proceed to invest here. There is no dialogue between the executive and enterprises. We are 
far too busy with domestic political struggles to dedicate time to these things” .  715
The president of the Romanian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry (CCIRC) 
pointed out that only few Sino-Romanian bilateral projects might have been finalised in a 
few years’ time: the Brăila-Tulcea bridge over the Danube (a project that should have been 
realised by a Chinese construction company in 1999; however, after being postponed for 18 
years, in 2017 an Italian-Japanese consortium won the bidding for the construction of the 
500 million Euros bridge in spite of the Chinese contestation ) the modernisation of the 716
Bucharest ring road - also a project of 1999 - and the railway between the Romanian capital 
and Constanța, the modernisation of the thermal power station Rovinari, the completion of 
Cernavodă reactors number 3 and 4 - for which China has allocated about five billion Euros 
- the realisation of Craiova - Pitești highway and last, but not least, an improvement in 
agriculture by resuming both the construction of the Siret-Bărăgan irrigation canal in the 
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 country's southeast  and the Danube-Bucharest canal, all projects of 2011.  717
Besides, according to Ghelmegeanu“the Chinese Tobacco Company in Buzău, established 
in 2007, the Chinese investment in Tractor production in Brasov, initiated in 2009, the Sino-
Romanian Economic and Trade Forum that promotes the strengthening of economic and 
trade cooperation between the two countries, organised in 2006, 2011, 2012, the possibility 
to receive Chinese investments in the Port of Constanta as well as the establishment of the 
Romanian-Chinese Friendship Association in 1995 - having as President Mr. Florea 
Dumitrescu and producing US $ 70 million bilateral trade, the Romanian Chinese House 
(Casa Româno-Chineză or Casa RoChi) in 2011 and the Parliamentary Friendship Group 
with the PRC in 2012 are, at this point, essential for the Sino-Romanian bilateral 
cooperation” .  718
Moreover, according to my interviewee, Chinese investors were also aspiring to set up solar 
and wind energy projects with the Romanian side, however these projects never 
materialised (and, I might add, discussions over these projects still linger in 2017). 
Regarding the Chinese investments to restore the hydroelectric plant Târnița-Lăpuștești or 
the opening of a Chinese bank subsidiary in Romania, Ghelmegeanu replied: “It is fiction, 
there is nothing going on there. The only viable thing would be the thermal plant at 
Rovinari, but there is not anything to do before next summer. If this project was running, we 
could even discuss the coming of China Development Bank at a local level. Chinese banks, 
alike important credit institutions in the West, come only when their clients have serious 
businesses in the area. Otherwise they have no reason to do so” .  719
Concerning the possible arrival of the Bank of China on the Romanian market, the president 
of the Romania-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry pointed out that this institution 
“would be the last one on the list interested to come to Romania” . To the question of 720
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 what Romania has to offer to the Chinese companies, besides cheap labor and a gateway to 
the European market, Gabriel Ghelmegeanu revealed that Romanian labour is cheap only 
compared to Western Europe, however China also had cheap labor. In this context, “it is 
crucial how much of the Romanian workforce is actually skilled” .  721
Moreover, Ghelmegeanu emphasised that while “in the international arena, Bucharest 
conveys positive messages and shows favourable reactions to the Chinese proposals, 
domestically, does exactly the contrary, by treating important Chinese companies in 
Romania and retail Chinese businessmen of Bucharest markets Europa, Red Dragon and 
the new China Town exactly the same (…) the Chinese authorities’ pragmatism is the 
resource that could play a cardinal role in encouraging the Sino-Romanian trade” . 722
Furthermore, the president of the Romania-China Chamber of Commerce and Industry 
restated what he had already imparted to the Romanian press, hence that the meetings of the 
Minister of National Interest and Foreign Investments Infrastructure Projects Dan Şova 
(PSD Senator - political ally of former Romanian PM Victor Ponta - arrested on charges of 
corruption in December 2015) with the Chinese business environment, as well as the 
intentions of the Romanian side to begin partnership with the Chinese, were only intentions 
and nothing more: “It is easy to talk, however the economy is based on facts, not on words 
or what we wish for. Probably when Chinese enterprises will start large-scale projects in 
Romania we will see China Development Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China or the 
Constructions Bank come to Romania, until then there is Libra Bank, within the Red 
Dragon commercial complex that is doing good business with China and serves the ones 
who need financial transactions with the PRC” .  723
At the end of the interview, Gabriel Ghelmegeanu stressed that the Sino-Romanian trade in 
2013 “has hardly seen any increase in comparison with the previous year (…) we imported 
from China about 2.6 billion and we exported 600-700 million Euros, with a trade balance 
of 1/4 or 1/5 - Romanian exports/imports from China - but one should look on the bright 
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 side, it is good in comparison with the Romanian trade deficit with China, of 1/12 or 1/13 
just a few years ago” . Although there were 10,878 Chinese companies and enterprises 724
with Chinese shares registered in Romania at the end of 2013, according to my interviewee 
“more than a half are either closed down or ineffective” . Additionally, because of 725
Chinese Foreign direct investments “are so insignificant, Chinese banks will only come 
here when we will have investments of at least 2-3 billion Euros”  concluded the president 726
of the Romanian-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
One year before this interview, in 2012, the chairman of the Romanian Chinese Chamber Of 
Commerce and Industry made a public statement about the aggravation of the visa issues 
for the Chinese citizens that wish to come to Romania. Thus, according to Ghelmegeanu, 
“nothing has been done about the issue of visas for Chinese citizens by the new 
government; on the contrary, everything has gotten worse. The law is good, and if it were 
complied with, there would be no more such issues, but it is not… it is not being applied the 
way it is supposed to. The Chinese who come to Romania are put in a room and 
interrogated. They are being asked why they are coming to Romania, how many days they 
plan on staying, why they stay for that number of days, who they are meeting (…)” .  727
On that occasion, Ghelmegeanu said that the government in Bucharest needed a strategy to 
help the development of the relations between Romania and the People's Republic of China. 
Moreover, in the context of a Sino-Romanian prospect to conclude an agreement regarding 
investments in agriculture, supported by the Chinese party, and the restoration of the 
Romanian exports of pork meat to the PRC, Gabriel Ghelmegeanu revealed that Romania 
and China had had an agreement for the bilateral meat trade in the past, but the authorities’ 
in Bucharest impassivity to renew the agreement eventually resulted in the interruption of 
the Romanian meat exports to the Asian country: “Romania had this agreement, and China 
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 most likely has its own regulations in that field, just like any other country, which we need 
to comply with. Since we were no longer interested, we didn't go there to renew the 
agreement At the time, the actions for the signing of that agreement took about 1-2 years. At 
the present time, if there is goodwill and if we go there well prepared, we could complete 
these steps quicker, if not, we are only wasting time” .   728
At the end of 2014, when asked about the proceedings of the Romanian meat exports to 
China, the chairman of the CCIRC disclosed: “nothing is happening with the meat exports 
as well, nothing is prepared, we only hear statements but no move because meat producers 
are hindered by those who want to have a monopoly. In these circumstances, it is useless 
that we have the capacity and that the Chinese want to buy from us” .  729
With the regrettable passing away of Gabriel Ghelmegeanu in December 2015, Luo 
Dongquan,Vice-President of the China-Romania Friendship Association reminisced about 
the achievements of the “old friend of the Chinese people, eminent promoter of Romanian-
Chinese friendship who has made major contributions to the development and 
intensification of friendship and cooperation relations between the Chinese and Romanian 
peoples” . Dongquan expressed that as a businessman, the founding member of the 730
Romanian Friendship Association with the PRC and President of the Chamber of 
Commerce Romania-PRC, Ghelmegeanu “looked with great concern at the stagnation of 
economic and trade relations between Romania and China and took a series of strategic 
measures to overcome the burdens and identify new opportunities for businessmen in the 
two countries” . Moreover, Dongquan reminisced about some of Gabriel Ghelmegeanu’s 731
statements in an interview for the Romanian Radio China International editorial in Beijing. 
Thus, according to the vice-president of the China-Romania Friendship Association, 
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 Ghelmegeanu was perfectly aware of both China’s opening and needs, and about “China's 
immense availability and financial resources. In a way, these two things go hand in hand 
with our desire to make investment partnerships in Romania. I am convinced that the 
Romanian companies in the fields of services, food industry, IT are welcome and can have 
an extraordinarily advantageous business climate in China. I am convinced that Romanian 
companies will have a special place in this domestic development plan of China (...) We 
hope to hear about collaborative projects between Chinese and Romanian companies” . 732
Moreover, Dongquan recalled that to revive economic and trade relations between different 
localities of Romania and China, the CCIRC has successively established representative 
offices in Beijing, Shanxi and Shanghai and Gabriel Ghelmegeanu has recurrently acted to 
reopen the Bucharest-Beijing airline by conducting thorough investigation into the viability 
and profitability of this line. He also promoted cultural and humanitarian exchanges 
between the two peoples by sponsoring several editorial projects and staff exchanges.  
The Vice-President of the China-Romania Friendship Association concluded that “the 
passing away of architect Gabriel Ghelmegeanu is a great loss for the friendship and 
cooperation between our countries and our peoples, (he) will always remain in our hearts. 
His dream of developing and intensifying economic and trade relations between Romania 
and China will surely be achieved with the joint efforts of the two countries” .  733
b) Personal interview : Better than nothing! Legislation for mutual advantageous 734
cooperation 
Additionally, Radu Lucian Fodoreanu, economic consul of Romania in Shanghai, whom I 
interviewed on November 5th, 2014, outlined China’s rapid economic growth and social 
development and provided a good insight into the state of the Sino-Romanian relations in 
the last decade. Hence, after a quick insight into Beijing’s latest international achievement, 
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 the One Belt and One Road strategy, (popularly called the New Silk Road Economic Belt), 
“a major development in outward diplomacy and an opportunity to expand Chinese 
influence” , my interviewee focused on Bucharest-Beijing trade and commercial 735
cooperation and expressed that “Sino-Romanian commercial ties have significant gaps in 
agriculture, and there is also the issue of being allowed to export to China only meat and 
bio products, such as clover or hay” . Moreover, Fodoreanu explicated that China-736
Romania bilateral ties are vulnerable because “Bucharest fails to fulfil the state’s financial 
guarantees, and thus, by failing to satisfy the EU’s norms and regulations, Chinese stop 
investing in Romania. Moreover, Romania does not have a legislation to attract foreign 
investments, albeit the Chinese side would like to create jobs and bring workforce to 
Romania. Everything is written in the papers, but no one applies these norms…Hence, there 
is no Romanian enterprise in Shanghai, with the exception of a Romanian company 
producing wine, Jidvei, the other ones are all franchising businesses. In Beijing things are 
almost the same, there are 2, mostly 3 companies, and one of them is Valvis, also producing 
wine” .  737
Furthermore, the consul on economic matters explained the impact of regulations on the 
process of diffusion and development of Sino-Romanian ties and articulated: “You know, 
multinational companies don’t need to go through the consulate or embassy, they just need 
representation in the host country. For example, Romania has only two commercial 
delegates in China, there is no Romanian representative in the agricultural or truistic field! 
So, if Romanians want to do commerce with the Chinese, the Romanian government needs 
to do the first steps, it needs to get involved…The Chinese man is an apprehensive type, he 
doesn’t trust the foreigner immediately. But China grew that much also because of foreign 
investments” .  738
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 Moreover, according to Fodoreanu, one should take into account that the EU is certainly not 
the first impediment for effective business, however albeit the international organisation 
“maintains that states are free to produce for both their domestic needs and to export to 
China, now China’s exports are much higher than its imports from both Europe and 
America” . Furthermore, Fodoreanu revealed that whoever might be interested in doing 739
commerce with China, “should also bare in mind that Chinese businessmen are only 
familiar with the Chinese market, and restrictions for them are huge, when spending, 
withdrawing, when they go to auctions or because of the bureaucracy” .  740
From a political perspective, Fodoreanu emphasised that unlike former Romanian President 
T. Băsescu, who found an ally in the United States, Prime Minister Ponta supported the 
partnership with China. This association however, “does not mean anything, I mean look at 
both Nicu Vasilescu, the PSD member of Parliament and President of the Romanian-
Chinese House that was arrested for corruption while he was planning to flee to China and 
to Dan Șova!” . Furthermore, my interviewee pointed out that from his perspective, the 741
commercial office in Shanghai “should be included in the adoption of the memorandum on 
the implementation of the public-private partnership project. There is a law, there is 
methodology. Look at the diplomatic relations, China and Romania have always been 
friends from this perspective!” .  742
From a cultural standpoint, on the one hand, Fodoreanu divulged that the Romanian 
community in Shanghai is composed by and large by three hundred individuals, “trained 
people, they are architects, teachers and shipyard directors. There are also 180 Romanian 
students in China, of which 120 located in Shanghai, however, there are no Romanian 
schools…There are also approximatively 25.000 Chinese in Romania” . On the other 743
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 hand, the economic advisor unveiled that, regrettably, “the cultural field is dead, there is no 
legislation for the Chinese tourists when they come to visit Romania. The Romanian 
Cultural Institute (ICR) in Beijing is not working yet. Moreover, the European funds for the 
consulate in Shanghai, funds that come from the EU and the Schengen Facility are not 
enough, they only cover the costs brought on by cars and rent. On top of that, the 
promotion of Romania’s image in the Chinese press costs 500$ per page..ICR could be the 
master stroke, but it absolutely needs funds! So, culturally, there is a lot that should be 
done. Of course, the Romanian Embassy in Beijing will tell you otherwise.”  744
Regarding the required funds, Fodoreanu added that “Murfatlar Winery and several 
Romanian mineral waters as well as catering services could come to China, I would like to 
bring them all here, but I need financial support, especially for the air tickets”.  
Moreover, the economic consul articulated that Romania does not know how to promote its 
image in the international arena, and the 2010 EXPO in Shanghai has been a clear example 
of that. Towards the end of the interview, the economic advisor explained that what 
Bucharest should firstly do, in order to increase Sino-Romanian bilateral trade, to attract 
Chinese investments and intensify cooperation in all fields, is “an investment legislation. 
For example, 10 or maybe 15 years ago we had a memorandum for tourism, the Romanian 
Immigration Office - ORI - provided a contract that was the equivalent of an invitation, thus 
the visa procedures were much more manageable and consequently, the Chinese did not 
need the 5000$ they need nowadays to come to Romania” . He further explained that with 745
some improvements, “we might be able to witness a boom in the two countries’ tourism, 
look at CITS, the leading enterprise in China’s travel industry” . The consul on economic 746
matters brought to public attention three more strategies that would have, in his view, a 
positive impact on the Sino-Romanian bilateral relations, “the creation of industrial parks 
in Romania, the modernisation of the infrastructure in the Port of Constanta and the 
already mentioned public-private partnership. On reflection, the EU legislation is also to 
 Ibidem744
 Ibidem745
 Ibidem746
 408
 blame, as more often than not it obstructs consulting firms to come to China and do their 
jobs” .  747
Furthermore, he underlined that Beijing only payed heed to the “EU’s statistics and what is 
written in the papers, but not to the reality. In this moment 50 people work for the EU within 
the Chamber of Commerce and Industry Shanghai. Both the EU and the US struggle to keep 
their companies here, not to destroy the Chinese economy. I believe there will be a huge 
wave of people leaving China in the next 10 years, and with countries like Poland, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania and Greece having the same manufacturing costs, these 
people will move to ASEAN countries, Vietnam, Cambodia, where it is easier to create 
specialists and establish a company..in Vietnam it only takes 1 year to have a specialisation, 
while in China you need 3” . At the end of the interview, when asked to provide his 748
opinion regarding the efficiency of the Romanian Ambassador to China, my interviewee 
revealed that Ambassador Doru Romulus Costea was “fine, albeit he does not speak 
Chinese…Anyway, I think he is not the most appropriate legate in dealings with China” . 749
Two years prior to this interview, in October 2012, the Social Democratic Party (PSD) 
deputy and President of the Romanian-Chinese House Nicu/Nicolae Vasilescu - to whom 
the economic consul made mention of - disclosed to the Romanian press asking him about 
the Dolj county’s special relationship with China that “our attitude towards the traditional 
friendly relationship with China has been about zero in recent years. We paid no attention 
to this relationship. This change of government has been long-awaited by the Chinese side 
because, besides some friendly statements, we have done nothing to attract the attention of 
the Chinese investors (…) there are only two generations in China who still remember the 
traditional Romanian-Chinese friendship, after these we will be treated like Cyprus. I mean, 
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 if we do not do something to preserve this excellent relationship, we risk losing it” . 750
However, at that point Vasilescu was hopeful that the new Romanian government would 
take important steps to recover from crisis in the Sino-Romanian bilateral relations and, in 
his opinion “the fact that Prime Minister Victor Ponta has already appointed a counsellor 
for the relationship with China, is an excellent sign” .  751
Returning to the relations between the PRC and the county of Dolj, Vasilescu claimed that 
“thanks to the efforts of the President of the County Council (…) relations with China are 
already great. And I think the fruits of these efforts will be seen soon, because there are very 
important Chinese companies interested in the realisation of the Industrial Park and of 
other investments that will create jobs. A very important delegation of Chinese investors 
will be present at Craiova  during the campaign and I think we will sign a series of 752
contracts with the Chinese side. I guarantee you that if I win the elections in the Dolj 
county, for 4 years I will do my best to create a few hundreds or perhaps even thousands of 
jobs by means of Chinese investments” . This was probably one of the last public 753
statements made by member of Parliament Nicolae Vasilescu. In fact, after participating to 
the China-Europe High-Level Political Parties Forum in Suzhou, China between April 
22nd-23rd, 2013, he was arrested for undue influence and bribery and sentenced to two years 
in prison in December the same year. As a result, in 2017 the Romanian - Chinese project 
for the realisation of the Craiova - Pitești highway is still a paper project, the Chinese 
assignment to build a neighbourhood with about 2000 homes in Craiova is not yet finalised, 
while the most wanted Industrial Park in Craiova is a project under construction (under the 
name of Southern Industrial Park) belonging not to a Chinese company, but to Zacaria real 
estate enterprise, part of the Alf Mizzi & Sons international group, founded in Malta more 
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 than 100 years ago. 
Thus, in Bucharest promises expand, city councils sign hundreds of papers with the Chinese 
side and bilateral contracts seem to flourish. However only once in a while a handful of 
projects are initiated, and scarcely ever finalised. In a globalised world wherewithal is 
everything, yet Bucharest is probably one of the few capital cities dreaming of launching 
projects with China without allocating funds for their initialisation. Additionally, an 
imprecise foreign policy and a scarce diplomatic staff that is more often than not unaware of 
or unprepared to deal with the Chinese economic hallmarks and interpersonal skills, affect 
the Romanian diplomacy, whose efforts eventually don’t pay off.  
According to journalist Dan Tomozei, whoever believes that Sino-Romanian inter-state 
bilateral relations can work successfully without an adequate number of Chinese speakers 
or experts of China, has probably not yet understood the East Asian reality and mentality. 
Modestly paid, and with hardly any opportunity to attract partnerships, “the Romanian 
diplomatic missions’ employees in China prove to be powerless, while the insufficient 
protocol budget limits the organisation of important events, and the supplements and 
bonuses provided exclusively to embassies on the occasion of the Romanian National Day 
only confirm the obstacles having become a rule” . Thus, with the government lacking 754
efficiency and a pragmatic attitude, the permanent state of dissatisfaction, excessive 
bureaucratisation and unnecessary vast paperwork eventually lead to unmitigated 
renunciation, abandonment, “as no expert on economy and diplomacy is able to operate in 
such atmosphere and conditions” . 755
 Dan Tomozei, “China poate fi o soluţie pentru schimbarea vitezei în România”, 5 septembrie 2014, 754
available at https://dantomozei.ro/2014/09/05/comentariu-china-poate-fi-o-solutie-pentru-schimbarea-vitezei-
in-romania/ accessed on 16.01.2017 
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 VI.2 Sino-Romanian political and diplomatic ties in the context of Bucharest’s accession 
into NATO and the EU 
According to Song, China’s rise, acknowledged as one of the major trends in contemporary 
international relations, has resulted into Beijing’s intensification of implementation of a 
more confident and forceful foreign policy in the past ten years. For example, the PRC’s 
assertive behaviour towards its neighbours and various regions in the developing worlds, 
like Africa and Latin America, culminated in a series of outstanding initiatives like the 
BRICS  and the OBOR (One Belt One Road) initiative, a huge project developed by 756
Chinese President Xi Jinping, aiming at connecting the Eurasian continent through massive 
investment and development of trade routes in the region, such as the land-based Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the oceangoing Maritime Silk Road.  
As demonstrated, with the end of the Cold War both China and Central and Eastern Europe 
focused on their respective domestic economic and political changes and restructuring. 
Song argues that China’s normalisation of bilateral relations with the CEE countries began 
in the first years of the 1990s, however at that point the process of normalisation was not 
based on a strategic thinking, nor was believed a priority for either side. Albeit some 
countries like Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland have been more attentive to maintain 
relations with the PRC for economic and investment reasons, many researchers consider 
that generally, China and CEE mutually neglected each other in the post-Cold War period. 
As a result, during this period Beijing was more interested in expanding economic ties with 
the developed countries of the West and involved itself in essential affairs like the dealing 
with its neighbouring states. On the other side, Central and East European states also turned 
to the West, guided by the feasible alternative of joining the EU for political and economic 
advantages and NATO for security reasons. Additionally, as I have mentioned in the 
previous chapter, rancour for their communist past and the general distrust when dealing 
with communist states, has contributed to increase negative perceptions of China in many of 
 BRICS - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa’s coordination in multilateral forums, with a focus 756
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 CEE states.  
Nonetheless, this situation has changed drastically in recent years. China and the CEECs 
started to rediscover each other and, with the Chinese political elite beginning to understand 
the strategic value of the CEE countries - especially demonstrated by the Belt and Road 
Initiative - the region sprang up to play a crucial political and economic role in the Chinese 
policymakers international drives. In fact, EU’s “enlargement to encompass these countries 
was one of the major motivations for China to approach this region. Most of the CEECs 
have been absorbed into the West, a development that China has observed.  Some observers 
initially concluded that China should improve its political and economic relations with the 
CEECs within the framework of its relations with the EU as a whole” .  757
As already mentioned in the previous chapter, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Romania 
in June 2014, thus soon after the EU’s eastward enlargement. Besides the signing of the 
“Joint Declaration by the Government of the People's Republic of China and the 
Government of Romania on Establishing a Comprehensive Friendly Cooperative 
Partnership”, with the Romanian President Ion Iliescu, on that occasion, according to Song, 
Hu “made suggestions for developing China-CEE relations in a speech to the Romanian 
parliament. This visit marks the beginning of the Chinese top leadership’s strategic 
attention towards CEE, with China seeing the region as offering a window of opportunity as 
part of its larger EU strategy” . 758
In accordance with the Consulate General of the PRC in San Francisco, “on the afternoon 
of May 9, 2005, President Hu Jintao met in the hotel where he stayed with President 
Băsescu of Romania in Moscow. The two heads of state noted that they would make joint 
efforts to expand and deepen the traditional, friendly and cooperative relations between 
China and Romania” . On that occasion, the Chinese head of state spoke about the two 759
countries and peoples profound traditional friendship, about the two countries bilateral 
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Routledge Contemporary China Series, 2017
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 relations’ smooth development, and about the Chinese and Romania side’s will to further 
develop these relations and maintain world peace and stability.  
Moreover, Hu Jintao reminisced about the 2004 Chinese-Romanian comprehensive, 
friendly and cooperative partnership agreement and claimed that Sino-Romanian economic 
and trade cooperation enjoyed “great potential and a bright future”. Both heads of state 
“expressed satisfaction over the development of bilateral economic and trade relations and 
agreed to expand the mutually beneficial cooperation and actively support enterprises of 
both countries to expand investment” .  760
At the end of the meeting, Băsescu expressed that the Chinese products were well received 
in the Romanian market. Additionally, with Romania actively developing the tourism 
industry and building transportation facilities and the Chinese companies being competitive 
in these fields, the Romanian president communicated to the Chinese counterpart his wishes 
to further broaden Romania-China economic and trade cooperation . 761
Romanian Foreign Minister Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu met Chinese State Councillor Tang 
Jiaxuan in Beijing on November 28th, 2005 during a visit to the PRC. During this meeting, 
the two countries’ representatives pledged to strengthen cooperation through the friendly 
and cooperative partnership and expressed mutual gratitude to each other. Thus, if the 
Chinese leader showed appreciation for Bucharest’s consistent adherence to the one-China 
policy and its support to the great cause of reunifying the country, Romanian FM 
Ungureanu thanked his Chinese counterpart for Beijing’s support and claimed that 
Bucharest’s top priority was the development of bilateral ties with China in all fields . 762
One year later, in March 2006, Romanian President Traian Băsescu met Chinese President 
Hu Jintao, China’s top legislator Wu Bangguo and Premier Wen Jiabao during a three-day 
state visit to Beijing. On that occasion, the Romanian head of state reached four important 
agreements with Chinese President Hu Jintao, aimed at further improving the 
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 comprehensive friendly cooperative partnership: sustain high-level exchanges, extend 
economic and trade cooperation, improve cultural exchanges and bolster multilateral 
cooperation. "The two sides have established mutual political trust and equality, harvested 
mutual economic benefit and forged mutual understanding and close coordination on 
various international issues” , said President Hu, “expressing his appreciation to 763
Romania's adherence to the one-China and friendly policies to China (…) We respect the 
development path chosen by the Romanian people and always regard Romania as a good 
friend and partner in central and eastern Europe” .  764
Likewise, Băsescu highlighted the two countries traditional friendly and cooperative 
relations and claimed that being China a significant part of Romania’s foreign policy, 
Bucharest “will not change its policy on the Taiwan issue, (…) supports the one-China 
policy and stressed that the Taiwan issue (…) and the issue of the reunification should be 
resolved by the Chinese people” . The Chinese President expressed the Chinese will to 765
“maintain the high-level exchanges and cement the friendly communications between the 
two governments, legislatures and parties”  and made some remarks regarding the two 766
governments’ necessity to strive for opportunities for the Chinese and Romanian stimulation 
of businesses, cooperation and investment “in some key industries of the two countries (…) 
The Chinese president also called on the two sides to further bilateral cooperation in fields 
such as culture, education, tourism and intensify the consultation and coordination on 
issues like human rights, UN reform and campaign against terrorism” .  767
Băsescu concurred, and emphasised that Romania held China to be “an important economic 
partner in Asia” and thus welcomed “Chinese businesses to invest in Romania and (…) 
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 create favourable conditions in the investment policies” . Bilateral talks between the two 768
heads of state concluded with “the signing ceremony of a memorandum of understanding on 
bilateral cooperation and administrative assistance concerning the customs issues” .  769
As mentioned, President Traian Băsescu also met China's top legislator Wu Bangguo in 
Beijing. On that occasion, Wu, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People's Congress (NPC), China's top legislative body, reminisced about China-Romania 
traditional friendly ties, that have maintained a steady growth since the two countries have 
established diplomatic relations. Moreover, Wu pointed out that “the political mutual trust 
has increased and cooperation in various fields between the two countries scored 
remarkable achievement. China is satisfied with the current development of China-Romania 
trade ties and hopes the two sides will step up bilateral economic and trade 
cooperation” . The chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's 770
Congress then focused his attention on the Sino-Romanian trade volume in recent years, 
and expressed his aspiration for a constant Bucharest-Beijing support of the “Chinese and 
Romanian businesses to improve communication and cooperation, expand and balance two-
way trade and implement the major cooperative projects in an effective manner” . At the 771
end of the talks, Wen praised the Sino-Romanian “growing political mutual trust since the 
two countries forged an all-round friendly and cooperative partnership in 2004, calling for 
the two countries to further cooperate in fields such as trade, culture and education, science 
and technology, and cement mutual support on international issues” . 772
In order to implement these four consensuses, NPC Chairman Wu Bangguo would visit 
Romania in May 2006, in what would be the first visit of a Chairman of the NPC standing 
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 committee to Romania .  773
According to Gao Ge, in May 2008, Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of 
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) payed a visit to Romania, 
and, at the Romanian Senate, he gave a talk on the Sino-Romanian relations and issues of 
common concern. Accordingly, China and Romania “have become all-round cooperation 
partners. The peoples of the two countries have become the all-weather friends. The Sino-
Romanian relations have become a good example of state-to-state relations (…) Our 
common task is to inherit the past, usher in the future and develop the Sino-Romanian 
comprehensive friendly cooperative partnership continuously, so as to better benefit the two 
countries and the two peoples” . On that occasion, Jia and Romanian President Băsescu 774
exchanged opinions on furthering the development of the Chinese-Romanian ties by making 
efforts to enhance high level political contacts and mutual trust, by increasing economic and 
trade cooperation, and by “deepening cultural exchanges and strengthening international 
coordination” (Gao Ge: 2017). 
Chairman Jia briefed Băsescu about Beijing's preparation for the Olympic Games and 
expounded the Chinese government's position on both the Taiwan issue and matters 
regarding Tibet. Băsescu emphasised that Romania fully supported Beijing’s staging of the 
2008 Olympic Games and “expressed the wish to visit Beijing to attend the opening 
ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games and the Asia-Europe summit” . Moreover, the 775
Romanian President reaffirmed Bucharest’s adherence to the one-China policy and assured 
that the issue concerning Tibet was China’s internal affairs point. Towards the end of the 
meeting, Jia updated the host on the achievements of China's “reform and opening up drive 
and its idea on sticking to the route of peaceful development (…), stressed that China will 
always stick to the route of peaceful development, unswervingly pursue the mutually 
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 beneficial and win-win policy of opening up and push for the development of a harmonious 
world of lasting peace and common prosperity” . On August 8th, 2008, Chinese President 776
Hu Jintao met at the Great Hall of the People with some of the foreign leaders who attended 
the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympic Games, and exchanged views on a wide 
range of topics, such as bilateral ties and “major international and regional issues of 
common concern” .  777
During the meeting with Romanian President Traian Băsescu, Hu said that the two peoples 
shared “a profound friendship. The leaders of the two countries agreed to lift bilateral ties 
to a cooperative partnership of all-round friendship in 2004, which marked a new stage for 
the development of bilateral ties. Both sides have become good friends and partners with 
political equality and mutual trust, economic cooperation of mutual benefit and close 
coordination in international affairs” . The President of the PRC asserted that Beijing 778
considered Romania “a sincere friend and an important partner in Europe, and valued 
Romania's role and influence in the European Union”  and Romania's pragmatic role in 779
furthering China-EU relations. Furthermore, if Hu Jintao pleaded for the upgrade of the 
Sino-Romanian partnership of comprehensive and friendly cooperation, Băsescu praised the 
long-term friendship between the two countries and peoples and the steady development of 
bilateral ties, he “appreciated China's positive efforts in balancing trade between the two 
countries, pointing to fruitful economic and trade cooperation (…) he also vowed to work 
closely with the Chinese side to celebrate the 60th anniversary well next year, so as to 
deepen the friendship between the two peoples and consolidate bilateral friendship” . 780
Băsescu restated Bucharest’s position on issues pertaining to Taiwan and Tibet and 
sustained Beijing’s endeavour to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity. At the 
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 end of the meeting, the Chinese President expressed gratitude for the most valuable support 
and assistance offered by the foreign governments and people following the devastating 
earthquake that affected the Chinese province of Sichuan, in May the same year . 781
Between 22-26 June 2009, the Romanian President of the Senate and PSD leader Mircea 
Geoană, together with the Romanian Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Titus 
Corlățean payed an official four-days visit to China. In Beijing, Geoană and Corlățean met 
Chen Fengxiang, head of the Chinese Communist Party's International Department, and Jia 
Qinglin, Chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in occasion of the 60th anniversary since the signing of 
the first bilateral agreement between Romanian and the PRC. On that occasion, the 
Romanian Social Democrat leader expressed concerns regarding Bucharest losing “intensity 
in relations with China, a country in full economic, scientific, cultural and technological 
progress” .  782
Therefore, according to the Geoană, Bucharest needed to reconsider the whole range of 
economic and investment relations between Romania and China: “This crisis affecting 
Romania should be a cold shower for the Romanian authorities, ought to make them realise 
we need a closer cooperation with the Chinese state and with Chinese companies that want 
to invest in Romania, in infrastructure projects or technology parks. In the new geopolitics, 
where China has gained a global prominence, Romania needs to pay more attention to 
working with the Chinese state in all areas of activity”  concluded the President of the 783
Senate. In response, Chen Fengxiang assured the Romanian side that because Beijing 
regarded bilateral relations with Bucharest as a priority, he would keep on supporting large 
Chinese enterprises that wished to invest in Romania. During discussions with Jia Qinglin, 
Mircea Geoană emphasised that the PRC’s rapid economic development has rendered most 
of the international political actors jealous, therefore Bucharest needed to display more 
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 pragmatic bilateral economic relations with China.  
Hence, the Social Democrat leader “proposed the establishment of a mechanism for 
collaboration between the standing committees of the two countries' legislative forums, 
especially in areas such as infrastructure, agriculture, energy and environmental 
protection” and “the institution of a mechanism for political coordination between the two 
countries on EU-related issues and a consultation mechanism between the two governments 
and parliaments before each G8 meeting” . Jia Qinglin asserted that authorities in Beijing 784
and Bucharest firstly needed to allocate “more time to consolidating mutual trust and to 
work together to develop economic exchanges between the two countries”. Secondly, he 
suggested to convene a new session of the Joint Economic and Trade Intergovernmental 
Commission aiming at finding the best solutions to realise it, and last, but not least, he 
stressed that Romania enjoyed a high appreciation of the Chinese state, thus revealing 
Beijing’s plans to organise a Chinese traditions festival in Romania . 785
On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of bilateral diplomatic ties, in October 2009, 
Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping made an official visit to Romania, where he met 
Romanian President Traian Băsescu. During the talks, the Chinese vice-president stated that 
the two countries’ friendship and cooperation has never faded away in the past sixty years, 
and thus can be viewed as a model of state-to-state balanced political relations and 
pragmatic economic, commercial, technical, scientific, humanistic and international ties . 786
Xi Jinping also pointed out that “the common task facing both countries is to take the 60th 
anniversary of diplomatic ties as a starting point to consolidate friendship and deepen 
cooperation”  for the benefit of both the Chinese and Romanian people. Moreover, Xi 787
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 Jinping asserted that in the backdrop of a complicated international context, the Chinese 
strategic  partnership  with  the  EU “could  bring  peace,  development  and  growth  in  the 
world”  if supported by all CEEC, Romania included.788
At  that  point,  Romanian  President  Băsescu  underlined  the  importance  of  the  Sino-
Romanian political and economic cooperation, especially within international organisations, 
and reaffirmed Bucharest’s position regarding the issue of Taiwan. Moreover, the Romanian 
head  of  state  announced  that  various  agreements,  ought  to  be  signed  between  the  two 
governments the next day, represented the result, the accomplishment of bilateral talks with 
Chinese head of  state Hu Jintao in 2006 and 2008.  “Romania will  continue to support 
China in the EU, as China has a functional market economy. There are currently 9,595 
Chinese and Romanian-Chinese joint ventures active in Romania, that have already made 
investments of more than 330 million dollars in the Romanian economy and the prospect is 
that Chinese companies will continue to invest in the Romanian economy at a high pace”  789
concluded Băsescu, however not before assuring the Chinese Vice-President that Romania 
will  attend  the  Shanghai  Expo 2010 with  a  delegation  led  by  himself  as  president,  on 
Romania’s day. 
Next, in conformity with Gao, in the aftermath of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake, several 
Romanian ministerial and senior officials visited China, like the Romanian President Traian 
Băsescu and Foreign Minister Teodor Baconschi who participated at the 2010 Shanghai 
World Expo, or expressed condolences to the Chinese people and the Chinese Embassy in 
Bucharest, such as the Romanian PM Emil Boc and the President of the Chamber of 
Deputies Bogdan Olteanu, who sympathised with the Chinese authorities and people after 
the devastating earthquake. Additionally, the Romanian Red Cross initiated a three-months 
nationwide fundraising and the Romanian Gendarmerie provided over US $ 200.000 cash 
assistance to the earthquake zone (Gao Ge: 2017).  
During the 2010 Shanghai World Exhibition, Romanian  President  Traian  Băsescu  met 
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 Shanghai’s Mayor Han Zheng at the Shanghai Xijiao Guesthouse. On that occasion, the 
mayor  explained  Băsescu  that  Shanghai's  development,  perceived  when  visiting  the 
Shanghai Urban Planning Exhibition Hall, “is a showcase of the achievements of China's 
opening and reform policy.  During the  period of  the  11th Five  Year  Plan (2006-2010), 
Shanghai is well-placed to become an international economic, financial, trade and shipping 
centre, realise sustained economic growth and improve residents’ living standards. We will 
also make the 2010 World Expo a most  excellent  and unforgettable  event”  observed 790
Mayor Han and then concluded that, because Romania and China enjoy strong friendship, 
the  President's  visit  “is  expected  to  boost  bilateral  cooperation  and  exchanges” . 791
Romania’s participation at the world exhibition Shanghai Expo 2010 costed the Romanian 
government 20 million Lei, approximatively 4.500.000 Euros. 
At the Romanian pavilion “Greenpolis”, visitors had the chance to discover present-time 
Romania, its traditions, art, architecture, tourism, economy, foreign investments, research 
and innovation. During the four months following the official opening,  “over 2,900,000 
people crossed the Greenopolis threshold, attending over 2,400 performances by Romanian 
artists. Romania's Pavilion at EXPO 2010 hosted seven economic forums and numerous 
other events promoting Romanian-Chinese trade relations (…) being visited by 130 official 
delegations and numerous personalities from different fields” .  792
According to Romanian Commissioner General at EXPO 2010, Ferdinand Nagy, Romania’s 
participation  at  Expo  2010  Shanghai  constituted  one  of  the  public  diplomacy  events 
organised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  aiming to promote Romania abroad as an 
important actor on the international public stage. “Four months after the official opening of 
the Shanghai World Expo, we appreciate that through cultural and artistic activities as well 
as events dedicated to economic promotion conducted within our pavilion, we have offered 
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 visitors the opportunity to interact with Romanian traditions, culture, services and products, 
succeeding in (…) gaining an important visibility among other countries at Expo 2010” , 793
stated  the  commissioner  in  September  2010.  In  the  diplomatic  field,  emphasised  Nagy, 
Romania's greatest visibility at Expo 2010 occurred on July 29th, when Romania celebrated 
its National Day in the presence of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Teodor Baconschi, Minister 
of  Regional  Development and Tourism, Elena Udrea and some members the Romanian 
Parliament and the Ministry of Culture and National Patrimony; “the legends of Romanian 
sports, Nadia Comăneci, Gheorghe Hagi and Ilie Năstase,  were also present in Shanghai 
(…) honouring Romania” . 794
Additionally, the most important visit of a foreign delegation to the Romanian Pavilion in 
the last  month was that  of the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign 
Affairs  and Security Policy and Vice-President  of  the European Commission,  Catherine 
Ashton, who visited Greenpolis on August 29th and was amazed by the cultural program 
offered by the Romanian pavilion .795
On the economic promotion side, the Romanian Pavilion at EXPO 2010 Shanghai hosted up 
seven economic forums, as well as numerous activities promoting Romanian-Chinese trade 
relations,  including  Romanian  Wine  Week,  Romanian  Fashion  Week  in  Shanghai  and 
Exhibition General Products,  Aeronautical Exhibition, Exhibition of IT and IT Services. 
Moreover, the economic promotion activities included in the Export Promotion Program of 
the  Ministry  of  Economy,  Commerce  and  Business  Environment  (MECMA)  and  the 
Romanian Trade and Investment Promotion Center (CRPCIS) continued in August with the 
support  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  hosted  a  mini-technical  aeronautical 
exhibition and a mini IT product exhibition .796
On  12  August  2011,  Chinese  President  Hu  Jintao  met  in  Shenzhen,  Guangdong  with 
Romanian Prime Minister  Emil  Boc,  who was  there  for  a  working visit  and to  attend, 
among  other  things,  the  opening  ceremony  of  the  26th  “Summer  Universiade"  sport 
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 competition, including a Romanian team amongst the participants. Emil Boc met, besides 
the  Chinese  President  Hu  Jintao,  the  Chinese  Premier  Wen  Jiabao.  The  head  of  the 
Romanian Executive was accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs Teodor Baconschi, 
Minister  of  Economy Ion  Ariton,  Minister  of  Transportation  Anca  Boagiu,  Minister  of 
Culture Kelemen Hunor, who had meetings with Chinese officials from their own sector of 
activity and by a delegation of businessmen to attend the Romanian-Chinese Economic 
Forum in Beijing. In line with a press release from the Government's Press Office, “the 
business delegation was proposed by the Ministry of Economy, Commerce and Business 
Environment and the Bucharest Chamber of Commerce and Industry and businessmen will 
bear, from their own budget, all expenses related to their travel to the PRC” .  797
During the meeting,  the Chinese head of  state made some remarks regarding the Sino-
Romanian  deep-rooted traditional friendship,  the two countries bilateral  relations’ steady 
growth in the sixty years since Romania and China established diplomatic ties,  and the 
Beijing-Bucharest mutual understanding and support. 
On the report of the Chinese embassy in the United States,  on that occasion Hu Jintao 
recalled the 2004 Sino-Romanian bilateral partnership that has raised the two countries’ 
relations to a comprehensive, friendly and cooperative cooperation and has reached broad 
“consensus on reinforcing traditional friendship and expanding pragmatic cooperation” . 798
“Romania is a good friend of China”  said the Chinese President, and he expressed the 799
hope that the two countries would  “tap the advantages of the traditional friendship and 
push forward cooperation in the areas of economy, trade, science, technology, agriculture 
and  culture  so  that  China-Romania  cooperation  can  become  a  model  for  China's 
cooperation with Central and Eastern European countries” . 800
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 Moreover, the Chinese head of state asserted that Beijing has supported and will continue to 
support  the  Chinese  companies  that  wish  to  participate  in  putting  up  Romania’s 
infrastructure  and  expressed  the  hope  that  Bucharest  and  Beijing  will  increase  mutual 
investment so as to promote their economic growth. Romanian PM Emil Boc praised the 
Sino-Romanian  lengthy  state-to-state  and  people-to-people  relationship  and  argued  that 
Romania was “ready to work with China to further develop bilateral ties and traditional 
friendship  by  strengthening  pragmatic  cooperation  in  the  areas  of  economy,  trade, 
electricity, transport, agriculture and culture” . Towards the end of the meeting with Hu 801
Jintao,  Boc conveyed Bucharest’s willingness to approve and sustain major cooperative 
projects and invited the Chinese companies to invest and set up businesses in Romania .802
During the working visit to China, Romanian PM Emil Boc also met the Chinese Prime 
Minister,  Wen Jiabao.  To the  latter,  the  Romanian  PM proposed  five  major  investment 
projects in Romania, worth at least 1 billion Euro each: the construction of Reactors 3 and 4 
of the Cernavodă power station, the Târnița-Lăpuștești power plant, the Danube-Bucharest 
canal,  the Siret-Bărăgan canal  and Bucharest’s ring road,  to be carried out in a public-
private partnership . Emil Boc also suggested China’s PM to open a subsidiary of the 803
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in Romania. Boc’s visit to China to find investors 
in  the  transportation,  energy  and  agricultural  sectors and  the  following  inconsiderable 
results of this visit would give rise to a political crisis in Bucharest, with the leaders of the 
governing  Democratic  Liberal  Party  (PDL)  and  the  Social  Democratic  Party  (PSD)  in 
opposition making strong accusations to each other. 
According to the PSD Department of Transportation and Infrastructure, because the PDL 
officials canceled several infrastructure contracts to be realised by Chinese enterprises, such 
as the Bucharest ring road and the Brăila bridge, negotiated in a public-private partnership 
in 2003 and 2004, “Emil Boc and Anca Boagiu’s visit will pay no results and, besides the 
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 protocol formalities, no one will take them seriously” .  Moreover, the members of the 804
Social Democratic Party accused Boagiu that the official visit to China was nothing more 
that the Minister’s way of apologising to the Chinese side, and the achievements were far 
from the realisations of  the PSD government during Adrian Năstase who “concluded a 
highway contract with 5,5 million euros per kilometre. They, instead, renegotiated three 
times before closing the deal for a quarter by number of kilometres, with 14 million euros 
per kilometre” . 805
Therefore, the Social-Democratic Party’s press release regarded the ironic wishes to the 
Romanian political elite for the successful achievement of cooperation projects with the 
Chinese side  and stood for PSD President and Prime Minister to come, Victor Ponta’s 806
allegations that the PDL had spent the Romanian government’s money for a state visit that 
“was rather a journey, a holiday for the leading party instead of a working visit” . In this 807
context, Ponta reminisced about the Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s working visit to Beijing, 
during which the Hungarian leader signed contracts worth over 1 billion euros and drew to a 
close that “Boc’s vacation is (...) a sign of his lack of intelligence and ineffectiveness”  808
considering that “he spoke for an hour to Chinese investors about the cut wages, about how 
he wanted to cut pensions, how he increased the VAT or about the austerity measures to 
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 save  Romania  while  (…)  the  Chinese  were  asleep  in  the  room” . Romanian  Prime 809
Minister and PDL leader Emil Boc did not wait too long to reply to the opposition party, 
and  asked  Victor Ponta to publicly give an explanation for the Social Democratic Party’s 
lack of pragmatism and ability to sign contracts with the Chinese side when the party took 
control over the government.“Their party visited China several times and, more 
importantly, Romania was not a member of the European Union at that time, hence the 
legislation allowed it. Now they speak a lot and act so bravely”  told Prime Minister Emil 810
Boc to the Romanian journalists asking him to comment on Ponta’s accusations. Boc 
reminded that Victor Ponta had been Minister in the PSD government leaded by Adrian 
Năstase, and at that point Romania was able to sign direct contracts with China with ease, 
just because the country was not a EU member.  
Moreover, President Ion Iliescu “gave all his support in this respect, but (…) former 
premier Năstase preferred making his own business, a reference to the containers brought 
from China by Năstase, currently subject to a National Anti-corruption Directorate file. We 
went (to China) with (the proposals for) five large projects. We have received the 
acceptance, and according to the European legislation point-by-point, these projects will be 
implemented, but we have to respect the EU rules”  declared the Prime Minister to the 811
Romanian press, and in conclusion advised Victor Ponta to make a complete inventory 
(“inventory of incompetency to conclude a contract with the PRC” ) of his activities as 812
minister within Adrian Năstase's government. 
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 VI.3 A “Great Leap Forward”: 
Cooperation between China and CEECs  within the 16+1 Framework 
The drive for cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries was 
materialised in the Warsaw Forum on April 26th, 2012 at the initiative of the Chinese Prime 
Minister, Wen Jiabao who met with each of the 16 CEE Prime Ministers. On the report of 
the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Directorate of Public Diplomacy, Partnerships and 
Diaspora - Department of Economic Diplomacy entitled “The Initiative of Cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, the goal of this initiative was 
the maintenance of the political dialogue among 17 participatory countries (of which 11 EU 
member states) as well as the promotion, extension and intensification of cooperation with 
regard to economic and trade relations among these countries. In the framework of the 
“16+1 Initiative”, five summits have been held so far - Warsaw 2012, Bucharest 2013, 
Belgrade 2014, Suzhou 2015 and Riga 2016 - including economic forums and meetings of 
the National Coordinators. The platform for cooperation, surfaced from both common 
political will to collaborate and mutual demand for close economic ties, includes China on 
the one side, and Bosnia-Hercegovina, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Montenegro, FYROM & Macedonia, Poland, Romania, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Serbia and Albania on the other.  
As stated, the first China-CEE Summit was held in Warsaw, in April 2012. On that 
occasion, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao announced Beijing’s “12 Measures Strategy” 
for the Promotion of Friendly Cooperation with Central and Eastern European Countries, “a 
document perceived as China’s new engagement strategy in the region” . The twelve 813
points, representing the short and medium-term goals of the platform for cooperation, 
included the setting up of a secretariat for cooperation between China and Central and 
Eastern European countries; the establishment of a US $ 10 billion special credit line; the 
setting up of an investment cooperation fund between the 17 states with the goal of raising 
US $ 500 million in the first stage; the increase of total two-way trade to US $ 100 billion 
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 by 2015; the Chinese support to Chinese enterprises to cooperate with relevant countries in 
order to establish one economic and technological zone in each country in the following 
five years; the Chinese consideration of financial cooperation in terms of currency swap, 
local currency settlement for cross-border trade and the mutual establishment of bank 
branches in each of the 17 countries; the Chinese and European interest in the building of a 
regional highway or railway demonstration network through joint venture; the proposal of a 
forum on cultural cooperation, with regular high-level and expert meetings on culture; the 
provision with 5.000 scholarships for the 16 CEE countries and the support to Confucius 
Institutes and Classes, as well as the mutual invitation to 1.000 students from CEE countries 
to study the Chinese language in China, and 1.0000 Chinese students to study European 
languages in CEE countries in the following five years; the establishment of a tourism 
promotion alliance between China and the 16 CEEC; the establishment of a research fund, 
with China providing RMB 2 million (240.000 Euros) every year to support academic 
exchanges both between research institutes and scholars from China and CEE; the hosting 
in China of the first young political leaders forum of the China-CEE 16+1 platform in 2013, 
to enhance mutual understanding and friendship .  814
However, the platform for cooperation that encompassed such a vast range of areas, from 
the establishment of economic parks with advanced technology and the construction of a 
transport network including highways and railways at the regional level, to the cooperation 
in the cultural, educational and tourism fields, would not prove easy to implement or fulfil. 
First of all, in 2014, two years after the first Summit, Beijing revealed that the CEE 
countries did not exploit the full potential of the line of credit. The main reason for this “are 
the conditions attached to it, which are not favourable especially to EU members. The 
biggest problems concern sovereignty guarantees by the country that receives the credit and 
China’s request to complete its investments in CEE states using Chinese companies and 
labour” . Besides the issue of the credit line, not appropriate for EU member states, 815
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 another problem arose within the China-CEE 16+1 cooperation platform, and that is 
Beijing’s perception of the CEE. As stated by Szczudlik-Tatar, China “claims that the 16 
states are former socialist countries with which China has long had diplomatic relations. 
Nevertheless, the 16 states are different from one another in terms of their size, scope of 
economic development, and even geographical location. What is more, five of them are not 
EU members” .  816
Furthermore, with each of these countries struggling to draw Beijing’s attention and 
enhance bilateral relations with the latter, it becomes “difficult to find common ground for 
the 16 countries in terms of their overall relations with China (…) In this sense, the 16 
states are competitors” . An evidence of this fact has been the competition between 817
Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria to host the second China-CEE 16 summit, ultimately 
scheduled for late November 2013, in Romania. To conclude, Szczudlik-Tatar added that 
the region’s EU member states hesitation to create a common platform for cooperation with 
the Chinese CEE secretariat as it might have been “perceived by Brussels as undermining 
the coherence of EU China policy” , resulted in the EU member CEE “states’ reluctance 818
to appoint high-ranking coordinators for cooperation with the secretariat, despite China’s 
pressure on the issue” . 819
According to Marcin Kaczmarski and Jakub Jakóbowski, other restrictions to China-CEE 
economic cooperation, besides the CEE-EU-China conflict, might be represented by the 
Chinese entrepreneurs’ lack of “knowledge and practical expertise concerning the region 
(…) and insufficient understanding of the legal conditions and characteristics of the 
region” that can be translated in the poor experience for the management of collaboration, 820
inadequate comprehension of the legal system, of the “specific labour and investment law 
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 and the social conditions, for example the mentality of the local workforce” . Last but not 821
least, the scholars have identified “the asymmetry of the economic needs and expectations 
on both sides”  as another challenge for Beijing - CEEC partnership.  822
Accordingly, the PRC “is aware of the huge trade deficit which is not likely to be remedied 
by bilateral actions” , however “the golden era of investing in the region, during which 823
foreign investors were granted access to attractive assets covered by privatisation projects, 
is now over” . While the EU member states from CEE put their trust in greenfield 824
investments, some Chinese companies consider these too risky and “Chinese experts have 
strongly emphasised their fears concerning the possible reaction of the old European 
Union” , especially since the 16+1 platform started to be condemned by EU institutions 825
and criticised by some of the EU’s key states (Germany). In this sense, the Chinese experts 
identified the allegations regarding Beijing’s aim “to divide the EU and to establish a pro-
China lobby within the EU, to foster bilateral relations at the cost of China-EU relations 
and to present the EU with faits accomplis” . As a matter of fact, it is also plausible that 826
“the EU as a whole or some of its strong member states act separately to block”  China-827
CEE initiatives, concluded Kaczmarski and Jakóbowski.  
Anyhow, in the past four years, on the basis of the 16+1 cooperation platform, China-CEE 
partnership has witnessed improvement, while China-EU relations - at least some of the EU 
states - have broadened. On that account, Romanian PM Mihai-Răzvan Ungureanu was one 
of the sixteen CEE heads of government that met the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during 
the 1st  China - CEECs Summit in Warsaw, in April 2012. At that time, bilateral discussions 
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 with Ungureanu focused on the economic opportunities of the two countries, and the 
Romanian authorities put in appearance a list of valid proposals of strategic investment for 
the Chinese side. “We must take note of the Chinese side’s availability to first analyse these 
proposals, and then share them with the special departments”  said the spokesman of the 828
Romanian Government Dan Suciu to the Romanian press on April 27th, 2012. Suciu also 
conveyed that “there is an agreement according to which the Chinese side should come up 
with a financing mechanism for various projects in a Romanian-Chinese partnership” , 829
and that the Romanian authorities also “hoped to stabilise the trade balance with the 
Chinese state, to develop tourism-cultural relations, to identify new opportunities for 
Romanians to study in China and to open the Romanian market for everything that means 
Chinese investment” .  830
According to official sources, the Chinese businessmen were interested in investing in 
Romania mainly in agricultural, IT, infrastructure and energy projects aiming at cross-
border infrastructure plans, through a transportation corridor linking the Black Sea to the 
Baltic Sea, the realisation of industrial and technological parks, and the development of 
programs for renewable energy, agriculture and tourism. Romania also proposed the 
transformation of the Constanta port into a "gateway" for Chinese industrial products to 
Southeastern Europe and the European Union.  
During the press conference, the Romanian journalists caveated the government’s 
spokesman that the PM’s predecessor Emil Boc negotiated with the Chinese side on the 
same topics, however those discussions had ended with no concrete economic result. In 
response, PM Ungureanu would clarify that an entire system needs to be set in motion, 
before such political meetings could capitalise in the economic field: “It is true, many times 
we were put in the position of not being able to offer consistency to high-level contacts (…) 
and you mentioned Prime Minister Emil Boc's visit to China. A whole system must be put in 
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 motion to recognise that the national interest is related to the way in which these high-level 
political contacts are economically exploited, otherwise they become history, as mere 
footnotes. It is not only my interest, but also an experience that I am aware of, and I do not 
want it to repeat ” said PM Ungureanu, former Foreign Minister in the Tăriceanu 831
government. Bucharest  and  Beijing  would  sign the Agreement on Strengthening 
Cooperation in the Field of Infrastructure in Bucharest in October 2012 (Gao Ge: 2017). 
China and Romania maintained frequent high-level exchanges. According to a report of the 
Chinese  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  in March 2013 President Traian Băsescu, Prime 
Minister Victor Ponta, Chairman of the Senate Crin Antonescu and Chairman of the 
Chamber of Deputies Valeriu Zgonea sent letters of congratulations to President Xi Jinping, 
Premier Li Keqiang, NPC Chairman Zhang Dejiang and CPPCC Chairman Yu Zhengsheng 
respectively on their assumption of office. In April, Chairman Zgonea sent a letter to 
Chairman Zhang to express condolences over the earthquake in Lushan, Sichuan.  
At the end of June and early July, Prime Minister Ponta attended the Local Leaders' 
Meeting of China and CEE Countries in Chongqing; he met both President Xi Jinping and 
Premier Li Keqiang during his stay in Beijing . 832
The Minister Delegate of the Department of Infrastructure Projects of National Interest and 
Foreign Investment and Romanian National Coordinator of Cooperation Between China 
and CEE Countries, Dan Ṣova, also visited China for the Local Leaders' Meeting of China 
and CEE Countries held in Chongqing and signed the China-Romania Framework 
Agreement on Cooperation with Vice President of China Development Bank Li Jiping. In 
September, Sova paid a visit to the PRC once more, in occasion of the 23rd session of the 
China-Romania Joint Committee on Economic Cooperation. The first work meeting of the 
China-Romania Expert Advisory Committee for the Construction of Transportation 
Network was held in China the same month .  833
Moreover, in March, Romanian Foreign Minister Titus Corlățean sent a letter of 
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 congratulations to Foreign Minister Wang Yi on his assumption of office and in April and 
July, he sent messages again to his Chinese counterpart, this time to express condolences 
over the earthquakes in Lushan, Sichuan and Dingxi, Gansu respectively. On the Chinese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ account, in October, “Vice Foreign Minister Song Tao traveled 
to Romania for vice-ministerial-level political consultation and presided over the National 
Coordinators' Meeting for Cooperation Between China and CEE Countries. He met with 
Prime Minister Ponta and Foreign Minister Corlățean and held talks with Dan Ṣova, 
Minister Delegate of the Department of Infrastructure Projects of National Interest and 
Foreign Investment and Romanian National Coordinator of Cooperation Between China 
and CEE Countries” .  834
Moreover, Sino-Romanian exchanges at political parties levels were broadened through the 
visits of Deputy Andrei Dolineaschi, Vice Secretary General of the Social Democratic Party, 
who attended the China - Europe High-level Political Parities Forum in Suzhou in April, 
and the President of the Liberal Democratic Party, Vasile Blaga’s June visit to the PRC. In 
September, the same year, NPC Vice Chairman Ji Bingxuan visited Romania and in 
October, Vice-Chairman of the Senate Cristian Dumitrescu payed a visit to China for the 
first Young Political Leaders Forum of China-CEE Countries . 835
Economic and trade cooperation under the framework of Cooperation Between China and 
CEE Countries was nourished by  Constantin Nita’s visit to China, in his quality of Minister 
Delegate of the Department of Energy. On that occasion, Nita attended the ninth China 
Nuclear Energy Congress . 836
In the cultural field, from April to August, China held the exhibition “Treasures of China” in 
Romania, an event “unprecedented in scale, duration and value since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the two countries” . In May, Irina Marin, Secretary of State 837
of the Culture Ministry, visited China in occasion of the first China-CEE Countries Forum 
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 on Cultural Cooperation, while the “Romanian Radio National Orchestra” staged 
performances at the Shanghai Spring International Music Festival .  838
A month later, in June, the exhibition "New Vision: Contemporary Chinese Art" was held in 
Romania and in July, leaders from 10 Romanian cities or counties, “including Bucharest, 
the County of Argeș and the County of Dâmbovița, came to China for the Local Leaders' 
Meeting of China and CEE Countries held in Chongqing and signed cooperation 
agreements with their Chinese counterparts at the meeting” . On that occasion, the 839
Romanian delegation included, besides Premier Ponta, the President of the Bacău County 
Council,  Dragoş Benea,  the  already  mentioned  Dan  Ṣova,  Minister  for  Infrastructure 
Projects and head of the delegation, Doru Costea, former Ambassador of Romania to the 
People's  Republic  of  China,  heads  of  administrative-territorial  units,  as  well  as 
representatives of the Romanian business environment. 
In November, the 4th Confucius Institute in Romania was established in Bucharest. On that 
occasion, Bucharest and Beijing signed the Agreement Between the People's Republic of 
China and Romania on Mutually Establishing Cultural Centres and the Plan for Cultural 
Cooperation for the period 2013-2016. 
Vice Minister of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and 
Quarantine Wei Chuanzhong payed a visit to Romania. On that occasion, a “Memorandum 
Between the People's Republic of China and Romania on Cooperation in Animal Inspection 
and Quarantine and Food Security” was signed, along with a Protocol between the General 
Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of the PRC and the 
National Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority of Romania on the Quarantine and 
Sanitary Requirements for China's Import of cattle from Romania as well as a Protocol 
between the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine of 
the PRC and the National Sanitary Veterinary and Food Safety Authority of Romania on the 
Quarantine and Sanitary Requirements for China's Import of Frozen Pork from Romania . 840
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 According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a delegation was sent to the first 
European Public Diplomacy Forum held in Romania the same year. Moreover, vice 
Minister of Supervision Yu Chunsheng visited Romania, while vice Chairman of the NPC 
Foreign Affairs Committee and head of the group on China's relations with the European 
Parliament (EP) Wang Xiaochu, “led a delegation to the EP for the 36th Meeting of the 
NPC-EP Regular Exchange Mechanism and visited Romania” . Last, but not least, the 841
President of the National Integrity Agency Horia Georgescu, Inspector General of the 
Romanian Gendarmerie Mircea Olaru and President of the Constitutional Court Augustin 
Zegrean visited China. According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, by the end of 
2013, the two countries had established 27 sister cities .842
As mentioned, at the end of June and early July in 2013, Romanian Prime Minister Victor 
Ponta attended the Local Leaders' Meeting of China and CEECs in Chongqing, China. On 
that occasion, he met both the Chinese President Xi Jinping and Premier Li Keqiang, and 
spoke about the two countries profound friendship, mutual support, respect and 
understanding, about the Sino-Romanian bilateral friendship “as important precondition 
and foundation for pragmatic cooperation”  in all fields of activity, especially in the 843
spheres of economics and trade, investment and new energy, and about Bucharest’s will to 
be Beijing’s “best cooperation partner in Europe (…) to continue to play a positive role in 
promoting China’s cooperation with CEE countries as well as Europe-China relations” . 844
Romanian  Premier Victor Ponta visited China once again at the end of August-early 
September 2014, in occasion of the 65th  anniversary since the establishment of bilateral 
diplomatic ties between China and Romania and the 10th anniversary since the inauguration 
of the China-Romania Comprehensive Friendly Cooperative Partnership. The Chinese and 
Romanian highest level leadership, thus President Xi Jinping and President Klaus Iohannis, 
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 would meet once more in September 2015, in occasion of the 70th anniversary since the 
founding of the United Nations.  
China's assertiveness at a global level is revealed by the largest project ever launched by a 
single country, the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road - the 
“Belt and Road” or the “One Belt, One Road” - known with the acronym OBOR, initiated 
between September-October 2013, in occasion of the Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to 
Central and Southeast Asia. To begin with, the OBOR, strategic interest of the Chinese 
leaders motivated by Beijing’s domestic and foreign economic and geopolitical factors, 
encompasses cooperation with more than 70 countries and “international organisations 
from Asia to Europe and Africa, even to Latin America, and requires a greater coordination 
of states around the world in matters of politics, of increasing financial integration, of 
promoting commercial exchanges and investments, of encouraging connectivity through 
infrastructure projects, and motivating people's movement and cultural exchanges. Its 
implementation period is estimated at 35 years” . Moreover, an inextricable part of the 845
OBOR project is represented by the platform for cooperation China-CEE 16+1, launched in 
2011. 
As mentioned, when the 2nd Summit of China and CEECs was held in Bucharest in 
November 2013, Li Keqiang paid his first official visit to Romania in his quality of Premier 
of the PRC and was the first Chinese Prime Minister to visit the country in past 19 years. In 
the welcoming speech, Li Keqiang stressed that, in view of the China-CEECs profound 
traditional friendship and lack of conflict of interest, “there is a firm foundation for 
expanding cooperation. China-CEEC cooperation is transparent, open and inclusive. It not 
only conforms to the interests of both sides, but also will play a positive and constructive 
role in deepening China-EU comprehensive strategic partnership” . Moreover, the 846
Chinese PM emphasised Beijing’s interest to develop strong relations with CEE states and 
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 “to innovate cooperation ideas, methods and mechanisms, to properly implement the 
Bucharest Guideline, and to promote China-CEEC cooperation to a new level” .  847
After delineating the 3 abiding principles that lay the foundation of the China-CEE 
cooperation - mutual respect and equal treatment; mutual benefits, win-win results and 
common development; and moving towards the same direction while promoting a balanced 
development - Li Keqiang advanced a six point proposal for the intensification of the 
cooperation between China and the CEECs in the following phase: 1) intensify economic 
and trade cooperation, and strive to double China-CEE trade value in five years; 2) speed up 
connectivity by jointly promoting “renovation and construction of China-CEEC 
transportation infrastructure to open up land and sea transportation channels between 
China and Europe”  and setting up “bonded areas and distribution centres along railways 848
and ports to build a new artery for China-Europe logistics” ; 3) boost green cooperation 849
by participating in the CEE nuclear power and other electric power projects, and improving 
investment environment; 4) expand financing channels by capitalising on the 10-billion-US-
dollar special credit line for China-CEEC cooperation and “setting up branches of financial 
institutions with the relevant CEE countries, signing currency swap and settlement 
agreements” ; 5) advance cooperation at local levels; 6) improve people-to-people and 850
cultural exchanges by supporting regular China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Forum and the 
Education Policy Dialogue, and the Young Political Leaders Forum, “strengthen exchanges 
between think-tanks and media” . According to Li Keqiang, China was “willing to take 851
corresponding measures with various countries to offer visas and other conveniences to 
citizens who travel and work at other relevant countries” . 852
The CEEC leaders acknowledged Li Kieqiang’s statements, applauded the achievements of 
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 CEEC-China cooperation and endorsed “the bilateral cooperative strategy framework put 
forward by Li Keqiang, thinking that it has further defined the general direction of bilateral 
cooperation development” . The 16 leaders remarked that CEECs shared similar 853
experiences with the PRC, both China and the CEE region found themselves at a key stage 
of development, while the bilateral relationship had a huge strategic importance. Moreover, 
they expressed high appreciation for their countries’ traditional friendship with China, 
showed admiration for China's development achievements, and proclaimed that China's 
further reform and opening-up would unfold “broader prospects for bilateral cooperation. 
CEE countries are willing to work with China to promote cooperation in economy and 
trade, investment, infrastructure connectivity, energy, finance, environmental protection and 
other fields, with a broader view and a more active attitude, to realise common development 
and to inject new impetus into China-EU relations” . 854
During Premier Li Keqiang's first official visit to Romania, he held bilateral talks with PM 
Victor Ponta, met Romanian President Traian Băsescu, Chairman of the Senate Crin 
Antonescu and Chairman of the Chamber of Deputies Valeriu Zgonea and held a speech on 
the topic “China - Romania Friendship and Cooperation: Move Forward Like a Ship in 
High Gear” at the parliament of Romania . In the course of the 2nd Summit China - 855
CEEC, bilateral discussions with Romanian Premier Victor Ponta on November 25th 
concentrated on Bucharest and Beijing’s need to increase the bilateral cooperation in 
economy and trade, to promote the energy sector and the construction of railway as well as 
other infrastructure. Moreover, Li Keqiang demanded an increase of the Romanian exports 
to China, especially with regard to agricultural and animal products and stated that China 
“was willing to increase imports of beef, mutton and other quality farm products from 
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 Romania, and strengthen long-term cooperation” .  856
The two governments agreed on supporting enterprises to increase mutual investment in 
line with the market legislation and business principles, as well as on encouraging people-to 
people and cultural exchanges  “and consolidate the social foundation of bilateral relations, 
so as to help pass on the China-Romania friendship from generation to generation” . 857
Towards the end of the meeting, Li Keqiang praised the Sino-Romanian traditional 
friendship relations, and maintained that Romania, as a large, significant country in Central 
and Eastern Europe was an active participant and facilitator of China-CEE cooperation, and, 
as member of the EU, was able to promote China-EU relations.   
Victor Ponta claimed that China was Romania’s “special partner and friend”, and thus 
Bucharest would “certainly push the bilateral relationship forward into a new phase” . 858
Moreover, Ponta emphasised Romania’s wish to strengthen cooperation with the PRC in the 
economic field, in trade, electric power, railway, animal husbandry and other spheres, 
expand people-to-people and cultural exchanges and support each other in international and 
regional affairs. Hence, “Romania will do its best in hosting the CEEC-China Summit (…) 
serve as China's gateway to Europe (…) and play an active role in promoting CEE-China 
cooperation and the development of EU-China relationship”  concluded the Romanian 859
head of government.  
Additionally, the two prime ministers decided organise working groups in order to 
encourage negotiations on bilateral cooperation in high-speed rail, energy and several other 
major projects and, at the end of the talks, witnessed the signing of a series of bilateral 
cooperative projects covering such areas as economy, trade, investment, quarantine, culture, 
as well as energy, and issued the “Joint Declaration by the Government of the PRC and the 
 “When Holding Talks with Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta, Li Keqiang Stresses to Deepen China-856
Romania Traditional Friendship and Pragmatic Cooperation, and Promote China-CEE Cooperation and China-
EU Relations to Achieve Greater Development”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, 26.11.2013, 
ava i lab le a t h t tp : / /www.fmprc .gov.cn /mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zz jg_663340/xos_664404/
gjlb_664408/3215_664730/3217_664734/t1103423.shtml , accessed on 06.02.2017
 Ibidem857
 Ibidem858
 Ibidem859
 440
 Government of Romania on Deepening Bilateral Cooperation in the New Circumstances”, a 
document stating that the Sino-Romanian “comprehensive friendly cooperative partnership 
is regarded as an example of inter-state relations in the current period”  and “conformed 860
to the aspiration and fundamental interest of the two countries and peoples” .  861
Therefore, according to the partnership agreement, the two sides would enhance the 
“connotation of the traditional friendship, further develop mutually beneficial and win-win 
cooperation, as well as promote common prosperity of the two countries under the principle 
of mutual respect, equality and mutual benefit” . 862
On the afternoon of November 27th, 2013, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang delivered a speech 
entitled “Letting the Ship of China-Romania Friendship Brave the Wind and Waves and Set 
Sail on the Sea” at the Romanian Parliament in Bucharest, in front of over 600 delegates 
attending the event. The President of the Romanian Senate Crin Antonescu, President of the 
Romanian Chamber of Deputies Valeriu Zgonea, Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta, all 
the members of parliament, cabinet ministers, governors, mayors, and foreign diplomats 
were also present . On that occasion, the Chinese head of government initiated his talk by 863
informing the attendees that Romania was the first among the Central and Eastern European 
countries he visited since he took office, and was impressed by the friendly feelings of the 
Romanian people towards the Chinese.  
Sino-Romanian bilateral ties had a long history, stressed Li Keqiang, however with the 
beginning of the 21st century, relations between Bucharest and Beijing had entered a new 
stage, “with mutual political trust being increasingly enhanced, economic and trade 
cooperation being constantly expanded and people-to-people exchange getting more and 
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 more colourful and diversified” . Moreover, the Chinese premier drew an analogy 864
between the Sino-Romanian relations and a large ship that “driving from the past, has 
withstood the tests of storms, and is driving confidently towards the future. To move steadily 
and far, the big ship needs to have an accurate rudder - befitting development strategies; a 
swelling canvas - deep pragmatic cooperation; and a solid anchor - firm traditional 
friendship. China and Romania are friends sharing weal and woe” .  865
Premier Li claimed that because Romania was a key element for the cooperation between 
China and CEE countries and between China and Europe, the two countries needed to boost 
political trust, to tap potentials of pragmatic cooperation, to develop big cooperation 
projects, to build bridges for people-to-people and non-governmental exchange, “to keep 
running cultural brand event, cement and expand current cultural, educational and people-
to-people exchange, so as to let the seeds of mutual learning between civilisations take 
roots and spread and let China-Romania friendship be passed onto future generations” . 866
Last but not least, Li Keqiang referred to the “China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation”, that had been adopted by China-EU Leaders’ Meeting in Beijing a week 
before, thus allowing all-round cooperation between China and EU “to embark on a new 
journey” , and designating the Sino-Romanian partnership a resource to add new 867
dynamics to the Sino-European cooperation. 
Prime Minister Victor Ponta, accompanied by a government delegation including ministers 
Liviu Dragnea, Daniel Constantin, Ioan Rus and Constantin Niță, payed an official visit to 
China between August 31st - September 2nd 2014, at the invitation of the Chinese side. On 
that occasion, Ponta held official talks with Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, Chinese 
President Xi Jinping and had a meeting with Zhang Dejiang, Chairman of the Permanent 
Committee of the National People's Assembly. The agenda of discussions included issues 
related to the strengthening of the EU-China relationship and future steps to be taken under 
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 the Central and Eastern Europe - China cooperation format, the implementation of the 
conventions agreed upon during the Bucharest Summit of 2013, especially those related to 
energy, infrastructure, agriculture, education, and culture. At the same time, bilateral talks 
with Chinese officials covered regional and international affairs issues, as well as due 
preparations for the Romanian Prime Minister’s participation at the economic meeting 
attended by representatives of the main Chinese companies and banks that ran businesses or 
wished to invest in Romania. Prime Minister Ponta travelled with the high-speed train at 
Tienjin, where he visited the Tianjian Technology Park and had meetings with the mayor 
and representatives of the companies doing business in the technology park in the fields of 
IT, car components, bio products, car construction, etc.  
On that occasion, the Romanian head of government said that Bucharest was proud of the 
traditional friendship with Beijing and expressed admiration to the CPC, for the way it 
leaded the Chinese people on the socialist road. He concluded by stating that Romania 
appreciated the PRC’s important role in promoting global peace and assured the Chinese 
leadership that Bucharest would continue to firmly support China's efforts to maintain 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity . 868
Three months later, on December 16th, 2014, the 3rd Summit of China-CEECs was held in 
Belgrade, Serbia. This time, the summit covered matters of cooperation in the fields of 
economy, trade (agriculture and livestock products), finance, agriculture, transport, 
investments, science, technology and innovation, energy, environment, education, tourism 
and culture. The 16+1 platform for cooperation also tackled with issues concerning sectors 
such as industry, manufacturing, telecommunication and health . 869
On the report of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on that occasion, CEEC heads of 
government and Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang eulogised the progress of the China-
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 CEEC cooperation, especially with regard to the implementation of the Bucharest 
Guidelines for Cooperation between China and CEECs “and recognised that China-CEEC 
cooperation has provided new driving force to China-CEEC traditional friendship, built a 
new platform for mutually beneficial cooperation and served as a new engine for deepening 
China-Europe relations for mutual benefit and win-win cooperation” .  870
Moreover, the participants restated that the PRC-CEECs cooperation respected Beijing-EU 
relations and reaffirmed their dedication to deepen the partnership for peace, growth, reform 
and civilisation “based on the principles of equality, respect and trust, thus contributing as 
appropriate to the implementation of the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for 
Cooperation” . Additionally, representatives of the 16+1 China-CEE partnership declared 871
to continue to do their best in order to have their countries and peoples benefiting from the 
cooperation, in the sense of attaining economic growth and prosperity, and promoting peace 
and stability by promulgating - in line with every country’s law and, in the case of EU 
members in accordance with the EU legislation and policy - the “Belgrade Guidelines for 
Cooperation between China and CEECs”, on the topic "New Driving Force, New Platform 
and New Engine” . 872
During the meeting between the Chinese PM and CEEC heads of government in Belgrade, 
Premier Li Keqiang and Romanian Prime Minister Victor Ponta spoke about intensifying 
the nuclear energy and the thermal energy along with the expansion of cooperation in 
transport infrastructure (the high-speed rail project from Bucharest to Constanta). Moreover, 
the Chinese leader hoped that Romania and the Republic of Moldova would also start 
consultations on the high-speed rail project, with Chinese support for preliminary studies. 
Prime Minister Victor Ponta claimed that Romania was willing to intensify cooperation 
with China in areas such as nuclear energy, thermal energy, high-speed rail, aviation, 
agriculture and culture, so as to further promote both bilateral relations and CEE-China 
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 cooperation. The Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China and CEECs thus 
witnessed the signing of nuclear energy cooperation agreements between China and 
Romania, as well as Romania’s initiative of setting up a centre for Dialogue and 
Cooperation in energy-related projects. Towards the end of the meeting, Chinese Premier Li 
Keqiang stressed that besides the energy and large infrastructure project cooperation, 
Romania and China needed to accelerate the research on the construction of the high-speed 
rail project, the agricultural potential, to strengthen scientific and technological partnership 
as well as the trade and investment in the agricultural field . 873
The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and CEECs were drew up and 
enacted during the 4th Summit of China and CEECs in 2015.   
The 4th meeting of the 17 heads of governments held in Suzhou marked a significant 
moment for the cooperation between China and the CEEC. The main topic of its agenda, 
“New starting point, new domains and new vision” concerned the need to make steps 
forward; to unfold new measures for, and to open new fields of, cooperation; to assess the 
terrain for a trilateral cooperation between China and Europe throughout the triangle China-
CEEC-EU . According to the Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs report, two documents 874
were approved during the Suzhou meeting of the 16+1 heads of government, a medium-
time Agenda for Cooperation, which anticipated the main directions of this “Initiative” for 
the period 2015-2020, and the “Suzhou Guidelines”.  
In this sense, Chinese President Xi Jinping unfolded that the medium-time agenda, master 
plan for a stable cooperation, would be founded on four main concepts, hence openness, 
inclusiveness, cooperation and benefits, while the pillars of cooperation would be political 
dialogue, cooperation in the fields of infrastructure (roads, rails, ports) and trade, integration 
of capitals and understanding among the nations . According to Oehler-Ṣincai, these 875
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 elements came to support Beijing’s position of satisfying the specific needs of the region, 
taking into account the differences in levels of development between the CEE countries that 
have recently joined the EU and the West, and the fact that the real convergence process 
between East and West, South and North has been interrupted since 2008-2009, the moment 
of the global financial and economic crisis .  876
During the meeting, participants praised the progress that had been made in the cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries between 2014-2015, especially 
with regard to the implementation of the “Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between 
China and CEECs”, and backed the significant agreement between the Chinese and EU 
leaders on the establishment of the China-EU Connectivity Platform, “as well as on 
developing synergies between the Belt and Road initiative of China and the Investment Plan 
for Europe, and between 16+1 cooperation and China-EU relations” .   877
Thus, Li Keqiang’s main proposals at this summit were the implementation of port 
collaborations between the three seas defining the European region, namely the Baltic Sea, 
the Black Sea and the Adriatic Sea - the arteries of the OBOR project. “Given the rich 
experience in the construction of harbours (…) we are eager to invest in port projects in the 
Central and Eastern European states”  said the Chinese PM on that occasion. He also 878
proposed the establishment of a 16 + 1 financial entity to facilitate China's financing of 
China's projects.  
In addition to the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), Beijing wished to join the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in order to be able to implement its 
projects more easily in the European countries. Li also announced China’s plan to build a 
high-speed line in the Baltic Sea region and talked about this project with Estonia's Prime 
Minister, Taavi Rõivas. Interestingly enough, in order to present China's high-speed line-
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 building experience in a visible and unforgettable way, Li would lead the representatives of 
the 16 states to travel in a high-speed Chinese train . Last but not least, the representatives 879
of the seventeen countries welcomed and supported Romania's initiative to organise a 
Centre for Dialogue in energy-related projects, with the meeting of the Centre due to take 
place for the first time in Romania the following year, in 2016 (Gao Ge: 2017).  
Probably Hungary believed more than any other CEE state in China’s initiatives, 
considering that the authorities in Budapest immediately expressed their intention to 
become a member of the AIIB and the Hungarian capital city was the first out of 16 
participants to sign a Memorandum of Understanding as part of the One Belt One Road 
project with Beijing. The Memorandum represented the foundation for future Chinese 
investments in the Budapest-Belgrade railway route, with a possible extension to Greece via 
Macedonia .  880
During the China-CEE summit, Hungary was represented by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
and various senior officials, such as the Foreign Minister, who signed a new agreement on 
the financing of the Budapest-Belgrade route, with 85% Chinese investment and 15% by 
the Hungarian state. Poland, the only Central and Eastern European state founding member 
of AIIB, reinforced its partnerships with China by means of bilateral talks between the 
Polish President and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping, as well as with Premier Li 
Keqiang. Discussions included the possibility of Chinese investment in Poland's energy 
sector, more precisely, in building a nuclear power plant. The Czech Republic instead, 
welcomed China's certain investments in the nuclear sector as well as Beijing's desire to 
create a special financial mechanism for the Chinese currency RMB in Prague. During the 
meeting with Xi Jinping, the Czech Prime Minister signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding on the One Belt One Road project. While Bulgaria, represented by Prime 
Minister Boyko Borisov along with other seven cabinet ministers, attracted important 
Chinese investments in the agricultural, commercial and financial fields, during the 16+1 
Summit, Slovakia managed to bring a ZTE research centre in Bratislava, by signing a 
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 bilateral agreement with the Chinese side . 881
Romania, unlike any other state in the China - CEEC 16+1 platform of cooperation, did not 
wish to get involved in any of the two projects proposed by China, namely OBOR and the 
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Although former Prime Minister Victor Ponta had 
initially announced his participation at the 16 + 1 China-CEE Summit in Suzhou, new 
Prime Minister of Romania Dacian Cioloș appeared hardly interested in partaking, and thus 
in stimulating China to invest in energy, agricultural and infrastructure projects in Romania. 
In fact, on that occasion, Romania’s delegation to China was represented by the Foreign 
Minister, Lazar Comănescu and vice-premier and Minister of Economy Costin Borc, albeit 
the meeting was supposed to comprise presidents or prime ministers of the CEE states. Both 
Borc and Comănescu met the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang . 882
In a speech held by vice-premier Borc at the summit, he called for more intense bilateral 
cooperation on agriculture, in order to increase the Romanian exports to China. Moreover, 
besides underlying the necessity to broaden the initiatives on tourism, the minister 
expressed the new Romanian government’s preoccupation “for seeing the ambitious agenda 
of the China - Central and Eastern Europe cooperation materialise, especially by including 
Romania's potential of a regional hub in the future routes of the multi-modal goods 
transport between China and Europe” . Specifically, he highlighted Romania's desire to 883
become a transport hub in the region, by developing the naval infrastructure in the port of 
Constanta and the Danube River . Furthermore, Borc provided sustenance for Bucharest’s 884
initiative to engage in the “coordination of the Sectorial Group on the energy cooperation 
between China and the 16 countries in the region. He underscored the need to attract 
regional resources, resources from the European Union and from China in order to 
capitalise on the creative potential in the information technology sector and on the new 
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 technologies in communications, information society and energy, by using already launched 
capacities or capacities that are undergoing consolidation in Romania” .  885
On that occasion, China and Romania signed cooperation agreements on quality inspection, 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) regarding the relevant nuclear power project, and 
a new agreement on avoidance of the double taxation .  886
Nonetheless, Romania failed to sign important agreements on OBOR or AIIB projects and 
thus, Bucharest’s delegation failed to achieve significant projects with Beijing. In 
conclusion, with Romanian leadership missing important economic opportunities coming 
from Asia - while Poland, Bulgaria, Serbia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia sanctioned 
memorandums of understanding on the OBOR and AIIB projects and reinforced 
collaboration with Beijing in various fields - the summit in Suzhou was an official 
diplomatic visit which only produced scarce pragmatic solutions. 
The second edition of the China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo during the International 
Consumer Goods Fair, following the Belt and Road Initiative, Yangtze River Economic Belt 
Strategy and The Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and 
Eastern European Countries, on the theme regarding “win-win cooperation” was held in 
Ningbo, China between 9-12 June 2016. By means of forums, exhibitions, investment 
symposiums, and cultural exchanges, the Expo represented an important platform for 
China-CEEC cooperation in all areas and contributed to the implementation of the Belt & 
Road Initiative and further opening-up of the country. Romanian Deputy Prime Minister 
Costin Borc participated at both the China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on Promoting 
Economy and Trade Cooperation organised between 7-9 June in Ningbo, China, and the 
China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo.  
On this occasion, Romania and China signed 5 bilateral cooperation projects regarding the 
construction of a car components factory in Brasov - investment worth 45 million Euro; a 
project in the field of automotive ornaments - investment worth US $ 17.6 million; the 
construction in Romania of a solar power plant of 20 MW - investment worth 33 million 
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 Euro; investments in the development of some real estate complexes in the Bucharest area - 
amounting to 23 million Euro and project of cooperation and exchange of experience in 
education in Hunedoara, Romania. During the summit, the Romanian delegation met the 
Chinese Trade Minister Gao Hucheng. Bilateral talks on that occasion focused on the 
importance of Chinese investments in Romania, a famous destination for Chinese tourists 
due to the traditional relations between the two countries, and a country with a huge tourist 
potential. “We will support you on both the touristic and commercial level, so that more and 
more Romanian products reach the Chinese market (…) The Government supports all 
Chinese companies that want to develop rail infrastructure projects, energy or tourism 
projects in Romania. What we want from the Romanian state is better coordination on these 
projects, considering that some companies have already signed agreements of 
investments”  announced the Chinese minister of Commerce.  887
Moreover, the two leaders mentioned the two Chinese companies that want to invest in the 
central heating plant from Rovinari - within the Oltenia Energy Complex - and the reactors 
3 and 4 of the Cernavodă nuclear power plant. “We hope to have you in Bucharest in 
September, when Romania will host the Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation in Energy, 
within the 16 + 1 China - Central and Eastern Europe format”  stated Costin Borc, 888
Romanian Minister of Economy and Deputy Prime Minister, and then he claimed that 
Romania offered many investment opportunities and Chinese companies were welcome to 
develop projects, if they respected the legal framework applied by the European Union. 
Moreover, he continued, “at the end of last year I had the privilege to lead the Romanian 
delegation to the fourth 16 + 1 cooperation summit in Suzhou, and I appreciate that now, 
almost eight months later, we meet in Ningbo to collaborate so far on a new concrete and 
implementable actions that make our efforts more substantial and profitable for all. Sino-
Romanian trade reached 3.8 billion $ last year and in the first quarter of this year we have 
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 already seen a slight increase of 1.4% of Romanian exports to the Chinese market”  said 889
Borc to the Chinese Minister of Commerce, and added that the authorities in Bucharest 
were making every effort to increase to increase the percentage.   
Towards the end of the meeting, Borc spoke about the revival of the Silk Road Economic 
Zone and stated that Romania was willing to cooperate on the project, being one of the first 
countries to sign a document for the development of the bilateral cooperation in the 
economic area of the Silk Road, and the Romanian political elite wished to implement 
cooperation projects and investments in this format: “it is in our interest to connect the One 
Belt, One Road initiative, through the Black Sea, with the European Strategy for the 
Danube Region” .  890
At the end of the conference, the delegations of the 16 Central and Eastern European 
countries, together with the Chinese representatives, signed a Declaration for cooperation in 
trade and economic sectors in the 16 + 1 platform, for the promotion of specific products, 
for the inauguration of new bilateral trade areas and the expansion of the sectors for 
cooperation. The Declaration also reinforced the continuation of investment projects in 
road, rail, maritime and air infrastructure as well as energy infrastructure. The Investment 
and Trade Exhibition, organised by the China-CEE Development Cooperation Forum, was 
attended by approximately 200 companies from the 16 CEE countries and nearly 300 
Chinese companies. Romania was represented by 12 companies promoting Romanian 
traditional products. Last, but not least, the Romanian Deputy Prime Minister expressed his 
conviction that Romania's pavilion would play an active role in promoting and diversifying 
Romanian products imported into the Ningbo area and across Zhejiang province, thus 
contributing to the development of the Romanian- Chinese commercial ties . 891
With Latvia being entrusted with the organisation of the 5th Summit of China and Central 
and Eastern European Countries on November 5th, 2016, in Riga, the Latvian authorities 
were assigned the task of organising key events of the 16+1 cooperation platform, such as 
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 the Meeting of Heads of Government as well as related side events like the business forum, 
the national coordinators’ meeting, a seminar of think tanks and the first 16+1 Transport 
Ministers' meeting. Moreover, at the Summit held in Suzhou, China, in November 2015, 
Latvia was given responsibility for the establishment and hosting of a Secretariat on 
logistics cooperation. On that occasion, besides the seventeen Premiers of the 16+1 
platform for cooperation, representatives of other parties - including Austria, Belarus, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the EU, Greece and Switzerland - 
were brought together as observers. 
In the beginning of the meeting, the participants expressed appreciation and gratitude to the 
Latvian authorities for the efforts made as host country to ensure the success of the meeting, 
“reviewed the good progress and results of the cooperation between China-CEECs since 
the establishment of the format in 2012 and commended the implementation of the Medium-
Term Agenda and the Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and CEECs” . 892
Additionally, the 17 members of the 16+1 format concurred to the feasibility of the 
cooperation and restated their goal for a coherent, viable and persisting partnership in 
various fields, denoting “openness, inclusiveness and mutual benefit” and their wish to find 
greater “synergies between 16+1 Cooperation and the EU-China Comprehensive Strategic 
Partnership, including through the EU-China Connectivity Platform” .  893
In this context, at the end of the meeting the participants conceived and issued two 
documents on the topic “Connectivity, Innovation, Inclusiveness and Common 
Development”, the “Riga Guidelines” and the “Riga Declaration”, “a document that lays 
foundation for more intensive cooperation in the development of ports, transport corridors 
and infrastructure connecting the CEECs with China” . Heads of government of all 894
countries witnessed the signing of cooperation agreements comprising various areas, such 
as connectivity, production capacity cooperation, infrastructure construction, people-to-
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 people and cultural exchanges, human resource and civil aviation cooperation. 
In his speech, Chinese premier Li Keqiang outlined the positive impact of the 16+1 
partnership for maintaining peace and development in the world also because part of, and 
supplement to China-EU cooperation. Li Keqiang spoke about the necessity to increase 
liberalisation, to smooth trade and investment, to keep the market mutually open, to 
enhance regional economic cooperation, and “oppose trade and investment protectionism, 
so as to not only add momentum to self-development but also contribute to world economic 
recovery” . The Chinese Prime Minister also made some suggestions for the 16+1 895
cooperation, related to the theme of the summit: 1) to intensify cooperation on infrastructure 
and connectivity - Beijing endorsed large Chinese companies to play a role in the 
construction of highway networks, port networks, power grids and Internet development in 
CEEC; the PRC leadership was prepared to proceed with the construction of the Budapest-
Belgrade railway and China-Europe Land-Sea Express, as well as other projects to 
additionally strengthen the CEEC’s role as a transport hub on the Eurasian Land Bridge; 2) 
to deepen financial cooperation through the establishment of the China-CEEC Financial 
Holding Company - on this topic, Li Keqiang stated that “China has signed Memorandums 
of Understanding with Poland and the Czech Republic on making financial contributions, 
and other Central and Eastern European countries are most welcome to take part” ; 896
moreover, he supported the boosting of cooperation on local currency settlement and 
financial institutions, including the Silk Road Fund, to provide financing for the 16+1 
cooperation projects; 3) to explore cooperation on green economy, “like processing bases of 
agricultural products and encourage cooperation on green agriculture between provinces 
and cities in China and the CEEC” .  897
Additionally, China expressed its wish to further cooperation on environmental protection, 
and increase cooperation in wind electricity and solar energy; to broaden people-to-people 
and cultural exchanges and cooperation by drawing on fields like education, culture, 
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 tourism, health, youth and other cooperation mechanisms. According to Li Keqiang, 2016 
was the Year of 16+1 People-to-People and Cultural Exchanges, thus Beijing supported the 
early establishment of a 16+1 coordination centre on cultural cooperation, and wished to 
invite young people from the CEEC to receive training in China. Moreover, Chinese 
Premier expressed his wishes for the facilitation of visa procedures for Chinese tourists and 
for the nomination of the year 2017 as the Year of China-CEEC Media Cooperation.  
The CEECs’ representatives expressed their satisfaction for the impressive achievements of 
the 16+1 cooperation format as well as their wish to intensify “the capacity of mechanism 
building, stick to the parallel development of economic and people-to-people and cultural 
cooperation, deepen cooperation in infrastructure, production capacity, trade, finance, 
agriculture, technology and other areas, expand new cooperation patterns such as e-
commerce, and expand local cooperation and people-to-people and cultural exchanges in 
technology, culture, education, health care, tourism and other areas”  in order to produce 898
connectivity, mutual benefit and win-win results, and enhance the evolution of both China-
CEEC relations and China-EU strategic partnership. 
At the plenary meeting of the 16+1 Cooperation Summit, Romanian Prime Minister Dacian 
Cioloș outlined different angles of interest for Romania, that would have been the subjects 
of bilateral discussions with the Chinese premier Li Keqiang. First of all, Cioloș spoke 
about Bucharest leadership’s responsibility to open in the Romanian capital city a centre of 
cooperation and dialogue in the energy field (already open at the time of the press 
statement) and to organise a fair of energy in the 16 +1 format the following year. Secondly, 
the Romanian head of government mentioned the role played - within the One Belt One 
Road concept - by the Constanta port for the Danube strategy, the connection and thus the 
transit of goods that can be achieved between Central and Western Europe, China and the 
EU. “In this respect, during the meeting with the Chinese Prime Minister, I will outline the 
importance we attach to the opportunity to develop a ferry-boat line between Batumi 
(Georgia) and Constanța, which may connect the Central Asia and China side of this silk-
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 road to Europe”  stated the Romanian premier.  899
Thirdly, Cioloș emphasised Bucharest authorities’ interested in further developing the trade 
exchanges, especially regarding the access of Romanian agri-food products to the Chinese 
market (meat and meat products), as well as the importance of developing the field of 
tourism in both ways - for the Chinese tourists traveling to Romania and Romanians visiting 
China - also by means of a direct charter flight Bucharest-Beijing. With respect to the 
nuclear energy sector, Dacian Cioloș claimed that advancement has been made concerning 
both the Rovinari thermal power plant project and the nuclear power plant in Cernavodă, 
Reactors 3 and 4: “We are in advanced stages, but some points need to be clarified and we 
need a clear position on the Chinese part too. We need to take into account European 
regulations too, European market regulations which should be introduced in the contract 
elements that are to be decided”  announced the Romanian PM regarding these projects. 900
Asked about the Romanian agreement with the Chinese company Huawei during the press 
statement at Riga, Cioloș revealed that the contract regarded the organisation of internships 
for Romanian students in the Chinese company, with the support of the Ministry of 
Communications and Ministry of Education, and expressed his wish for intensification of 
this type of  collaboration between Huawei and Romanian universities.  
To the reporter’s question concerning the Romanian agri-food products’ access to the 
Chinese market, Dacian Cioloș explained that, in the first place, the leadership in Bucharest 
was waiting for some documents - export certificates from the Chinese side. Moreover, in 
order to facilitate the entrance of these products on the Chinese market, each Romanian 
company that was meat processor and that wished to export, needed accreditation, “starting 
from the sanitary veterinary situation of these Romanian enterprises – here, the Sanitary 
Veterinary Authority is in contact with the similar authority from China. A high – level 
impetus is required for this. I know this subject very well, since I was European 
Commissioner, and I know that, beyond the technical issue, an impetus is required at 
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 governmental level too” .  901
In conclusion, undoubtedly during the four years of China-CEE 16+1 cooperation platform, 
relations between China and each of the CEE state have flourished, however it is necessary 
to point out that the process of proliferation of the bilateral relations between Beijing and 
each of the CEE capital cities has not been similar, or balanced, but asymmetrical or, as 
Iulia Monica Oehler-Ṣincai explained, “the 16+1 platform has a variable geometry with 
respect to the priorities of each CEE countries in cooperation with China” .  902
Following this line of thought, scholar Liu Zuokui stated that amongst the Visegrád 
Group , “Hungary has always led the China-CEE cooperation. From 2003 to 2009, 903
Poland and Czech kept criticising China on human rights and Tibet issues; while Hungary 
and Slovakia refrained from criticism, kept their distance with Poland and Czech Republic 
and took every opportunity to promote the bilateral trade and economic relations with 
China. Since 2003, Hungary maintained rapprochement policies towards China” .  904
Moreover, Liu pointed out that “in May 2010, when Viktor Orbán, a centre-right, formerly 
pro-Tibet and anti-China politician, was elected Prime Minister of Hungary” , he made 905
it clear that Budapest would be formed “into the centre of the China-CEE cooperation” . 906
Poland instead, in the scholar’s opinion only began to increase relations with China in 
recent years, but Hungary still managed to keep up the pace and even outreach any other 
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 CEE state in their relations with Beijing. From 2010 to 2012, however, the pro-China 
government of Viktor Orbán “led to complicated results: on the one hand, the relationship 
between both parties has been improved but on the other hand, China started to estrange 
Hungary to shun possible risks” . Meanwhile, China and Poland established a strategic 907
partnership in 2011 and in 2012, with the Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to 
Warsaw, Beijing proved to trust Poland’s political and economic stability and “good outlook 
of the country’s market” .  908
For Oehler-Şincai instead, Poland, a country that “was responsive, quickly launched the 
China-CEE Joint Commerce Chamber and the Secretariat of the Contact Mechanism for 
Agencies to Promote investments” , has been the undisputed leader of the CEE in terms of 909
cooperation with China in the past years. Additionally, the scholar revealed that in the 
backdrop of the 16+1 China-CEE cooperation platform, “Bulgaria has set up the 
Association for Agricultural Co-operation, Hungary the Tourism Coordination Center, 
Latvia the Logistics and Transport Cooperation Secretariat, and Slovenia has chosen the 
forestry cooperation sector” .  910
Romania instead, has chosen the energy sector as a priority of cooperation with China, 
however even in this field, Bucharest cannot compete with Serbia and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, countries that have already witnessed the construction of thermal power 
plants by Chinese companies. The “One Belt, One Road” initiative has provided new 
opportunities for China and Central and Eastern European countries to broaden cooperation 
in areas such as production capacity, transport, infrastructure construction and finance, and 
in this sense Serbia, Macedonia and Herzegovina saw the construction of highways by large 
Chinese enterprises while in recent years, the Czech Republic witnessed the investment of 
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 US $ 300 million, that generated more than three thousand jobs. Moreover, on September 
23rd, the Beijing-Prague airline was inaugurated and “the Czech Republic has thus become 
the third country in CEE to be linked to the capital of China by a direct airline after Poland 
and Hungary” .  911
In November, during bilateral discussions in Suzhou between the Czech Prime Minister and 
his Chinese counterpart Li Keqiang, the Czech head of government revealed that a 
significant number of Chinese companies and banks were investing in the Czech Republic, 
such as the China Industrial and Commercial Bank, the National Development Bank, the 
Bank of China, and the Bank of China’s, all had subsidiaries in Prague, thus he concluded 
“the Czech Republic is the gateway to CEE for Chinese companies” . 912
At this point, in conformity with Oehler-Ṣincai, it might be asserted that Bucharest had 
adopted “a wait and see attitude in relationship with China, in contrast to countries such as 
Poland, Hungary and the Baltic States” . This is also the reason why, in the scholar’s 913
opinion, China has signed partnership agreements with Serbia (2009), Poland (2011) and 
the Czech Republic (2016) - comprehensive strategic partnerships that resulted in Poland, 
the Czech Republic and Hungary having direct air routes with China, and in the Sino-
Serbian mutual visa exemption  - “but not with Romania, the second CEE country in 914
terms of territory, population, third according to nominal GDP, with a position 
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 geographically extremely favourable” , although “Romania's EU integration and 915
strategic partnership with the US are not contrary to active cooperation with other 
countries of the world, China included” .  916
To illustrate this, the scholar unfolded that since 2014, when China launched “the Silk Road 
Forum” through the State Council Development Research Centre, three meetings in Turkey, 
Spain, and Poland have been organised, and Romania was not represented in either of the 
sessions. Poland on the other hand, besides actively participating in the events dealing with 
cooperation with China, has even launched a Council for the Silk Road.  
Nonetheless, the Romanian leadership’s press statements as well as the Romanian media, 
speak highly of the Romanian-Chinese flourishing cooperation in all fields, and of the large 
number of positive results, outcome of the 16+1 China-CEE cooperation platform: the 
Romanian delegation’s participation to the China-CEE 16 + 1 summits, to other important 
events for bilateral co-operation, the Romanian Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of 
Economy Costin Borc's attendance to the second edition of the Ministerial Meeting on 
Economic and Trade Promotion between China and the Central and Eastern European 
Countries held in Ningbo, China on 7-9 June 2016, as well as the meeting, on 15 July 2016 
between the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and Romanian Prime Minister Dacian Cioloș 
during the Asia-Europe Summit in Ulan Bator, Mongolia .  917
Thus, when it chooses key partners, China seems to give priority to countries with 
prominent economic and political indicators, that seek to intensify pragmatic cooperation 
with Beijing, such as Hungary - always pursuing a China-friendly policy, enjoying a 
favourable geological location and with lots of Chinese living in the country, the Hungarian 
government has also established a special committee in charge of affairs with China, 
demonstrating its political orientation; Poland - constantly boosting cooperation with China, 
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 “a big and influential country in both CEE and EU. Its resource endowment, population 
quality, geological position and development potential are exceptional enough to be deemed 
as an important partner” ; Serbia - an essential successor to the Socialist Federal 918
Republic of Yugoslavia and a valuable partner to China, the Serbian government “has 
maintained a close cooperation with China on regional and global affairs”  while “the 919
bilateral cooperation begins to shift from the political dimension to economic and trade 
dimensions in a more comprehensive and balanced way” ; the Czech Republic - keen to 920
become a free rider of China’s economic development, it has the ability and advantage to 
develop the relations with China at the regional level. In 2015, two-way Sino-Czech trade 
topped US $ 11 billion, and bilateral cooperation covered areas such as nuclear power, 
finance, aviation, science, technology and agriculture.  
Romania, with good location and outstanding resource endowment is a big country that 
could have maintained traditional friendship and cooperation with China, but, because of 
the huge differences of political orientation between the liberal-democrat governments of 
the mid and late 2000s, that centred their attention on promoting economic relations with 
the West, and the social-democrat governments that focused on relations with China - by 
signing the Economic Cooperation Agreement in early 2000s and the Enhanced 
Cooperation Partnership in 2013 -  Romania was outreached by Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic or Bulgaria in terms of partnerships with Beijing . 921
If Sino-Romanian economic ties had witnessed an actual improvement since the China-CEE 
16+1 format was initialised, things have been slightly different for Bucharest-Beijing’s 
political relations as well. According to Simona Soare, the Romanian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs has time and again declared that “stronger economic engagements with China will 
not lead to changes in, or conditioning of, Romania’s One China policy, nor will they affect 
 Liu Zuokui, “The Pragmatic Cooperation between China and CEE: Characteristics, Problems and Policy 918
Suggestions”, Working Paper Series On European Studies, Institute Of European Studies, CASS, Vol. 7, No. 
6, 2013
 Ibidem919
 Ibidem920
 Ibidem921
 460
 Romania’s support for the EU arms embargo against China” .  922
Nonetheless, by means of a Romanian official delegation to Taipei, “Romania was one of 
the first CEE countries to engage economically with Taiwan” , an incident that shook the 923
Chinese leadership and requested the intervention of the Romanian ambassador to Beijing 
to sort out the problem. The authorities in Bucharest made no public statement on this 
regard, but subsequently gave prominence to their commitment to the One China Policy and 
to the fact that the visit to Taiwan of the parliamentary delegation was just a business 
agreement, with no inter-state political implications. While the incident proved how delicate 
the One China policy matter is for Beijing, the Romanian Minister of Foreign Affairs Titus 
Corlățean took measures, and withdrew the business passport used by one of the members 
of that delegation.  
Moreover, Soare revealed that“another source of friction seems to be over the Chinese 
community in Romania and Bucharest’s visa-issuing policy for Chinese nationals” . In 924
conformity with the author, Beijing accused Bucharest of “discriminatory visa-issuing 
policy towards Chinese citizens and investors, Romania issuing 10 times less visas for 
Chinese citizens  (approx. 11.000 in 2013-2014) than other CEE countries. By comparison, 
Hungary issued approx. 115.000 visas in the same period” .  925
Last, but not least, Sino-Romanian bilateral political relations have been affected by the 
cyber security matter. According to the Western Cyber Security Strategies, Romania’s 
“2014 Cyber Security Strategy considers China a source of potential cyber security 
challenges for Romanian national critical infrastructure grid and other Romanian secured 
sites (banking, corporate and national personal databases)” . As a result, the Chinese 926
standpoint towards all CEE countries, Romania included, changed in 2014, and nowadays it 
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 gives prominence to “the fight against corruption, the consolidation of constitutionalism 
and the rule of law as a greater control of cyber crime originating from China”  . In light 927
of the above, Bucharest’s position towards Beijing appears prudent but hopeful, however 
deeply rooted in the need for coordination with both the EU and USA’s affairs with East 
Asia.  
VI.4 Going global: Chinese migration to Romania after 2004 
As previously indicated, the process of Chinese migration to the CEECs, Romania included, 
must be placed in the larger context drawn by the Chinese globalisation in the course of the 
21st century. Nevertheless, the Chinese migration towards this region was everything but an 
even process, and a proof of that is the unequal dispersal of Chinese migrants in the CEE 
states. In fact, although most of these countries recognised the People’s Republic of China 
in 1949, established diplomatic and then economic, cultural and technological ties with 
Beijing, China’s international relations with the region were influenced by both the Sino-
Soviet split in the 1960s and the political, economic and social changes emerged with the 
fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989.  
Generally, the CEE capital cities did not witness great verve in collaborating with China in 
the 1990s, as the region was more attracted by the West and Western investment. Beijing 
however, experienced the CEE syndrome already in the beginning of the 1990s, and 
migration towards these countries began to flourish right away. Only ten years later, CEECs 
would begin the process of integration into NATO and the EU, guarantors of democracy. If 
Romania joined NATO in 2004, the same year stood for the Visegrád Group’s integration 
into the EU. Henceforth, it would not take long before the CEE governments, aware of 
China’s growing economy as well as of its influence in the international arena, would take 
interest in collaborating with Beijing. Therefore, if in the initial process of migration 
Chinese citizens considered the CEECs a transit area towards Western Europe and North 
America, in gradually became a “place of settlement, where Chinese migration can be 
 Ibidem927
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 perceived in terms of both first and second generations” .  928
Nonetheless, with Chinese communities increasing more and more in the region, with 
academic studies on the topic of Chinese migration and integration in host countries 
becoming stagnant, with little data being imparted by the police and border controls, or 
because “Chinese migrants are highly mobile and often move to a new country after 
residing (…) for only a few months” , it is difficult to establish the exact number of 929
Chinese migrants living in Romania, Hungary or Poland nowadays. Accordingly, between 
1999–2000, approximatively “ten years after the initial Chinese migration boom, the 
number of the Chinese migrants was between ten to twenty thousand in Hungary, around 
two thousand one hundred in Poland, some five to six thousand in Czech Republic, between 
fourteen and twenty thousand in Romania, some five thousand in Bulgaria, some twenty to 
thirty thousand together in Serbia and Montenegro, only about two hundred in Croatia, and 
about three hundred in Slovenia” .  930
As a general rule, researchers have established that there are three types of Chinese 
migration to Romania, hence the migration via the participation of co-operation projects, 
migration via the acquisition of Diplomatic and Service (Official) Passports and via human 
trafficking and smuggling (Ondreicsik 2012: 27-28). On the authority of official Romanian 
reports, the number of Chinese residents living in Romania in 2006 was  4,974, thus 13% 
more than the previous year. Out of these, only 716 held permanent residency (Ondreicsik 
2012: 30). Moreover, official records of the Romanian authorities showed that the number 
of Chinese migrants living in Romania in 2002 was 2,249, increased to 5,189 in 2007 and 
8,488 in 2008, and they were scattered over 31 counties.  
Bucharest hosted most of the Chinese immigrants in the country - almost three quarters of 
all Chinese immigrants - and, “together with Ilfov and Bacău, is home to nearly 90% of all 
 Dorottya Nagy, “Fiery Dragons: Chinese Communities in Central and Eastern Europe, with Special Focus 928
on Hungary and Romania”, pdf.
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 Chinese immigrants in Romania” . The International Organisation for Migration Office in 931
Romania however, claimed that the number was much lower than the real number of 
Chinese actually living in Romania because authorities only take into consideration those 
immigrants “that have permanent residence cards or changed their citizenship to 
Romanian, and do not include those who are there as temporary workers or hold residence 
permits for a determined period of time. Consequently, although official Romanian numbers 
say immigrants make up 0,2% of the total population, the IOM places it somewhere higher 
than 0,6%” (Ondreicsik 2012: 30). Accordingly, the Chinese population in Romania might 
have been somewhere around 20,000 between 2009-2010.  
From Bucharest, more specifically from Colentina neighbourhood, also called “the Chinese 
neighbourhood” - the area comprising Europa Market, the Red Dragon and, since 2011, 
Chinatown - the Chinese communities expanded throughout the country and established 
small businesses such as various types of stores as well as restaurants.  
Consequently, in 2006, there were more than 8.000 small Chinese enterprises spread around 
in Romania, out of which “15 registered organisations and/or associations for Chinese 
citizens living in Romania, as well as three printed publications aimed at this minority and 
over 35 branches of the Association of Friendship Between Romania and China” .  932
If in the 1990s the goods imported by Chinese businessmen mostly consisted of textiles and 
shoes, in the past ten years electronic appliances took the lead, and came to represented 
50% of the goods brought to Romania, while clothing and textiles only reached 11.3% of 
the imports. Moreover, if in the 1990s the Chinese migrants moved to Romania for the 
purpose of doing business - a category of migrants which is now known as the “old Chinese 
immigrants”  and corresponded to the first wave of migration - the new wave has been 933
motivated by long-term contracts and job offers for various international companies settled 
in Romania. Still, with the Romanians visa requirements for the EU being lifted in the 
beginning of the 2000s, many Romanian citizens reached Western Europe to search 
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 employment, thus leaving a gap in the Romanian labour market, particularly in the 
construction and industry sectors. Thus, some companies “started importing cheaper labor 
directly from China, making it the fastest growing migrant group to the country between 
2003 and 2008, when the financial crisis started in Romania and the industries that 
imported Chinese labor had to cut down on the number of employees” .  934
Furthermore, as hinted at in the previous chapter, in Hungary and Romania the first wave of 
Chinese immigrants forged a religious group as well, called the Chinese Christian 
Community of Romania, who did not adopt the Orthodox Christianity - the most practiced 
religion in the county - “but rather embraced a Neo-protestant version of the religion” . 935
As one of the first Chinese communities in Romania, in 2009 the CCCR “became a 
member church of the Romanian Baptist Union, and bought 1,500 square meters of land in 
Bucharest” , hoping to build a church and a Chinese school. According to Ondreicsik, 936
although there are still many Chinese migrants who encounter plenty of difficulties “not 
only when it comes to the language or laws, but also because they often face discrimination, 
are lied to by their employers, or have no safety net to fall back on if they lose their 
jobs” , these long-term plans of the CCCR “suggest that at least some of the Chinese 937
migrants have settled into Romania, making it their home”  938
There are several studies focusing on Chinese immigration and integration in European 
societies, however when dealing with the Chinese mobility, integration issues and impact on 
the host societies, besides reports and various materials produced by the Council of Europe, 
one can rely on the works of authors like Nagy, Nyiri and Wundrak. According to these 
studies, if the Hungarian population opposing the Chinese immigration reached 81% in 
2007, their rejection being “part of a high level of intolerance towards foreigners” (Nyiri 
2007: 132-133), as maintained by Nagy, in the Romanian case “the history of Chinese 
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 migrants (…) is inseparable from the history of corruption in Romania” .  939
Indeed, for the author, corruption together with economic, political and social instability, 
that still marks present-day Romanian society, are the main features exerting influence on 
and shaping thousands of Chinese lives in the country. Nagy articulated that albeit in the 
past ten years a “successful Chinese business class has become visible (…) there is still a 
large group of small traders whose daily struggle with corruption and instability makes the 
future of the Chinese presence in Romania unpredictable” .  940
Moreover, the author also included Bucharest’s import of Chinese workers - as a result of 
Romania’s manpower shortage -  in the story of corruption and instability in the country. 
For example, in her opinion, the involvement of Chinese workers in the textile and 
construction industries is marked by labour maltreatment and false promises by 
intermediating agencies. As a result, while frustration, disappointment and despair 
overshadowed the Chinese immigrants’ testimonies, “reports on strikes and protests by 
these workers have become frequent headlines in Romanian newspapers” . 941
With the Social-Democrat Romanian government seeking closer ties with, and greater 
foreign investment from China, Bucharest’s official stand towards the Chinese immigration 
appear to be reassuring, however legal and social difficulties that are still there, re-emerge 
whenever the Romanian Office for Immigration penalise immigrants when something is 
wrong, “rather than help them adjust to their new environment” (Ondreicsik 2012: 56). 
Moreover, the methods used to distribute residence permits “leads immigrants in the hands 
of corrupt officials, so they do not have the guarantee they can prolong their 
stay” (Ondreicsik 2012: 56).  
According to Xiao, while some workers reaching Romania for seasonal work frequently 
lose their jobs and are forced to return home without any means to pay off the debt they 
acquired trying to get to Romania, others have suffered maltreatments and abuses in 
Romanian factories (Xiao 2010: 78-80). Moreover, while some of the Chinese immigrants 
 Dorottya Nagy, “Fiery Dragons: Chinese Communities in Central and Eastern Europe, with Special Focus 939
on Hungary and Romania”, pdf.
 Ibidem940
 Ibidem941
 466
 only stayed in the host country for a short while, others have remained for decades and have 
brought their families with them, and thus became a challenge for the Romanian authorities, 
who had to develop laws that protected them “and ensured their presence in the country 
would be beneficial for both immigrants and locals” (Ondreicsik 2012: 56).  
According to Ondreicsik, on the one hand authorities, the media and public opinion have 
begun to note their presence both in positive and negative ways. Consequently, “by some, 
they are seen as a temporary problem and their neighbourhoods are associated with crime 
and violence. Chinese human trafficking cartels allegedly operate from Romania, 
smuggling people in and out of the country”, thus leading to far-reaching discrimination 
against the Chinese people. On the other hand, however, Chinese citizens are known to be 
excellent business partners and resultantly, “are respected by their Romanian counterparts” 
(Ondreicsik 2012: 56).  
It can be thus assumed that the socio-economic advantages, against the backdrop of social 
as well as political adjustment, has been crucial for the migrant community’s prosperity on 
the one hand, and for their social rejection, on the other.  
Nevertheless, beyond numbers , whether is larger or smaller than twenty years ago, the 942
Chinese community in Romania prevails, and coming after the Moldovan and Turkish 
communities, it gradually gained public attention through the media and started to become 
more visible. Slowly, it uncovered a “way within the social reality of corruption, instability, 
and high risk and to a certain extent (…) succeeded in integrating into the post-1989 
Romanian society” .  943
 As stated, it is impossible to establish the number of Chinese expatriates in Romania considering that 942
generally, official documentation and reports speak about 10.000 to 40.000 Chinese citizens before the 2000s, 
a significant decline showing there were between 2.000 to 5.000 during the 2000s. While former Chinese 
ambassador to Romania Liu Zengwen stated there were around 8000 Chinese in Romania in 2008 (see 
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investiţiilor chineze în Europa Centrală şi de Est”, 20 iulie 2012, available at http://adevarul.ro/news/
eveniment/liu-zengwen-romania-china-poarta-ue-1_50accd717c42d5a6638a2294/index.html ) and 7000 in 
2011 (see Andreea Neferu, “Ambasadorul Chinei la Bucureşti: România este una dintre cele mai importante 
destinaţii pe harta investiţiilor chineze în Europa Centrală şi de Est”, 20 iulie 2012, available at http://
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pe-harta-investitiilor-chineze-in-europa-centrala-si-de-est-9892293 ) Romanian authorities, like former prime 
minister Petre Roman, expressed there were approximatively 40,000 Chinese citizens in Romania in 2014 (see 
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 However, if Bucharest wishes to both intensify relations with Beijing and to become a 
country of immigration like any other EU state, “changes are required in the way residence 
permits and visas are distributed, to offer immigrants some kind of guarantee that they can 
continue their work or business in Romania, without falling prey to corruption from 
authorities” (Ondreicsik 2012: 57). If, on the one hand, Chinese immigrants necessitate 
“accessible and reliable sources about their rights and obligations” as well as visa 
documentation available in several foreign languages, on the other hand restrictive work 
permits could improve their chances of finding a job, while enterprises hiring foreign 
manpower should be kept under observation to ensure the payment and duration of the work 
contract before the migrants get to Romania (Ondreicsik 2012: 57).  
According to Ondreicsik, once the Romanian government officials will find a solution to 
fight human trafficking, the only issues to be solved would be the Romanian education 
system - which seems unqualified to take immigrant children in, thus leading to Chinese 
families having to send their children back home for schooling, the institutionalisation of 
language and integration courses and the adoption of a “more multicultural 
approach” (Ondreicsik 2012: 57) in the teaching process in schools - both in response to 
the needs of foreign children and to acclimatise Romanians to a globalised way of life, as 
well as the support to foreign citizens through associations that cooperate with the 
government and communicates the immigrants’ needs - so as to smooth the Chinese 
migrants’ integration into the Romanian society (Ondreicsik 2012: 58).    
VI.5 Personal interview : Chinese attitudes towards Romania 944
Wáng Mei-Lien, whom I interviewed on August 28th, 2016 is, together with her husband, 
the owner of a convenience store in Sinaia, one of Romania’s finest touristic resorts, located 
in the centre of the country, in the Carpathian mountains. She and her husband arrived in 
Romania in 2011 and immediately opened up the shop. During the interview Mei-Lien, 
  Wáng Mei-Lien, retail store owner, face-to-face interview, Sinaia, Romania, 28.08.2016944
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 coming from Shanghai, said that out of the four people she employed, only one was 
Chinese, while the other three were Romanians. She confided that while the business was 
satisfactory, and she had managed to regain the capital invested in order to come to 
Romania in two years time, she had problems in allowing other Chinese relatives to come 
work with her in Romania because the residence permit was difficult to achieve, and 
expensive too.  
Moreover, she and her husband had no wherewithal to send to their relatives in China, but 
her daughter (five years old), who was living with them at the time of the interview, lacked 
nothing. She had some acquaintance with other Chinese living in Sinaia and Bușteni (also a 
mountain touristic resort near Sinaia), all of them doing business, owners of retail shops, but 
not all of them were completely happy about their lifestyle or their businesses. She 
supposed that the capital city Bucharest was a better place for marketing, but, on the other 
hand, she had also heard that because of the numerous shopping malls, people living there 
don’t often go to Chinese stores and Chinese merchandise might not always be in great 
demand. Mei-Lien said that Romania was well-liked by people from Shanghai and the 
country had a fine reputation, albeit other states in Europe were much more developed and 
rich. Towards the end of the interview she confessed that her life in Romania was all right, 
she also enjoyed some of the Romanian dishes, but missed the variety of Chinese food. 
From an economic perspective, she and her husband were glad about the fact that there 
were not too many Chinese stores in the area, thus competition was not high and business 
was solid. When asked about her familiarity with the China-Romania traditional friendship 
relations during the 1960s-1970s, Mei-Lien just nodded.   
VI.6 A step forward: Sino-Romanian cooperation in the cultural and academic fields 
After the signing of an Agreement between the Government of Romania and the 
Government of the PRC concerning the scientific and technological cooperation on June 
27th, 2008 and of a Memorandum of understanding between the two governments regarding 
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 the mutual establishment of cultural institutes on October 20th, 2009, four years later, on 
November 25th, 2013, in occasion of Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang’s official visit to 
Romania, the governments in Bucharest and Beijing signed an Agreement on the 
Establishment and Functioning of the Romanian Cultural Institute in Beijing and the 
Chinese Cultural Center in Bucharest, as well as the Sino-Romanian Cultural Program for 
2013-2016. The Romanian Cultural Institute in Beijing (ICR) was officially inaugurated on 
July 14th, 2015, being the first one to be opened in Asia and the 18th in the world. According 
to the website of the Romanian Embassy in China, the institution is led by sinologist and 
translator of several prominent works of Chinese and Romanian literary art, Constantin 
Lupeanu.  
Moreover, to further the Sino-Romanian cooperation in the cultural field, Chinese language 
and literature classes began to be taught at the Romanian universities of Bucharest, Iași and 
Cluj-Napoca, while Chinese citizens started to take Romanian language and literature 
lessons at the University of Beijing. According to Apachiței, in the academic year 
2013-2014, twenty Chinese students took classes of Romanian language at Beijing Foreign 
Studies University . Likewise, I shall mention the establishment of the first public school 945
with Chinese language teaching classes within the Sf. Pantelimon Centre for cultural, sports 
and entertainment activities in Bucharest, in July 2014. 
Sino-Romanian cultural cooperation was also strengthened through the foundation of four 
Confucius Institutes in Romania, non-profit public educational organisations worldwide, 
affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education, that aim to promote Chinese language 
and culture, and smooth cultural exchanges. Thus, attached to universities, the Confucius 
Institutes operate “with a combination of local and Chinese support. They do not compete 
with university programs, but augment existing language courses and cultural exchange 
efforts. Confucius Institutes also support primary and secondary school Chinese-language 
classes” .  946
 Petru Apachiței, “Lectoratul de limbă română din China”, Dosar Românistica - stare de fapt, An X, Nr. 945
1(19), Institutul de Filologie Română ‘A. Philippide’, 2014, pp. 243-249, accessible at http://
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 In Romania, on November 8th, 2007, the first Confucius Institute opened in Sibiu, affiliated 
to the University Lucian Blaga, and two years later, in 2009, another similar institute was 
opened at "Babeș-Bolyai" University in Cluj Napoca. In March 2012 a third Confucius 
Institute was instituted in Brașov, within Transylvania University, and on November 22nd, 
2013, the fourth Confucius Institute was established in Romania, at the University of 
Bucharest. Simultaneously, Confucius Classes were initiated in various Romanian cities, 
such as Sibiu, Constanța, Miercurea-Ciuc, Deva, Petroșani, Pitești, Hunedoara and Făgăraș. 
Since 2007, according to the Romanian journalist and author of the book “Diplomația 
Panda” (“the Panda Diplomacy”) Dan Tomozei, around 30.000 Romanian citizens have 
attended the Chinese language classes within both the Confucius Institutes and Classes and 
have discovered the Chinese cookery, penmanship, traditional painting, paper cutting, Kong 
Fu martial arts, dances and Chinese songs .  947
As second track diplomacy, I should mention the endorsement, during the Belgrade Summit 
of 2014, of Bucharest’s proposal for the “establishment of a network of think tanks and 
research institutes that are to meet regularly and cooperate on scientific projects” , with 948
the first meeting scheduled in 2015, in Beijing. China and Romania also enjoy institutional 
twinning, with local authorities (cities, municipalities and counties) being engaged in direct 
exchanges on the basis of 30 twinning agreements. For example, the twinning agreement 
between Bucharest and Beijing was signed in 2005. Additionally, if various Sino-Romanian 
friendship associations organise activities in occasion of the celebration of important events 
in the history of the two countries , the “Parliamentary Friendship Group with the PRC”, 949
founded in 2012, aims at fostering stronger relations between the two countries and their 
elected representatives.  
It is compulsory to mention in the cultural field Romania’s participation to the 2010 Expo 
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 Shanghai, a huge international event that required Romanian decision makers’ efforts for 
significant investments in the cultural promotion side. Designed to enhance and promote 
national cultural heritage, especially in geographic areas where Romania is less well known, 
Romania’s Pavilion offered visitors about 2,400 live artistic performances, consisting of 
dance performances and daily concerts of popular and classical music from the Romanian 
and international repertoire. The artistic events included a series of concerts, folk music and 
dance  performances  from  the  national  and  international  repertoire  of  the  Nagyvárad 
ensemble of the Oradea State Philharmonic, concerts of instrumental music - violin, viola, 
clarinet and piano. Many Romanian artists’ performances impressed the Chinese audience, 
like  Gheorghe  Zamfir,  Grigore  Leşe,  Damian  Drăghici  and  groups  like  Holograf  and 
Amadeus,  the  folkloric  ensemble  “Căluşarii  Slatinei”,  etc. Moreover, at  the  Expo  2010 
Shanghai,  the  Romanian  pavilion  was  the  only  one  supporting  daily  opened  theatre 
performances and promoting cultural diversity . 950
Furthermore, on January 28th, 2016, Romania and China witnessed the exhibition "The 
Treasures of Romania" being opened at the National Museum in Beijing, where it was 
hosted until 8 May 2016. The exhibition was then moved to the Sichuan Province Museum 
in the city of Chengdu, from June to August 2016. In the field of cinematography, the recent 
participation in the 6th edition of the Beijing International Film Festival (April 2016), in 
which the Romanian film “Aferim!” won the award for best cinematography, is worth to be 
mentioned. Moreover, the Romanian Film Festival, taking place in Beijing, Shanghai and 
Xi'an was held between 14-24 November 2016 .   951
On that occasion, the films “To Paris with only the identity card” (“Doar cu buletinul la 
Paris”), “Beyond the Railroad” (“Dincolo de calea ferată”) , “Carmen”, “Kira Kiralina” and 
“Sierranevada” were broadcasted and on June 25th, 2017, during the award ceremony of the 
International Shanghai Film Festival 20th edition, Romanian director Cătălin Saizescu - 
who participated in the competition with the film “Short Circuit” (“Scurt Circuit”) - 
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 received from the jury the special prize for outstanding artistic achievement .  952
Two months later, on August 22nd, 2017, Romanian sinologist Anna-Eva Budura received 
the "Special Book Award of China”, awarded for the first time in 2005 and meant to 
acknowledge the work of foreign translators, writers and editors for their contributions to 
the promotion, translation and publication of Chinese books as well as to the promotion of 
cultural exchanges . In the end, I should specify that the general framework for Sino-953
Romanian scientific collaboration is made up by the Cooperation Agreement between the 
Romanian Academy and the Chinese Academy, signed on 12 July 1994, as well as the 
Agreement on Scientific and Technical Collaboration signed in 1996, accords that allowed 
the establishment of the Romanian-Chinese House in 2011, with various branches in 
Romania, and the ChinaRo Association in 2015.  
Not always, however, things go for the best, and the difficult situation for Chinese 
merchants within the Bucharest Chinatown complex, the largest in South-East Europe, is a 
perfect example of the costs and consequences of bad Chinese investments in the region and 
how economic activities can influence socio-cultural ties.  
The Chinatown Commercial Complex, controlled by several Chinese investors, that in June 
2011 was believed to become a tourist attraction for both Romanian nationals and 
foreigners by former Prime Minister Emil Boc, is nowadays just dust in the wind. Indeed, in 
more than five years since its inauguration, not only did the China Town Complex not 
flourish - as is happened in other cities around the world - but the project, for a total value 
estimated at 100 million Euros, is slowly but constantly perishing. According to the article 
“O ţeapă mare cât China! S-a ales praful de cel mai mare cartier chinezesc din România, în 
doar patru ani”  the fact that the largest Chinese commercial complex and neighbourhood 954
in Southeast Europe, occupying an area of 80 hectares, is, at the present time, in ruins, can 
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 be perceived already at the entrance. Indeed, as specified by the article and personally 
corroborated, Chinese sellers - gathered together for a tea, playing cards, knitting, watching 
movies or just trying to keep themselves busy - almost seem disturbed by the presence of 
possible buyers or prying eyes. With the Chinese economic activities at Chinatown 
gradually closing down, the rather large Chinese parish, united in forlornness, isolates itself 
from the rest of the world, and, if any chance for interrelations with Romanian customers 
ever existed, they clearly vanished into thin air.  
VI.7 Personal interview : Hopes and Reality 955
On July 29th, 2013, I interviewed Ms. Stănescu, member of staff at the Romanian Chinese 
House - Friendship Association, branch located in Craiova. First of all, my interviewee 
pointed out that, at the time of the interview, the new subsidiary in Craiova of the Romanian 
Chinese House had been opened for only two weeks, thus the information and data she 
provided during the interview stood more for estimations rather than clear statistics. Ms. 
Stănescu revealed that Craiova RoChi House organised Chinese language, culture and 
civilisation classes (in English language, with classes held two times a week and groups 
composed by 10 persons of various age) and in the time to come, would set up several 
recreational activities and seminars of Chinese traditional sports and medicine.  
Moreover, she emphasised the significant role of the House both in the private sector, for 
the import-export consultancy offered to Romanian and Chinese enterprises, and in the 
touristic field. In this sense, my interviewee unfolded that members of the RoChi House 
benefitted from a discount for excursions to China, and the association dealt with issues 
such as the compilation of forms and applications for visa for anyone who was interested in 
taking a trip to China. “The first trip organised by the Craiova RoChi House is going to be 
a eleven days journey, between October-November in Macao, Beijing and Guangzhou and 
 A. Stănescu, assistant at the Romanian Chinese House - Friendship Association, face-to-face interview, 955
Craiova, Romania, 29.07.2013
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 you can see details and everything about the trips in our biannual journal. Moreover, you 
can find specifics about sports and cultural projects, as well as book fairs in there” added 
Ms. Stănescu.  
According to my interviewee, the Chinese citizens able to speak the Romanian language 
integrate quite rapidly in the Romanian society, they love Romania, and thus they should be 
the ones to engage in the promotion of the Sino-Romanian relations as they were in the 
1980s. Stănescu also mentioned the launching, in November the same year, of the volume 
“Dialoguri la Beijing”  (“Dialogues in Beijing”), written by journalist and one of the 956
cognoscenti of China, Dan Tomozei, as a salient point for the Sino-Romanian cultural 
cooperation.  
Towards the end of the interview Ms. Stănescu stated that the leadership of the NGO 
Romanian-Chinese House - branch of Craiova, a significant structure for promoting 
Romanian-Chinese cooperation, consisted of businessmen, teachers and representatives 
from the local administration. Thus, while Alin Mitrică, secretary of state in the Ministry of 
European Funds, occupied the position as president of the Romanian-Chinese House, Vice-
presidents of the organisation were Radu Preda, Cristian Ṣtefănescu, Nistor Duval, Toni 
Bold, Ṣtefan Bratu, Dan Dașoveanu and Mircea Năstase. Moreover, besides the secretary 
general Corneliu Stănescu and treasurer Marin Traian Radu, there was also a small number 
of Chinese members within the association. In conclusion, when asked how many 
Romanians attended the Chinese language and culture classes, Ms. Stănescu revealed that 
the association had put together 2 groups of 10 learners each, but the superintendents hoped 
the number of Romanians learning Chinese language in the city of Craiova reached 400 or 
500 students within a year. 
 This volume, aiming to capitalise on the friendship and appreciation the author has found away from 956
home, in China, with regard to Romania, brings together 22 interviews conducted over almost three years for 
the Romanian department of the Radio China International. The interviewees are ministers, ambassadors and 
high-level representatives of both Romania and the Republic of Moldova in official missions to Beijing, who 
accepted to talk about Romanian and Moldavian relations of cooperation with the People's Republic of China, 
such as Prime Minister of Romania - Victor Ponta, Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister of the Republic 
of Moldova - Iurie Leanca, former Romanian Ambassador to Beijing - Viorel Isticioaia-Budura, Foreign 
Minister of Romania - Titus Corlățean, European Commissioner for Agriculture and Rural Development - 
Dacian Cioloș, Romanian Ambassador to China - Doru-Romulus Costea, Ambassador of the Republic of 
Moldova in R.P. Chinese - Anatol Urecheanu, Minister in charge of Business at the Embassy of Romania in 
R.P. Chinese - Ion Dicu, Prince Paul of Romania - Ambassador of Romanian-Chinese Friendship.
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 VI.8 New challenges, unbalanced trade and one sided investment relations 
Sino-Romanian economic and technological ties after 2004 
Until 1990, Sino-Romanian economic relations were regulated by governmental agreements 
which ensured the balance of economic and trade exchanges. However, the cessation of 
supplies on the Chinese market of Romanian products that represented the compensation for 
trade receivables between the two countries led to a drastic drop of exports in the 1990s, 
that reached the lowest point of US $ 22.8 million in 1998 .  957
Beginning with the 2000s, under the Romanian social-democrat government, a new trend 
emerged aiming at the recovery of the bilateral trade, so that at the end of 2010, the 
Romanian exports to China reached US $ 410 million. Simultaneously however, the strong 
and aggressive expansion of Chinese exports to the international market encouraged by the 
very small and attractive prices, produced a tremendous increase of imports from the PRC, 
reaching US $ 3.38 billion in 2010 and generating once again a negative trade balance to the 
detriment of Romania. Albeit the effects of the economic crisis were felt both in Romania's 
economic and social fields, Romanian exports to the PRC continued an upward trend, 
reaching the highest point at the end of 2011  and 5 years later, in 2016, bilateral trade 958
between the two countries reached US $ 4.5 billion, with a trade balance of 1/6 favourable 
to China .  959
For the Sino-Romanian trade’s unbalance has profoundly burdened the economic 
relationship between Bucharest and Beijing, the Romanian authorities have several times 
expressed their concerns and frustration and have demanded for measures to re-equilibrate 
the trade exchanges. However, considered the signifiant presence of French, Italian and 
even Moldavian competitors on the Chinese market, the Romanian producers’ attempts “to 
 “Îndrumar de afaceri Republica Populară Chineză 2017”, Ministerul Economiei, Comerţului şi Relațiilor 957
cu Mediul de Afaceri, Biroul de Promovare Comercial - Economică Beijing, 2017
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 promote wine products through the participation to several expo throughout China”  has 960
done little to remedy the situation.  
On the authority of the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Sino-Romanian 
economic ties are nowadays regulated by the 1994 Economic and Trade Agreement, the 
1991 Agreement on the avoidance of double taxation and for the prevention of tax evasion, 
as well as the Agreement on the mutual promotion and protection of investments of 1997. 
According to the same source, China is Romania's first trading partner in Asia and ranks 
19th among foreign investors . 961
Additionally, in 2004, during the state visit to Romania of the Chinese President Hu Jintao, 
the two sides signed the Joint Declaration of Romania and the People's Republic of China 
on the establishment of a Comprehensive Friendly Partnership for Cooperation, 
emphasising that the boosting of economic and trade cooperation would contribute to a 
steady development of the bilateral relations, and that the large cooperation projects 
(especially in the fields of information and communication technology, infrastructure, 
agriculture, environmental protection) were prime resources to encourage the blooming of 
economic and trade ties. By means of this partnership, Romania started to look at China as 
the main economic partner in Asia, aiming to increase the bilateral trade and welcomed 
further Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in Romania. Moreover, “the Economic Cooperation 
Agreement by the Government of the PRC and the Government of Romania, the Additional 
Protocol of Agreement on the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment，the 
Statement of Intent to Strengthen the Exchanges and Cooperation in the Field of SMEs by 
the Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China and the Ministry of SMEs, 
Trade and Business Environment of Romania were signed one by one in October 2006, 
April 2007 and May 2008” .  962
 Andrea Chiriu and Zuokui Liu, “Sino-Romanian Relations - From the First Ponta’s government to Klaus 960
Werner Iohannis’s victory in the presidential elections”,, Institute of European Studies, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences, Working Paper Series on European Studies of IES, CASS ,Vol.9, No.1, 2015. 
 “Relații Bilaterale. Republica Populară Chineză”, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MAE, Direcția 961
Asia-Pacific, available at https://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/3121 accessed on 13.11.2017
 Gao, Ge, “The Development of Sino-Romanian Relations After 1989”, Global Economic Observer, 962
“Nicolae Titulescu” University of Bucharest, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Institute for World Economy of 
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 Furthermore, on November 25th, 2013, in occasion of the official visit to Romania of the 
Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, the governments of Romania and China signed the 
Joint Statement on the deepening of bilateral cooperation under the new circumstances. If, 
in 2014, the two countries celebrated the 65th anniversary since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations and the 10th anniversary since the signing of the Comprehensive 
Partnership of Friendship and Cooperation, a year later, on November 18th, 2015, Romania 
and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China signed 
an Agreement in Bucharest for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of tax 
evasion . 963
According to Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, “after three decades of economic reform and 
development, China has emerged as the world’s second-largest economy and the number 
one exporter of goods, as well as an increasingly important political power” . In all these 964
years, Beijing kept its political system and many of its institutions unaltered, and 
concentrated on pragmatic measures such as the economic reform as well as the building of 
the market economy with Chinese characteristics that “generated impressive results in 
terms of modernisation, development and growth, poverty reduction, improved living 
standards and the country’s repositioning in the global economy” .  965
It should be clear by now that Bucharest, on the other hand, chose to build “a democratic 
society and a capitalist economy and, to this end, it implemented a shock therapy type of 
reform, focussed on liberalisation and privatisation, which significantly changed its 
economic structure. Its main goal was to adjust to and to integrate into the European 
Union” . Albeit China and Romania’s traditional friendship relations remained unaltered 966
in the political and diplomatic fields - supported by several mutual high level visits during 
those years of transition - the economic relations and trade between the two countries 
 “Relații Bilaterale. Republica Populară Chineză”, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MAE, Direcția 963
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 suffered greatly, and only started to recover in the beginning of the 2000s, when, as a result 
of political changes that allowed the putting into effect of various agreements, Romania 
became a favourite destination for the early Chinese investments in Europe.  
Thus, equal only to Germany and followed closely by Poland, the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, Romania was ranked by the Beijing government’s 2004 Outbound Foreign 
Investment Catalogue amongst the European countries “offering the best opportunities for 
Chinese companies. Textiles, leather goods and luggage, TV sets, communication 
equipment, computers and other electronic equipment were the recommended sectors for 
investments in Romania, all of them industries in which China enjoys considerable export 
strength but has faced barriers because of its trade surplus” . Moreover, according to the 967
same article, Bulgaria and Romania, “weaker economies with a low quality of governance, 
can be assumed to be particularly attractive to Chinese investors with comparative 
advantages in low-cost product segments and experience in behind-doors negotiations and 
personal lobbying” .  968
Still, Chinese foreign direct investment in both countries remained modest for ten years 
after the publication of the foreign investment catalogue and thus Romania, as the largest 
recipient of Chinese FDI in CEE in the early 2000s, witnessed a share decline “after 2005 
as Chinese investors shifted to Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and other countries in 
the region” .  969
This reaction was somehow expected, considered that in the years prior to Romania’s 
accession to the EU (2007), Bucharest’s political elite - in pursuit of the EU membership - 
disregarded or was inclined to reject Chinese investment proposals, and only after 2008 this 
tendency started to change and, in order to stimulate its economy, Romania opened its doors 
to Chinese investment. In this context, the leadership’s objectives towards Beijing started to 
be the minimisation of the trade deficit by increasing exports; the Chinese involvement in 
 Drahokoupil Jan, Kirov Vassil, Muntean Aurelian and Radu Elena, “Chinese investment in Romania and 967
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ETUI Printshop, Brussels,  2017, pp. 141-154
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 major projects in the energy, infrastructure, agriculture and tourism fields, the cooperation 
in the veterinary field for the export of Romanian agro-food products, the identification of 
cooperation projects in “non-traditional” areas such as IT, banking, and environmental 
protection and the exploration and capitalisation on opportunities for cooperation on third 
markets such as Mongolia, Iraq and Afghanistan. The Chinese interests instead, were, 
according to the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs “integrated in the general 
orientation of promotion of products in the EU market, hence the identification of 
penetration points in other areas with prospects for consumption and involvement in large-
scale investment projects (energy and transport infrastructure)” .  970
This does not mean that China-EU’s economic bilateral ties did not meet fundamental 
stumbling blocks. On the contrary, with China being the second largest trading partner and 
the first source of EU imports, while the EU is China's first trading partner, major 
imbalances in bilateral trade are inevitable. For example, in 2008, the EU imported more 
than 3.15 times more than it exported, while direct investment in China was 4.5 billion 
euros, compared to less than 1 billion euros in the EU.  
Unfortunately, despite all efforts, Bucharest - member of the EU for ten years now - still 
seems incapable of capitalising on the opportunities to boost its exports to China, albeit it 
benefits, besides the bilateral agreement with China, from the Strategic Partnership 
between China and the EU. Resultantly, in accordance with Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, “the 
evolution of China-Romania exchanges clearly reveal that there still are many benefits 
untapped and many opportunities not turned to good account, both in their bilateral trade 
and in investments” . 971
 “Relații Bilaterale. Republica Populară Chineză”, Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MAE, Direcția 970
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 VI.9 No honeymoon forever:  
Sino-Romanian bilateral trade in numbers and trading structure 
Table 1: Volume of Bilateral Trade between Romania and China, 2004-2016  972
YEAR         Region                 TOTAL             EXPORT             IMPORT                   SOLD 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2004            RPC                      1.317,5               231,0                    1.086,5                       -  855,5 
                   (RASHK)                 (58,7)               (35,7)                   (23,0)                            (-12,7) 
_______________________________________________________________________________  
2005            RPC                      1.890,59             227,64                  1.662,95                   - 1.435,31 
                   (RASHK)                (50,19)             (20,26)                  (29,93)                           (9,67) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2006            RPC                       2.471,30             248,08                 2.223,22                  - 1.975,14 
                   (RASHK)                 (67,10)             (30,50)                  (36,60)                         (-6,10) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2007            RPC                       2.541,55             230,08                 2.311,47                  - 2.081,39 
                   (RASHK)                 (43,64)             (16,68)                  (26,96)                       (-10,28) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2008            RPC                       3.805,45             270,17                 3.535,28                  - 3.265,10 
                   (RASHK)                  (63,07)            (32,89)                   (30,18)                         (2,71) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2009            RPC                       2.942,62             296,54                 2.646,08                  - 2.349,54 
                    (RASHK)                 (99,10)             (82,44)                   (16,66)                      (65,78) 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2010            RPC                        3.893,41             498,86                 3.394,55                 - 2.895,69 
_______________________________________________________________________________                     
2011            RPC                        4.201,86             659,28                 3.542,58                 - 2.883,30 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2012            RPC                        3.180,00             500,00                 2.680,00                 - 2.190,00 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2013            RPC                        3.284,65             663,59                 2.621,05                 - 1.957,46 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2014            RPC                        3.909,15             759,44                 3.149,70                 - 2.390,26 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2015            RPC                        3.786,81             581,79                 3.205,02                 - 2.623,23 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
2016            RPC                        4.500,78             682,48                 3.818,30                 - 3.135,82 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
* RPC  - PRC, People’s Republic of China 
* RASHK - Regiunea Administrativă Specială Hong Kong (Special Administrative Region HK) 
As shown in the table above, while Sino-Romanian bilateral trade increased gradually 
between 2004-2009, in the same time lapse Romanian exports to China never outreached 
US $ 300 million, but Romanian imports from the PRC increased three times as much, from 
US $ 1 billion to US $ 3,5 billions. The augmenting gap between exports and imports 
values with China thus generated an increasing trend of Romania’s trade deficit. Moreover, 
 Values expressed in millions US $, “Relații Bilaterale. Republica Populară Chineză”, Romanian Ministry 972
of Foreign Affairs, MAE, Direcția Asia-Pacific, available at https://www.mae.ro/bilateral-relations/3121 
accessed on 13.11.2017
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 bilateral trade continued its ascending rate between 2009-2011, when it reached a record 
high in spite of the economic crisis, decreased considerably during the subsequent period as 
a result of a decline in Romania’s imports from China, and reached another peak in 2016 
thanks to the increase of 8,17% in Romanian exports. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that 
Bucharest more than doubled its exports to the PRC (from US $ 296 million in 2009 to US 
$ 759 in 2014), the extensive imports from the PRC have maintained the balance of bilateral 
trade unfavourable for Romania each year, for more than a decade.  
Chart 1: Trade flows between Romania and China between 2000-2012  973
Moreover, considered that in 2012, 2/3 of Romania’s foreign trade was with the EU, and 
China only ranked 3rd after Turkey and Russia as Romania’s non-EU trading partner , in 974
view of Romania’s huge trade deficit with China in 2008, 2010, 2012 (with imports from 
China 5 or 6 times larger than exports), it can be deduced that in the aftermath of Romania’s 
 Sarmiza Pencea, “Windows of opportunity in China-CEE Economic Relations”, Global Economic 973
Observer, November 1st, 2013
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 revolution, the authorities in Bucharest lacked a long-term strategy, that might have 
contributed to effectively position Romania within the new global order, and overall, the 
country aligned itself with the EU and the USA. Romania’s foreign trade, grounded on 
political orientation, thus determined Romania to be, at some point, China’s most important 
partner in Europe prior to 1989, while Western countries became Bucharest’s main trading 
partners after 1989.  
Moreover, according to Pencea, the lack of strategy and ineffectiveness of the Romanian 
economy channeled the Chinese exports to Romania and Romanian exports to China 
through other EU countries - third party intermediaries, thus making Bucharest operating at 
a loss . For example, if on the one hand “Romanian wood was re-sold to China by arab 975
traders, Romanian ships were re-sold to China by Dutch companies, Romanian machine-
tools reached China through German societies, while Romanian garments got into the 
Chinese market through Italian firms”, on the other hand Chinese exports have been, to a 
certain extent, channelled to Romania via Hungary . 976
In conformity with Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, later on, in 2013, “China was the 22nd export 
partner and the 9th import partner of Romania, while Romania’s trade deficit with China 
was its third highest, considering both the intra and extra-EU trade flows” . The authors 977
deduced that despite the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade flows increased in the past years by 
comparison with “the 2000-2005 time span, their values remain low as juxtaposed to other 
EU countries, due to the still underdeveloped connections between Romanian and Chinese 
companies” . Moreover, considering that Bucharest’s foreign trade “is mostly managed by 978
the multinational companies (…) which have their own strategies and interests, not always 
complying with the Romanian government’s endeavours of deepening and enlarging the 
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 bilateral relationship with China” , in the authors’ opinion a strategy to boost Sino-979
Romanian bilateral trade in both goods and services could be the endorsement of manifold 
pragmatic Chinese investments in Romania, in areas of mutual interest. 
In fact, with the “Outbound Foreign Investment Catalogue” (OFIC) of 2004 placing 
Romania - as destination for Chinese investments - in first position, next to Germany, one is 
entitled to ask why, in the last decade, Sino-Romanian unsteady trade flows have been 
perspicuously exceeded by China’s trade with several CEE countries, such as Poland, 
Hungary, the Czech Republic and lately, Bulgaria. An explanation might be that, albeit the 
number of Chinese companies registered in Romania was maintained around 10,000 in the 
past ten years - a significant number considered other CEE states - these companies were 
mostly individual or family owned small and medium size companies (SMEs), thus, 
although great in number, their investments in trade or low-to-medium technology 
manufacturing - producing small capital - were rather inconsequential for the Romanian 
economy .  980
Moreover, at that time the leadership in Bucharest was, in every respect immersed in the 
struggle to join the EU and did not conceive and strategy “to build on this advantage. This 
came on top of a certain previous mismatch of policies and implementation lag between the 
two countries: the Chinese going-out policy, initiated in 1999, was devised at a time when 
the privatisation process was broadly finished in Romania, with much of the ownership 
already in private hands” . Hence, in concordance with Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, “both 981
the initial dissonance of policies and the later lack of strategy on Romania’s part have 
contributed to Romania’s following decrease in ranking, in terms of the totally attracted 
Chinese investment stock: from ranking first in 2005, it fell to the second place in 2006, 
third place between 2007-2011 and, finally, to the fourth position after 2012 . 982
Homogeneously, Bucharest’s share in the total Chinese investment stock of the CEE5 group 
 Ibidem979
 Ibidem980
 Ibidem981
 Ibidem982
 484
 diminished unexpectedly from 2/3 of the total in 2005, to less than 1/3 in 2006, and then 
slowly to only 12.7% in 2013, also as a result of the cutting in of the TAROM Bucharest–
Beijing direct flights in 2004 and the preservation of “restrictive and lengthy visa 
procedures by the Romanian party, while providing little or no assistance to the Chinese 
investors in their difficult attempt of adjusting to an unknown and challenging Romanian 
business environment” . 983
As a consequence, while Chinese investment flows to Romania increased slowly, “their 
pace in other CEE countries picked up speed, especially in Hungary and Poland, which had 
already been accepted in the EU and could be more committed and more successful in 
developing a stronger relationship with China, attracting, consequently, increased Chinese 
outward direct investments” . The scholars highlighted that Hungary and Poland, together 984
with the Czech Republic and Bulgaria succeeded in making capital out of the second wave 
of Chinese outward direct investment (ODI), “performed by powerful state owned, or state-
backed companies and implying considerable higher amounts invested per project” .  985
As mentioned, textiles, leather goods and luggage, TV sets, computers, telecommunications 
and electronic equipment were the industrial fields that, together with three services sectors, 
were suggested for Chinese investments. Indeed, as specified by the report of the Romanian 
Ministry of Economy, Commerce and Business Environment - Bureau for Commercial and 
Economic Promotion in Beijing, Romanian exports to the PRC mainly consist of energy 
equipment (components for hydro power plants and thermal power plants), machine tools, 
electrical equipment (base networks), rolling mill, car parts and components, automotive 
tires, optical instruments and equipment, chemicals and complex fertilisers, plastics, beech 
and wood panels, common metals, electrolytic copper, copper articles and other non-ferrous 
metals, rubber and rubber products, garments and knitwear, wines, mineral water and wool. 
Imports from the PRC instead, have been represented by telephone and spares equipment, 
telecommunication equipment, machinery and equipment, metallurgical products and 
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 articles of metals, organic chemicals, textiles and clothing, footwear, televisions, air 
conditioners, calculators, instruments and appliances optical materials, building materials, 
common metals and common metal products, machinery and equipment, production line 
installations, furniture and wood products, other consumer goods .  986
Moreover, the measures taken by the Romanian leadership to promote new products on the 
Chinese market, have diversified the range of products for export by gradually initiating the 
procedures for the penetration of the Chinese market with Romanian agro-food products - 
vegetal, organic, bio as well as animal products (pork and bovine) - that meet the demands 
of this market and the Chinese government's policy of increasing domestic consumption . 987
As already stated, China is Romania’s main Asian investing partner. According to the 
National Trade Register Office’s report, on December 31st, 2008, there were 9,432 Chinese 
companies and Romanian-Chinese joint-ventures enterprises in Romania, and the total 
Chinese investment in the country’s economy was US $ 330 millions.  
In July 2017, 12,235 companies with Chinese participation were established in Romania - 
accounting for about 5% of the total number of businesses with foreign participation - and 
the value of Chinese investments reached approximatively US $ 440 millions, representing 
0.75% of total foreign investments in Romania. Presumably accurate, the recent data places 
nowadays the PRC on the 5th position among the foreign investors in Romania by the 
number of companies set up, but only on the 18th by the amount invested , hence far from 988
both the two countries’ possibilities and the evaluation made by the Romanian authorities’ 
while bragging about the country’s success in its relations with China.  
Besides Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, authors like Russu and Bulearcă also stated that these 
figures “outline two realities whose approach should become a priority for the two parties 
in their efforts to intensify economic, trade and technical-scientific relations” . In fact, 989
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 they pointed out that the present-day Sino-Romanian level of trade as well as the two 
countries’ economic relationship “is far from the potential development that they have, and 
that was higher valued in the past” , while “the profound asymmetry of trade (…), that 990
intensified continuously and is net unfavourable to Romania, needs to increase mutual 
efforts for identifying business opportunities on multiple plans, such as direct investments in 
new businesses or modernisation of existing capacity, technical-scientific cooperation in 
production and marketing, transfer of know-how etc” . 991
VI.10 A not so “special” relationship 
Chinese companies and investments in Romania 
I should start by giving emphasis to the fact that in 2005, “Romania was the most important 
European host for Chinese investments, cumulating over two thirds of the total investment 
stock of the CEE- 5 and making Chinese officials declare at the time that Romania”  was 992
the East European country where Beijing obtained the best results in the implementation of 
the “going out strategy”. These firms belonged to the “first wave” of Chinese ventures 
which entered the Romanian market.  
However, their private small and medium enterprises (SMEs), “mainly family companies 
with little capital, involved in trade activities or low and medium technology 
manufacturing”  did not benefit from financial support from their government, thus, 993
“although great in number, these small companies could not cumulate high investment 
values in Romanian economy” . It was against this backdrop that Bucharest initiated its 994
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 efforts to access the European Union, and thus lacked essential economic and political 
strategies aiming to attract more Chinese investments. Additionally, as mentioned, the 
interruption of the direct flights between Bucharest and Beijing in 2004, the conservation of 
restrictions and long-lasting visa processes, as well as a poor assistance to the Chinese 
investors, was followed by a significant decline of Chinese investment flows to Romania, 
while Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic managed to achieve great investment 
contracts with strong state owned enterprises (SOEs).  
Of significant importance of the first-wave investors in Romania has been the “Red Dragon 
Centre” (“Dragonul Roșu”), the best-known of the trade hubs that have been established 
near Bucharest. A bazaar-like mall, the 200 million Euros trade hub was founded in 2003 by 
the Niro Group (a joint venture with a 30% Chinese stake), owned by Nicolae Dumitru and 
linked with the Romanian-Chinese House, and the neighbouring 100 million Euros China 
Town (trade and business centre, 100% Chinese investment, developed in 2010). Almost 
since its establishment, the commercial complex has been the core of discussions, media 
scandals and political controversies, and several owners of commercial activities within the 
Red Dragon Centre have been indicted for tax evasion or other illegal activities .  995
A further notable achievement of the first-wave investors in Romania is represented by the 
22,000 hectares industrial park a Pârscov, in the Buzău County, put in place by the F&J 
International Group, an entirely Chinese private firm that entered the Romanian market in 
1991 and began its first investments in 1997. The industrial park, including “five factories 
with production, distribution and foreign trade operations in garments, wood processing, 
cigarettes, electronics, household electric appliances and ecologic electric bulbs, as well as 
a fresh fruit and vegetables import company”  also comprises  small and medium 996
enterprises dealing with recycling and bicycle production as well as with the production of 
construction materials and industrial printing.  
Beginning with 2012, Romania and China announced numerous investments contracts in 
 Drahokoupil Jan, Kirov Vassil, Muntean Aurelian and Radu Elena, “Chinese investment in Romania and 995
Bulgaria” in Drahokoupil Jan (ed.), “Chinese investment in Europe: corporate strategies and labour relations”, 
ETUI Printshop, Brussels,  2017, pp. 141-154
 Sarmiza Pencea, Iulia Monica Oehler-Şincai, “Chinese Outward Direct Investment In CEECs: A 996
Comparative Analysis”, Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Volume 6, No. 2, pp. 34–43
 488
 various economic sectors, however, it will be demonstrated that only some of them were 
actually signed by the two sides, while others, announced by the media, were shortly after 
completely forgotten about. Having said that, I should underline that both Romanian and 
international scholars have lately started to consider the recent Chinese businesses in the 
renewable energy sector, especially in the building and employment of photovoltaic parks 
and wind farms, a significant component of the “second wave” Chinese investments in the 
Romanian economy.  
For example, in 2012, “the ET Solar Group, the world’s leading one-stop provider of solar 
power solutions, announced that it would take over Romania’s largest 50 MW photovoltaic 
power plant project, and one year later completed the construction of an 18.5 MW power 
plant in Giurgiu county in Southern Romania” .  997
Moreover, China General Nuclear and Nuclearelectrica have proved interest in financing 
the development, construction, operation and decommissioning of reactors 3 and 4 of the 
Cernavodă nuclear power plant, with a total investment of US $ 6 billion over the following 
nine years. This became a priority investment project in May 2016, when the two 
companies agreed to establish a joint venture project where the Chinese company would 
have owned a minimum of 51% of the joint stock .  998
However, because of the lack of bilateral political commitment and for several security 
concerns in order to overcome legal challenges  and finally close the deal, the project was 999
still under discussion, and negotiations were still in the bargaining phase in July 2017 .  1000
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 Additionally, the projects with Societatea Națională Nuclearelectrica (2015), Oltenia Energy 
Complex (2014) and Hunedoara Energy Complex - Rovinari and Deva state-owned 
thermoelectric power plants, Tarnița - Lapuștești hydroelectric power plant, together with a 
wind power project in Constanta have also been part of the programme for cooperation 
between Romania and China since 2013 (Soare 2015: 6). The realisation of the Rovinari 
coal-fired power station represents a significant project for the Romanian authorities, thus, 
in 2014, when China Huadian Corporation set up a joint venture with Oltenia Energy 
Complex that implied the investment of approximatively 1 billion Euros and the 
construction of a 600 MW coal-fired power plant that provided around 400 new jobs, 
everything looked for the best. However, because of political disagreements on the 
Romanian side, the project was still under negotiation in 2017. 
Moreover, according to FRD Center Market Entry Services, it was the Chinese company 
China Gezhouba Group International Engineering, encompassing a vast range of sectors, 
such as transport infrastructure, energy and tourism, the one that, in 2014, demonstrated 
pragmatic engagement towards the investment of over one billion Euro in the hydroelectric 
power plant of Tarnița-Lapuștești. The report also revealed that the construction works - 
estimated between five and eight years - would have provided over 4.000 jobs in the two 
phases of the construction . Nevertheless, alike the other projects, the end of the Ponta 1001
government in November 2015 led the negotiations to a standstill and, in the beginning of 
2017, the project was still not completed by the new PSD-led coalition government. 
According to Gao Ge, in November 2013, China Ming Yang Wind Power Group Limited 
“signed a framework agreement with Speranța & Succesul S.A., a leading renewable energy 
developer in Romania”  owned by the Romanian Păunescu Corporation. The agreement 1002
“covered wind farm development, supply of EPC services and equipment procurement of a 
200MW wind farm project” . Additionally, some Chinese enterprises, such as Sungrow, 1003
 “Chinese Business in Romania”, report FRD Center Market Entry Services1001
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 Goldwind, Dahua Technology, China Energy Conservation and Environmental Protection 
Group, also penetrated the Romanian market . 1004
This very recent trend has been triggered by Bucharest’s green certificate programme, 
designed to absorb foreign capital in the production of renewable energy. However, 
according to Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, Chinese larger private companies “reacted quite 
late to the Romanian incentive programme, missing its most rewarding phase, when lots of 
Western companies scrambled for a piece of the pie. As a result, in the recent few years 
Romania experienced a tremendous growth in the development of renewable energy 
facilities” .  1005
Moreover, the authors emphasised that, by “considering its objectives met and the incentive 
scheme already too generous, in 2013-2014 the Romanian government changed the 
legislation on renewable energy, reducing the incentive scheme”, thus leading to the 
discouragement of these late Chinese investors who eventually chose to partially give up 
their initial investment plans . 1006
Despite that, it is compulsory to mention that in January 2013, Sinovel Wind Group, “the 
largest wind turbine manufacturer in China and the second largest globally, expressed its 
interest in investing in both wind farms, and wind turbine manufacturing in Romania” . 1007
The scholars deduced that, if Sinovel and Faur, a Romanian industrial engineering company 
based in Bucharest, “manage a successful cooperation agreement in this new, high-
technology industry, China could get access to the larger European market, while Romania 
could diversify and upgrade its industrial structure, increase exports and create jobs” .  1008
In the infrastructure sphere the opportunities are huge, hence the priorities of Bucharest’s 
social-democrat leadership have encompassed the construction or modernisation of 
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 Romania’s highways and railways, canals, irrigation systems and bridges as well as the 
development of harbour and maritime infrastructure in Constanța, as part of the much larger 
New Silk Road Economic Belt project and the latter’s connection with the EU Strategy for 
the Danube Region  (EUSDR). 1009
Hence, the 2015 Romanian “Transport Master-Plan” outlines the Chinese investments in the 
building of some sectors of the Bucharest-Transylvania highway, the modernisation of the 
Romanian Railway system and supposedly, the privatisation of the Romanian Railway 
Company, a settlement which could “include a $500 million-worth contract to purchase 
Chinese-made high-speed trains” (Soare 2015: 6).  
Moreover, with Bucharest needing “a second beltway, other highway connections, a 
modernised rail ring, additional subway lines between its extremes, and better connections 
to other major towns, the Black Sea ports included”  apart from the infrastructure 1010
projects referred to above, “the new project of a high-speed railway connection between 
Constanța – the largest Romanian seaport and the second largest harbour in Europe – 
Bucharest, Brașov, Arad, Budapest and Vienna, is an attractive project, which could play a 
significant role in both the intra-CEE, intra-EU cooperation, and their bilateral trade and 
economic cooperation projects with China” .   1011
In fact, this project, might be finalised by dint of the realisation of an 11 billion Euro 
industrial park in Agigea port area “and along the Danube-Black Sea Canal, with 2000 
Romanian-Chinese joint-venture companies being hosted” . In the end, Pencea and 1012
Oehler-Ṣincai pointed out that the Constanța-Arad high-speed line and the industrial park 
 EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR): “EU Strategy for the Danube Region intends to develop 1009
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 near the Black Sea and the Danube “are key pieces in a larger strategic plan of setting up a 
modern new Silk Road connecting Asia and Europe” .  1013
Bucharest’s social-democrat government has regarded the agricultural field as a priority 
area of economic development and, with the sustenance provided by EU funding, Romanian 
agricultural production has witnessed a continuos improvement since 2010. Moreover, as 
mentioned in the first subchapter, following the Sino-Romanian 2014 Cooperation 
Agreement on Agriculture, Romania is interested in expanding its agricultural exports on 
the rapidly-growing Chinese markets (livestock, cereals, dairy and meat products, wine). In 
this sense, the Chinese company China Agricultural Group Corporation showed interest in 
the construction of the Siret-Bărăgan irrigation canal in Romania . However, the 6 Billion 1014
Euros project, approved by Ceaușescu in 1986, still stagnates. 
When considering the second wave Chinese investments in Romania, scholars have also 
taken into account prominent enterprises dealing with communication and information 
technology (IT), that entered the Romanian market in the early 2000s, but only in very 
recent years have shown real willingness and preparedness to make significant investments 
in Romania.  
According to the FRD Centre, Huawei and Lenovo have been the largest Chinese IT&C 
companies on the Romanian market, generating more than 1,000 jobs since 2011. However, 
for Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, representative for the area of information technology - of 
strategic interest to China - is, in the first place, the state-owned company ZTE, established 
in Romania in 2004 (the largest Chinese producer of telecommunications equipment) and 
secondly, the private company Huawei, the largest global provider of IT&C solutions, 
present on the Romanian market since 2003 . If ZTE announced a 100 million Euro 1015
investment programme until 2015 and expressed its interest to take over the Nokia factory 
at Jucu, “Huawei has already invested Euro 90 million in Romania between 2007-2012 and 
has another Euro 200 million investment project to open a global support centre by 
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 2015” , presumably bringing the number of its employees in the country to 1016
approximatively 1,000 until 2018 . 1017
In the oil industry instead, China Energy Company (CEFC) agreed to take over a 51% stake 
in KMG International, the former Rompetrol Group, under agreements reaching US $ 4 
billions. According to Mediafax, the largest provider of general and business news from 
Romania, the agreements were signed in Beijing in December 2015. KMG International 
Group was valued between US $ 500 million - US $ 1 billion, and recorded a net profit of 
US $ 11,4 million in the first nine months, in comparison with the US $ 30 million deficit in 
the similar period of 2014. The Chinese side also proposed investments in the state-owned 
and bankrupt Oltchim industrial complex and one of the largest chemical companies in 
Romania and Southeastern Europe, however, in 2017, the company interested in investing 
hundreds of millions of Euros for the recovery of Oltchim, withdrew the bid . 
To draw to a close, the most important Chinese enterprises and investments in Romania 
nowadays are the “Niro Group”, that invested €100 Million to construct a whole trade and 
business centre, “China Town”; “Golden Way Development BV” a brick factory in 
Constanta with investments of € 28 Million; “Sinoroma Industry Company” - part of the 
Chinese Group F&J - that expanded to “China Tobacco International Europe Company”, 
with investments of 40 Million Euros in Buzău County, and many prospects to expand the 
amount. In 2010 the company had 100 employees . 1018
Other large Chinese companies in Romania are “Eurosport DHS”, a bicycle producer in 
Hunedoara, with € 20 Million investments and 250 employees in 2010; “Dongguan 
Yuncheng Plate Making Co.” from Guangzhou, that invested US $ 4 Millions in the 
Prahova County, provided 50 new jobs in the field of industrial rolls for printed packaging 
and, at the end of the first semester of 2010, the company started investing in an industrial 
hall located in the Industrial Park Ploiești; “Ricky Impex SRL”, set up in 2002, is a bicycle 
and scooter producer that invested 15 Million Euro to open a production site in the Ialomița 
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 province and in 2010 the company counted approximatively 60 employees ; “Friendly & 1019
Joy - F&J Romania”, mainly involved in low-cost environment, food and textiles, natural 
resources, wood materials - the Chinese company is Lemnking Industry, that employed 
around 500 people in Buzău county and invested about US $ 50 Millions in the wood 
industry in 2005, household appliances - the Chinese company is Vortex, it produces small 
electronic appliances which did not enjoy a huge successful on the Romanian market and in 
2013 was held accountable of tax and VAT evasion of up to 9 Million Euros  and tobacco 1020
- the company is the already mentioned Sinoroma Industry, build in 1997 with an 
investment of 3 Million Euros, that increased to 15 Millions in 2006 and opened another 
unit of the cigarette factory in 2007, with an investment of 36 Million Euros ; “Huawei”, 1021
that invested $ 200 Million in Romania by 2013, a year later announced additional 
investments of 100 Million Euros; “ZTE”, set up in Romania in 2004 with investments of 
55 Million Euros, employed about 200 workers in Timișoara in 2016.  
The company, supposed to take over the former Nokia factory in Jucu, has retained its 
investments and recently has focused on the creation of the "smart city" concept in several 
projects with local authorities. The success of these two companies, Huawei and ZTE in 
providing telecommunication equipment - that makes use of local engineering skills - and 
services to European mobile network operators, lies in the favourable price/quality ratio, 
especially by combining the use of Romanian engineers (insufficiently paid in comparison 
with European standards) “in technical support for deployment services around Europe, the 
innovation network that relies on engineers employed at the Chinese sites and financial 
support for market expansion through Chinese industrial policy” . 1022
All in all, Bucharest’s objectives to make a profit out of Beijing’s investments and 
operations abroad following China’s announcement of its “going out” strategy at the 
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 beginning of the century have not merely been accomplished, and most of Bucharest’s 
proposals, as well as several suggestions from Chinese enterprises to invest in Romania, 
predominantly concerning the infrastructure and energy spheres, have not been actualised, 
failed or were abandoned. For example, according to Chiriu and Zuokui, China Huadian 
Engineering, China National Electric Engineering, Minmetals Engineering Co. Ltd. and 
Sinohydro “did not reach even the final stage of an international competition launched by 
the Russian-Dutch group Vimetco to realise a thermoelectric plant for supplying power to 
the aluminium production plant of Alum Tulcea, a second plant of Alro Slatina and the city 
of Tulcea” .  1023
The authors explained that what lies behind these failures is the decline of Romania’s  “role 
as recipient of Chinese FDIs in Europe” . In fact, the authors go on, both the fact that the 1024
modest rise of Chinese investments in Romania was clearly inferior in comparison with the 
broader growth of Beijing’s FDIs in Europe, as well as the country’s “unfavourable 
geographic location, which does not allow a rapid transit of products to Western 
Europe” , have led to this situation. Moreover, to support this theory, Chiriu and Zuokui 1025
took into account former Chinese Ambassador to Romania, Liu Zengwen’s declaration 
regarding “the difficulties deriving from the strictly binding EU legislative framework on 
matters of labor force to which Romania must adhere and respect” . 1026
Nevertheless, as mentioned before throughout this chapter, one cannot misrepresent the 
views of the government in Bucharest, blameworthy of not taking the relations with Beijing 
seriously or of demonstrating insufficient concern when dealing politically, diplomatically 
and economically with a global power, causing gaffes through hasty declarations (I recall 
former President Traian Băsescu’s assertions regarding Romania’s lining up with the USA, 
its closest non-European political and economic partner since the 2000s) and perpetual 
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 misunderstandings as well as negative investment outcomes. 
The 2008-2010 global financial and economic crisis emphasised that the deep-seated 
reliance on the EU markets and capital was a widespread frailty of the CEECs, and most of 
the states in the region started to look towards East, however without renouncing to the EU 
integration process and its indispensable funds. With Russia not being on the list of options 
for the greatest part of the CEECs, the best alternative was represented by China, that 
shared with each of these countries, Romania included, a common past of fruitful 
cooperation. However, even in the privileged class, there are some stakeholders who’s 
understanding regarding the importance of Chinese investments and initiatives of bilateral 
cooperation on the basis of the 16+1 platform is substandard, others look upon Beijing’s 
proposals with skepticism.  
Still, it is worth mentioning that there is also a small-scale minority of China enthusiasts in 
Romania, however “this is a tiny minority” . According to Oehler-Ṣincai, “such attitudes 1027
are influenced by China’s image in Romania and, in its turn, this image is reflected upon the 
attitudes towards China’s initiatives” . 1028
Therefore, if in 2012, Victor Ponta’s emergence as premier reflected new “expectations and 
the China-CEE summit held in Bucharest in November 2013 was a great success for the 
Socialist Prime Minister (…) such expectations showed to be beyond reality once 
again” (Chiriu, Liu 2015: 16) when, two years later, in 2014, Ponta’s defeat against the 
right-wind liberal Klaus Werner Iohannis in the race for president of Romania put Sino-
Romanian relations on hold. Indeed, once he actually took charge of the country, Iohannis 
made several Western-oriented statements, which were immediately taken into 
consideration by the Chinese official press agency, Xinhua.  
For example, “following the dramatic events in Paris, the new Romanian President assured 
all partners of Romania of the full support in the fight against terrorism and extremism of 
any kind and called for closer ties with the United States” (Chiriu, Liu 2015: 17). 
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 Therefore, to a certain degree, Romania’s membership to the EU and NATO limited the 
possibilities for the two countries to strengthen economic cooperation. In fact, according to 
the EU legislation, the governments of the EU member countries can not provide state 
guarantees to certain investment projects; “this offers an evident advantage to the CEE-5 1029
countries - Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, former Yuglosav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia - which have a large space of manoeuvre” . 1030
Thus, albeit the strive of the new social-democratic government in Bucharest, Romania’s 
overly strong political, economic and security attachment to both the US and the EU leads 
into thinking that a stronger, eager approach to China “is not foreseeable in the near future, 
unless Washington, or the EU’s institutions and its strongest members will not decide 
so” .  1031
Moreover, “despite Chinese willingness and pragmatism, Romania is not economically 
significant enough for China to assume a more pro-active policy toward the Balkan 
country” , hence the privileged destination in the early 2000s - Bucharest - having failed 1032
to capitalise on its advantage and having terminated the struggle for Chinese capital, “will 
likely continue on a path of political and economic ups and downs”  in its relations with 1033
Beijing, and will remain “behind the level of diplomatic and economic exchanges that the 
Chinese capital has achieved with other CEE countries such as Hungary, Poland, the Czech 
Republic and even Slovak Republic and Serbia” .  1034
Additionally, the lack of a direct flight between Bucharest and Beijing, that had 
continuously operated for 30 years (1974-2004), must be regarded as an impediment to the 
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 intensification of cultural and people to people exchanges. If in 2003 these flights were 
suspended because of the avian influenza, subsequently Tarom postponed the rehabilitation 
of the route owing to profitability reasons, and albeit several attempts to reopen it in 2014, 
Romania is at present one of the very few countries in CEE that lacks an essential 
implement, a catalyst, that is direct flights to support direct people-to-people exchanges 
with the PRC. 
VI.11 Pragmatic cooperation in the new millennium:  
the PRC’s trade relations with other CEECs 
The trade relationship between China and CEECs has been established in the 1950s, when 
the rather small bilateral trade between the PRC and each of the CEE country was 
undertaken by the stated-owned foreign trade companies. If, in the beginning of the 1990s, 
the economic and political transformation of the CEE states negatively affected the smooth 
development of commerce between China and these countries, in the early 2000s, following 
a gradual improvement of economic situation in CEECs, the bilateral trade improved 
rapidly. Again, when in 2004, the four members of the Visegrád Group Poland, Hungary, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia joined the EU and were followed, in 2007 by Romania 
and Bulgaria, the countries began to carry out EU's common trade policy, resulting in the 
trade relation between these countries and China entering a new stage again.  
Table 1. Trade volume among China and CEECs, Billions US $, China Customs 
                        
                         2004                2005                 2006                2007                2008(Jan-Jun) 
Poland             2.331               3.153                4.671                  7.664                   5.071 
Hungary          3.127               2.859                3.987                  6.226                   3.870 
Czech R.         1.793               2.039                 2.882                 4.967                    3.051 
Romania         1.384               1.662                 6.314                 2.366                    1.575 
Slovakia          0.288               0.491                 0.914                2.206                     1.492 
Bulgaria          0.405               0.531                 1.865                0.969                     0.656 
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 It can be observed in the table above that bilateral trade between China and CEEC increased 
rapidly, with Sino-Polish trade volume doubling in 2008 in comparison with 2004, while 
Hungary, holding the second position, doubled its bilateral trade volume with China in 
2007. In conformity with Ruixia and Zhang, in the first half of 2008 “the trade volume 
between China and Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovakia as well as 
Bulgaria all exceeded the 60% of their trade volume in 2007 respectively” . Moreover, 1035
according to Romanian official information, in 2007 “China was listed as the 10th import 
origination country include EU members and the 28th export partner of Romania” . In 1036
the context of promoting bilateral trade with CEE countries and motivating Chinese 
companies to operate abroad, the government in Beijing held the “China high-tech product 
exhibition” in Hungary in September 2006 and the “Beijing brand product exhibition” in 
CEECs to upgrade the image of China in the international arena and intensify the promotion 
efforts oversea .  1037
Moreover, the amicable political ties contributed at the improvement of economic and 
commercial relations between Beijing and the CEE capital cities. For example, if Sino-
Polish trade volume was nearly 4 times greater in 2007 than in 2003, Chinese imports from 
Bulgaria increased 90% compared with 2006 and bilateral trade between Slovakia and 
China increased 141% in 2007 . Between 2004-2008, Sino-Czech trade volume listed 1038
third amongst Sino-CEECs and, in order to adapt to the new EU legislation, the Czech and 
Chinese governments signed an “Economic Cooperation Agreement” in 2004 and the 
“Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement” in 2005, consenting further trade 
development between the two countries. However, according to Ruixia and Zhang, the US $ 
24.398 billion trade volume between China and CEECs only accounted for a small portion 
of trade between China and EU, that is for 6.9% of total Sino-EU trade and 25% of Sino-
German trade in 2007 and “China only played minor roles in CEECs international 
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 trade” . 1039
For example, if for Romania, the imports from China only accounted for the 3.27 % of its 
total import and the exports to China accounted for 0.53 % of its total export in 2007, for 
Slovakia, the imports from China accounted for 5.2 % of its total imports, while the export 
to China accounted for 0.8 % of its total export in 2007. Slovakia instead, imported 1.02 
billion Euros in January to May 2008, increasing 24.6 % compared with the same period of 
2007, but only accounting for 5.1 % of its total import, while it exported 0.18 billion Euros 
to China, increasing 49.2 % compared with the same period of 2007, also accounting for 0.9 
% for its total exports. Czech sources unraveled that the Sino-Czech bilateral trade 
amounted to US $ 6.22 billion “accounting for 4.1 % of Czech total trade from January to 
June 2008”  and Czech exports were US $ 0.42 billions, accounting for 0.5 % of its total 1040
exports; the imports from China were US $ 5.8 billion, accounting for 7.8 % of its total 
imports. According to the same source, in 2007 “Poland was China’s no.1 trade partner of 
these new EU members and held the largest trade deficit reaching more than 5.7 billion US 
$” .  1041
Furthermore, albeit Chinese exports to Romania and Bulgaria declined considerably in 2007 
after their EU entry, “China still kept large trade surplus with them amounting to 1.8 billion 
US $ and 0.6 billion US $ respectively. The China’s surplus with Hungary and Czech also 
exceeded 3 billion US $” . If in the first half of 2008, the trade volume between Romania 1042
and China reached 1,134 billion Euros, 50.5 % greater than the same period in 2007 and 
Romania imported 1.043 billion Euros from China, hence 11 times more than it exported, in 
the first five months of 2008, Hungary exported 0.3 billion US $ to China and imported 
1.79 billion US $, 37.2 % more than it imported during the same period in 2007. In 
addition, “Slovakia’s trade deficit with China reached 0.84 billion Euros in the same period, 
the Czech Republic held 5.38 billion US $ trade deficit with China in the first half of 2008, 
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 and Bulgaria held 0.22 billion Euros trade deficit against China in the first five months of 
2008” . 1043
It is obvious, at this point, that bilateral trade between China and these countries increased 
rapidly during those years, however, 80% of Hungary’s exports, for example, flowed to the 
EU after Budapest’s accession to the international organisation and Germany was its No.1 
trading partner, counting 30% of its exports and more than 29% of its imports, while import 
from China only stood for 5 % of total imports in the same period. Analogously, “exports 
from China to Romania and Bulgaria decreased more than 50 % after their EU entry in 
2007” . In conformity with Bulgarian sources, “the total foreign trade was 35.482 billion 1044
Euros in 2007, with the EU countries was 21,05 billion Euros, with non-EU countries was 
14.43 billion Euros and the trade with China was only 0.68 billion Euros” .  1045
Ruixia and Zhang asserted that CEE countries enjoyed substantial resources in tourism, 
thus, 32.6 millions foreigners visited to Slovakia in 2007, while Bulgaria was elected one of 
the "best destinations" by the World Tourism Organisation. According to the authors, 
however, in order to overtake the trade imbalances as well as the language barriers 
obstructing the cooperation between China and CEECs, CEE governments’ website should 
provide English versions for Chinese citizens, while Chinese “enterprises and trade unions 
in CEECs should make full use of their local advantage to help the newcomers develop the 
local market by providing local law consultation and language assistance, establishing 
friendly relationship with local peoples, actively participating local public affairs, making 
contributions to the local economic development and promoting the health sustained 
development” .  1046
The Lisbon Treaty of December 2007, that became operative in January 2009 and integrated 
the CEE members’ Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) policy into the EU Common Trade 
Policy, was believed by some CEE capital cities to set up even more barriers to non-
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 member countries, and thus contributed to several CEE countries’ determination to 
participate to the 2010 Shanghai World Exhibition so as to strongly promote culture, 
tourism, education, scientific research ability and encourage the business investment 
environment to China. As a result, beginning with 2010, “these countries economical and 
trade structure would improve gradually along with their continuously economy 
transformation and adaption to the EU integration” . 1047
In fact, as a result of Beijing’s awareness of the continuously growing influence of the 
region within the EU, in 2011, by means of an Economic Forum in Budapest, China 
approached the countries of Central-Eastern Europe with a proposal regarding regional 
cooperation on the basis of the ‘16+1’ platform, planned to help the Chinese capital smooth 
the state of its long-term economic and political bilateral relations with various CEECs . 1048
As already stated, if the official launch of the 16+1 platform was in 2012, when the 17 
heads of government met in Warsaw, subsequent rounds of talks between the premiers were 
held in Bucharest (2013), Belgrade (2014), Suzhou (2015) and Latvia (2016).  
On all these occasions, representatives of the CEE states and China attended several events 
and organised various initiatives like forums on economic and investment affairs, regional 
cooperation as well as ministry-level conferences as well as events dedicated to issues such 
as tourism, education, agriculture, energy affairs and infrastructure development. 
Investment, trade, finance, connectivity, science, technology, innovation, environmental 
protection, energy, people-to-people and cultural exchanges – as well as cooperation at sub-
national levels have been the priorities of the 17 partners.  
Obviously, China’s motivations to improve its ties with CEE countries are various, and 
some of them are the fact that these countries are former socialist nations, “hybrid 
economies, between emerging and developed markets (…) and the growth rates in the CEE 
region are higher than in the Western Europe (…) the labour costs are lower than in the old 
EU member states (…) the natural resources endowment and some CEE’s function as a 
 Ibidem1047
 Marcin Kaczmarski, Jakub Jakóbowski, “China on Central-Eastern Europe: ‘16+1’ as seen from Beijing”, 1048
OSW Commentary, Centre for Eastern Studies, Number 166, 15.04.2015
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 springboard and bridgehead to the EU” .   1049
Moreover, according to Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, the CEECs geographical position as well 
as their access to important harbours encourages Beijing to “finance large industrial 
projects such as equipment manufacturing and to build a new artery for China-Europe 
logistics through the construction of land and sea transportation infrastructure”  and 1050
simultaneously to double bilateral trade in fields like energy, technology industrial projects, 
agriculture and transport. Indeed, if in the beginning of the 2000s Chinese investment in the 
region was insubstantial, in 2010 it reached US $ 800 million, while bilateral trade 
increased from US $ 3 billion in 2000 to over US $ 40 billion in 2010 .  1051
Still, I should outline once more that among the 16 members of the China-CEE platform, 
only 5 states have stood out, Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania and Bulgaria, 
for all these countries enjoyed a Chinese ODI (Outward Direct Investment) stock larger 
than US $ 100 million in 2013 , however standing for only 3.8% of the Chinese ODI 1052
stock in the EU and 0.2% of the Chinese stock worldwide . 1053
 Sarmiza Pencea, Iulia Monica Oehler-Şincai, “Chinese Outward Direct Investment In CEECs: A 1049
Comparative Analysis”, Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Volume 6, No. 2, pp. 34–43
 Ibidem1050
 Ibidem1051
 Sarmiza Pencea, Iulia Monica Oehler-Sincai, “Romania, Strategic Partner in China-CEE Relations”, 1052
Institute for World Economy (IWE), Romanian Academy, 2014
 Pencea, Sarmiza and Oehler-Şincai, Iulia Monica, “Chinese Outward Direct Investment In CEECs: A 1053
Comparative Analysis”, Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Volume 6, No. 2, pp. 34–43
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 Chart 1: The hierarchy of the EU countries, 2013 by value of the Chinese ODI stocks ($ million)  1054
Chart 2: Chinese outward FDI stock in CEE5, 2005-2013 ($ million)   1055
The charts also reveal that, in spite of the new strategy towards CEECs, Chinese companies 
are by and large reticent to investing in the region, “mainly due to their unfamiliarity with 
 Pencea, Sarmiza and Oehler-Sincai, Iulia Monica, “Romania, Strategic Partner in China-CEE Relations”, 1054
Institute for World Economy (IWE), Romanian Academy, 2014 
 Ibidem1055
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 the rules of the large EU market and the ambiguous positioning of the CEE” . Moreover, 1056
Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai claimed that another reason for China-CEECs volume of trade 
not being able to outreach the bilateral trade between China and Western states is the fact 
that most of the high-quality assets of the CEECs “have been absorbed by Western 
countries due to privatisation in the transformation period in the 1990s and some Chinese 
companies (…) failed to enter some CEE countries” .  1057
Infrastructure construction (China Road and Bridge Corp.), information and 
communications technology (Huawei and ZTE), chemical industry (Wanhua Industrial 
Group Co. Ltd.), machinery processing and manufacturing (Liugong Machinery Corp.) 
have been, however, the fields that witnessed an outstanding Chinese investment, and 
Hungary has been leading the group of 5 CEECs in terms of ODI stock attracted from 
China within the past years. The presence, in Hungary, of the Bank of China, Huawei 
(networking and telecommunications equipment and services company), ZTE 
(telecommunications equipment manufacturer) and Wanhua (a chemical industry company) 
as well as many other Chinese leading companies are living proof of how strong relations 
between Budapest and Beijing have become.  
According to a 2017 article in Forbes magazine, when asked about Budapest’s relations 
with China in 2016, the Hungarian foreign minister Péter Szijjártó ostentatiously stated that 
“when the Chinese think about the economy and Europe, then it is Hungary that mostly 
comes to their minds now” . In fact, in 2012, Chinese investment in Hungary more than 1058
doubled the investment in Poland, which accounted for the second-highest amount of 
Chinese FDI in the CEE region. The same article revealed that “up until 2015, Hungary 
received almost 80% of all Chinese investment in the region (…) and Budapest was chosen 
as the location for China’s first think tank in Europe” . 1059
 Pencea, Sarmiza and Oehler-Şincai, Iulia Monica, “Chinese Outward Direct Investment In CEECs: A 1056
Comparative Analysis”, Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Volume 6, No. 2, pp. 34–43
 Ibidem1057
 “China’s relationship with Hungary is Being tested as the EU and Russia apply pressure”, Forbes, 1058
available at https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2017/11/27/chinas-bid-to-buy-eastern-europe-on-
the-cheap-the-161-group/ last accessed on 11.12.2017
 Ibidem1059
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 Just by looking at the Chart 2, “Chinese outward FDI stock in CEE5, 2005-2013” it 
becomes clear that the second strongest competitor has been Poland, the only country in the 
EU “with more than 20 years of uninterrupted GDP growth and one of the best destinations 
for foreign investment, with a good investment environment and stimulus packages. Besides, 
China and Poland established a strategic partnership in 2011” .  1060
Furthermore, branches of the Bank of China and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of 
China, and offices of some of the most important Chinese law companies, like Yingke Law 
and Dacheng Law, are nowadays present in both Poland and Hungary. However, according 
to Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, Chinese investments in Poland, consisting of electronics, such 
as the production of TV sets and monitors, the electro-machinery industry, IT and 
construction machinery, are far from the actual potential and expectations from both sides. 
Moreover, the authors unveiled that major investors include TCL Corp, Digital View, 
Nuctech, ZTE, Huawei, Liugong Machinery Co Ltd and the Chengdu-Lodz direct rail route, 
connecting China and Europe was opened in 2013 . 1061
Similarly, in the past few years, the Czech Republic also witnessed a Chinese ODI 
extending rapidly, and, according to Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai, Prague’s most important 
Chinese investors are ZTE, Huawei, Changhong (TV sets production), Noark (electrical 
appliances and components), Shanxi Yuncheng Plating Group (manufacturer of rotogravure 
cylinders), Shandong Linyi Yuli Foodnuts (nut roasting plant) and Beijing Fight Company 
(crystal glass production).  
Bulgaria instead, has been enjoying important Chinese investments in fields such as car 
production, chemical industry and energy, as well as agriculture and food processing. 
Moreover, Pencea and Sincai revealed that “Bulgaria intends to strengthen cooperation 
with China in sectors including infrastructure, energy, new materials and high technology. 
Meanwhile, it is ready to offer favourable conditions to attract more Chinese tourists and 
investment” .  1062
 Sarmiza Pencea, Iulia Monica Oehler-Şincai, “Chinese Outward Direct Investment In CEECs: A 1060
Comparative Analysis”, Knowledge Horizons - Economics, Volume 6, No. 2, pp. 34–43
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 On the basis of the authors’ calculations, within the CEE-5 group, Romania’s share in the 
overall Chinese investment stock decreased sharply, “from over two thirds of the total in 
2005, to less than one third in 2006, and then gradually to only 13.4% in 2012” , leading 1063
to Bucharest’s lost of its first position until 2005 and second in 2006, to third position 
between 2007-2011 and eventually to fourth position in 2012 . This decline, according to 1064
both Romanian and Chinese experts, has taken place as a result of Hungary’s, Poland’s and 
the Czech Republic’s ability to attain, by establishing concrete goals and developing 
winning political strategies of economic and strategic cooperation with China, significant 
investment deals with powerful state owned enterprises, while Romania was not able to do 
the same, “even if such companies have continually tested its market opportunities” . 1065
Therefore, in a nutshell, noteworthy investment agreements have been signed between 
CEECs and China in areas such as chemicals (with Hungary), automotive (Bulgaria), 
machinery (Poland), IT&C (Hungary, Romania), infrastructure and logistics (Poland, 
Hungary, Serbia), electronics (Poland, the Czech Republic), energy (Poland, Romania, the 
Czech Republic, Serbia). (Idem). The strategies used in the last decade by each of the CEE5 
in order “to develop, extend and tighten their economic relations with China (…) their 
having or not having a specific strategy in relation with this partner, the coherence of their 
succeeding governments (…) and their obstinacy and insistence on negotiating and 
concluding agreements with this country”  have clearly influenced the progress of the 1066
volumes of bilateral trade with China and the Chinese ODI.  
Romania has not managed to attract enough of it, hence, if Bucharest led the group of 5 in 
2005, it only occupied the fourth position in 2013, while Hungary witnessed a remarkable 
rise after 2009, and climbed to the first position in the hierarchy, followed by Poland and 
the Czech Republic after to 2011.  
It is thus appropriate to conclude that, until 2017, Bucharest’s leadership, endowed with the 
 Ibidem1063
 Ibidem1064
 Ibidem1065
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 tendency to vacillate when important decisions needed to be made, embraced a “wait and 
see” policy towards Beijing, and, according to Pencea and Oehler-Ṣincai this is also the 
reason why China signed Strategic Partnership Agreements with Serbia (2009), Poland 
(2011) and the Czech Republic (2016), “but not with Romania the 2nd largest CEEC in 
terms of territory, population, third according to the nominal GDP value, with an extremely 
favourable geographical position” . Moreover, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary 1067
have been enjoying direct air routes with China while, as a result of the Riga Summit in 
2016, Serbia and China signed an agreement on the mutual abolition of visas, Belgrade thus 
becoming the first capital city in CEE to sign such an agreement with Beijing .   1068
Table 1: Chinese investment in the 16 between 2009-2014, according to the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, as reported by the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) 
 Oehler-Şincai, Iulia Monica, “O Evaluare A Relației Bilaterale UE-China În Contextul Economic Și 1067
Geostrategic Actual. Poziția României”, în Pop, Napoleon Pop, Dr. Prisecaru Petre (coord.), “O propunere de 
viziune strategică a Uniunii Europene - Evaluarea domeniilor de acţiune cu relevanţă pentru viziunea 
strategică a Uniunii şi raportarea la interesele României (temă multianuală)”, Institutul de Economie Mondială 
(IEM), Academia Română, București, noiembrie 2016, pp. 14-26, personal translation
 “Serbia and China scrap visas, sign other contracts in Riga”, B92 Politics English, available at https://1068
www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2016&mm=11&dd=07&nav_id=99612 accessed on 13.11.2017
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 Last, but not least, as one can observe from the table above, Romania received just over 
11% of total Chinese investment in the CEE region, similar to Bulgaria, but 30% lower than 
the Czech Republic, almost half that of Poland and three times less than Hungary. 
Therefore, “the rate of growth for Romania’s share of Chinese investment is actually much 
lower than its three main competitors, Poland and Hungary registering almost a 
quadrupling and a quintupling respectively, of Chinese investment in the 2009-2014 period, 
as opposed to Romania’s doubling” . Consequently, what the figures of this study have 1069
demonstrated so far “is that Romania has been less competitive than many of its regional 
peers with regards to attracting Chinese investment and some of it can be laid at the feet of 
the government itself” . 1070
 Valentina Crivăț, “Romania and China - Friends with no benefits”, The Market for Ideas, 04.03.2017, 1069
available at http://www.themarketforideas.com/romania-and-china-friends-with-no-benefits-a250/ accessed on 
05.01.2018
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  Conclusion 
In the course of this study I explored Romania’s relations with China, from a political, 
diplomatic, economic, cultural and technological perspective, since the very beginning in 
the 19th century until 2016. The main objective leading this research has been that of 
providing plausible answers to a series of questions regarding the Sino-Romanian 
cooperation both prior to, and following 1989, through an overall analysis of several aspects 
of the Romanian and Chinese foreign policy, of the Romanian and Chinese leadership’s 
decision making process, as well as by providing an outlook of the Chinese and Romanian 
processes of social and economic transformations brought about by a series of events in the 
end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s.  
The most important questions to which this study aimed to find an answer were concerned 
with issues regarding the uncertainty, skepticism or incapacity of the Romanian leadership 
to capitalise on the rising Chinese economic presence in Central and Eastern Europe since 
the beginning of the 2000s, and consequently intensify Sino-Romanian cooperation in the 
new millennium. Moreover, the study intended to investigate the Romanian anti-communist 
revolution of December 1989 as the watershed for Sino-Romanian relations as, in the wake 
of those events, China embarked on the road of becoming a global superpower while the 
government in Bucharest, struggling economically, politically and socially to cope with the 
reverberations of a lost decade  and utterly disregarding the Asian capital’s economic 1071
and military potential as well as diplomatic influence internationally, eventually turned its 
eyes to the West.  
The investigation emphasised that the comradely and pragmatic cooperation between 
Bucharest and Beijing, as well as the two countries’ mutual political and diplomatic support 
in the international arena, reached its climax in middle of the Cold War as a result of the 
gradual worsening of relations between Moscow and Beijing and their respective 
 Wendell Steavenson, “Ceaușescu’s children”, Romania. The long read, 10 december 2014, The Guardian, 1071
available at https://www.theguardian.com/news/2014/dec/10/-sp-ceausescus-children  accessed on 13.04.2017
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 communist parties, which coincided with Bucharest’s efforts to break free from Moscow’s 
influence between the 1950s and the 1960s.  
Nonetheless, the challenges posed by Gheorghe Gheorghiu Dej to Nikita Khrushchev’s 
integrationist plans would only reach the peak during Nicolae Ceaușescu’s dictatorship, 
when the Romanian Communist Party’s firstly limited margin of independence in foreign 
policy became an increasingly self-assertive international policy and ended up as a public 
dissidence towards the Communist Party of the Soviet Union’s claims for hegemony in the 
communist world. Simultaneously, Ceaușescu consistently maintained a neutral stance in 
the Sino-Soviet dispute and, by means of numerous exchanges of visits with the Chinese 
leadership and mutual political support, that intensified economic, cultural, and military 
interactions, succeeded in making Romania’s relations with Beijing distinguish themselves 
from those of other Warsaw pact socialist states’ relations with the Asian capital.  
Moreover, Bucharest authorities’ attempts to act as mediator between the PRC and the 
USSR in the 1960s, and to play a part in the Sino-American rapprochement between the late 
1960s and beginning of the 1970s, were in some way reciprocated. Thus, if in 1968 Beijing 
officially supported Bucharest against a possible Soviet military invasion, Ceaușescu’s trip 
to China and North Korea in 1971 opened the leader’s eyes to the employment of political 
and ideological mobilisation, as well as to an extensive use of personality cult. Relations 
with China were further strengthened as Beijing granted Romania a loan of US $ 250 
million, Bucharest acted as an attorney to the admission of China to the United Nations, 
supported the Chinese position regarding the situation in Indochina and expressed ideas 
similar to the Chinese standpoint on the Palestinian national movement.  
Furthermore, during the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) Romania actively 
engaged in bestowing China with industrial modernisation and many Chinese students were 
educated in Romania in various fields, including oil and gas engineering, while several 
universities were initiated with the support of Romanian teachers. Romania exported to 
China equipment and machinery and transferred know-how for the development of modern 
industry and agriculture. By the end of the 1970s, Sino-Romanian bilateral trade reached an 
unprecedented amount of approximatively US $ 2 billions. Although Romania ceased to be 
China’s first economic partner in CEE, Sino-Romanian bilateral ties were generally 
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 maintained sound throughout the 1980s. 
In the wake of the revolution of 1989 however, the two countries assumed different paths. If 
in China, the post-1989 model of economic reform was exercised more efficaciously, 
allowing Beijing to become a global player in the international arena within a decade, 
Romania registered a period of economic stagnation and social confusion, while 
Bucharest’s foreign policy strategies were bounded to the Euro-Atlantic partnership. 
Although Romania, unlike other CEE capital cities, never really questioned the “one-China 
policy” and Bucharest gave Beijing a wide berth concerning the question of Taiwan or 
regarding the human rights issues, despite the fact that Bucharest supported Beijing’s cause 
of reunification and in January 1991 the first Romanian President after Ceaușescu travelled 
to Beijing to sign several economic agreements, in the beginning of the new millennium 
Bucharest’s entrance on a path of reforms for NATO and EU accession, boosted the 
Romanian economy on the one hand, but drastically reduced the latter’s relations with 
traditional partners such as China, on the other. 
Following a more general diplomatic, political and economic trend that concerned most of 
the CEECs in the decade following the dissolution of the socialist bloc, a vacillating and 
unreliable government in Bucharest induced the lessening of the Beijing leadership’s trust 
in the Romanian decision-makers, that progressively affected the Sino-Romanian bilateral 
ties. In order to prove the new, unresponsive attitude of the Romanian authorities towards 
their Chinese counterparts, it is only necessary to look at the two countries’ bilateral trade 
relations decline in the period 1992-2004. Furthermore, the 1997 cessation of the custom 
preferential treatment allowed to the Romanian exports, coupled with an insufficient 
dynamism of the Romanian economic agents present on the Chinese market, with 
Bucharest’s ineffective approach towards Chinese investments, a meagre understanding of 
the Chinese market and culture, as well as with the Romanian exports’ poor quality, 
culminated in a great collapse of Romanian exports to the PRC after the 2000s .  1072
In fact, considering that in 1996/1997 Romania - in comparison with CEE neighbouring 
countries that witnessed a sharp decline of exports, like Poland, 4,5% and Slovakia 17% - 
 Eduard Goean, “Relaţiile economice româno-chineze: 1999-2000” [Sino-Romanian economic relations: 1072
1999-2000], in Sfera Politicii, No. 100, Year 8, 2002, pp. 29-35
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 maintained the level of exports to China at 30%, it becomes clear that most of Romania's 
exports were carried out on the basis of pre-1990 governmental agreements, such as the 
credits received by Romania in the 1970s, the liquidation of liabilities accrued to the 
clearing account trade or the repayment of the US $ 20 million credit granted by China to 
Romania on July 8th, 1991 .  1073
As mentioned, the Sino-Romanian bilateral trade drop stretched out for a long period of 
time, and albeit Bucharest’s exports to Beijing were clearly favourable - at least when 
compared to the exports to China of Romania’s neighbouring countries in CEE - in 
1996-1997 Romania was only China’s fourth bilateral trading partner after Poland, Hungary 
and the Czech Republic .  1074
Following a slight revival in 1992 and 1993, the volume of trade witnessed a gradual 
reduction in the following years, reaching the lowest point of US $ 181 millions in 1999. 
Subsequently, the amazing development of the Chinese economy during the 2000s 
systematically triggered the amplification of the gap between Romanian imports from and 
exports to, the PRC, generating an increasing trend of Romania’s trade deficit. Therefore, in 
the first decade of the 21st century, more specifically between 2004-2009, Romanian exports 
to China - largely represented by mechanical products - never outreached US $ 300 million, 
but imports  - consumer goods like textiles, technology - from the Asian giant increased 
three times as much, from US $ 1 billion to US $ 3,5 billions, thus leading to the major 
export crisis in the history of the Sino-Romanian trade relations. Moreover, later on, 
regardless of Bucharest’s roughly threefold increase of its exports, from US $ 296 millions 
in 2009 to US $ 759 millions in 2014, its extensive import values kept for several years the 
bilateral trade balance unfavourable for Romania, afflicting profoundly the two countries’ 
economic relationship.  
In spite of Bucharest leadership's preoccupation, not a single measure to re-equilibrate the 
trade exchanges has been adopted yet and, despite the Chinese investors’ determination and 
incontestable prospectives, and their countless and unbending attitudes to negotiate and 
 Ibidem1073
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 conclude far-ranging and long-term projects, did not produce tangible outcomes. However, 
numerous promising statements regarding the successful economic partnership continue to 
be broadcasted by Sino-Romanian (non-)governmental bilateral organisations and 
institutions, presidents, prime ministers, economic experts, and, most of all, embassies and 
(former) ambassadors, while the cultural sphere of cooperation, according to these 
testimonies, is thriven and thro. 
Moreover, many important works in the academic fields of European and Global studies, 
Cold War studies or international relations, as I have partly corroborated, are inclined to 
highlight the Sino-Romanian ties from a positive standpoint, and focus their attention on the 
traditional friendly relations that the two countries have shared since the 1960s and that has 
yielded, beginning with the 2000s, to a steady development of the Sino-Romanian bilateral 
pragmatic cooperation. Albeit scholars periodically acknowledge that economic and trade 
cooperation needs improvement, more often than not diplomats and experts working in the 
field of Sino-Romanian relations tend to overemphasise the outcomes of the collaboration 
between Romania and China in the 2000s.   
For example, while some authors endeavour to demonstrate that the Sino-Romanian 
relationship has had a gradual and stable evolution since the 1960s, and accordingly allude 
to official statements, such as the Chinese PM Li Keqiang’s speech at the Romanian 
parliament in November 2013  or to the former Chinese ambassador to Bucharest Liu 1075
Zengwen’s declaration, in 2009, regarding China and Romania’s excellent traditional 
relations , this study indicates that Chinese investment in the CEE region in the new 1076
millennium, magnetised by the market potential, by rather modest labor costs and qualified 
 Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's speech at the Romanian parliament in November 2013:“Sino-Romanian 1075
friendship have withstood the test of time and is deeply rooted, evergreen and eternally renewed. The 
friendship between the two peoples across time and space has laid a solid foundation for the sustainable 
development of Sino-Romanian relations” in Gao, Ge, “The Development of Sino-Romanian Relations After 
1989”, Global Economic Observer, “Nicolae Titulescu” University of Bucharest, Faculty of Economic 
Sciences, Institute for World Economy of the Romanian Academy, vol. 5(1), June 2017
 “China and Romania share excellent traditional relations. This year we will celebrate the 60th 1076
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations. Now, the friendly country, Romania, is also a member 
of NATO and the EU. Moreover, EU and China share strategic partnership relations. So far, there are 27 EU 
countries and we have bilateral relations with them at the same time. Personally, I believe that Romania is a 
gateway to China, or one of the gates to the European Union” in Liu Zengwen: „România este pentru China o 
poartă către UE”, Interview by Adevărul, 25 septembrie 2009, available at http://adevarul.ro/news/eveniment/
liu-zengwen-romania-china-poarta-ue-1_50accd717c42d5a6638a2294/index.html accessed on 25.05.2016, 
personal translation
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 labour force, has not been homogeneous at all, and that there are evident dissimilarities both 
in the intensity of the partnership that the Asian country has with each of the CEE states and 
in the dispersion of Chinese investment in those countries. For instance, while the Visegrád 
countries’ trade structure is, by and large, mostly supported by high tech products (car and 
electronic industry), and are thus included in the global production networks, Romania and 
Bulgaria mainly provide the PRC with wood, copper, and several other low tech products. 
Moreover, this work distinguishes itself for its focus on precise historical events that 
determined the Sino-Romanian relationship to become, on the one hand, “special” in the 
1970s, in consequence of Bucharest and Beijing’s mutual brotherly approach, mutual 
support in the international arena, their intense cooperation in the political and diplomatic 
fields as well as the two sides’ pragmatic collaboration in economic, technological and 
cultural spheres and, on the other hand, “numb” because of Bucharest’s leadership 
incapacity to develop a strategic partnership with Beijing and tap the potential of Chinese 
investments in Romania subsequent to Romania’s orientation towards Western countries 
beginning with the 1990s.   
Hence, I have exposed how, following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China 
(1949) and the Romanian People's Republic (1947), the two countries provided each other 
with mutual assistance and support, political trust, and on the basis of various bilateral 
agreements, the two states expanded wide-ranging economic cooperation and established 
long-lasting cultural ties as well as significant people-to-people exchanges. Accordingly, I 
tried to demonstrate that the challenges to Nikita Khrushchev’s integrationist plans by the 
Romanian Communist Party’s leader Gh. Gheorghiu Dej, led to Bucharest’s gradual 
distantiation from its old ally Moscow and its progressive rapprochement to Beijing. If the 
watershed of Romania’s public deviation in its foreign policy - that is the Declaration of 
Independence of April 1964 - served as an implicit protest against the Warsaw Pact, the 
Sino-Soviet split represented the framework for the intensification of Sino-Romanian 
bilateral ties.  
In fact, already before Nicolae Ceaușescu’s rise to power, the Romanian mediation of the 
Sino-Soviet dispute had so much stimulated the Sino-Romanian ties, that the Romanian 
leadership discussed on a regular basis with the Chinese Ambassador in Bucharest their 
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 stance with regard to the Warsaw Treaty Organisation. Moreover, the study revealed how, 
following Nicolae Ceaușescu’s denunciation of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet troops military 
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, and a very likely Soviet military invasion of 
Romania, the Romanian political elite enjoyed full public support from the Chinese 
authorities in Beijing.  
Subsequently, I looked into the Sino-Romanian traditional brotherly socialist relationship 
since 1969 until 1989, by taking into account the Romanian political elite’s drive to deepen 
political, economic and cultural relations with China, since Zhou Enlai’s open support to 
Romania’s independence in the wake of Prague’s events in 1968 until the tragic events of 
1989 in both Romania and China. That being the case, I endeavoured to investigate issues 
such as Bucharest’s position in the Sino-Soviet thaw, the Romanian authorities’ role in the 
Sino-US rapprochement as well as the effects of Ceaușescu’s triumphal visit to Beijing in 
1971 on Sino-Romanian ties by giving prominence to the fact that once Romania enjoyed a 
powerful ally to hold out against Moscow, Bucharest became Beijing’s first diplomatic 
partner in Europe and Romania’s relations with China were consequently enhanced in all 
areas of activity.  
Furthermore, I examined the relationship between China and Romania in the 1970s and the 
1980s by putting an emphasis on significant moments such as Beijing’s support to their 
Romanian counterpart during the devastating floods in Romania, Ceaușescu’s visit to 
Beijing in the beginning of the 1970s and the Romanian Communist Party’s public backing 
of the Communist Party of China, that particularly determined the Sino-Romanian bilateral 
trade to reach its apex in the end of the 1970s, and more generally corresponded to a 
matchless stage in the history of the two countries’ bilateral relations. Additionally, as 
mentioned, the work brought into focus the Romanian authorities’ attempts to act as 
mediator between Washington and Beijing in the beginning of the 1970s, as well as the 
dynamism of the Sino-Romanian relations brought about by Bucharest’s contribution to the 
industrial modernisation of China - owing to equipment and machinery exports as well as 
know-how transfer for agricultural modernisation and industrial development - and the 
extensive people-to-people exchanges.  
The study then followed the events that in the beginning of the 1980s forced Romania in 
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 straitened financial and social circumstances, and on the other side, pushed the People’s 
Republic to a path of reforms and opening to external markets. Consequently, Romania’s 
political and diplomatic relations with China remained cordial throughout the 1980s, 
nevertheless Bucharest ceased to be Beijing’s first economic partner in Europe. 
Moreover, I attempted to demonstrate how the Romanian Revolution of December 1989, 
and the death of the Romanian dictator in the aftermath of a show trial, with its significant 
echo worldwide, initially triggered a wave of empathy, and then suspicion. In this context, 
the Chinese authorities who had deeply known Ceaușescu - in twenty-five years the latter 
made eight official visits to China - communicated almost instantly to the Romanian 
counterparts their respect for the right of the Romanian people to choose their political 
regime as well as the hope to maintain and enhance bilateral friendship relations with 
Bucharest.  
However, in the first years after the revolution, Bucharest froze bilateral relations with the 
outside world and embarked on what Romanian academics have called the “lost decade”. 
The media, the revolutionaries as well as the members of the new political groups, that 
speculated upon Ceaușescu’s escape to China and, above all, focused on the extrapolation of 
the Tiananmen Square events, disapproved the broadening of relations with China. It is no 
wonder that under these circumstances, trade decreased sharply and the ongoing economic 
cooperation was cut short. Hence, the downfall of Ceaușescu’s regime in December 1989 
undoubtedly altered the bilateral relationship between Romania and China in the long-run, 
and albeit the political and diplomatic background was favourable for the maintenance of 
amicable ties, especially considering the Chinese government’s prompt recognition of the 
new government in Bucharest in the aftermath of the revolution, Sino-Romanian relations 
became stagnant and remained sluggish for more than a decade. 
Moreover, after committing a significant diplomatic gaffe by supporting the American led 
resolution in the UN Human Rights Council, in Geneva, in condemning China, the new 
government in Bucharest approached Beijing for the first time after the revolution in 
October 1990, by means of former Foreign Minister Adrian Năstase’s visit to the Chinese 
capital. On that occasion, bilateral talks with Foreign Minister Qian Quichen and President 
Yang Shangkun revealed the very same readiness and support of the Chinese leadership 
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 concerning relations with Romania, and pinpointed the sectors of future cooperation by 
taking into account the new geopolitical changes.  
The visit of President Iliescu to China the following year increased bilateral diplomatic 
contacts and standardised the relations between the two countries by means of the principles 
of international law. Following President Jiang Zemin’s trip to Bucharest in June 1996, that 
accelerated discussions for a package deal worth US $ 500 millions, Romanian President 
Constantinescu’s visit to China in September 1997 resulted in a pledge from Beijing to 
import thousands of Romanian Dacia cars. Nevertheless, when Adrian Năstase became 
prime minister in 2000, the Romanian government began to multiply efforts in order to 
ensure the prerequisites for Romania's integration into the North Atlantic Alliance and the 
European Union. Therefore, Bucharest’s endeavour to maintain an effective political 
dialogue with China was coupled with the priorities of Romania’s integration in the two 
international organisations and the Romanian leadership’s drive for the improvement of 
bilateral exchange and cooperation programs. Still, the Romanian Prime Minister undertook 
three important visits to China in 2002, 2003 and 2004, and signed several agreements of 
bilateral cooperation in the political and diplomatic fields that resulted in the Sino-
Romanian trade volume exceeding US $ 1 billion in 2004. Moreover, on the occasion of the 
state visit to Romania of President Hu Jintao in 2004, the two sides signed the Joint 
Declaration of Romania and the People's Republic of China on the establishment of a 
Comprehensive Partnership for Friendship and Cooperation. 
The last section of this study dealt with the Sino-Romanian bilateral ties since Romania’s 
accession to NATO in 2004 until the 5th Summit of China and CEECs held in Riga in 2016. 
The results obtained by means of this research thus confirmed the hypothesis that, with the 
accession to NATO and the EU, Bucharest’s foreign policy objectives mostly payed 
attention to the development of bilateral relations with Western countries. Albeit the Social 
Democratic government headed by Victor Ponta (2012-2015) promoted, to a certain extent, 
the improvement of relations with the Asian giant, the study revealed that in 2012, two 
thirds of Romania’s foreign trade was with the EU while China only ranked 3rd after 
Turkey and Russia as Romania’s non-EU trading partner.  
Moreover, Romania’s huge trade deficit with China in the past ten years confirmed that the 
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 Romanian leadership’s lack of a long-term strategy - presumably caused by unstable 
Romanian governments, their frequent change in recent years - resulted in Bucharest’s 
inefficiency to position itself as a pawn in larger European/global power games, necessary 
in the new geopolitical context. With China as the Asian giant, the avowedly mature global 
power and Romania now an accustomed EU-member state, Bucharest has to find a way to 
enhance cooperation with all its strategic partners, the EU, China and the USA.  
Next, the investigation covered the Chinese foreign policy strategies, and brought to a close 
that albeit Beijing has been constant in sustaining fair relations with most of the countries 
worldwide and has always expressed appreciation of Romania's constant attitude towards 
the issue of Taiwan and Tibet, the respect for Romania's option of joining the European and 
Euro-Atlantic structures, as well as the confidence that Romania, as member of the EU 
would support the development of China's relations with the former, it became clear that, 
because of the Romanian media and authorities’ worries that solid relations with Beijing 
might yield the “restoration” of communism in the public opinion assessments, the Chinese 
strategy to grow its influence in Southeastern Europe was only favourable for some of the 
CEECs, that succeeded in capitalising on the China-CEE 16+1 cooperation platform since 
2011.  
In fact, the study displayed that, when compared to other CEE neighbouring countries’ trade 
with China, Romania only ranked 5th, preceded by Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Slovakia or Bulgaria, suggesting that even the recent Social Democratic governments in 
Bucharest, either skeptical or inefficient, have been incapable to tap the full potential of the 
Chinese investments in Romania, and boost the Sino-Romanian economic partnership.  
In order to support this statement, I ought to reproduce the speech held by Ambassador Xu 
Feihong at the Seminar on China-Romania Cooperation, in April 2016. On that occasion, 
the Chinese ambassador plenipotentiary to Bucharest focused on the recent condition of the 
Sino-Romanian relations, and stated that the two countries’ “cooperation potential is far 
beyond the (…) results. Bilateral trade volume has not reached the level of our aspiration 
and enthusiasm. No China-Romania key economic project has started its construction. No 
Chinese company has yet won tenders for Romanian infrastructure projects such as 
motorways and railways. Next step, both sides need to show more confidence, to tap the 
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 potential and seek appropriate methods, in order to push forward the mutual beneficial 
cooperation between China and Romania” . 1077
It is thus comprehensible that, while other CEECs initiate state-implemented far-reaching 
investment projects with the Chinese side, Romania still has a long way to go before even 
starting to capitalise on a partnership that first-hand needs to abandon the turgid prose in 
favour of pragmatic operations and convert the official high-level exchange visits in 
concrete modern infrastructure or mutually beneficial bilateral trade at once.  
China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) stock in CEEC,  
2003-2013, Selected Countries  1078
Moreover, Bucharest authorities’ exaggerated prudence when dealing with China, the 
repeated diplomatic gaffes such as the 2013 visit to Taiwan of four Romanian parliament 
 “Speech by Ambassador Xu Feihong at the Seminar on China-Romania Cooperation: Romania's 1077
contribution to China-CEEC Cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
PRC, 01.04.2016, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zwjg_665342/zwbd_665378/
t1352434.shtml accessed on 05.01.2018
 Andrea Éltető, Ágnes Szunomár, “Chinese investment and trade - strengthening ties with Central and 1078
Eastern Europe”, International Journal of Business and Management, Vol. IV, No. 1, 2016, p. 33
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 deputies, the lack of a long-term policy yield by the ever-changing governments and with it, 
legislation, as well as an unreasonable bureaucracy, are all motives that influence the 
authorities in Beijing to transfer their interest from Bucharest, a traditional special partner in 
the communist era, to more dynamic states. If following the Sino-Soviet split, the PRC 
“began to distinguish socialist states based on their degree of autonomy from the USSR, a 
policy referred to as ‘differentiated’” , nowadays Beijing looks for attentiveness, 1079
efficiency, seriousness, determination and unambiguity from its CEE partners, thus 
Bucharest needs to learn from its neighbours, adopt a successful foreign policy and make 
every effort to intensify all-encompassing relations with Beijing.  
While, on the one hand, factors related to the surface, population, geographical location, 
natural resources, history, culture, tradition and language have been considered, clearly by 
the ones opposing cooperation with China, as unfavourable and insurmountable features, on 
the other hand the lack of any territorial contentious, the strong tradition of friendly 
relations, the sharing of the same values for national identity, territorial integrity, worldwide 
peace building and the fight against terrorism, the international plan for a fairer political and 
economic order could be regarded as beneficial for the maintenance and intensification of 
the Sino-Romanian bilateral ties.  
Countries in CEE, Romania included, have no reason to regard international organisations 
such as NATO and the EU as a threat to their collaboration with China. On the contrary, 
Bucharest oughts to identify the way to combine the intensification of relations within the 
European Union, NATO, the partnership with the US as well as with neighbouring states, 
Russia included, with the development of pragmatic, solid and mutually beneficial relations 
with China, permanent member of the UN Security Council, because regardless of Romania 
or Beijing’s bilateral relations with Bucharest, China is, and most probably will carry on 
being, a global superpower. However, without substantial relations with China, Romania 
will be deprived of a valuable friend and of significant support, both internationally and 
domestically, for its national interest, as well as from economic, financial, cultural, political 
and strategic perspectives.  
 Péter Vámos, “China and Eastern Europe in the 1980s: A Hungarian Perspective”, 20 January 2016, 1079
Wilson Center, CWIHP,  e-Dossier no. 69,  available at https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/china-and-
eastern-europe-the-1980s-hungarian-perspective
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 Considering both the intensification of China’s relations with CEECs through strategic and 
structural fast paces, aimed at further development of economic, technological and cultural 
partnerships,  and  given  that  European  Union  member  states  have  been  the  favourite 
destination of Chinese investors, the joint efforts of the leadership in Bucharest and Beijing 
should not only be consumed in trade. Recently, PSD chairman Liviu Dragnea, expressed 
that Romania does not benefit from the Chinese investments enough and perhaps “the time 
has come for Romania to start benefitting from these investments because it helps our 
development seriously” . Moreover, according to Dragnea, the Sino-Romanian bilateral 1080
trade suffered greatly especially when Romania was not governed by the Social Democratic 
party. He explained that during Adrian Năstase's government, the latter signed “important 
agreements which included major Chinese investment projects in Romania. Then they were 
suspended for ten years. The government led by Victor Ponta, in which I took part, resumed 
the large investment projects, and led them to an almost final phase. In 2016, unfortunately, 
they were suspended again and I hope that now, after being resumed by the current 
government, we will be able to see them finalised” .  1081
Nevertheless, albeit the most profitable alternative seem to be the investments in large 
projects, such as the modernisation of some hydropower plants, in infrastructure and in 
industrial and greenfield parks, the Romanian leadership should pinpoint effective measures 
to minimise the Sino-Romanian trade unbalance by identifying the best circumstances to 
improve exports of industrial products, to modify the imports structure of Chinese goods, to 
implement promotional policies aiming to attract wide-ranging Chinese investments and to 
enhance the collaboration between the Romanian and Chinese banks.  
As China has become the second largest export market for Romanian wines after the 
European Union , Bucharest could consider more seriously the Asian giant’s explicit 1082
 Mihnea Dumitru, “Relații bilaterale doar dintr-o parte. De ce investițiile chineze în România sunt în mare 1080
parte doar pe hârtie”, Bursa, 04.10.2017, available at http://www.bursa.ro/relatii-bilaterale-doar-dintr-o-parte-
de-ce-investitiile-chineze-in-romania-sunt-in-mare-parte-do...&s=macroeconomie&articol=332357.html 
accessed on 06.10.2017, personal translation
 Ibidem1081
 Victor Lupu, “China has become the second largest export market for Romanian wines”, The Romania 1082
Journal, November 16, 2015, available at http://www.romaniajournal.ro/china-has-become-the-second-largest-
export-market-for-romanian-wines/  accessed on 05.11.2017
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 requests for this Romanian product and, in the context of nearly all European countries 
having opened law offices to act as medium with Chinese businessmen, while permanent 
economic representatives take part in economic events and promotion fairs, the Romanian 
leadership should also start improving the level of its official economic representation in the 
Asian country.  
Furthermore, in the cultural field, considered that Romania was given the status of tourist 
destination for Chinese citizens once the Romanian Tourist Receiving Bureau was opened 
in China in 2004, Bucharest should intensify the activity of this tourist promotion office and 
evaluate the possibility of opening new offices in China, given the huge increase in numbers 
of Chinese tourists. However, in order to attract Chinese tourists to Romania, the latter 
should firstly provide a larger number of tourism promotion Chinese-language speakers and 
should seriously consider the possibility of restoring the Bucharest-Beijing direct airline.  
Additionally, the authorities in Beijing and Bucharest should smooth the visa-issuing 
system, nowadays a huge obstacle for the intensification of Sino-Romanian cultural ties, 
should evaluate the possibility of concluding new partnership agreements between the 
Romanian academies and famous Romanian universities with Chinese academies and 
universities, and to intensify the bilateral exchange of students. Considered that a large 
number of contemporary Romanian literature, of Chinese culture and civilisation narrative 
has been printed in both Chinese and Romanian language with Beijing’s financial support, 
the authorities in Bucharest should also consider its own contribution to the publication, and 
thus mutual knowledge and understanding, about China and Romania respectively.  
In conclusion, the study demonstrated that while China endeavours into reducing the 
distances to all countries worldwide, Bucharest seems more effective in the opposite 
direction, enlarging the distance, holding back, blocking or delaying active and pragmatic 
diplomatic, economic as well as cultural communication. Moreover, it is certain that as long 
as Bucharest’s governmental relations with the outside world fails in the thick of domestic 
struggles while Romania’s neighbours are amplifying partnership projects with China, an 
awareness that a different approach towards Beijing, based on respect and thoughtfulness, 
will never be achieved. 
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 Annexes: 
Annex 1: “Bucharest Guidelines for cooperation”, 26 November 2013   1083
1. Hold a China-CEEC meeting of heads of government every year to review cooperation 
achievements and set the direction for future cooperation. Parties will discuss and set the 
date and venue of the 2014 meeting as soon as possible. 
2. Consider formulating a medium-term agenda for cooperation when appropriate in light of 
how China-CEEC cooperation evolves.  
3. Promote investment, economic and trade cooperation 
   i. Firmly oppose protectionism in all its forms and manifestations, work to promote 
mutual investment and scale up and upgrade economic cooperation and trade while striving 
to mitigate its current imbalances. 
    ii. Designate and announce 2014 as the China-CEEC Investment and Business Promotion 
Year, and under its framework: 
1. Hold a China-CEEC ministerial meeting on promotion of economic cooperation and 
trade; 
2. Hold an expo of CEEC commodities in China; 
3. Hold a China-CEEC symposium on macroeconomic policies in China; 
4. Hold a China-CEEC symposium on investment promotion in China; 
5. Organise a China-CEEC investment promotion event at the China International Fair for 
Investment and Trade; 
6. Hold a China investment forum in the Czech Republic; 
7. Establish a China-CEEC liaison mechanism for investment promotion agencies;  
8. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association of chambers of commerce, 
joined by chambers of commerce of China and CEECs on a voluntary basis. 
   iii. Encourage SMEs to play an active role in business cooperation and discuss the 
 “The Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”, 1083
27 November 2013, available at http://gov.ro/en/news/the-bucharest-guidelines-for-cooperation-between-
china-and-central-and-eastern-european-countries accessed on 21.11.2017
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 possibility of establishing a platform for China-CEEC SME exchanges and cooperation. 
The Chinese side welcomes CEECs' participation in the China International Small and 
Medium Enterprises Fair in 2014 and is ready to organise a special event for CEEC SMEs 
at the Fair. Parties support SMEs in strengthening cooperation in green technologies. Poland 
will hold a special event during POLEKO Fairs in Poland. 
    iv. Encourage Chinese and CEEC businesses to discuss the possibility and opportunities 
of using convenient geographic location and favourable investment conditions of China and 
CEECs to jointly explore third markets. 
      v. Encourage parties to develop agro-trade when supplies are ensured and their 
respective inspection and quarantine requirements are met. 
  vi. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association to promote agricultural 
cooperation. Relevant Chinese and CEEC agencies, businesses and organisations are 
welcome to join on a voluntary basis. 
   vii. China and one of the CEECs will take turns to hold a China-CEEC agricultural 
cooperation forum. 
4. Expand financial cooperation 
    i. China and CEECs will step up coordination, encourage their financial institutions to 
engage in cooperation in flexible and diverse forms and bring into full play the role of the 
US$10 billion special credit line in promoting China-CEEC economic cooperation and 
trade. 
      ii. Parties welcome the official launch of the China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund 
(stage one), commend the efforts made by Chinese, Polish and Hungarian financial 
institutions, support the relevant financial institutions in launching stage two of the fund at 
an appropriate time and encourage more financial institutions and businesses to contribute 
to the fund. In the meantime, CEEC governments, financial institutions and businesses are 
welcome to recommend high-quality and promising projects to the Fund.  
  iii. Support qualified and interested financial institutions of China and CEECs in 
establishing branches and developing business in each other's countries in line with the 
relevant regulatory and supervisory legislation. Support the People's Bank of China and the 
central banks of CEECs in signing agreements of currency swaps as they see necessary and 
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 promote local currency settlement as one of the means to promote trade and investment.  
    iv. Support qualified and interested Chinese and CEEC institutions in investing in each 
other's inter-bank bond market. 
5. Enhance cooperation in connectivity 
   i. Actively discuss the possibility of building an international railway transportation 
corridor connecting China with CEECs and encourage businesses to establish bonded areas 
and distribution centers along the railway routes to build a new logistics passage between 
China and Europe. 
   ii. Strengthen cooperation in infrastructure development, such as construction of roads, 
railways, ports and airports based on the principle of mutual benefit. 
    iii. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association on infrastructure cooperation 
and relevant Chinese and CEEC agencies and businesses are welcome to join on a voluntary 
basis. 
   iv. Welcome a high-level conference on transport, logistics and trade routes connecting 
Asia with Europe to be held in 2014 in Riga, Latvia. 
 6. Expand cooperation in science, technology, innovation, environmental protection and 
energy 
      i. Hold on a regular basis a China-CEEC symposium to promote innovation, techno-
logical cooperation and international technology transfer, with the first symposium to be 
held in 2014. 
        ii. Strengthen cooperation in the information and communications sector.  
       iii. Strengthen China-CEEC cooperation and exchanges on protection of forest, wetland 
and wildlife and development of green economy and eco-culture. 
       iv. The Chinese side stands ready to strengthen cooperation and exchanges with CEECs 
on environment-friendly science and technology, negotiate the signing of relevant MOUs on 
environmental cooperation, encourage institutes of environmental science and research 
from China and CEECs to establish partnerships and research networks, support 
environmental experts and scholars in carrying out exchanges and mutual visits, engage in 
cooperative research programs on water, air and solid waste management, promote 
exchanges, cooperation and capacity building in the fields of eco-industries, sustainable 
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 consumption and production and environmental labelling certification, and achieve mutual 
benefit and win-win progress in environmental science, technology and innovation. 
     v. The Chinese side stands ready to step up cooperation with CEECs on nuclear power, 
wind power, hydro power, solar power and other sources of clean power for mutual benefit 
and common development. CEECs welcome the Chinese readiness in this regard. 
   vi. Encourage closer cooperation between China and CEECs in the fields of protection 
and sustainable use of natural resources, geology, mining and spatial planning. 
7. Promote dynamic people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation 
     i. Hold the first China-CEEC high-level symposium of think tanks in China in December 
2013. 
  ii. The Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European 
Countries will organise mutual visits by 50 Chinese journalists and 50 CEEC journalists in 
2014. 
    iii. Hold the China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum and the China-CEEC Cultural 
Cooperation Forum once every two years. China and CEECs will discuss and set the venues 
and dates of the two events to be held in 2015 as soon as possible. 
   iv. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association of tourism promotion agencies 
and businesses and welcome Chinese and CEEC tourism promotion agencies and 
businesses to join on a voluntary basis. Promotion events of Chinese and CEEC tourism 
products will continue to be held at the China International Travel Mart. 
      v. Hold on a regular basis the China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue. Actively explore 
the possibility of establishing a China-CEEC association of institutes of higher learning. 
    vi. Take effective measures to facilitate movement of people. The Chinese side welcomes 
visa and residence permit facilitation measures of Romania and the Czech Republic for 
Chinese citizens and announces that citizens of all the 16 CEECs will be entitled to 72-hour 
visa-free transit in Beijing, Shanghai and other ports. 
    vii. Cooperation at the sub-national level will be encouraged and supported as one of the 
important pillars of China-CEEC cooperation. Support the establishment of a China-CEEC 
association of provincial governors, joined by Chinese and CEEC provinces, states and 
municipalities on a voluntary basis. The China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting will be held 
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 once every two years.   
Annex 2: “Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation between China-CEECs”  1084
1. Support China in hosting the 4th China-CEEC Meeting of Heads of Government in 
2015. 
2. Acknowledging the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation as the guiding 
document for China-EU relations, the participants support the efforts to start 
formulating a medium-term agenda for cooperation between China and interested 
Central and Eastern European Countries as appropriate in 2015. 
3. Enhance cooperation on connectivity 
4. (1) Taking note of the agreed EU regulations, guidelines, policies and processes in 
connectivity and the agreed regulations, guidelines, policies and processes of other 
regions, participants welcome and support exploring possibilities of China-CEEC 
cooperation in this field. (2) The participants welcome the signing of cooperation 
agreements on the railway connecting Belgrade and Budapest between China, Hungary 
and Serbia, and hope that the relevant parties would continue to create a favourable 
environment for the cooperation on the project through joint efforts. (3) Continue to 
improve the China-Europe international railway container traffic, making it a priority in 
deepening mutually-beneficial cooperation between China and Europe and improving 
connectivity and market-access between Asia and Europe. Encourage relevant countries 
to facilitate customs clearance, create new logistics routes and hubs and encourage the 
participation of businesses based on their own advantages. (4) Strengthen cooperation 
in infrastructure development including road, railway, port and airport under the 
principle of mutual benefit, and actively discuss the cooperation on building regional 
transport networks. (5) Invite more CEECs to take part in the China-EU Smart and 
Secure Trade Lanes (SSTL) Pilot Project. Actively discuss the inclusion of land, air and 
other means of transportation into SSTL cooperation. (6) Welcome Serbia in leading the 
efforts to establish a China-CEEC association on transport and infrastructure 
cooperation, and welcome the participation of relevant Chinese and CEEC institutions, 
 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC website1084
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 businesses and organisations on a voluntary basis. (7) Support the functioning of 
existing direct flights between China and CEECs, the opening of new routes at an early 
date, and the exchanges and cooperation in fields related to civil aviation. (8) Support 
the Riga High Level Conference on Transport, Logistics and Trade Routes in 2015. (9) 
Support the establishment of a China-CEEC association on logistics cooperation at an 
appropriate time. (10) Welcome heads of CEEC customs authorities to China for 
relevant forums in 2015. 
5. Promote economic cooperation, trade and investment (1) Firmly oppose protectionism 
in all its forms and manifestations. Work to increase mutual investment, elevate the 
scale and level of economic cooperation and trade, and create conditions for the 
sustained and steady growth of trade. (2)Welcome and support the establishment of the 
executive body of the China-CEEC Business Council in Warsaw, Poland, and invite 
relevant Chinese and CEEC business associations, organisations and businesses to join 
on a voluntary basis. (3) Welcome the establishment of the Secretariat of the China-
CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism in Beijing, China, and 
Warsaw, Poland, and support its active role in promoting information sharing on 
investment and increasing mutual investment between China and CEECs. (4) Hold the 
China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation once 
every two years. Organise a China-CEEC investment and trade fair during the China 
International Consumer Goods Fair in Ningbo, China, in 2015. (5) The Chinese side 
welcomes CEEC businesses to continue to participate in the China International Small 
and Medium Enterprises Fair and other fairs held in Hebei Province and other Chinese 
localities. The CEECs welcome Chinese businesses to participate in trade fairs and 
expos in their countries. (6) Encourage Chinese and CEEC businesses to discuss the 
possibilities and opportunities of using the convenient geographic locations and 
favourable investment environment of China and CEECs to jointly explore third 
markets. (7) Encourage the participants to develop agricultural trade when supplies are 
ensured and in line with inspection and quarantine standards and requirements, and step 
up cooperation on animal husbandry, including breeding, farming, processing and trade. 
(8) Welcome and support Bulgaria in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC 
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 association on promoting agricultural cooperation and invite relevant Chinese and 
CEEC institutions, businesses and organisations to join on a voluntary basis, noting that 
the association will be officially launched in Sofia in the first half of 2015. (9) Hold the 
10th China-CEEC Agro-trade and Economic Cooperation Forum in Hungary in 2015. 
(10) Hold CEEC-China Forum during European Economic Congress in Katowice, 
Poland in 2015. 
6. Expand financial cooperation (1) Encourage Chinese and CEEC financial institutions to 
continue to engage in cooperation in flexible and diverse forms, explore creative 
models of financial cooperation, and improve financing conditions for businesses. Bring 
into full play the role of the US$10 billion special credit line and other financing tools 
in promoting China-CEEC economic cooperation and trade. (2) Commend the positive 
progress of the China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund (stage one) and the 
contribution by Hungary. Support the launch of stage two of the Fund and encourage 
more financial institutions and businesses to contribute to the Fund and conduct 
investment cooperation. (3) Encourage and support qualified and interested Chinese and 
CEEC financial institutions to establish branches, develop market and expand business 
in each other's countries in line with the relevant regulatory legislations. (4) Support the 
People's Bank of China and CEEC central banks in signing currency swap agreements 
as they see necessary, and facilitate local currency settlement as one of the effective 
means to increase trade and investment. Welcome the signing of currency swap 
agreements between China and Hungary and between China and Albania. Encourage 
Chinese and CEEC businesses to use RMB as settlement currency in cross-border trade 
and investment. (5) Support qualified and interested Chinese and CEEC institutions in 
investing in each other's inter-bank bond market. Welcome investment by the relevant 
institutions of Hungary and Lithuania in the Chinese inter-bank bond market. (6) 
Encourage Chinese and CEEC banks to develop comprehensive financial cooperation, 
including information and personnel exchanges and mutual business facilitation and 
support. (7) The Chinese side will favourably consider organising the meeting of the 
Central Bank Governors’ Club of the Central Asia, Black Sea Region and Balkan 
Countries in China in 2015 and welcomes the participation of countries in the relevant 
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 regions. 
7. Expand cooperation in science, technology, innovation, environmental protection and 
energy (1) Hold the China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and 
International Technology Transfer in Slovakia in 2015. Encourage Chinese and CEEC 
research institutes and businesses to enhance industrial, academic and research 
cooperation and on international technology transfer. (2) Continue to support closer 
cooperation on information and communications technology. Encourage joint research 
projects between China and CEECs and promote cooperation among companies of 
science and technology parks. (3) Step up China-CEEC cooperation and exchanges on 
protecting forest, wetland and wildlife, and on developing green economy and eco-
culture and share experience of forestry development, with a view to increasing mutual 
understanding and promoting cooperation. (4) Encourage China and CEECs to develop 
nuclear energy projects under the principle of transparency and responsibility. 
Recognise the rights of each country to develop nuclear energy and the importance of 
properly fulfilling international obligations on nuclear security. Welcome the signing of 
nuclear energy cooperation documents between China and Romania and between China 
and the Czech Republic, and the common understanding between China and Hungary 
on nuclear energy cooperation. (5) Encourage closer China-CEEC cooperation on the 
protection and sustainable use of natural resources, geology, mining, shale gas 
development and spatial planning. (6) Welcome Romania’s initiative of setting up a 
Centre for Dialogue and Cooperation in energy-related projects and encourages 
representatives of the academia, legal institutions, businesses and governments in China 
and CEECs, as well as in other countries, to share and pool their expertise with a view 
to expanding and further developing their endeavours. 
8. Deepen people-to-people and cultural exchanges and cooperation at the sub-national 
level (1) The Chinese side encourages its performing arts organisations to purchase 
programs from CEECs and supports Chinese and CEEC cultural and arts organisations, 
groups, businesses and artists in engaging in all-dimensional, wide-ranging practical 
cooperation such as training, joint creative work, experience sharing and platform 
building. The Chinese side is ready to use the opportunity of the Festival of Baltic 
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 Culture to gradually improve its model of cultural exchanges with CEECs to expand 
and enhance such exchanges. Support China and Poland in co-organising an expert 
forum on the protection of Chinese and CEEC cultural heritage to be held in Poland. 
Welcome Albania's initiative to hold an expert forum in the field of tangible and 
intangible cultural heritage management and protection. Invite CEEC artistic directors 
of international jazz festivals to visit China, hold a China-CEEC summer dance camp in 
China, and hold Chinese art festival in the three Baltic countries in 2015. (2) Hold the 
China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks on a regular basis. (3) Support the 
establishment of a China-CEEC think tanks exchange and cooperation centre. (4) The 
Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 
will organise mutual visits by 50 Chinese journalists and 50 CEEC journalists in 2015. 
(5) Hold the 2nd China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum in China in 2015. (6) 
Hold the 2nd China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Forum in 2015 and hold a China-
CEEC dance evening gala concurrently. (7) Welcome and support the establishment of 
China-CEEC Association of Tourism Promotion Agencies and Businesses in Hungary. 
The Association will organise promotion events, open a bilingual (Mandarin and 
English) website on China-CEEC tourism cooperation and develop more quality travel 
routes catered to the needs of Chinese and CEEC tourists. (8) Designate 2015 as Year of 
Promotion of China-CEEC Tourism Cooperation. Organise under this framework the 
2nd China-CEEC High Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation in Slovenia, a 
promotion event of Chinese tourism products, trips to CEECs by 1,000 Chinese 
travellers, a "China tourism day" event and other events, and build platforms for 
exchanges and cooperation between Chinese and CEEC tourism sectors. Invite media 
organisations and tourism businesses from both China and CEECs to look at each 
other’s tourism products and routes and organise promotion events. The Chinese side 
will continue to invite heads of CEEC tourism authorities to participate in the China 
International Travel Mart in Kunming, Yunnan Province, in October 2015. (9) Hold the 
3rd China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue in one of the CEECs in 2015. Welcome 
Sofia University (Bulgaria) in its capacity as the first rotating coordination centre on the 
European side for China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium and support the 
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 Consortium in playing an important role in promoting China-CEEC educational 
exchanges and cooperation. (10) Support China-CEEC cooperation in translation and 
publication of each other's literary works. The Chinese side welcomes CEECs to serve 
as the Country of Honour as a group at the Beijing International Book Fair in 2016. (11) 
Organise a Romanian film festival in China in 2015; the Chinese side will organise a 
China-CEEC high-level radio and television seminar; China and the Czech Republic 
will jointly produce a cartoon entitled Panda and Mole. (12) China and CEECs are 
ready to make more contribution to facilitating mobility of people. (13) Support 
Chinese and CEEC localities in taking an active part in exchanges and cooperation in 
all fields under the China-CEEC cooperation framework, properly run the China-CEEC 
Association of Governors of Provinces and Regions and make it the most important 
platform for China-CEEC sub-national cooperation. Welcome the inclusion of sub-
national cooperation as an important agenda item of the China Investment Forum. (14) 
The 3rd China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting will be held in Hebei Province, China, in 
2016. (15) Strengthen information sharing and exchanges under the China-CEEC 
cooperation framework. 
9. Support the convocation of the 1st China-CEEC health ministers' meeting in the Czech 
Republic in 2015. The Chinese side will work with interested CEECs to select proper 
locations to set up TCM centres. The Chinese side commends the efforts of the Czech 
Republic to cover TCM under its national health insurance system. 
The Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 
will organise a trip to China for senior CEEC officials in 2015. 
Annex 3: Implementation of the Measures of the “Bucharest Guidelines for Cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”  1085
1. Since December 2013, citizens of all the 16 CEECs are entitled to 72-hour visa-free 
transit in ports including Beijing and Shanghai. 
 Ibidem1085
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 2. In December 2013, the 1st China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks was 
held in Beijing, China. 
3. In April 2014, a delegation of CEEC journalists visited China. 
4. In May 2014, the 1st China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology Cooperation and 
International Technology Transfer was held in Shanghai, China. 
5. In May 2014, the inaugural conference of the China-CEEC Association of Tourism 
Promotion Agencies and Businesses was held in Budapest, Hungary. 
6. In June 2014, the 1st meeting of the China-Hungary-Serbia joint working group on 
transport infrastructure cooperation was held in Beijing, China. 
7. In June 2014, the China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on Promoting Trade and Economic 
Cooperation was held in Ningbo, China. 
8. In June 2014, the Central and Eastern European Countries' Products Fair (CEEC Fair) 
was held in Ningbo, China. 
9. In June 2014, the High Level Conference on Transport, Logistics and Trade Routes: 
Connecting Asia with Europe was held in Riga, Latvia. 
10. In August 2014, the 2nd China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting was held in Prague, the 
Czech Republic. 
11. In August 2014, the China Investment Forum was held in Prague, the Czech Republic. 
12. In August 2014, the Memorandum of Understanding on Promotion of the Establishment 
of the Association of Governors of Provinces of China and Representatives of Regions 
of Central and Eastern European Countries was signed in Prague, the Czech Republic. 
13. In September 2014, the 2nd China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks was 
held in Bled, Slovenia. 
14. In September 2014, the 2nd China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue was held in 
Tianjin, China. 
15. In September 2014, the China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium was 
established in Tianjin, China. Sofia University (Bulgaria) was elected as its first rotating 
coordination centre on the European side. 
16. In September 2014, a China-CEEC symposium on investment promotion was held in 
Xiamen, China. 
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 17. In September 2014, the establishment of China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies 
Contact Mechanism was announced in Xiamen, China. 
18. In September 2014, a China-CEEC investment promotion event was held in Xiamen, 
China. 
19. In October 2014, a promotion event dedicated to CEECs was held in Guangzhou, 
China, during the 11th China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair. 
20. In October 2014, the China-CEEC Agrotrade and Economic Cooperation Forum was 
held in Bucharest, Romania. 
21. In October 2014, agreement was reached on Bulgaria leading the efforts to establish a 
China-CEEC association on promoting agricultural cooperation. 
22. In October 2014, artistic directors of international dance festivals from the CEECs 
visited China. 
23. In October 2014, an event dedicated to China-CEEC cooperation in environmental 
technologies was held in Poznan, Poland, during the PolEko fairs. 
24. In November 2014, the 2nd Meeting for the Investment Promotion Agencies Contact 
Mechanism of China and CEECs was held in Warsaw, Poland. 
25. In November 2014, a promotion event of Chinese and CEEC tourism products was held 
at the China International Travel Mart in Shanghai, China. 
26. From November to December 2014, delegations of Chinese journalists visited CEECs. 
27. In December 2014, the 3rd China-CEEC Meeting of Heads of Government was held in 
Belgrade, Serbia. 
28. The China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund (stage one) was officially launched and 
successfully invested in a number of projects. 
29. China signed currency swap agreements with Hungary and Albania. 
30. Relevant institutions of Hungary and Lithuania invested in the Chinese inter-bank bond 
market. 
31. China signed with Romania and the Czech Republic cooperation documents on 
peaceful use of nuclear energy, and reached common understanding with Hungary on 
nuclear energy cooperation. 
32. China signed cooperation agreements on quality inspection with Hungary, Latvia, 
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 Serbia and Macedonia. 
Annex 4: “Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern 
European Countries”, Topic ”New Beginning, New Domains, New Vision”  1086
1. The Participants support Latvia in hosting the 5th China-CEEC Summit in 2016. 
2. The Participants welcome the Medium-Term Agenda for Cooperation between China and 
Central and Eastern European Countries issued during the 4th China-CEEC Summit, and 
are ready to implement it in light of their respective realities, needs and priorities. 
3. 16+1 National Coordinators' Meetings will be held in China and Latvia respectively in 
2016. 
4. The Participants support the establishment of a mechanism of quarterly meetings between 
the Secretariat for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Secretariat"), its member organizations and CEEC embassies 
in China. The Participants support more efficient use of the Secretariat's website. 
5. Cooperation on Connectivity (1) The Participants note that the cooperation document on 
the Belt and Road initiative was signed between the governments of China and Hungary 
and that there is an interest to have similar documents between China and other CEECs, 
with a view to enhancing cooperation on regional connectivity. (2) The Participants 
welcome the commencement of the regular express cargo railway transit from China to 
Poland. The Participants encourage and support similar links between China and other 
CEECs and appreciate the efforts assuring possibility that the goods could be transported in 
both directions. The Participants support the further development of the Eurasian Land 
Bridge and welcome the establishment of logistic centres in CEECs. (3) The Participants 
appreciate the major progress that has been made in the modernisation of the railway line 
connecting Budapest and Belgrade and welcome the joint efforts of the relevant parties for 
early completion of the project. (4) The Participants welcome China, Hungary, Serbia and 
Macedonia in organising the 2nd working group meeting and a workshop under the 
Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance Among the 
Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs in Budapest in 2016, streamlining 
 Ibidem1086
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 customs clearance procedures for goods in transit and means of transport and increasing 
cooperation on customs clearance facilitation for the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line. 
(5) More CEEC customs are encouraged to take part in the third phase of the China-EU 
Smart and Secure Trade Lanes Pilot Project. (6) The Participants welcome and support 
Serbia in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC association on transport and 
infrastructure cooperation and welcome the participation of relevant Chinese and CEEC 
institutions, businesses and organisations on a voluntary basis. (7) The Participants 
welcome and support Latvia in leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC secretariat on 
logistics cooperation and welcome the participation of relevant Chinese and CEEC 
institutions, businesses and organisations on a voluntary basis. (8) The Participants 
welcome the relaunch of direct flights between Beijing and Budapest and the launch of 
direct flights between Beijing and Prague in addition to existing Beijing-Warsaw 
connection. The Participants support deepening civil aviation cooperation between China 
and more CEECs. (9) The 1st China-CEEC Transport Ministers' Meeting will be held in 
Riga, Latvia, in 2016.  
6. Economic and Financial Cooperation (1) The 2nd China-CEEC Ministerial Meeting on 
Promoting Trade and Economic Cooperation will be held in Ningbo, China, in June 2016. 
(2) The China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo will be held in Ningbo, China, in June 
2016 during the China International Consumer Goods Fair. (3) The 3rd Meeting of the 
China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism will be held in China in 
2016. (4) The Participants welcome and support Romania's initiative of setting up a Center 
for Dialogue in energy-related projects. The 1st meeting of the Center will be organised in 
Romania in 2016. (5) The Participants welcome and support the participation of Chinese 
and CEEC SMEs in the China International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair 2016. (6) 
China will attend the Brno International Engineering Fair in the Czech Republic in 2016 as 
a partner country. (7) The China Investment Forum will be held in the Czech Republic in 
2016. (8) The Participants welcome and support the organisation of an economic forum 
focused on infrastructure, tourism and industrial capacity cooperation between China and 
CEECs, to be held in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the first half of 2016. (9) 
Qualified CEEC financial institutions are welcomed to apply to be indirect participants in 
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 the RMB Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System (Phase One). (10) The Participants 
welcome the ongoing work leading to the signing of a statement of cooperation on crisis 
management between the China Banking Regulatory Commission and the Czech National 
Bank and the signing of an MoU on regulatory cooperation between the China Banking 
Regulatory Commission and the Polish Financial Supervision Authority. 
7. Agricultural and Forestry Cooperation (1) The 11th China-CEEC Agrotrade and 
Economic Cooperation Forum will be held in China in 2016, in conjunction with the 2nd 
meeting of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting Agricultural Cooperation. (2) An 
exhibition area will be set aside for top-quality CEEC agro-products at the 14th China 
International Agricultural Trade Fair to be held in Yunnan Province, China, in the second 
half of 2016. (3) The Chinese side will create a free-of-charge exhibition space for top-
quality CEEC wines and spirits at the National Agriculture Exhibition Centre. (4) The 
Participants welcome the signing or the work leading to the signing of the relevant 
protocols on quarantine of animal and animal-originated products to be exported to China 
between China and Serbia, Macedonia, Slovenia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia 
respectively. The Participants support China and more CEECs in expanding trade of agro-
products and food. (5) The Participants support Slovenia in leading the efforts to establish a 
China-CEEC coordination mechanism for forestry cooperation. The 1st China-CEEC High-
Level Meeting on Cooperation in Forestry will be held in Slovenia in May 2016. (6) The 
Participants welcome China and CEECs in signing agreements on strengthening 
cooperation in water resources and agricultural irrigation. 
8. Cooperation on Science, Technology and Health (1) The 3rd China-CEEC Seminar on 
Innovation, Technology Cooperation and International Technology Transfer will be held in 
China in 2016. (2) The Participants encourage and support the establishment of a virtual 
China-CEEC technology transfer centre, and the role of the secretariat will be assumed by 
the relevant Chinese and Slovak institutions. (3) The Participants support the environment 
protection authorities of China and CEECs in enhancing exchanges under the framework of 
16+1 cooperation and discussing the possibility of cooperation with a third party. (4) The 
2nd China-CEEC Health Ministers' Forum will be held in China in 2016. (5) CEEC health 
professionals will be invited to visit China in 2016 and to participate in seminars on global 
 539
 health diplomacy, healthcare system reforms and health promotion, with a view to 
strengthening academic and professional exchanges. (6) CEEC medical and health 
businesses will be invited to China for exhibitions on health services and medical devices, 
with a view to promoting cooperation in the medical industry. 
9. People-to-People Contacts and Cultural Exchanges (1) The Secretariat will continue to 
invite senior CEEC officials for a trip to China in 2016. (2) The 4th China-CEEC Education 
Policy Dialogue and the 3rd meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes 
Consortium will be held in China in 2016. (3) A China-CEEC forum on cooperation in the 
field of art and the 2nd China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp will be held in China in 2016. 
(4) Famous CEEC artists and composers as well as artistic directors of international opera 
festivals in CEECs will be invited to visit China in 2016. (5) The Participants support China 
and CEECs in carrying out joint projects on translation and publication of each other's 
literary works. China welcomes CEECs to be the Country of Honour as a group at the 
Beijing International Book Fair in 2016. (6) The 1st China-CEEC Cultural and Creative 
Industries Forum will be held in Belgrade, Serbia, in 2016. (7) The 1st China-CEEC 
Experts' Forum on Intangible Cultural Heritage will be held in Krakow, Poland, in 2016. (8) 
The Participants welcome the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in leading the efforts to 
establish a China-CEEC think tanks network. (9) The 4th China-CEEC High-Level 
Symposium of Thinks Tanks will be held in 2016. (10) The Participants encourage and 
support mutual visits by Chinese and CEEC journalists in 2016. (11) A China-CEEC 
seminar of sinologists will be held in 2016. (12) The Participants welcome the organisation 
of the Travel 2016 expo and the related professional conference in March 2016 in Budapest. 
China will participate in the expo as the Country of Honour. The Participants support the 
opening of the regional centre of the China National Tourism Administration in Budapest. 
(13) The 3rd China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation will be held in 
Croatia in 2016. 
10. Cooperation at the Local Level (1) The 3rd China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting and 
the China (Hebei) International Economic and Trade Fair 2016 will be held in Hebei 
Province, China, in 2016. (2) The 2nd working meeting of the China-CEEC Association of 
Provincial Governors will be held in Hebei Province, China, in 2016. (3) The Participants 
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 encourage and support exchanges and cooperation between mayors of Chinese and CEEC 
capital cities. 
Annex 5: Implementation of the Measures of the Belgrade Guidelines for Cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries  1087
1. In January 2015, the customs clearance facilitation cooperation mechanism for the 
China-Europe Land-Sea Express Line among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian, 
Macedonian and Greek Customs was officially established. 
2. From February to October 2015, the Chinese Art Festival was held in Lithuania, Estonia 
and Latvia. 
3. In March 2015, the launch ceremony of the Year of Promotion of China-CEEC Tourism 
Cooperation was held in Budapest, Hungary. 
4. In March 2015, the 1st working group meeting under the Framework Agreement on 
Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance Among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian 
and Macedonian Customs was held in Shanghai, China. 
5. In April 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs appointed the Special 
Representative for China-CEEC Cooperation. 
6. In April 2015, the 1st meeting of the China-CEEC Business Council was held in 
Katowice, Poland. 
7. In April 2015, the Riga High Level Conference on Transport and Logistics and the 3rd 
ASEM Transport Ministers' Meeting was held in Riga, Latvia. 
8. In May 2015, the 1st Customs Control Techniques Workshop for the China-Europe 
Land-Sea Express Line among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian 
Customs was held in Shanghai, China. 
9. In May 2015, the 33rd Meeting of the Central Bank Governors' Club of the Central 
Asia, Black Sea Region and Balkan Countries was held in Shanghai, China. 
10. In May 2015, the 1st Meeting of China-CEEC Association of Provincial Governors was 
 Ibidem1087
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 held in Hebei Province, China. 
11. In May 2015, the Beijing-Budapest regular flight was launched. 
12. In May 2015, heads of customs of China, Hungary, Serbia and Macedonia met in Xi'an, 
China, and signed the Cooperation Action Plan for 2015-2016. 
13. In May 2015, China and Hungary signed an MoU on nuclear energy cooperation. 
14. From May to June 2015, the Chinese Ministry of Culture organised Chinese performing 
arts organisations to purchase programs from Hungary, Serbia and Romania. 
15. In June 2015, a delegation of CEEC journalists visited Zhejiang Province, Henan 
Province and Beijing, China. 
16. In June 2015, the 1st China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo was held in Ningbo, 
China. 
17. In June 2015, the launch ceremony of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting 
Agricultural Cooperation and the 1st Meeting of Ministers of Agriculture was held in 
Sofia, Bulgaria. 
18. In June 2015, the 1st China-CEEC Health Ministers' Forum was held in Prague, the 
Czech Republic. 
19. In June 2015, the 1st TCM center in the Czech Republic was established. 
20. In June 2015, the cartoon series Panda and the Little Mole co-produced by China and 
the Czech Republic was premiered in the Czech Republic. 
21. In July 2015, the 5th China-CEEC National Coordinators' Meeting was held in Beijing, 
China. 
22. In July 2015, a delegation of senior CEEC officials visited Sichuan Province, Yunnan 
Province and Beijing, China. 
23. From July to August 2015, the 1st China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp was organised in 
Shaanxi Province, China. 
24. In August 2015, Bank of China Prague Branch was opened. 
25. From August to September 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC High-Level Conference on 
Tourism Cooperation was held in Bled, Slovenia. 
26. In September 2015, the 10th China-CEEC Agro-trade and Economic Cooperation 
Forum was held in Budapest, Hungary. 
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 27. In September 2015,the 3rd China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 2nd 
working consultation of the China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium were 
held in Warsaw, Poland. 
28. In September 2015, the Beijing-Prague direct flight was launched. 
29. In September 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC Seminar on Innovation, Technology 
Cooperation and International Technology Transfer was held in Bratislava, Slovakia. 
30. In October 2015, an exhibition area dedicated to CEECs was created at the 11th China 
International Small and Medium Enterprises Fair in Guangzhou, China. 
31. In October 2015, the Workshop on Customs Clearance Procedures of Transit Goods and 
Risk Management among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs 
was held in Skopje, Macedonia. 
32. In October 2015, a delegation of artistic directors of CEEC jazz festivals visited China. 
33. In October 2015, the Seminar on Radio and Television Program Production for Central 
and Eastern European Countries was held in Shanghai and Hunan Province, China. 
34. In October 2015, the 6th China-CEEC National Coordinators' Meeting was held in 
Warsaw, Poland. 
35. In October 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC Young Political Leaders' Forum was held in 
China. 
36. In November 2015, the 2nd China-CEEC Cultural Cooperation Forum was held in 
Sofia, Bulgaria. 
37. In November 2015, the China Investment Forum was held in Prague, the Czech 
Republic. 
38. In November 2015, China and Slovenia signed an MoU on the establishment of the 
China-CEEC coordination mechanism for forestry cooperation. 
39. The 3rd China-CEEC High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks will be held in Beijing, 
China, in December 2015. 
40. China and Romania will sign a new agreement on avoidance of double taxation as 
appropriate; China signed cooperation agreements on education with the Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Lithuania and Romania respectively; China signed cooperation 
agreements on quality inspection with Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia 
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 and Slovenia respectively; China signed documents on cultural exchanges and 
cooperation with Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia and Poland respectively; China signed with 
Romania an MoU regarding the relevant nuclear power project. 
Annex 6: “Riga Guidelines for Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern 
European Countries”  1088
1. The Participants support Hungary in hosting the 6th China-CEEC Summit in 2017. 
2. The Participants appreciate the guiding and facilitating role that the Medium-Term 
Agenda has played in enhancing 16+1 Cooperation and express readiness to 
continuously implement the Agenda in light of their respective realities, needs, and 
priorities. 
3. 16+1 National Coordinators' Meetings will be held in China and Hungary respectively 
in 2017. 
4. Trade and investment (1) The Participants encourage and support progress in the 
ongoing EU-China negotiations over an ambitious and comprehensive investment 
agreement, which will contribute markedly to the development of the China-CEEC 
investment cooperation and will create a mutually favourable investment environment 
and market access for all companies. (2) The China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo 
will be held in Ningbo, China in June 2017 during the China International Consumer 
Goods Fair. (3) The China Investment Forum will be held in the Czech Republic in 
2017. (4) The Participants acknowledge the important role of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in promoting trade and investment cooperation and intend to 
facilitate cooperation and networking among CEEC and Chinese SMEs. They welcome 
the participation of Chinese and CEEC SMEs in the China International Small and 
Medium Enterprises Fair 2017, and are willing to explore the possibility of establishing 
16+1 SME Association. (5) The Participants welcome further cooperation on enhancing 
trade through e-commerce platforms and encourage Chinese and CEECs' businesses to 
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 promote exports and imports of their quality and featured products through e-
commerce. 
5. Connectivity (1) The Participants acknowledge the importance and comprehensive 
character of connectivity between Europe and Asia and reaffirm support to the progress 
made under the EU-China Connectivity Platform.They recognize the need and indicate 
their willingness to make concerted efforts to develop synergies between the "Belt and 
Road Initiative" and the relevant EU initiatives such as the Trans-European Networks 
(TEN-T). (2) The Participants noted the progress made in and underlined the 
importance of cooperation in the field of transport and logistics under the framework of 
China-CEEC cooperation. The Participants welcome fostering of information exchange 
on transport and logistics services as well as strengthening of relevant bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation in order to develop integrated transport corridors between Asia 
and Europe. (3) The Participants support development of transport routes between 
Europe and Asia, including intensifying development of the Europe-China international 
railway container traffic so that goods could be transported in both directions. The 
Participants support the establishment of multimodal logistic centres in CEECs and 
throughout the whole Eurasian Land Bridge areas and improvement of the international 
supply chain and border crossing rules on the transport corridors in line with national 
and EU competences. (4) The Participants appreciate the progress made by Serbia in 
leading the efforts to establish a China-CEEC association on transport and 
infrastructure cooperation and welcome the participation of relevant Chinese and CEEC 
institutions, businesses and organisations on a voluntary basis. (5) The Participants 
welcome Latvia in establishing the China-CEEC Secretariat on Logistics Cooperation 
in Riga, as well as creating the Virtual Information Platform www.ceec-china-
logistics.org, and support the Secretariat in playing a leading role in coordinating and 
facilitating the cooperation in the field of logistics. (6) The Participants support 
deepening cooperation in scheduled air transport and general aviation, between China 
and CEECs and appreciate the launch of direct flights between Shanghai, Chengdu and 
Prague, as well as between Beijing and Warsaw. The Participants welcome airline 
companies of both sides in opening new routes and flights between China and CEECs. 
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 The possibility of holding a CEEC-China Civil Aviation Forum in the Czech Republic 
will be discussed. (7) The Participants welcome the modernization of Bar–Belgrade 
track section and further development of high-speed railway network under the 
framework of 16+1 Cooperation, with a view to improving the connection of Port of 
Bar to the modern railway network in Central and Eastern Europe. (8) The 2nd China-
CEEC Transport Ministers' Meeting will be held in CEEC, in 2017. (9) China, Hungary, 
Serbia and Macedonia will organise the 3rd working group meeting in Serbia 2017 
under the Framework Agreement on Cooperation in Facilitating Customs Clearance 
among the Chinese, Hungarian, Serbian and Macedonian Customs. The Participants 
commend Poland for participating in the third phase of the China-EU Smart and Secure 
Trade Lanes Pilot Project. More eligible CEECs are encouraged to take part in the 
SSTL pilot project and other cooperation projects under the China-EU Strategic 
Framework for Customs Cooperation, if they fulfill requirements, based on the purpose 
and principle of mutual exchange of information, mutual recognition of supervision and 
mutual assistance in law enforcement. (10) The 6th meeting of the China-Hungary-
Serbia joint working group on transport infrastructure cooperation will be held in 
Hungary in May 2017. 
6. Cooperation in industry, energy, science and technology (1) The Participants welcome 
and support Port Area Cooperation between China and CEECs bordering the Baltic, 
Adriatic and Black Sea, and establishment of China-CEEC Secretariat for Maritime 
Issues in Poland, to promote cooperation among the major ports of the coastal areas, 
support building coastal industrial clusters, and encourage cooperation in infrastructure 
development, including railways, roads, waterways and logistics hubs. (2) The 
Participants support Romania's imminent establishment of a China-CEEC Centre for 
Dialogue and Cooperation on Energy Projects and welcome the participation of relevant 
Chinese and CEEC institutions, businesses and organisations as well as other partners, 
on a voluntary basis, and support the Centre in facilitating the cooperation in the field of 
energy. The first edition of the 16+1 Energy Fair and Expo will be held in Bucharest in 
the first quarter of 2017. (3) The 2nd China-CEEC Conference on Innovation 
Cooperation will be held in CEEC in 2017. (4) The Participants support development of 
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 China-CEEC Technology Transfer Centre established in Bratislava, Slovakia. (5) The 
Participants support the environmental protection authorities of China and CEECs in 
enhancing exchanges under the framework of 16+1 Cooperation and exploration of 
cooperation with a third party. 
7. Financial cooperation (1) CEECs financial institutions and businesses are invited to 
contribute on voluntary basis to the investment fund launched by Sino-CEE Finance 
Holding Company Ltd., to jointly promote China-CEEC cooperation on connectivity 
and relevant industries. (2) The Participants encourage Chinese banks to develop 
business in the CEECs and vice versa. The Participants support more regular exchanges 
and cooperation among financial regulatory and supervisory authorities. (3) The 
Participants encourage Chinese financial institutions, including the Silk Road Fund, in 
actively expanding investment and cooperation in CEECs, and providing financing 
support for China-CEEC cooperation. (4) The Participants support China and CEECs in 
enhancing practical cooperation under the framework of the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development, including third party cooperation with other countries 
and regions. (5) The China-CEEC Investment Cooperation Fund (stage two) will be 
launched and put into operation in 2017. (6) The Participants are willing to explore the 
possibility of establishing a China-CEEC Inter-Bank Association, and welcome 
participation of CEEC institutions on a voluntary basis. 
8. Agricultural and forestry cooperation (1) The 12th China-CEEC Agro-trade and 
Economic Cooperation Forum and the 5th Meeting of the Consultative Board of the 
Association for the Promotion of Agricultural Cooperation between China and CEECs 
will be held in Slovenia in 2017 in order to further promote China-CEEC agro-trade and 
economic cooperation. (2) China welcomes CEEC delegations' participation at the 15th 
China International Agricultural Trade Fair to be held in China in the second half of 
2017. (3) China will continue to provide free-of-charge exhibition space for top-quality 
CEEC wines and other kinds of alcohol at the National Agriculture Exhibition Center. 
China-CEEC Agricultural Products and Wine Fair will be held during the Mostar 
International Trade Fair in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 2017. (4) Recognising that 
agricultural investment and cooperation will help bring common development in 
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 agriculture for China and every CEEC by giving full play to their complementary 
advantages, the Participants support more agro-trade promotion activities between 
China and CEECs, such as international agricultural expos, and more exchanges of 
information regarding agro-trade market access. (5) The participants encourage China 
and CEECs to work towards signing of the relevant protocols on quarantine of animal 
and animal-originated products and on quarantine of plants and plant-originated 
products to be exported to China. (6) The Participants commend Slovenia in leading the 
efforts to establish a China-CEEC coordination mechanism on forestry cooperation, 
support the implementation of the Action Plan for China-CEEC Coordination 
Mechanism on Forestry Cooperation, and intensified cooperation in the field of 
sustainable forest, multi-functional management, forestry research and education, wood 
processing and forestry products trade between China and CEECs. The Participants 
support the convening of the China-CEEC High-level Meeting on Cooperation in 
Forestry on a regular basis. (7) The Participants welcome China and CEECs in signing 
relevant agreements on strengthening cooperation in water resources management and 
agricultural irrigation, and deepening bilateral and multilateral exchanges and 
cooperation in water-related fields. 
9. People-to-people contacts (1) Designate 2017 as Year of China-CEEC Media 
Cooperation. Under this framework, strengthen media exchanges, hold a forum on 
media cooperation, organise mutual visits by Chinese and CEEC journalists, encourage 
media from China and CEECs to film promotional videos, documentaries, and other 
multi-media products in each other's country, and explore the possibility of co-
production. (2) The Secretariat will continue to invite senior CEEC officials for a trip to 
China in 2017. (3) The 5th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 4th 
meeting of China-CEEC Higher Education Institutes Consortium will be held in CEECs 
in 2017. (4) The 3rd China-CEEC Culture Cooperation Forum will be held in China in 
2017. (5) The China-CEEC Culture Season will be held in China in 2017. (6) The 2nd 
China-CEEC Cultural and Creative Industries Forum will be held in China in 2017. (7) 
The 3rd China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp will be held in China in 2017. (8) The 
Participants support China and CEEC in carrying out joint projects on translation and 
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 publication of each other's literary works. (9) The Participants encourage and support 
China and CEEC in carrying out cooperation on projects in areas such as historical and 
cultural heritage protection and repair, joint archaeological activities, exhibition 
exchanges, and personnel training. (10) The 4th China-CEEC High-Level Symposium 
of Think Tanks will be held in China in 2017. (11) The Forum on Cultural Heritage will 
be held in Serbia in 2017. (12) The Participants recognise the important significance of 
China and CEEC's cooperation in tourism and support further transnational cooperation 
through various means such as exchange of tourism experiences, promotion of mutual 
tourist visits and development of regional tourism products.Support China and CEECs 
in taking more measures to facilitate mobility of people between China and CEECs. 
(13) The 4th China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation will be held 
in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 2017. (14) The Participants support 
strengthened youth exchanges, and mutual visits of youth. The 3rd China-CEEC Young 
Political Leaders' Forum will be held in Romania in 2017. (15) The 2nd China-CEEC 
Literature Forum will be held in 2017. (16) The Participants encourage China and 
CEECs in mutually establishing culture centres. (17) The Participants will explore the 
possibility of establishing a China-CEEC cultural cooperation coordination centre in the 
Republic of Macedonia. (18) The Participants support enhancing sports exchanges, and 
exploring new possibilities of cooperation. (19) The All-China Youth Federation will 
invite young people from CEECs to participate in the Bridge of Future youth campus 
and workshop. (20) The Participants welcome the organisation of Happy Spring 
Festival events in CEECs. 
10. Health Cooperation (1) The Participants support activities and projects to be held in 
multiple forms under the framework of the China-CEEC Association on the Promotion 
of Health Cooperation, and the strengthening of direct cooperation between medical 
institutions of China and CEECs. (2) The Participants continue to support the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Macedonia, Montenegro, Lithuania and other CEECs in their 
exploration in the field of traditional Chinese medicine, and China will provide 
necessary technical assistance. (3) Taking into account the healthcare system diversity, 
national specificities and legal framework, the Participants support cooperation between 
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 CEECs and China in the field of health industry, and welcome medical and health 
enterprises from both sides in carrying out direct cooperation. (4) The 3rd China-CEEC 
Health Ministers' Forum will be held in Hungary in 2017. 
11. Local Cooperation (1) The 3rd working meeting of the China-CEEC Association of 
Provincial Governors will be held in Bulgaria in 2017. (2) The 4th China-CEEC Local 
Leaders' Meeting will be held in Bulgaria in 2018. (3) The Participants encourage and 
support exchanges and cooperation between mayors of Chinese and CEEC capital 
cities. (4) The Participants encourage China-CEEC cooperation at the local level and 
support the twinning of provinces, regions and municipalities. 
Annex 7: “Implementation of the Measures of the Suzhou Guidelines for Cooperation 
between China and Central and Eastern European Countries”  1089
1. In January 2016, the "Treasures of Romania" Exhibition was held at the National 
Museum of China in Beijing, China 
2. In February 2016, the 1st Quarterly Meeting of 2016 between the Secretariat for 
Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries and CEEC 
embassies in China was held in Beijing, China. 
3. In February 2016, the Press Conference for the 2016 year of China-CEEC people-to-
people and cultural exchanges was held in Beijing, China. 
4. In February 2016, the 2nd meeting of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting 
Agricultural Cooperation was held in Sofia, Bulgaria. 
5. From February to March 2016, the "Happy Spring Festival" activities were held in the 
Estonian capital of Tallinn, the Croatian capital of Zagreb and the Czech capital of 
Prague. 
6. In March 2016, the eRegions on the New eAmber and New eSilk Roads Think Tank 
Meeting was held in Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
7. In March 2016, the regional centre of the China National Tourism Administration was 
 http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016liattendsSCOCCEEC/2016-11/06/content_27286311.htm , 1089
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 launched in Budapest, Hungary. 
8. In April 2016, the 2nd Quarterly Meeting of 2016 between the Secretariat for 
Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries and CEEC 
embassies in China was held in Beijing, China. 
9. In May 2016, Sarajevo Business Forum 16+1 was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
10. In May 2016, the Conference of the Presidents of the Supreme Courts of China and 
CEECs was held in Suzhou, China. 
11. In May 2016, the China-CEEC forum on cooperation in the field of art was held in 
Beijing, China. 
12. In May 2016, the 1st China-CEEC Transport Ministers' Meeting was held in Riga, 
Latvia. The China-CEEC secretariat on logistics cooperation was established, and the 
Riga Declaration on Closer Cooperation in Logistics between CEECs and China was 
adopted. 
13. In May 2016, officials from tourism authorities of CEECs attended the 1st World 
Conference on Tourism for Development in Beijing, China. 
14. In May 2016, the 1st China-CEEC High-Level Meeting on Cooperation in Forestry and 
China-CEEC Forestry Business Forum were held in Ljubljana, Slovenia. 
15. In May 2016, the 1st China-CEEC Literature Forum was held in Budapest, Hungary. 
16. In May 2016, a delegation of CEEC journalists visited Guangdong Province, Jiangxi 
Province and Beijing, China. 
17. In June 2016, the 2nd China-CEEC Ministerial Conference on Promoting Trade and 
Economic Cooperation, the China-CEEC Investment and Trade Expo and the 3rd 
Meeting of the China-CEEC Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism were 
held in Ningbo, China. 
18. In June 2016, the 3rd China-CEEC Local Leaders' Meeting and the 2nd Working 
Meeting of the China-CEEC Association of Provincial Governors were held in 
Tangshan, China. 
19. In June 2016, the 2nd China-CEEC Health Ministers' Forum was held in Suzhou, 
China. 
20. In June 2016, the 7th China-CEEC National Coordinators' Meeting was held in Haikou, 
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 China. 
21. In June 2016, the 1st China-CEEC Cultural and Creative Industries Forum was held in 
Belgrade, Serbia. 
22. In June 2016, Chinese Performing Arts delegation paid the fourth visit to Slovenia, the 
Slovak Republic and Croatia to purchase programs. 
23. In June 2016, famous painters from CEECs visited Guizhou Province, China. 
24. From July to August 2016, the 2nd China-CEEC Summer Dance Camp was held in 
China. 
25. In August 2016, a delegation of senior CEEC officials visited Fujian and Ningxia, 
China. 
26. In August 2016, the Beijing International Book Fair with CEECs being the main guests 
of honour was held in Beijing, China. 
27. In September 2016, the 5th meeting of the China-Hungary-Serbia joint working group 
on transport infrastructure cooperation was held in Belgrade, Serbia. 
28. The China-CEEC Forum of Capital City Mayors was held in Sofia, Bulgaria in 
September 2016. 
29. The 3rd Quarterly Meeting of 2016 between the Secretariat for Cooperation between 
China and Central and Eastern European Countries and CEEC embassies in China was 
held in Beijing, China in October 2016. 
30. The 4th China-CEEC Education Policy Dialogue and the 3rd meeting of China-CEEC 
Higher Education Institutes Consortium was held in China in October 2016. 
31. In October 2016, Poland and Bulgaria participated in the China International Small and 
Medium Enterprises Fair held in Guangzhou, China. 
32. Artistic directors of international opera festivals from CEECs visited China in October 
2016. 
33. The 1st China-CEEC Experts' Forum on Intangible Cultural Heritage wasl be held in 
Krakow, Poland in October 2016. 
34. China attended the Brno International Engineering Fair in the Czech Republic in 
October 2016 as a partner country. 
35. In October 2016, the China-CEE Countries Political Parties Dialogue was held in 
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 Budapest, Hungary. 
36. In October 2016, the 8th China-CEEC National Coordinators' Meeting was held in 
Riga, Latvia. 
37. In October 2016, the China-CEEC Dance Culture Union was established in Plovdiv, 
Bulgaria, as part of the Forum for cooperation in the field of art. 
38. In November 2016, the side events of the 5th CEEC-China Summit – the 6th 16+1 
Business Forum, the International Forum of China and Central and Eastern European 
Countries and the Seminar on Sinology Research and Chinese Teaching in Central and 
Eastern European Countries – were held in Riga, Latvia. 
39. The China Investment Forum will be held in Prague in November 2016. 
40. The 11th China-CEEC Agro-trade and Economic Cooperation Forum will be held in 
Kunming, China in November 2016. 
41. The 3rd meeting of the China-CEEC Association on Promoting Agricultural 
Cooperation will be held in Kunming, China in November 2016. 
42. The China-CEEC Conferences on Innovation Cooperation will be held in Jiangsu, 
Nanjing, China in November 2016. The technology transfer virtual center of China and 
CEECs will be formally established. 
43. The China International Tourism Fair will be held in Shanghai, China in November 
2016. 
44. The Health Qigong Team will visit Slovenia and Serbia to hold promotional activities 
and training sessions in November 2016. 
45. The China-CEEC High-Level Conference on Tourism Cooperation will be held in 
Croatia. 
46. The 4th Quarterly Meeting of 2016 between the Secretariat for Cooperation between 
China and Central and Eastern European Countries and CEEC embassies in China and 
the closing event of the Year of China-CEEC people-to-people and cultural exchanges 
be held in China in December 2016. 
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